China’s military unification plan (5): Hypothetical scenario of a total war between China and the United States

(Research Outline)

summary:

The United States and its allies have multiple response plans in place to counter China’s potential military actions across the Taiwan Strait in 2026. These plans all aim to minimize political losses and prevent China from further expanding its political gains. However, there is always a gap between politicians’ understanding and public opinion. Public opinion is the main obstacle to “pre-emptive negotiation.” Domestic legal obstacles, international legal obstacles, and the uncontrollability of the outcome also prevent the implementation of “pre-emptive deterrence.” In post-event response plans, comprehensive political and economic sanctions form the basis of the US-led alliance’s response. However, any plan lacking a military response cannot effectively stabilize the domestic situation, maintain the authority of the existing imperial order, or effectively prevent the rapid expansion of China’s geopolitical gains. However, the risks of a military strategy are also obvious. Controlling the level of military conflict and avoiding significant military losses for either side presents a huge challenge for politicians on both sides. China’s advantage lies in its political advantage of choosing the timing and scope of the conflict. The difficulty for the US-led coalition to land on Chinese soil also ensures that China will not suffer a total military defeat. The US advantage lies in its comprehensive military and political superiority on a global scale. China lacks the capacity to inflict significant damage on the US at the national level. Even if US military forces retreat to the Americas, it will not result in a significant weakening of US political and economic power. Numerous factors give the United States a psychological advantage to proactively escalate its military response level, and even to apply nuclear devices in actual conflicts. To deter nuclear war, in addition to politicians on both sides having a fully rational political understanding, it may be even more important to substantially mobilize the anti-nuclear awareness of the people on both sides.

Keywords:

War, Taiwan Strait, unification, US-China conflict, response, level, plan, assumption

Based on China’s military actions across the Taiwan Strait in 2026, the US-led coalition has launched a series of countermeasures. These countermeasures could provoke a full-scale total war between the US and China. There are likely three different versions of a full-scale total war between China (and its coalition) and the US-led coalition. These three versions differ in details, but their basic subject structure and evolutionary paths are very similar. The following discussion will, as far as possible, omit the differences between the three versions and focus primarily on the subject path.

One: Three different versions.

• The pacification military plan of the US alliance got out of control and escalated into a full-scale war between the two sides.
• The United States Group had proactively planned a comprehensive overall war strategy in advance;
• The suffocating economic war against China spurred China to launch a proactive, comprehensive war.

Second: A completely new war character and tone.

New historical features

If a full-scale war were to break out between the US and China this time, it would have one distinctive characteristic. This characteristic is the first of its kind in the 3,000 years of fully recorded warfare history: it would prioritize weakening or eliminating the opponent’s sustained war-making capabilities, replacing the previous focus on destroying the enemy’s military strength.

From the first recorded war in ancient Chinese history books, through World War I and World War II, and even in major wars after World War II, the focus of eliminating or weakening the enemy’s war-making capabilities has been on destroying, annihilating, and defeating their military capabilities. A complete military defeat for one side meant the loss of both military and political capabilities.

This impending war will also be unlike any other, lacking a military strike process. Moreover, the military strike process may be more complex, diverse, and brutal, potentially leading to even greater casualties. Attacks from space; military actions heavily reliant on space capabilities; beyond-visual-range warfare; land-based warfare capabilities suppressing naval warfare capabilities; comprehensive political manipulation in the military process; the actual use of nuclear devices or their mutual deterrence in a state of impending war—this series of new military forms and characteristics will leave a strong mark on the course of history.

However, none of these military markers constitute the fundamental characteristic of this war. The fundamental characteristic of this battlefield lies in…

First New Feature War

This was the first full-scale war in human history focused on weakening the enemy’s ability to sustain a war. The importance of eliminating battlefield military capabilities and killing armed personnel took a backseat in this war.

Part Three: The Response Levels and Escalation Process of War

3.1 Level 1 Response: Harassment

Harassment warfare can appear in both the pacification and overall warfare plans, becoming a common part of both plans.
To coordinate with comprehensive political and economic sanctions, the United States and its allies launched a multi-pronged, multi-pronged harassment campaign against China, alongside a propaganda war. This campaign was characterized by armed standoffs at the level of a potential military conflict.
During this phase of action, Western European countries, Japan, South Korea, and Australia are all significant assets of the United States. Hotspots of unrest could emerge in Myanmar, Thailand, India, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, near the maritime boundary between China and South Korea, near the Diaoyu Islands, and near Huangyan Island, all in an effort to increase political and military pressure on China.
China will try to influence or support the political claims of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Palestine as a reciprocal response to political harassment by the US bloc.
This phase will not last long because the United States has an overwhelming advantage over China in this stage of the struggle. China will do its best to avoid being trapped in an unfavorable situation for a long time. 

