China’s Plan for Military Reunification (9.1): Taiwan’s Fate (The Evolution of the “One Country, Two Systems” Version in Taiwan)

 

 

 

summary:

On August 10, 2022, the central government of mainland China published a white paper entitled “The Taiwan Question and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era.” This is essentially a mainland version of the resolution on Taiwan’s future. This white paper effectively strips Taiwan of its substantive rights to “one country, two systems,” representing a significant retreat from the promises made in Ye Jianying’s “Nine Points” and Deng Xiaoping’s “Six Points.” The previous promise of “military power, diplomatic power, and complete autonomy; the central government reserving a special seat for Taiwan” has been reduced to “no military power, no diplomatic power, high-ranking officials subject to central control and supervision, and not necessarily a special administrative region.” Taiwan’s political space has evolved from Ye Jianying’s “quasi-confederation” to Deng Xiaoping’s “substantive complete autonomy,” to the Hong Kong demonstration version of “partial diplomatic power and complete autonomy,” to the Hong Kong abridged version of “NPC intervention in legislation, the Chief Executive not sitting on equal footing with the President, expanding executive power and suppressing legislative power.” This series of evolutions suggests that Taiwan’s political space is shrinking. Especially under the stimulation of the complex political atmosphere in 2019, strong public opinion on the mainland opposed peace talks and demanded reunification by force. Some had specifically reminded Taiwan to seize the time and opportunity to actively pursue “one country, two systems.” However, Taiwan ultimately lost this precious timeframe. The 2022 White Paper imposed the strictest political constraints on Taiwan, thus ending Taiwan’s de facto political power under “one country, two systems.” This series of developments is, in fact, the result of a long-term power struggle between Taiwanese politicians and the mainland. If Taiwan loses this window of opportunity before 2026, an even greater and more serious political defeat will be unavoidable.

Keywords:

One Country, Two Systems, latest version, Ye’s Nine Points, Deng’s Six Points, force, unification, Taiwan, future

I. The Evolution of Different Versions of “One Country, Two Systems”

From Ye Jianying’s initial proposal of the “one country, two systems” framework for Taiwan on September 30, 1981, to the latest version of the framework proposed by the Chinese central government on August 22, 2022, 41 years have passed. During these 41 years, the mainland’s “one country, two systems” framework for Taiwan has actually undergone five evolutions. These five versions are: a confederation-like structure based on Ye’s nine points; a substantive and comprehensive autonomy system based on Deng Xiaoping’s six points; a comprehensive autonomy system based on the Hong Kong demonstration version; a comprehensive autonomy system based on the abridged Hong Kong version after 2020; and the 2022 version without substantive “two systems.”

Table 1 shows the main differences between the following five versions.

1.1 Best Taiwan-Friendly Version – Ye Jiutiao

• Retain the army;
• Possesses diplomatic powers (specific level not specified);
• The central government does not interfere in Taiwan affairs;
• The social system remains unchanged; the economic system remains unchanged; the way of life remains unchanged;
• A leadership seat has been reserved specifically for Taiwan;
• Published on September 30, 1981.

1.2 Deng Xiaoping’s Six Points Recognize Substantive Full Autonomy

• They can have an army, but it cannot pose a threat to the mainland.
• The negotiations were on an equal footing, without mentioning negotiations between the central and local governments.
• After unification, Taiwan could have more power than other provinces and regions, such as having the final appeal power not going to the mainland.
• The mainland does not send anyone to Taiwan; the party, government, and military are all managed by the Taiwanese themselves; the central government has reserved a special seat for Taiwan.
• I do not agree with the notion of Taiwan’s “complete autonomy”.
• Different systems may exist, but internationally, only the mainland can represent China.
• Published on June 25, 1983, it outlined restrictions on the military but made no specific mention of diplomatic powers. It specifically stated its opposition to the notion of “complete autonomy” for Taiwan.

1.3 Roadshow Version—Hong Kong’s First Version of “One Country, Two Systems”

• Hong Kong has no right to command troops.
• Possessing some diplomatic power
• It possesses legislative, executive, judicial, and final appellate powers.
• Social and economic systems remain unchanged
• If you don’t pay taxes, the central government can distribute sweets.
• The central government will not send anyone to participate in Hong Kong affairs.
• The Chief Executive of Hong Kong sits alongside the President of China.
• The outgoing Chief Executive of Hong Kong tacitly agrees to serve as Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (at the national level).
• It was put into use on July 1, 1997.

1.4 Abridged Version of “One Country, Two Systems” in Hong Kong

• The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress intervenes in Hong Kong’s legislative power through its legislative and judicial interpretation powers.
• The Liaison Office has been upgraded from a central liaison agency to a representative of the central government.
• Establish a Hong Kong Committee for Safeguarding National Security, expand the powers of the Chief Executive, and reduce the powers of the Legislative Council.
• The Chief Executive of Hong Kong cannot sit parallel to the President of the People’s Republic of China; he must sit below him.
• It was put into use in June 2020.

