summary:
On August 10, 2022, the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China released a white paper entitled “The Taiwan Question and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era,” formally announcing that Taiwan had lost “one country, two systems in a substantive sense.” The main points were: 1. All political promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping were null and void; 2. Taiwan had no diplomatic power; 3. Taiwan had no power to command the military; 4. Taiwan’s leaders and high-ranking officials were required to support the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China and accept its direct supervision. From that day forward, the mainland granted approximately a three-year window for peace negotiations. The content of these negotiations would be the shell of “one country, two systems,” including issues of taxation, administrative structure, and economic system. However, I do not believe that Taiwan will participate in the peace talks. The timing for the mainland to launch a cross-strait reunification operation could occur anytime between April and September 2026. This military operation will have the following characteristics: 1. No political hesitation; 2. Deployment of an unusually large number of troops; 3. Focus on pursuing political objectives; 4. A rapid and comprehensive military advance; 5. A slow and protracted political process; 6. Triggering a comprehensive response from the US bloc; 7. Triggering a comprehensive soft confrontation between China and the West lasting more than three years; 8. Significant political steps being taken in advance in the European, North African, and Arab regions; 9. Taiwan will not quickly establish a political structure without military oversight.
Keywords:
Military operations, crossing the strait, unification, politics, characteristics, Taiwan Strait
The mainland has maintained a political negotiation window for three years.
On August 10, 2022, the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China released a white paper entitled ” The Taiwan Issue and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era “. It officially announced that Taiwan had lost “one country, two systems in a substantive sense “. At the same time, it also clearly stated that for the sake of national righteousness, it would still maintain a window for peaceful negotiations. But how long is this window of time? The mainland did not say for sure. According to my speculation, it is highly likely that the reunification action will be launched between April and September 2026. [1] [2] So from August 10, 2022 to April 2026, Taiwan actually has a window of at least 3 to 3.5 years for peace talks.
The mainland has tried its best to show the world its patience, mainly based on three foundations: national responsibility, humanitarian responsibility, and historical responsibility.
The Spring and Autumn Annals record the story of “Duke Zhuang of Zheng defeating Duan at Yan.” This means that even if Taishu rebelled and committed a great treason, Duke Zhuang, as the eldest brother, also bore responsibility for violating the established rites and regulations. Since China announced its red line for political negotiations with Taiwan on August 10, 2022, it has left a window of about three years for political negotiations, mainly to appeal to the principles of rites and regulations and avoid historical responsibility like “Duke Zhuang of Zheng defeating Duan at Yan.”
National responsibility and humanitarian responsibility are two other important reasons. Others have discussed these topics more comprehensively and in greater depth. This article will omit them.
Taiwan will miss this three-year window of opportunity for negotiations.
If we consider the timeline from when I reminded Taiwan in October 2019 that it should proactively pursue “one country, two systems,” Taiwan has six to seven years to pursue peace talks.
Starting from August 10, 2022, the date drawn by the Chinese central government, Taiwan has three to three and a half years to pursue the outcome of political negotiations.
Based on my understanding of the political situation in Taiwan, Taiwanese people have a very, very high chance of “missing this three-year window of opportunity.” The reasons are as follows:
(1. There is still much room for improvement in the overall political literacy of Taiwanese people;)
(2. Taiwan lacks a cultural and historical environment that produces great heroes;)
(3. Taiwan has built a strong moat against political negotiations.)
1. There is room for improvement in overall political literacy.
1.1 Taiwanese people cannot see the political direction.
There was once a website that suddenly appeared in the Chinese-speaking world: Duowei News. Its actual function was as a political commentary platform. During its existence, I published many articles, including those discussing the Taiwan issue.
From a practical political science perspective, it’s highly likely that both mainland China and Taiwan are monitoring this website’s major activities. The possibility of interference in its activities is entirely plausible. I’ve had at least a thousand articles read and nearly a hundred discussed. Moreover, my articles are overly biased and sharply worded. It’s somewhat unbelievable that the Taiwanese side hasn’t seen my articles.