3.2 Level 2 Response: Semi-contact warfare or low-level proxy war

Whether China or the US’s Asian proxies are the first to escalate their response level, small-scale combat conflicts will occur during this phase.
During this phase, India, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Myanmar could all become important assets for the United States.
China will undoubtedly create conflict hotspots and chaos in Europe. It will escalate the chaos of the Russia-Ukraine war and reactivate or escalate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Utilizing existing and potential hotspots in North Africa and the Far East will also become China’s political and military options.
Strictly speaking, this level of military conflict is still a side effect of political warfare and does not possess the characteristics of an independent and complete military conflict. However, it is a necessary and preparatory stage for the occurrence of actual military conflict.

3.3 Level 3 Response: Low-Intensity Hot Warfare

After a transitional and probing process involving semi-contact warfare or low-intensity proxy wars, low-intensity hot war will inevitably follow.

3.3.1 The grading characteristics of low-intensity hot war:

The low-intensity hot war exhibited typical combat characteristics, with severe casualties and military property losses. Neither side suffered major war losses, nor were there any large-scale attacks targeting the national economic base.

3.3.2 Leading Members

In a small-scale, low-intensity hot war, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, the Philippines, and Myanmar could all be positive assets for the United States.

3.3.3 South Korea’s withdrawal from the war process

Whether by choice or necessity, South Korea will withdraw from combat after one or more low-intensity hot wars. Regardless of the state of the war between the Chinese and American groups, South Korea will be the first country in the US-led coalition to withdraw. South Korea’s withdrawal signifies a significant retreat of US political power in the country. This political and military retreat by the US will be difficult to recover after the war.

3.3.4 India and Myanmar

The border between India and China will remain in a state of hostility but calm. India will only intervene lightly in a low-intensity hot war or will never enter that stage.
Myanmar’s overall situation is similar to India’s, but it is more volatile. It may either never join the US alliance, or it may be more active in the US alliance than India.

3.3.5 China

The frequency with which U.S. allied nations monitor and inspect cargo ships entering and leaving Chinese ports on the high seas has increased significantly. China’s economic activities have been severely hampered. China has openly and extensively intervened in various political hotspots in Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and the Far East.

3.3.6 Europe

Chaos is inevitable in several hotspots across Europe. The unrest in North Africa and the Middle East is intensifying. The history of border shifts in Europe faces reactivation, or acceleration, or exacerbation.

3.4 Level 4 Response: Moderate Intensity War

3.4.1 The relocation of US troops stationed in Japan and South Korea to other locations

The redeployment of US troops from Japan and South Korea is a characteristic indicator of US preparations for a medium-intensity war. The movement of US troops, and even its main fleet from Japan, to the Philippines, Guam, or Indian Ocean islands can be seen as a characteristic indicator of US preparations for a total war. Furthermore, it is also a typical indicator that the Chinese and US groups are preparing for medium- and high-intensity wars.

3.4.2 China has no military plan to proactively defeat the United States.

When China initiates its plan to reunify Taiwan, it does not have a plan to proactively wage war against the United States. Nor does China have a plan to proactively defeat the United States, as a re-response plan to a military response from the US-led coalition. Furthermore, China will not prevent the movement of US and Japanese military forces to the Philippines or other regions.

3.4.3 The root cause of South Korea’s withdrawal from the war does not lie with China.

South Korea lacks the capacity to engage in a medium-intensity war and cannot relocate its naval forces to the Philippines. The root cause of its withdrawal from a medium-intensity war lies in its lack of political capacity to withstand such a conflict. South Korea might declare neutrality and withdraw from US military installations in South Korea without suffering significant naval losses.

3.4.4 Japan’s de-Americanization process begins.

Whether it’s a proactive move or a passive consequence of being attacked by China, once the Chinese bloc and the American bloc engage in a medium-intensity war, Japan’s demilitarization from the United States is inevitable. This outcome also simultaneously initiates Japan’s political process of de-Americanization.

3.4.5 China’s proactive involvement in complex operations in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East.

More complex and in-depth cooperation processes between China and Russia, China and Iran, China and Turkey, China and Arab countries, China and Syria, and China and Egypt may be initiated during this stage.

3.5 Level 5 Response: Major War

3.5.1 The Risk of Japan Withdrawing from the Battlefield

Regardless of the extent of damage a medium-intensity war would inflict on China, it would be a historical trigger. It would initiate a process of American military and political influence retreating from Japan. Once it becomes clear that the United States cannot prevent China’s geopolitical expansion in a major war, Japan’s withdrawal from the conflict will be an inevitable outcome.

3.5.2 The opportunity for the United States to maintain its presence in Northeast Asia

The opportunity to halt the US retreat in Northeast Asia depends on the US defeating China in a major war and effectively halting China’s political and geopolitical expansion. This opportunity is difficult to predict and control, and is highly susceptible to chance.