Version 1.5 (Most Strict): Latest version released on August 10, 2022

• Taiwan has no right to command troops.
• All diplomatic power was handed over to the central government.
• Executive power is subject to oversight (senior officials are subject to restrictions and supervision), and the administrative structure can be maintained.
• Economic system unchanged
• You don’t have to pay taxes; the central government can distribute sweets.
• Other details can be discussed; if they are not discussed, there is no guarantee of availability.
• If the policy is implemented after a military unification, there will be virtually no opportunity for peace talks. The political conditions will only be more severe than those mentioned above, not more lenient.

  

  II. A Plain Language Explanation of the New “One Country, Two Systems” Framework

  On August 10, 2022, the Chinese central government officially released a white paper entitled “The Taiwan Question and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era” [1]. This is in fact a formal “new plan for one country, two systems in Taiwan”. It can also be called the mainland version of the “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future”. It actually shrinks the conditions for peaceful negotiations between the mainland and Taiwan on a large scale, thereby further shrinking Taiwan’s political space. In terms of severity, it can be considered the biggest political challenge Taiwan has faced in nearly 40 years. The restrictions on Taiwan’s political space imposed by this white paper far exceed those imposed by the Anti-Secession Law promulgated in 2005.

  The main framework of the 2022 new version of the “One Country, Two Systems” framework for Taiwan is briefly described below:

  • All of Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping’s promises have become invalid.
  • Taiwan has no diplomatic power; all diplomatic authorizations are entirely in the hands of the central government.
  • Taiwan has no right to command its troops; its military forces must be completely under the control of the central government.
  • Taiwanese government officials must uphold mainland China’s rule. They must accept the jurisdiction and supervision of the central government.

  The specific content of “one country, two systems” in Taiwan is almost entirely contained in Parts IV and V of the white paper “Taiwan Question and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era” [1]. This part is copied here and explained in plain language.

2.1 A window for peace negotiations is still maintained.

(Section 4, Paragraph 2) Achieving national reunification peacefully is in the best interests of the Chinese nation, including our compatriots in Taiwan, and is most conducive to China’s long-term stability and development. It is the first choice for the Communist Party of China and the Chinese government to resolve the Taiwan issue. Despite the difficulties and obstacles encountered over the decades, we have persevered in striving for peaceful reunification, which reflects our cherishing and safeguarding of national interests, the well-being of our compatriots, and peace across the Taiwan Strait.

(Interpretation: A window for peace talks is still open. We have fulfilled our historical, national, and informational responsibilities.)

(In plain language: Whether you want to talk or not, don’t blame me for not giving you a chance.)

2.2 All the promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping have become invalid.

(Section 4, Paragraph 3) “One Country, Two Systems” is an important institutional arrangement made by the Communist Party of China and the Chinese government to achieve peaceful reunification, and a great innovation of socialism with Chinese characteristics. “Peaceful reunification and one country, two systems” is our basic policy for resolving the Taiwan issue and the best way to achieve national reunification. It embodies the inclusive and magnanimous wisdom of the Chinese nation, fully considering the realities of Taiwan while also being conducive to the long-term stability and prosperity of Taiwan after reunification. We advocate that after peaceful reunification, Taiwan can implement a social system different from that of the mainland, exercise a high degree of autonomy in accordance with the law, and allow the two social systems to coexist and develop together for a long time. “One country” is the premise and foundation for implementing “two systems,” and “two systems” are subordinate to and derived from “one country” and unified within “one country.” We will continue to unite with our compatriots in Taiwan, actively explore a “two systems” solution for Taiwan, and enrich the practice of peaceful reunification. The specific implementation of “one country, two systems” in Taiwan will fully consider the realities of Taiwan, fully absorb opinions and suggestions from all sectors on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and fully take into account the interests and feelings of our compatriots in Taiwan.

(Interpretation: Taiwan’s “two systems” must be subordinate to the “one country” principle. Everything needs to be renegotiated, and the opinions of both sides of the Taiwan Strait must be taken into account.)

(In plain language : The promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping have expired and are no longer valid. Peace talks should be based on the will of the people on the mainland.)

2.3 The preferential treatment given to Taiwan shall not exceed that given to Hong Kong.

(Section 4, Paragraph 4) Since the “One Country, Two Systems” principle was proposed, some political forces in Taiwan have distorted and misled the issue, and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its authorities have spared no effort in spreading rumors and smearing it, leading to biased perceptions among some Taiwanese compatriots. The fact is, after Hong Kong and Macao returned to the motherland, they were reintegrated into the national governance system and embarked on a broad path of complementary advantages and common development with the mainland. The practice of “One Country, Two Systems” has achieved universally recognized success. At the same time, for a period of time, influenced by various complex internal and external factors, “anti-China and pro-chaos” activities were rampant, and the situation in Hong Kong became extremely serious. The Communist Party of China and the Chinese government, assessing the situation, adopted a series of measures that addressed both the symptoms and root causes, upheld and improved the “One Country, Two Systems” system, and propelled Hong Kong’s situation to a major turning point from chaos to order, entering a new stage of prosperity. This laid a solid foundation for advancing the rule of law in Hong Kong and Macao and ensuring the steady and long-term implementation of “One Country, Two Systems.”