I recall discussing in at least three articles that “one country, two systems” is drifting away from Taiwan, and that Taiwanese people should stand up and fight for it, not oppose it. One of the articles was even titled ” How to Fight for the Possibility of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ is Now a Reality for Taiwan to Consider.”
However, we can see one fact: To this day, Taiwanese people see absolutely no sign of China’s growing strength and power in the global power system. They also see absolutely no sign of the United States’ inability to function and maintain the power system. Furthermore, Taiwanese people still harbor unfounded and unrealistic expectations regarding American involvement in Taiwan’s affairs.
The lack of a sense of urgency regarding political responsibility is the primary reason why Taiwanese people are not taking action.
1.2 Taiwanese people seriously lack the ability to interpret the political language of mainland China.
Taiwanese people not only lack the ability to judge political trends, but they may also seriously lack the ability to understand the political language of mainland China.
In October 2019, in my article “How to Fight for the Possibility of ‘One Country, Two Systems’: A Reality Taiwan Needs to Consider,” I pointed out the following fact: “One Country, Two Systems is moving away from Taiwan, and Taiwanese people need to stand up and fight for it, not oppose it.” This judgment wasn’t my personal imagination, but a conclusion drawn from interpreting mainland China’s public propaganda. Because someone as insignificant as me has absolutely no ability to influence the political direction of mainland China. However, I know to read what mainlanders are saying. Unfortunately, Taiwanese people are unwilling to listen to even my straightforward explanation, wasting a full three years until August 10, 2022.
On this extremely important day, mainland China officially announced that “Taiwan has lost its de facto ‘one country, two systems.’ Now there is still an outer shell. But this shell also needs to be discussed.”
This important announcement has been clearly displayed in black and white on the table for almost a year now. Yet, not a single Taiwanese person has come forward to interpret it!
I am now willing to report my translation to the relevant parties, ordinary people, politicians, and leaders in Taiwan to fight for this shell, and I only have a maximum of three and a half years left.
1.3 Plain language translation of the announcement issued by the Mainland on August 10, 2022:
Now let me repeat my plain language translation of the announcement from mainland China on August 10, 2022:
(1. All political promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping have become invalid. Everything needs to be renegotiated.)
(2. Taiwan has no diplomatic power;)
(3. Taiwan does not have the authority to command troops;)
(4. Taiwan’s leaders and senior executives must support the mainland and be directly supervised and governed by the central government.)
(5. What we need to talk about is the shell, including not levying taxes on Taiwan, retaining the administrative system, and retaining the economic system.)
(6. This shell isn’t free; you have to come and negotiate for it.)
(7. Keeping this negotiation window open is fulfilling our national righteousness and historical responsibility. Whether to negotiate or not is up to you.)
(8. If you want to talk, talk quickly. Anyway, we need to finish this matter within my term of office (this is the basis for my judgment that something big will happen between April and September 2026).
(9. Stop playing tricks. The Americans can’t keep up with them. If they dare to try, I’ll beat them to a pulp.)
Taiwan has 23 million people, and its universities are said to be among the best in Asia. Universities, professors, and students need to produce tangible results to demonstrate their worth. They need to shoulder their political and historical responsibilities. Truly love yourselves, and take action! Don’t let these crucial three years slip by.
2. Taiwan has no space to produce great heroes.
2.1 Important figures who lost their opportunities
The Chinese definition of a great hero is someone who has established immortal achievements, regardless of whether this is based on a small group like Taiwan’s 23 million people or a large group like mainland China’s 1.4 billion people.
For the Taiwanese people, whether they achieved independence or the “one country, two systems” principle, they would become great heroes in history. Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, Lien Chan, and Ma Ying-jeou were among those who came closest to this opportunity. But ultimately, they failed. Lee Teng-hui and Ma Ying-jeou failed due to personal courage. Chen Shui-bian failed due to historical timing. Lien Chan missed his chance due to the hesitation of the Taiwanese people. From then on, Taiwan could no longer produce someone who dared to declare Taiwanese independence, nor could it produce someone who dared to accept “one country, two systems.”