3.5.3 Europe cannot fully commit to the war in Asia.

The Russo-Ukrainian war has, in effect, restarted the history of border maneuvering among European countries. Many nations have already completed their psychological and even political preparations to join this turbulent history. Once China and the United States begin preparing for a major war, the process of border unrest in Europe will accelerate and intensify. Initiating and accelerating the process of power dismantling in Europe is a necessary measure for China to prevent Europe from joining the Asian battlefield.

3.5.4 It is difficult to see the United States having a chance of winning a major war.

China faces no pressure to maintain its power structure, and therefore no pressure to pursue total victory. This fact grants China political initiative in choosing its battlefield. Within the battlefield chosen by China, the United States has no opportunity to land on Chinese soil. This deprives the United States of the chance to completely defeat China. Once China and the United States enter into a war of attrition, the process of dismantling the American imperial order will have already begun.

3.5.5 The United States will not suffer a national-level failure.

Even in the event of a major war, the United States will not suffer a defeat at the national level. China lacks both the strength and the resolve to defeat the United States at the national level. However, the major problem facing the United States is the pressure to maintain the imperial order.

3.5.6 The United States’ chances of defeating China in a major war.

The United States is not without a chance to defeat China in a total war. That chance is to use nuclear weapons in the war.

3.6 Nuclear War Options

The possibility of a nuclear war breaking out between the United States and China cannot be ruled out.
The use of nuclear devices is an unavoidable option in the escalation of the war between China and the United States.

3.6.1 Options for the United States to Maintain Imperial Order

3.6.2 The United States faces significant risks in conventional military conflicts.

Table 1 provides a clear comparison of the risks facing the United States. If the conflict and reactions between China and the US exceed the scope of the “pre-emptive peace agreement” and the “military pacification plan,” the US will face the risk of South Korea and Japan withdrawing from their military alliance. The only possibility of averting these risks lies in the option of nuclear war.
If the United States has a strong desire to maintain the existing imperial order, the nuclear war option is a real pressure option.

3.6.3 The United States has a psychological advantage in proactively escalating the war.

The United States is at the heart of the current imperial order, possessing far greater strength than China (the group) in terms of global deployment and allies. In regions beyond the range of China’s medium-range missiles, the US enjoys formidable military and political superiority. China is unlikely to inflict a military defeat on the US at the national level. Even if the US suffers a major military defeat or the imperial order collapses, the retreat of US military forces to the Americas would be sufficient to prevent a significant weakening of its actual national power. The disintegration of the existing imperial military order does not necessarily represent a severe loss of US economic and political power. Numerous factors determine that the US is not actually afraid of military defeat in a conflict with China. These factors also give the United States a psychological advantage in proactively escalating the level of war.

3.6.4 Factors that deter nuclear options

(1. Skillful Deterrence
Politicians on both the Chinese and American sides must maintain complete control over the war process throughout, and must ensure that the political and military capabilities of frontline commanders are coordinated. At the same time, both China and the United States must avoid inflicting significant military damage on the other side. For example, they should not sink either side’s aircraft carriers, and should not inflict more than 5,000 casualties on the other side in a single battle.
(2. Substantive Deterrence
China must substantially leak or disclose more than 3,500 nuclear warheads before launching military action against Taiwan, so as to deter the nuclear option from the public opinion of the United States and its allies.

summary

The United States and its allies have multiple response plans in response to a potential military operation across the Taiwan Strait launched by China in 2026. These plans all aim to minimize political losses and prevent China from further expanding its political gains. However, there is always a gap between politicians’ perceptions and public opinion. Public opinion is the main obstacle to a “pre-emptive peace negotiation plan.” Domestic and international legal obstacles, as well as the uncontrollability of the endpoint, also prevent the implementation of a “pre-emptive deterrence plan.” In post-event response plans, comprehensive political and economic sanctions form the basis of the US-led alliance’s response. However, any plan lacking a military response cannot effectively stabilize the domestic situation, maintain the authority of the existing imperial order, or effectively prevent the rapid expansion of China’s geopolitical gains. The risks of a military option are also obvious. Controlling the level of military conflict and avoiding significant military losses for either side is a huge challenge for politicians on both sides. China’s advantage lies in its political advantage of being able to choose the timing and scope of the conflict. The difficulty for the US-led alliance to land on Chinese territory also ensures that China will not suffer a complete military defeat. The United States’ advantage lies in its comprehensive military and political superiority on a global scale. China lacks the capacity to inflict a significant blow on the United States at the national level. This gives the US a psychological advantage to proactively escalate its military response, and even to deploy nuclear weapons in actual conflicts. To deter nuclear war, in addition to politicians on both sides having a fully rational political understanding, it may be even more important to substantially mobilize anti-nuclear sentiment among the people of both sides.