(Interpretation: Improving and revising “one country, two systems” is necessary. Improvement and refinement are the foundation for its steady and long-term development.)

(In plain language: Don’t forget what you did in Hong Kong; the preferential treatment given to Taiwan cannot exceed that given to Hong Kong.)

2.4 There is no option to maintain the status quo.

(Section 4, Paragraph 5) To achieve peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Strait, we must confront the fundamental issue of the differences in social systems and ideologies between the mainland and Taiwan. “One Country, Two Systems” is precisely the most inclusive solution proposed to address this problem. It is a peaceful, democratic, benevolent, and win-win solution. The differences in systems across the Strait are not an obstacle to reunification, much less an excuse for division. We believe that, with the passage of time, “One Country, Two Systems” will be re-understood by the vast majority of our compatriots in Taiwan; and that the space and connotation of the “Two Systems” Taiwan solution will be fully demonstrated in the process of compatriots on both sides of the Strait working together to achieve peaceful reunification.

(Interpretation: Maintaining the status quo is no longer possible. Now it is time for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to work together to promote unification.)

(In plain language: The main driving force for unification is on the mainland)

2.5 Unification will be completed during Xi’s term.

(Section 4, Paragraph 6) Peaceful reunification is achieved through equal consultation and joint discussion. The long-standing political differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are the root cause affecting the steady and long-term development of cross-strait relations, and cannot be passed down from generation to generation. Cross-strait consultations and negotiations can be conducted step-by-step and in stages, using flexible and diverse methods. We are willing to engage in dialogue and communication with all political parties, groups, and individuals in Taiwan on resolving cross-strait political differences and to exchange views extensively, based on the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus. We are also willing to continue to promote democratic consultations by representative figures nominated by political parties and sectors across the Taiwan Strait to jointly discuss the grand plan for promoting the peaceful development and integrated development of cross-strait relations and the peaceful reunification of the motherland.

(In plain language: Unification must be completed during Xi ‘s term; it will not be left to the next term.)

2.6 Capable of confronting the United States

(Section 4, Paragraph 11) Pursuing “Taiwan independence” will only plunge Taiwan into a deep abyss of disaster and bring profound harm to our compatriots in Taiwan. To safeguard the overall interests of the Chinese nation, including our compatriots in Taiwan, we must resolutely oppose “Taiwan independence” and promote the peaceful reunification of the motherland. We are willing to create broad space for peaceful reunification, but we will never leave any room for any form of “Taiwan independence” separatist activities. The affairs of the Chinese people must be decided by the Chinese people. The Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair, concerning China’s core interests and the national sentiments of the Chinese people, and brooks no external interference. Any attempt or action to use the Taiwan issue to interfere in China’s internal affairs or obstruct China’s reunification process will be resolutely opposed by all the Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan. No one should underestimate the Chinese people’s strong determination, unwavering will, and powerful capability to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

(In plain language: I now have the ability to handle this matter)

(Section 4, Paragraph 13) Currently, some forces in the United States are attempting to “use Taiwan to contain China,” deliberately playing the “Taiwan card” to provoke provocations by “Taiwan independence” separatist forces. This not only seriously endangers peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and hinders the Chinese government’s efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, but also severely impacts the healthy and stable development of China-US relations. If this trend continues, it will inevitably lead to a sustained escalation of tensions across the Taiwan Strait, posing a significant and potentially devastating risk to China-US relations and severely damaging US interests. The United States should adhere to the one-China principle, handle Taiwan-related issues prudently and properly, stop saying one thing and doing another, and fulfill its commitment to not support “Taiwan independence” with concrete actions.

(In plain language: The US can no longer play the Taiwan card. If it does, I’ll crush it.)

2.7 No taxes will be levied on Taiwan.

(Section 5, Paragraph 2) Taiwan’s economy has a high level of development, distinctive industries, and a thriving foreign trade sector, with strong economic complementarity between the two sides. After reunification, the mechanisms and systems for cross-strait economic cooperation will be further improved. Taiwan’s economy will have a vast hinterland in the mainland market, resulting in greater development space, stronger competitiveness, more stable and smooth industrial and supply chains, and more vibrant innovation. Many long-standing problems hindering Taiwan’s economic development and improvement of people’s livelihoods can be resolved through cross-strait integration and development, ensuring comprehensive connectivity. Taiwan’s fiscal revenue can be fully utilized to improve people’s livelihoods, doing practical things, good deeds, and solving difficulties for the people.