Today, let’s summarize Taiwan’s influential political figures, roughly dividing them into two categories: those with strong political insight and those with strong practical abilities. Lee Teng-hui, Lien Chan, Yu Mu-ming, and Wang Ping-chung can be considered those with strong political insight; Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, Tsai Ing-wen, Lai Ching-te, and Hou Yu-ih can be considered those with strong practical abilities. Apart from Chen Shui-bian, who might be considered to possess both qualities, almost all the others do not have both abilities simultaneously.
Having a historical opportunity but lacking heroism will never make you a great hero. The only possible chance for Taiwan independence lay with Lee Teng-hui. But he didn’t dare gamble. He lost because he lacked heroism, even though he actually did the most in the process of moving towards Taiwan independence.
In my judgment, the only person who had a chance to achieve “one country, two systems” was Lien Chan. His personality, similar to Huang Wei’s, meant he dared to take action. If Lien Chan had Ma Ying-jeou’s opportunity, the chances of achieving “one country, two systems” would have been very high. Unfortunately, he encountered Chen Shui-bian, this “demon sword,” and also missed the opportunity due to the overall hesitation of the Taiwanese people. I disagree with those who criticize Lien Chan as weak and incompetent.
Chen Shui-bian was arguably the most capable person in this group. However, he also jeopardized Taiwan’s historical opportunity for independence. It’s not entirely his fault that Chen Shui-bian didn’t become a Taiwanese hero; blame Bin Laden and history. But Taiwanese people blame him, feeling he squandered this opportunity. Shih Ming-teh’s anti-corruption movement wasn’t primarily against Chen Shui-bian’s greed—at least not on his own. The main issue was Taiwanese people blaming him for missing a historical opportunity. That’s how Ma Ying-jeou somehow gained a significant advantage.
Unfortunately, Ma Ying-jeou also missed his chance to become a great hero. Without inner conviction, one cannot become a hero. Although Ma Ying-jeou once won great victories, in reality, my assessment of him is far lower than that of Su Tseng-chang. Su Tseng-chang’s strength lay in his strong ability to take action. Ma Ying-jeou, on the other hand, lacked both political acumen and the ability to take action. He also lacked heroic spirit. He was simply someone who pursued petty gains. He neither wanted nor was willing to have ideals, and he would never strive for even the most unattainable ideals.
Having ideals and the ability to act are not guarantees of becoming a great hero. Su Tseng-chang, Tsai Ing-wen, and Lai Ching-te are examples of people who have both ideals and the ability to act. However, they all lack the ability to foresee political trends. At the very least, they lack the ability to guide the direction of politics.
Without understanding the overall trend, there’s no foundation for becoming a hero. Chen Jiongming is a prime example. He was a man of good character, highly regarded by the people, supported by the grassroots, and his actions aligned with the general interests of his local community. Yet, in history books, he can only be listed as a rebel against the Republic of China—a negative figure.
It is a very obvious fact that from the moment George W. Bush decided to crack down on the Arab rebellion, Taiwan forever lost its opportunity and possibility for independence. Chen Shui-bian knew this fact. But others were unwilling to believe it. Su, Tsai, and Lai are typical examples of those who went against the tide. The Chinese mainland public now completely opposes peaceful reunification and insists on reunification by force; this debt should actually be held against these three. In other words, the real cost of harming Taiwan’s long-term interests will ultimately fall on these three. And the historical cost will also ultimately fall on them. Their personal integrity is inferior to Chen Jiongming’s, their public reputation is inferior to Chen Jiongming’s, their ability to act is inferior to Chen Jiongming’s, and the long-term damage they bring far exceeds that of Chen Jiongming. The three men, Su, Cai, and Lai, had very poor prognoses. Their place in history books is estimated to be far worse than that of Chen Jiongming.
2.2 Is there a chance that a hero will emerge in Taiwan?
Will Taiwan have a chance to produce a hero who dares to go against the tide and talk about “one country, two systems” in the future? My feeling is no. Here are my reasons.
(1. The drawbacks of the decentralized electoral system)
The drawback of a system of separation of powers is that it cannot produce strong politicians through peaceful and uneventful elections. Without strength, there is no power. Without power, there is no opportunity to oppose the will of the people.
