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Chinese Current Affairs |
Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 2, April 2026 |
The Real Shortcomings and Potential Opportunities for China’s Three Political Forces
Ye Qiquan
| First release date | November 7, 2025 | renew | Monday, March 23, 2026 |
| Reference data element: (APA) | |
| Ye Qiquan. (2026). The Real Defects and Potential Opportunities for Escape from Difficulties of the Three Political Forces in China. Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis. April 2026. Vol. 1 (2), 13-16. | |
| Abstract: Currently, all three political forces in China are simultaneously facing difficulties. A clear understanding of their respective power bases and practical shortcomings is fundamental for them to find a way out of their predicament. | |
So far, the Chinese government has not released any information, either explicitly or implicitly, indicating that the political changes in China in 2025 are related to the Taiwan issue.
Although there are many clues pointing to the Taiwan issue being inevitably linked to China’s internal situation, as practitioners who make political predictions based on publicly available information, it is essential to avoid speculation in the absence of clear information.
By analyzing the announcements of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee and the announcement of January 24, 2026, a clear political fact emerges: all three political forces in China are currently facing difficulties. If these three parties wish to extricate themselves from these predicaments as soon as possible, identifying their respective weaknesses and potential opportunities is fundamental to achieving their goals.
I. The Power Base and Realistic Limitations of the Daoist Tradition (Xi Jinping Group)
Strength and Armor:
Regardless of whether the Xi Jinping faction is currently at its lowest point in the political landscape, it has always maintained control over a powerful political force: the power of the established order. The announcement on July 1, 2025, explicitly declared that the Xi Jinping faction still holds this “power of the established order.” This force is the Xi Jinping faction’s strongest armor, guaranteeing it will not suffer a major blow before November 2027.
This powerful armor could become a regeneration tool for the Xi Jinping faction. It’s even possible that the Xi Jinping faction will rely on this armor to defeat the combined forces of the military and deep-seated political powers.
In addition, the Xi Jinping faction retains nominal “ruling power.” This provides the Xi Jinping faction with room to conduct complex political maneuvering.
Real-world limitations:
Deep-seated political forces in China currently hold a firm grip on the final decision-making power. Despite their poor performance in the early stages, as long as their ties with the military are not severed, the Xi Jinping faction’s attempt to regain final decision-making power is essentially doomed to failure.
opportunity:
It is too early to conclude that the Xi Jinping group is “proceeding towards its predetermined end.” Xi Jinping is a political strongman. He is highly skilled at manipulating political issues. He has extricated himself from political quagmires on numerous occasions. He still has the opportunity to summon the most powerful political forces in China.
However, the military and the deep state alliance will not allow Xi Jinping to succeed so easily. If they merely survive past February 2027, the Xi Jinping group’s chances of rebirth will be almost entirely lost.
Huge risks:
Xi Jinping’s assertive political maneuvering over the past 15 years has almost completely severed any avenues for reconciliation with other political families. If he cannot recover, all the concessions previously made by these families will translate into pressure to hold him accountable. Although Xi himself is protected from criminal prosecution, his family, his mother’s family, and his wife’s family will inevitably suffer significant blows.
II. The Military’s Power Base and Practical Limitations
strength:
In any country, the military is the most powerful force. Once the military breaks free from the control of the ruling class, its inertia is to become a force opposing the ruling class.
Protect:
Judging from the announcement on July 1, 2025, the deep-seated political forces in China have not endowed the Chinese military with legitimacy. However, the alliance between the deep-seated political forces and the military is a form of protection for legitimacy. As long as the legitimacy of the deep-seated forces is not overturned, the military will be difficult to abandon.
Real-world limitations:
The military is certain to be the leading force in the power transfer announced on July 1, 2025. However, this has not become a strength for the military, but rather a weakness.
The announcement failed to explicitly grant the military a legitimacy, making it a vassal of deeper political forces. Especially after Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were removed from military power, the military completely lost its ability to make independent decisions and act independently.
Through their control of the ruling power, the Xi Jinping faction can exert financial constraints on the military, further limiting its ability to act independently.
Potential risks
The fact that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were not completely politically killed does not mean that other senior military officers and political figures involved in military operations are in an absolutely safe state.
Once the leaders of China’s current deep-seated political forces are freed from the danger posed by the Xi Jinping group, they may impose further constraints on the current senior military officers. There is even a risk that, in order to absolve themselves of historical responsibility, these deep-seated political leaders might conduct a complete purge of current senior military officers.
Political leaders from all sides may try to project goodwill to dilute the risk awareness of military leaders and reduce their incentive to find a way out of the predicament.
Escape Plan
The military’s fatal flaw lies in its lack of the support of the established moral authority. However, both the nominal and actual forces of the established moral authority (Xi Jinping’s group) will do everything in their power to prevent the military from independently acquiring this authority.
The military’s escape plan must be tailored to the specific circumstances. However, military operations are difficult, and discovering an escape plan is extremely challenging.
III. The Power Base and Realistic Limitations of Deep-Seated Political Forces
strength:
The announcement on July 1, 2025, explicitly granted substantial moral authority to the deep-seated political forces in China. Their ultimate control over Chinese politics is their most powerful political armor and offensive weapon.
Although the military possesses the most powerful execution capabilities, it must rely on the protection of deep-seated political forces in China. In other words, military power is also a component of China’s political power.
As long as the nominal ruling faction (Xi Jinping’s group) is not fully reborn before February 2027, the deep-seated political forces in China can naturally dominate the formation of the 21st Chinese power group.
Real-world flaws:
The Xi Jinping faction has not been completely stripped of its moral authority. They remain, in name only, the holders of that authority. Relying on this power, the Xi Jinping faction has not lost the opportunity for a “do-or-die” gamble. They have not completely lost the opportunity to mobilize China’s most powerful political force.
As long as the Xi Jinping faction has not suffered a complete political demise, it cannot be asserted that the leaders of China’s deep-seated political forces are in absolute safety.
Although the military is currently under the protection of deep-seated political forces in China, this does not mean that the military is completely subservient to them.
In theory, the military still has the opportunity to gain some control over the traditional political system. If this possibility is realized, the advantage of China’s deep-seated political forces could collapse from its very foundation.
Risks and dangers
Whether the military breaks free from the control of deep-seated political forces or re-establishes deep ties with the Xi Jinping faction, the current leaders of these deep-seated political forces will fall into a political abyss.
Escape Plan
This cuts off the Xi Jinping faction’s chances of revival before February 2027.
This eliminates the possibility of the military and the Xi Jinping group re-establishing a “deep and complex cooperation plan that will not be easily decoupled.”
summary
Currently, all three political forces in China are simultaneously facing difficulties. A clear understanding of their respective power bases and practical shortcomings is fundamental for them to find a way out of this predicament.
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