(In plain language: No taxes will be levied on Taiwan)

2.8 There may not necessarily be a special administrative region; senior executives are subject to oversight.

(Section 5, Paragraph 4) Under the premise of ensuring national sovereignty, security, and development interests, Taiwan can exercise a high degree of autonomy as a Special Administrative Region. The social system and way of life of Taiwan compatriots will be fully respected, and their private property, religious beliefs, and legitimate rights and interests will be fully guaranteed. All Taiwan compatriots who support the reunification of the motherland and the rejuvenation of the nation will truly be masters of their own affairs in Taiwan, participate in the construction of the motherland, and fully enjoy the dividends of development. With a strong motherland as their support, Taiwan compatriots will stand taller and more confident internationally, and will enjoy greater security and dignity.

(In plain language: 1. The key point is the word ” may “. Taiwan is not guaranteed to have special administrative region status; there are prerequisites . 2. The appointment and removal of Taiwan’s governing officials are contingent upon their support for unification.)

(In plain language: Taiwan’s governing officials must support the central government and accept its supervision. Whether there will be a special administrative region in Taiwan is currently uncertain.)

2.9 Lack of command authority

(Section 5, Paragraph 6) Compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are connected by blood and share a common destiny. After reunification, China’s international influence, appeal, and shaping power will be further enhanced, and the Chinese nation’s self-esteem, self-confidence, and pride will be further elevated. Taiwan compatriots will share the dignity and glory of a great nation with their mainland compatriots, and be proud to be upright Chinese. Compatriots on both sides of the Strait will jointly explore and implement the “two systems” solution for Taiwan, jointly develop and improve the “one country, two systems” institutional framework, and ensure Taiwan’s long-term stability and security.

(Translator’s note: Now it is time for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to jointly decide on the “one country, two systems” approach in order to ensure that Taiwan will not experience another rebellion .)

(In plain language: Taiwan does not have the authority to command troops; military power belongs to the central government.)

2.10 All diplomatic powers were transferred to the central government.

(Section 5, Paragraph 8) After reunification, relevant countries may continue to develop economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. With the approval of the Chinese central government, foreign countries may establish consulates or other official or semi-official institutions in Taiwan, international organizations and institutions may establish offices in Taiwan, relevant international conventions may apply in Taiwan, and relevant international conferences may be held in Taiwan.

(In plain language: Taiwan has no diplomatic power. All foreign affairs powers belong to the central government.)

III. Reasons for Taiwan’s lukewarm response to the new “one country, two systems”

The white paper “Taiwan Question and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era,” released on August 10, 2022 [1], is in fact a formal “new plan for one country, two systems in Taiwan.” It can also be called the mainland version of the “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future.” It severely restricts Taiwan’s political space after its return to China. It also effectively blocks the path for peaceful negotiations between the mainland and Taiwan.

In terms of severity, the distribution of this white paper represents the biggest political challenge Taiwan has faced in nearly 40 years. The restrictions this white paper places on Taiwan’s political space far exceed those imposed by the Anti-Secession Law of 2005. Furthermore, its subsequent effects will seriously impact the existing international order.

However, the political science community as a whole reacted with a lukewarm reception to this major event. The countries and regions affected by this policy change, including mainland China, Taiwan, the United States, the European Union, Japan, and South Korea, did not issue any political response to the contents of the white paper.

In the past, whenever the mainland introduced a major measure or changed an important policy, regardless of whether it had any substantial connection with Taiwan, it would trigger a series of responses and reactions from both official and unofficial sources in Taiwan. Even the oversupply of pickled mustard tubers from mainland China could spark heated discussions on the island of Taiwan. When mainland China introduced the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, it also provoked strong reactions from many countries, including the United States, Europe, and Japan.

The white paper issued by mainland China on August 10, 2022, is a fundamental outline document that will affect Taiwan’s future political space, political path, and political direction. It has been lying there quietly for a year, undiscussed by anyone. This is truly absurd.

It’s easy to understand why people on the mainland don’t interpret it. They already know what it means. Moreover, for a significant issue, mainland politicians often pretend they haven’t said anything. This is both their political strategy and their political style.

Whether it’s feigned incomprehension or genuine inability to understand mainland political language, a complete vernacular translation has yet to be seen. Furthermore, none of the numerous Taiwanese political commentators have offered any interpretation of its actual content.

However, it’s difficult to understand why Taiwanese people haven’t commented on this political event. The main reasons for their continued silence regarding this important document can be summarized as follows:

3.1 Mainland political discourse has a characteristic structure

Why did Taiwan react so coldly to such an important political document? A major reason is that ordinary Taiwanese people are unfamiliar with the political language of mainland China. Over the 70 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, a unique coded language has developed: political language.