“Trump” has the appearance of a strongman, but he is not actually a strongman. Even so, he rose to power by manipulating domestic separatist rhetoric. “Modi” became a strongman through years of manipulating domestic separatist rhetoric and actions. “Erkhuhann” also rose to power by manipulating separatist rhetoric for many years. “Thaksin” also made his fortune by exploiting Thailand’s vast urban-rural divide. His family has risen and fallen in Thai politics through this issue. “Putin” is also a strong leader who emerged through domestic separatist issues. Elections in peaceful circumstances cannot produce strongmen. Leaders in peaceful elections are often below average intelligence.
(2. There is currently no opposition voice in Taiwan.)
In Taiwan, anti-China speech is free, but pro-China speech is not. The pro-China rhetoric that mainlanders often see online has absolutely no power in the Taiwanese world. Without space for divisive topics, there is no space to manipulate divisive topics, no space for the emergence of strong leaders, and no space for the creation of great heroes.
(3. The Taiwanese military is not a powerful political force in Taiwan.)
Taiwan’s military lacks both military and political capabilities. This is a fundamental fact. The basis for negotiating “one country, two systems” with the mainland through a military coup is also nonexistent.
(4. Lack of a cultural foundation for reflecting on history)
Culturally, Taiwan has produced no one other than Li Ao who dares to reflect on history. The pervasive factional culture has led to a culture of conformity and blind obedience, which is the cultural foundation preventing Taiwan from producing great heroes.
2.3. Taiwan has built a strong moat against political negotiations.
In at least the past three articles, I have pointed out that “one country, two systems” is drifting away from Taiwan. Taiwan needs to face this reality and take the initiative to fight for it.
Furthermore, I specifically recommended one of my articles to a prominent pro-unification commentator in Taiwan. However, even the most radical pro-unification commentator dared not address the topic. This demonstrates the strength of the anti-“one country, two systems” forces in Taiwan.
The reality today is that a strong and unified public opinion in Taiwan has built a solid trench against “one country, two systems.” There is no room for “one country, two systems” in Taiwan. This is a fundamental fact. The pro-China rhetoric from various commentators that mainlanders see is not the fundamental fact of Taiwan.
Mainland Chinese must face the fact that the label “Taiwanese” is, in effect, the political adversary of the label “Chinese.” Many university professors and radio personalities who make logically sound statements in public today would have no place in Taiwan.
The best historical opportunity for Taiwan to discuss “one country, two systems” was during Lien Chan’s time. Unfortunately, he was defeated by Chen Shui-bian’s treacherous sword.
Then there’s the historical window before this current mainland leader. The Taiwanese people failed to seize that 10-year historical opportunity.
In the first few years after the current leader of mainland China came to power, Taiwanese people remained inactive. This was the third-best period in history.
On August 10, 2022, the mainland officially drew a strict red line. Taiwanese people are even less likely to accept this framework.
I can even say with certainty that the shell that the mainland has left behind, and the three-year window of opportunity for negotiations, will ultimately be discarded by the Taiwanese.
Alas! Fate cannot be changed. This is why I named this part “Taiwan’s Destiny.”
Characteristics of China’s Trans-Strait Military Operations
With the possibility of peace talks and reunification no longer possible, this article will omit various related extensions on peace talks. Based on my speculation about the personality traits of the current Chinese leaders, the mainland’s cross-strait military operations in 2026 will generally have the following characteristics.
(1. There will be no obvious political hesitation)
(2. The number of troops deployed should be at least four times the actual number required;)
(3. Focus on pursuing political goals;)
(4. A rapid and comprehensive military advance process;)
(5. A slow and protracted political process;)
(6. It triggered a slow and heavy response from the American conglomerate;)
(7. Triggering a full-scale soft confrontation between China and the West lasting more than 3 years;)
(8. Significant political steps were taken in the European, North African and Arab regions.)
(9. It is unlikely that a political structure without military oversight will be established in Taiwan relatively quickly.)
1. There will be no significant political hesitation.
Political hesitation is common. Even a strong leader like Putin launching the first phase of special military operations is a typical example of political hesitation. And even today, it cannot be said that Putin has completely escaped political hesitation.
Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law is a typical example of political hesitation in modern mainland China. Even great figures like Mao Zedong and cautious leaders like Lin Biao were not immune to political hesitation. However, this current mainland leader will not (or has very little chance of) exhibiting political hesitation. I admire him immensely. I have long since included him in the list of great heroes of Chinese history.
Many Western political science journals only classified him as a strongman leader in his fourth or fifth year in power. But I judged him to be a strongman even before he officially assumed the presidency.
Here are some examples that mainland Chinese political professionals would understand. I apologize for not being able to provide too much explanation to the many readers.
(1). An editorial published on March 27, 2012;
(2). An editorial published on May 2, 2012;
(3). An editorial published on May 18, 2012;
(4). An interview conducted by a reporter between June and August 2012 with grassroots officials during the handover of duties (the exact date is unknown).
(5) Examples of handling the Hong Kong issue.
When I was furious about the mindlessness of Hong Kong people and the intervention of Taiwanese people in the Hong Kong unrest, I wrote, “Two words to sum up Hong Kong people: greedy and stupid.” That was in the early stages of the Hong Kong unrest, and at that time, I predicted that the central government would spend 30 years regulating the series of problems brought about by “one country, two systems.” But at the same time, I also saw that the awareness and consequences of regulating “one country, two systems” would be directly reflected in the Taiwan issue.
Later, after someone posted the “X-channel gossip” comment, I immediately revised my 30-year-old judgment. In an article, I specifically discussed how the central government would definitely tighten its control over Hong Kong within two years. This is because the central government would spend about two years restraining Hong Kong’s monopolistic capital and capitalists, forcing them to align with the central government. After that, it would tighten its control over Hong Kong’s overall structure.
The fact is that less than four months after my judgment, the central government took swift and decisive action, completely eradicating the Hong Kong issue. I foresaw this outcome. However, I did not expect that the decisiveness of this mainland leader would far exceed my expectations of him.
These examples triggered a series of profound psychological changes in me, from surprise to worry to admiration. They also gave me a fuller understanding of this person’s character traits. He aspired to be a great hero, possessed the spirit to achieve it, had the means (ability) to do so, and had the opportunity to become one. Ultimately, in 2026, he will be inscribed on the list of great heroes in Chinese history.
I believed he would become a great hero long before August 2012, before he became President of China. This is the basis for my series of articles, titled “China’s Unification Plan: Formed in 2012, Implemented in 2026.” It is entirely based on my belief in him, out of my admiration for him.
Based on over a decade of continuous observation, I can conclude that the current leader of mainland China possesses unwavering character, the courage to make difficult decisions, resilience under pressure, exceptional political insight, sophisticated political skills, comprehensive and profound thinking, and a strong sense of ideals, ambition, and heroic spirit. Based on this understanding, I believe he will not hesitate to initiate the cross-strait reunification action. His team will undoubtedly fulfill all his instructions. Through the reunification action in 2026, his name will certainly be inscribed on the list of great heroes in Chinese history.
2. The number of troops deployed should be at least four times the actual number required;
I have no military background (nor do I have a political science background), and I have never thought about military matters, which means I cannot make any estimates or predictions from a military professional perspective.
However, I can personally predict military issues from a political science perspective. In the course of Chinese history, military issues have always been subordinate to politics.
If we assume that China’s 50,000 troops could completely defeat Taiwan’s 260,000 troops, I still believe that China would at least send 200,000 troops, or even more, to Taiwan. This is not out of military ambition, but political ambition.
(1. China needs to show its voters that military action poses no obstacle to China. The United States has no chance to retaliate against China’s military action.)
(2. China needs to show European politicians that they have no chance of profiting from military means.)
3. A rapid and comprehensive military advance process;
This is an expansion on the previous point. The mainland will definitely use a method akin to smashing a peanut with an eight-pound hammer to advance its military progress. It will not give American or Japanese voters the false impression that they have the opportunity to interfere in this military action. It will also create political hesitation among European politicians.