Table 2: Examples of political language used in mainland China.

template language	Plain Language Translation	Background of political language
On March 14, 2012, then-Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out at a press conference that the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee and Government should learn profound lessons from the Wang Lijun incident.	Bo Xilai must be held responsible for the Wang Lijun incident.	On February 6, 2012, Wang Lijun entered the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu for 24 hours. Bo Xilai was the then Party Secretary of Chongqing.
On March 27, 2012, the People’s Daily published an editorial: Don’t leave the difficulties to future generations.	Hu Jintao should not leave Bo Xilai’s case to be resolved during Xi Jinping’s term.	After March 15, 2012, Bo Xilai disappeared from public view.
On May 2, 2012, the People’s Daily published an editorial: Don’t cool down before leaving office.	Hu Jintao was asked to handle the Bo Xilai case properly before leaving office.	Hu is about to step down and Xi is about to take office.
On May 18, 2012, the People’s Daily published an editorial: Pave the way before stepping down.	Hu Jintao was asked to handle the Bo Xilai case properly before leaving office.	Hu is about to step down and Xi is about to take office.
From June to August 2012, several provincial party newspapers reprinted a report featuring interviews with grassroots officials. The title was: “The work of this term shall be completed within this term; no work shall be left behind.”	“Don’t leave the mess for me to do.” If you drag this out any longer, I’m going to flip the table. (Very firm and impolite)	Hu Jintao is about to leave office, and Xi Jinping is about to take office. The Bo Xilai case is still pending.

Even those deeply immersed in the political environment of mainland China need to interpret its political language within its specific political context. This is a major reason why ordinary people in Taiwan often struggle to understand mainland political language and pronouncements.

3. A unique cultural atmosphere prevents people from seeing any damage to their own political interests.

• The consciousness of ordinary Taiwanese people has been manipulated and misled by some “people with ulterior motives,” leading to the evolution of five versions of “one country, two systems” step by step, and causing Taiwan’s political space and political rights to shrink step by step.
• The overwhelming anti-“one country, two systems” atmosphere has led some clear-headed individuals to hesitate to easily raise the topic of “one country, two systems,” thus missing a political opportunity.
• As early as 2019, some predicted that mainland China was abandoning the “one country, two systems” policy. From an observer’s perspective, this person believed that “one country, two systems” aligned with the medium- and long-term political interests of the Taiwanese people. Image 1 at the top is evidence of this. It demonstrates that this person tried their best to convey their prediction to the Taiwanese people, reminding them to pursue “one country, two systems.” Unfortunately, no matter how hard this voice tried, it failed to effectively reach the Taiwanese public. This clearly shows that public opinion in Taiwanese society is not very open, hindering the dissemination of voices beneficial to Taiwan’s medium- and long-term interests.

  

  3.4 The mainland is unwilling to emphasize the substantive content of the latest version of “one country, two systems” .

  The mainland’s recent major policy announcement has significantly impacted Taiwan’s political space and environment. In contrast to the past when mainland China frequently issued loud warnings to Taiwan, this time it has chosen to handle this significant event with a low profile. The reasons for this consistent low-key approach from both the public and official levels on the mainland are roughly as follows:

  Public opinion in mainland China opposes peaceful reunification and anticipates armed reunification. The mainland government is unwilling to provoke Taiwan’s willingness to negotiate.

  The authorities have made armed preparations and are confident that this armed unification operation will proceed without incident. They do not wish for Taiwan to initiate peace talks.

  Compared with peaceful reunification, armed reunification is more in line with China’s overall national interests. [2]

  Major media platforms in mainland China have been banned from discussing this incident.

  IV. The Game Between Taiwan and Mainland China Over “One Country, Two Systems”

  4.1 Ye Jianying’s Nine Points, Deng Xiaoping’s Six Points , and the Three No’s Principle

  • According to the Nine Articles of Yeh in 1981, Taiwan could obtain a substantial and complete autonomous status similar to, or even superior to, that of a confederation (with complete military control).
  • While Deng Xiaoping’s Six Points of 1983 explicitly limited the term “complete autonomy,” they did not deny its substance. Although the Six Points imposed restrictions on the size of Taiwan’s military, they did not revoke Taiwan’s command over its troops. Furthermore, they explicitly stated that the central government would not send personnel to Taiwan, but Taiwan could send personnel to the central government. The central government specifically reserved seats for Taiwan (implicitly referring to the vice-chairmanship and other positions).
  • Then-Taiwan leader Chiang Ching-kuo initially rejected the mainland’s proposal under the pretext of “unifying China according to the Three Principles of the People.” He later rejected the mainland’s proposal again with the “Three No’s” policy (no contact, no negotiation, no compromise).
  • At that time, Taiwan’s GDP was US$53.5 billion, while mainland China’s was US$231.2 billion. Taiwan’s GDP was about a quarter of mainland China’s. This was a major reason why Taiwan was unwilling to reunify with mainland China.
  • Secondly, Taiwan’s economic takeoff in the 1970s was closely related to US economic policy. No political force in Taiwan could defy US foreign policy. The division of Taiwan and mainland China is a US political goal.
  • Chiang Ching-kuo was powerless to prevent pro-independence forces in Taiwan from politically purging the Chiang family. This may also be another major reason why Chiang Ching-kuo lost the desire to pursue historical achievements.

  4.2 Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States broke the tacit political understanding between Chiang Kai-shek and his son and the mainland (1995)

  • In 1995, Lee Teng-hui, while serving as “President of Taiwan,” visited an American university, breaking the long-standing political tacit understanding between Chiang Kai-shek and his son and mainland China. This triggered the 1995 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis.

  4.3 Lee Teng-hui put forward the theory of “special state-to-state relations” before leaving office (1999).

  • In 1999, before leaving office, Lee Teng-hui put forward the theory of “special state-to-state relations,” which once again intensified the conflict between mainland China and Taiwan. Lee Teng-hui had a deep-seated pro-Japanese mentality, and his obstruction of rapprochement between mainland China and Taiwan was driven by his inner desires.
  • Although Lee Teng-hui prevented rapprochement between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, public opinion in Taiwan at the time was not strong enough to support Taiwanese independence. Furthermore, the international political landscape did not offer Taiwan the opportunity to achieve independence.
  • In 1999, Taiwan’s GDP was US$298.8 billion, while mainland China’s was US$1.4212 trillion. Taiwan’s GDP was about one-fifth of mainland China’s. Taiwan’s economic advantage remained very significant.

  4.4 Chen Shui-bian’s statement “one country on each side” (2002)

  • In 2002, Chen Shui-bian put forward the “one country on each side” theory, which made relations between the mainland and the islands extremely tense.
  • In reality, since Osama bin Laden’s 9/11 attacks in 2001, Taiwan has effectively lost its political chance for independence. However, the pro-independence sentiment on the island has been elevated to unprecedented levels by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, becoming uncontrollable. Chen Shui-bian’s “one country on each side” theory can only slightly alleviate the political pressure on him from pro-independence forces. But this move has provoked sanctions against Taiwan from both mainland China and the United States.
  • The United States designated Chen Shui-bian as a troublemaker and imposed sanctions on Taiwan on the premise that the United States needed China’s help to suppress rebellions in the Arab world.

  4.5 The mainland promulgated the “Anti-Secession Law” (2005).

  • Because Chen Shui-bian repeatedly hinted and explicitly stated his intention to hold a “referendum,” the mainland enacted the “Anti-Secession Law,” directly designating Taiwan’s referendum and related matters as grounds for triggering a military unification. Because the war on terror required China’s assistance, the United States was unable to prevent the enactment of this law.
  • Another impact of this law’s enactment was that the mainland tacitly agreed to maintain the status quo. The mainland also tacitly agreed to abide by the conditions promised in Yeh’s Nine Points and Deng’s Six Points. This period was actually the best opportunity for Taiwan to gain political space with ‘near-complete autonomy’.
  • However, due to the rising pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan, the Taiwanese side failed to clearly recognize that the political environment had changed, thus missing a great opportunity for negotiations.

  4.6 Taiwan Red Shirt Army’s Anti-Chen Shui-bian Movement (2006)

  • In 2006, Taiwan witnessed a large-scale anti-Chen Shui-bian and anti-corruption demonstration. The main focus was on uncovering Chen Shui-bian’s corruption in the State Affairs Fund.
  • However, the “Lafayette-class frigate case” involving Lee Teng-hui was far more serious than Chen Shui-bian’s State Affairs Fund case, and there was more readily available and readily available apparent evidence. Yet, no one came forward to accuse Lee Teng-hui of corruption.
  • In essence, the Red Shirt Movement’s anti-corruption campaign was merely a pretext. Its true aim was to oppose Chen Shui-bian’s hesitation on the path to Taiwanese independence. Although Chen Shui-bian knew full well that Taiwanese independence had no chance, public opinion in Taiwan at the time believed he had missed the opportune moment for independence. This was the fundamental reason why pro-independence forces in Taiwan were criticizing him.
  • The anti-Chen Shui-bian rally organized by the Red Shirt Army in Taiwan, ostensibly for anti-corruption purposes, was in reality a concentrated display of pro-independence forces in Taiwan.