4. Focus on pursuing political goals;
I can make this judgment: the outcome and process of military operations will hardly consume a large amount of energy from mainland political leaders. Pursuing this outcome will not be as complicated as Taiwanese people imagine.
How to use military operations as a shell to achieve as many political goals as possible is a key consideration for politicians. Even amateur politicians like myself spend a lot of time in this direction.
5. A slow and protracted political process;
This is a manifestation of the point above.
6. It triggered a slow and heavy response from the American conglomerate;
Americans must respond to this event. Inaction is suicide. A flawed response is also suicide. The US government and military’s response is based on responding to voters, responding to allies, responding to the needs of systemic governance, and, most importantly, responding to needs from the direction of China.
I have already written that there are two main theories about American answer packets.
6.1 Pre-response package and post-response package
A pre-emptive response package. Americans know that China is going to do this, and they know on what day it will happen. The best course of action for the US national interest is to negotiate with the Chinese beforehand. However, this doesn’t align with the personal interests of American politicians. Because whoever does this will be doomed. This is a structural flaw in a system of power-sharing elections. It prevents actions from benefiting the long-term interests of the nation. Therefore, this response package doesn’t exist in practice.
Post-battle response package. This package contains three sets of tools: a pacification package, a comprehensive economic warfare package, and a comprehensive military warfare package.
6.2 Suijing Bao
The pacification package is a complex and challenging undertaking. It requires close cooperation between the Chinese and US governments to be successful. It rests on at least three fundamental prerequisites.
(1. Show American and European voters in advance that China is prepared for the nuclear option, and that this is sufficient to make American voters remove the nuclear option from the script of Sino-US conflict. It may even remove the option of full-scale military war.)
(2. Quickly and comprehensively end the military process of the Taiwan operation. This demonstrates that there are no gaps in the mainland’s military capabilities.)
(3. A small to medium-sized engagement demonstrates that the United States cannot win a conflict, nor can it lose one. This is a very difficult political process (not a military one) to manage.)
(4. Unless there are very rare and accidental factors, it is very unlikely that politicians will choose this package voluntarily. However, it cannot be ruled out that in practice, the military actions of both sides may be downgraded due to a decline in public support, thus achieving a pacification plan.)
6.3 Full-scale economic war
A full-scale economic war is the most likely option that the US group has chosen proactively.
The United States must project a tough political stance. Its course of action must bear the label of “tough.” This toughness must be sufficient to appease American voters, European voters, and European politicians, while intimidating the Arab world, South American countries, and African nations. This matter doesn’t need to be rushed; it can be done gradually, tested slowly. Borders can be gradually moved closer in both directions. Therefore, economic warfare, especially a full-scale economic war, is inevitable, and may even be integrated into a full-scale military war.
6.4 Total Military Warfare:
A full-scale military war is something the United States will do everything in its power to avoid. However, this process is difficult to control. A small to medium-sized conflict spiraling out of control could rapidly escalate into a hot conflict, because the people of both China and the United States have long been preparing for a full-scale war. A medium-sized conflict, regardless of which side suffers a defeat, could quickly ignite public opinion in favor of a full-scale war. Politicians are virtually powerless to stop this. This is a major reason why appeasement strategies are difficult to implement in practice.
China wants to avoid a swift, all-out war because it believes it has the strength to completely destroy the American system through a long and protracted all-out war.
Even so, China has not yet made a political demand to completely dismantle the American system. This is an important basis for the fact that China and the United States were able to sit down and make peace after their clashes.
However, this will also be the basis for political hesitation in mainland China, making the Chinese central government the party that is passively escalating the conflict (excluding the European direction).
7. It could trigger a full-scale soft confrontation between China and the West lasting more than three years;
This is the outward manifestation of the previous point.
8. Significant political steps have been taken in the European, North African, and Arab regions.
The Japanese won’t truly be fully invested in the script of a conflict between China and the United States. But they will pretend to be. China only needs to provide Japan with enough props for its performance. This is because Japan has a huge political weakness in its dealings with China (for more details, please follow “China’s Unification Plan Part Seven: Japan’s Dilemma “). Faced with this huge political weakness, Japan is in fact powerless in its dealings with China. China doesn’t need to make any promises to make Japan hesitant.