  4.7 Ma Ying-jeou maintained the status quo (2008-2016)

  • The 2006 Red Shirt Movement against Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan was essentially an accusation by pro-independence forces that Chen was slowing down the process of Taiwanese independence. However, this accusation was made under the guise of “anti-corruption.” This anti-corruption facade contributed to the victory of the “clean” Ma Ying-jeou in the 2008 Taiwanese elections.
  • Ma Ying-jeou won a landslide victory in the 2008 Legislative Yuan election. However, during his presidency, the percentage of Taiwanese people who identified as Chinese rapidly declined, while the percentage who identified as Taiwanese surged. Ma Ying-jeou didn’t even correct the pro-independence propaganda in history textbooks, which would have been relatively easy. His actions led to widespread condemnation from many labor union members.
  • But at a deeper level, it was the Red Shirt Movement’s anti-corruption campaign in 2006 that made Ma Ying-jeou fear pro-independence forces and dare not take any measures to correct or restrict pro-independence.
  • At the same time, the newly enacted Anti-Secession Law in mainland China gave Ma Ying-jeou room to maintain the status quo. This allowed him to maneuver between the mainland’s opposition to Taiwan independence and Taiwan’s pursuit of independence.
  • Limited by the strength of mainland China at the time, it did not find more or better ways to control the development of the independence movement. As a result, relations between Taiwan and the mainland gradually became more distant.

  4.8 Tsai Ing-wen manipulates pro-independence sentiment (2016-)

  • Tsai Ing-wen is a typical politician who won elections in Taiwan by relying on pro-independence sentiment. She has many flaws, all of which rely on her pro-independence stance to protect her stable rule. This pro-independence stance may even continue to protect her after she leaves office.
  • However, the political environment has changed drastically, and she is unlikely to achieve any success in the actual process of Taiwan independence.

  During her term, China’s political and economic power was able to completely rival that of the United States. It also gained a military advantage in the region. This effectively made Tsai Ing-wen the weakest politician in Taiwan.

  • However, Tsai Ing-wen possesses superior political skills; through a series of feigned pro-independence actions, she continues to garner public support in Taiwan and protects her perceived weaknesses.
  • Another effect of Tsai’s series of confrontational actions with the central government is that public opinion on the mainland has shifted towards demanding the military reunification of Taiwan. Mainland public opinion has evolved from embracing Taiwanese people to feeling aversion, dislike, and then contempt and even disdain for them. It has changed from viewing Taiwanese people as “the most beautiful scenery” to “one country, two systems,” then to “green frogs” (a derogatory term for pro-independence groups), and finally to “selling out the country.”

  In the 2020 Taiwan elections, nearly 97% of mainland Chinese citizens supported Tsai Ing-wen. The motivation was that Tsai Ing-wen’s administration could facilitate the process of China’s reunification by force. This demonstrates the extent of pressure the mainland’s central government faces regarding the use of force for reunification.

  4.9 Public opinion in mainland China opposes peace talks and demands reunification by force (2019, 2020)

  • 2019 was, in fact, a pivotal year for the “one country, two systems” principle. In that year, the attitudes of the mainland Chinese people toward the “one country, two systems” principle underwent a fundamental shift.
  • In 2019, Hong Kong experienced significant unrest. The United States and the Taiwanese authorities became deeply involved. This caused mainland Chinese people to rapidly shift from disdain to hostility towards the Taiwanese authorities and people, viewing them as “traitors.”
  • Following the unrest in Hong Kong in 2019, any blog post containing anti-war content, or even just those potentially related to anti-war sentiments, was swiftly reported by readers and disappeared. In contrast, a massive number of blog posts commemorating the war and its heroes emerged.
  • On September 3, 2019, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the Central Party School. The word “struggle” appeared 56 times in the speech. [3]
  • On September 8, 2019, Yeh Chi-chuan published an article on Duowei Blog, pointing out that “one country, two systems” is moving away from Taiwan and reminding Taiwan to take the initiative to fight for it in order to avoid serious damage to its political interests.
  • On June 30, 2020, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China used its legislative power to directly enact the Hong Kong version of the National Security Law.
  • In the 2020 Taiwan elections, nearly 97% of mainland Chinese citizens supported Tsai Ing-wen. The motivation was that Tsai Ing-wen’s administration could facilitate the process of China’s reunification by force. This demonstrates the significant pressure the mainland’s central government faces regarding the use of force for reunification.

  4.10 Conflicts: Taiwan Repeatedly Loses Political Interests (2022)

  • In August 2022, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. China launched military exercises involving waters within 12 nautical miles of Taiwan and extending into Japan’s exclusive economic zone.
  • During this wave of military exercises, mainland Chinese military aircraft formally and frequently crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, a line that had been in place for 70 years. Taiwan has officially lost the military deterrent function of the median line in the Taiwan Strait.
  • Uncertain sources indicate that Chinese warships were once within visual range of Kaohsiung Harbor.
  • On August 10, 2022, the central government of mainland China released a white paper entitled “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification Cause in the New Era.” Taiwan was stripped of its right to “substantive one country, two systems.” This white paper explicitly emphasized that the promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping were invalid and null and void; Taiwan has no right to command troops; Taiwan has no diplomatic power; Taiwan’s high-ranking officials must be directly supervised by the central government; and the issue of Taiwan’s reunification must be resolved during Xi Jinping’s term. This was seen as the biggest setback to Taiwan’s political rights in nearly 40 years.
  • The mainland has introduced the most severe and substantial punitive measures against Taiwan. However, both Taiwan and the mainland have maintained a low profile and refrained from publicizing this major event.
  • Ye, Qiquan predicts that 2026 will be the latest deadline for China to launch armed unification.[4]

  V. The probability of the latest version of “one country, two systems” being implemented in Taiwan

  While the latest version of the “One Country, Two Systems” proposal released in August 2022 explicitly stripped Taiwan of its military and diplomatic powers, it made clear commitments in areas closely related to ordinary people. These include maintaining the economic system, not levying taxes on Taiwan, preserving the standard of living, and allowing the central government to provide financial support when necessary. It also hinted that the administrative system is open to discussion and that a special administrative region structure is possible.

  However, the new white paper contains a strong implication: all reserved political space must be obtained through peaceful negotiations. This perhaps hints at another pessimistic side: that the above commitments are not guaranteed to be maintained under the military unification approach.

  Will the Taiwan authorities choose peaceful negotiations under the “one country, two systems” framework? Is there an opportunity for peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Strait? This article predicts no. The chances of the two sides initiating peaceful negotiations are extremely slim. The main path to reunification will ultimately be military action. The main reasons are as follows:

  This “shell of one country, two systems” imposes far more severe constraints on Taiwan’s political space compared to Ye’s Nine Points and Deng’s Six Points. Taiwan lacks the public support to accept it.

  There is no chance that a great hero will emerge in Taiwan to reverse the current political atmosphere; [2]

  Public opinion on the mainland opposes peace talks; [2]

  Peace talks have significant negative effects on the overall interests of the country; [2]

  The mainland holds a political and military advantage over the United States in regional battlefields;

  The United States and its allies would find it extremely difficult to confront a mainland China-led armed unification campaign. [5]

  Based on the above, the chances of peace negotiations between the two sides are extremely slim. The main path to unification will ultimately be military action. Then, a considerable period of military control will follow, until there is a fairly good mutual integration between the two sides. Ye, Qiquan’s expected period of military control is about 30 years. [6]

  summary:

  On August 10, 2022, the central government of mainland China published a white paper entitled “The Taiwan Question and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era.” This is essentially a mainland version of the resolution on Taiwan’s future. This white paper effectively strips Taiwan of its substantive rights to “one country, two systems,” representing a significant retreat from the promises made in Ye Jianying’s “Nine Points” and Deng Xiaoping’s “Six Points.” The previous promises of “military power, diplomatic power, and complete autonomy; the central government reserving a special seat for Taiwan” have shrunk to “no military power, no diplomatic power, high-ranking officials subject to central control and supervision, and not necessarily a special administrative region.” Taiwan’s political space has evolved from Ye Jianying’s “quasi-confederation” to Deng Xiaoping’s “substantive complete autonomy,” to the Hong Kong demonstration version of “partial diplomatic power and complete autonomy,” to the Hong Kong abridged version of “NPC intervention in legislation; the Chief Executive not sitting alongside the President; expanding executive power and suppressing legislative power.” This series of evolutions suggests that Taiwan’s political space is shrinking. Especially after the complex political atmosphere of 2019, strong public opinion on the mainland has emerged opposing peace talks and demanding reunification by force. This led some to perceive a trend of the mainland central government abandoning the “one country, two systems” policy. However, Taiwan ultimately lost its last precious window of opportunity to pursue substantive “one country, two systems.” The 2022 white paper imposed the strictest political constraints on Taiwan, ending its political power to possess substantive “one country, two systems.” This series of developments is, in fact, the result of a long-term struggle between Taiwanese politicians and the mainland. If Taiwan loses this window of opportunity for peaceful negotiations before 2026, a more serious political defeat will be unavoidable.

  References

  1. The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification Cause in the New Era. White Paper. People’s Republic of China. Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2022-08/10/content_5704839.htm
  2. Ye, Qiquan. China’s Plan for Military Reunification (9): Taiwan’s Destiny (2: The Perpetual Loss of One Country, Two Systems) . 2023. https://pppnet.at/chinas-unifying-plan9-taiwans-destiny-02/
  3. Xinhua News Agency. Xi Jinping delivers important speech at the opening ceremony of the training course for young and middle-aged cadres at the Central Party School (National Academy of Governance). China Government Network. https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-09/03/content_5426920.htm
  4. Ye, Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (1) A: Formed in 2012, implemented in PPPNet. 2023. https://pppnet.at/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026-1cn/
  5. Ye, Qiquan. China’s Unification Plan by Force (2): Variables on China and the US. 2023. https://pppnet.at/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables-on-china-and-usa/
  6. Ye, Qiquan. China’s Plan for Unification by Force (9): Taiwan’s Destiny (3: Paths and Characteristics of Unification) . 2023. https://pppnet.at/chinas-unifying-plan9-taiwans-destiny-03/