South Koreans have consistently sought opportunities for national rise. However, within the context of the US-China conflict, even if they wanted to stir up trouble, they are actually the least powerful party involved. Their reactions and stances are heavily influenced by other stakeholders. South Korea can only passively respond to the reactions of the US, China, North Korea, and Russia. (For more details, please follow ” China’s Unification Plan Part 8: South Korea’s Difficult Path “)
China will undoubtedly engage in more political activity in the European, North African, and Arab regions than it has in Japan. China’s aim in doing so is to inform Europe in advance that it possesses the capability and ambition to completely overturn the European order, and that it holds the initiative.
Based on my personal observations, Europe’s involvement in the US-China conflict goes beyond mere passive engagement. More importantly, Europe harbors an inherent hostility towards China. It’s not just that Europe is passively drawn into the conflict; it has an intrinsic need to actively seek opportunities to completely defeat China.
Japan and South Korea were undoubtedly participants in the early stages of the US-China conflict. Therefore, China did not experience difficulty or political hesitation in choosing between Japan and South Korea when formulating plans and solutions.
The major European powers represent the biggest variable for China. Unlike Japan and South Korea, these powers have greater freedom of choice. They have a stronger intrinsic motivation to strike at China than Japan and South Korea. This initiative means they will be constantly watching for the right opportunity to intervene.
Europe is outside of China’s land-based coverage. This is another major basis for their ability to exercise agency.
This dictates that China should not and cannot afford to have political hesitation regarding its stance on Europe. A strong stance must be taken beforehand to directly deter Europe.
Europe also has its fatal flaws when dealing with China. This is the basis for China’s ability to restrain Europe.
If the Chinese central government were to experience political hesitation in a particular direction, the most likely scenario would be in Europe.
Recent research in political science suggests that Chinese political scientists share significant disagreements with me on this point. However, this hesitation could have substantial implications. If Europe, Japan, and the United States act swiftly and synchronously in the early stages, it would inflict enormous political losses on China—while unlikely to reverse the outcome of the Taiwan Strait military action, it would have a significant impact on the subsequent economic response phase and increase the likelihood of a full-scale military war. Furthermore, it would place immense pressure on China in the early stages of a full-scale military conflict.
However, European intervention would come with enormous political costs and risks for Europe. China can (and must?) demonstrate this capability and its firm stance fully beforehand. Appeasement towards Europe is high-risk for China.
9. Taiwan will not establish a political structure without military oversight more quickly.
That’s uncertain. It depends on how each party weighs the options. But personally, my point is to remove the political connotations from the label “Taiwanese” so that it can be understood in the same way as “Guangxiese,” “Guizhouese,” and “Sichuanese.”
However, based on general patterns, military rule for 10 to 30 years is a common political choice.
Summary
On August 10, 2022, the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China released a white paper entitled “The Taiwan Question and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era.” It formally announced that Taiwan had lost “one country, two systems in a substantive sense.” The main points were: 1. All political promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping were null and void; 2. Taiwan had no diplomatic power; 3. Taiwan had no power to command troops; 4. Taiwan’s leaders and high-ranking officials were required to support the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China and accept its direct supervision. From that day forward, the mainland granted approximately three years for peace negotiations. The content of these negotiations would be the shell of “one country, two systems,” including issues of taxation, administrative structure, and economic system. However, I do not believe that Taiwan will participate in the peace talks. The timing for the mainland to launch a cross-strait reunification operation could be any day between April and September 2026. This military operation has the following characteristics: 1. No political hesitation; 2. Deployment of an unusually large number of troops; 3. Emphasis on political objectives; 4. A rapid and comprehensive military advance; 5. A slow and protracted political process; 6. Triggering a comprehensive response from the US bloc; 7. Triggering a comprehensive soft confrontation between China and the West lasting more than three years; 8. Taking significant political steps in advance in the European, North African, and Arab regions; 9. Not rapidly establishing a political structure without military oversight in Taiwan.
(The above judgments are based on speculation about the personality traits of leaders in mainland China. For further details, please refer to the website www.pppnet.at)