The Tripartite Dilemma in Contemporary Chinese Politics

Chinese Current Affairs

Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 2, April 2026

                     

The Tripartite Dilemma in Contemporary Chinese Politics

Ye Qiquan

First release date:	Monday, February 2, 2026
Modified date:	Friday, March 20, 2026

 

Reference data element: (APA)

Ye Qiquan. (2026). The Tripartite Dilemma in Contemporary Chinese Politics. Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis. April 2026. Vol. 1 (2), 1-12.

summary: China’s current political situation has entered a complex and entangled phase. All three major political forces are in trouble. Xi Jinping’s side holds significant “legacy power,” but they are suppressed by the “deep-seated political forces” in internal power-executing procedures and by the “military” in terms of actual power. The military currently holds the actual ability to control the situation, but it lacks the protection of legitimacy. They are a typical example of being “both the strongest and the most vulnerable.” The “deep-seated political forces” are not currently in the limelight. There are three possibilities: First, they are unwilling to provide the military with legitimacy. Second, the military is unwilling to relinquish too much power to them. Third, they have been deceived into a dead end by the “current legitimacy holder.” None of these three parties are completely dead, nor are any completely alive. They all need to find a way out of their predicament. The current political chaos in China may have a series of international repercussions.

Keywords:
Xi Jinping Group; Traditional Powers; Chinese Military; Deep-Seated Political Forces in China; Domestic Politics in China; Political Dilemma

China’s current political forces can be categorized into three groups: the Xi Jinping faction, the “current ruling faction”; the military, the most powerful yet most vulnerable political force in China; and the “deep-seated political forces,” which are the deep-seated political forces in China, possessing profound and substantial power, but often struggling to form a united front.

The undeniable reality is that all three political forces are currently mired in difficulties. None are completely dead, and none are completely alive.

I. Current Political Realities in China

When speculating about China’s domestic political situation, it is difficult to accurately determine the causes, processes, and prospects of events without inside information. However, speculating and judging China’s political situation through publicly available information is often more accurate than relying on “secret intelligence.”

A pivotal indicator of a new development in Chinese domestic politics is the front-page headline report in the People’s Daily on July 1, 2025. This report revealed the establishment of a newly formed institution called the “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body.” This institution “removed Xi Jinping’s previous ultimate decision-making power in Chinese politics.” This report is essentially a public announcement of the transfer of political power in China. It explicitly declares that China’s power execution system, power execution procedures, and ultimate political decision-making power have all changed. It is an announcement that is both clear and ambiguous.

Clarity: It publicly issues clear guidelines for the exercise of power within the power system. That is, it clearly announces within the power system that the ultimate political decision-making power in China has shifted. The highest power and the ultimate political decision-making power now belong to the “Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the decision-making and deliberative body.” All levels of power execution must adhere to the new power execution procedures.

Ambiguity: While making clear disclosures to those within the power structure, the highest power center intentionally sends ambiguous signals to the “public outside the system.” That is, it does not disclose to the “ordinary people outside the system” the fact that supreme power and its execution procedures have been transferred. This maintains basic stability in the domestic political situation. However, one effect of this is that, at the public level, the power of the ruling ideology remains in the hands of the Xi Jinping group.

Currently, the most important political force in China, the “force of the established order,” remains in the hands of the Xi Jinping faction. This force can be used to counter pressure from adversaries. It could even be an opportunity for the Xi Jinping faction to stage a dramatic comeback.

The successful isolation of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from military forces on January 24, 2026, was one of the most successful political maneuvers by the Xi Jinping faction. However, this does not mean that the military has completely failed, nor does it mean that the Xi Jinping faction has escaped its predicament.

The events of January 24, 2026, clearly mark a new political symbol: the simultaneous predicament of three political forces in contemporary China. No one is completely dead, nor is any one completely alive. Each has the opportunity for complete rebirth, and each also carries the probability of sudden and utter demise.

II. The Dilemma and Prospect of the Daotongfang (Xi Jinping Group)

2.1 Dilemma

The predicament of Xi Jinping’s group is obvious. Here is the evidence.

The announcement on July 1st was a clear public notice of the transfer of power.

The announcement on July 1, 2025, regarding the establishment of the “Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s Decision-Making and Deliberative Body” is the latest announcement of a power transfer in China. It is a notice outlining a new power execution procedure for officials within the system.

To date, this announcement has not been overturned, nor has the leader or figurehead who spearheaded the announcement fallen into a “clear predicament.” In other words, the final decision-making power that was stripped away has not yet returned to the Xi Jinping group.

It is impossible to place Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli in “complete political death”.

The successful separation of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from the military was one of the most successful political maneuvers by the Xi Jinping faction. It suggests that the Xi Jinping group has recovered some vitality from its political low point. However, the inability to completely eliminate Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli politically indicates that the Xi Jinping faction not only lacks the “final decision-making power,” but also squandered a crucial opportunity for rebirth.

Wasting the most important chance of rebirth

On January 24, 2026, the Xi Jinping faction successfully “isolated Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from military forces.” This event has three negative implications.

A. Xi Jinping’s group lacks top-tier political talent;

B. The Xi Jinping Group itself squandered a crucial opportunity for rebirth;

C. The core of Xi Jinping’s group is completely disconnected from grassroots officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2.2 Political Pursuits

A “smooth landing” is the ultimate goal of Xi Jinping’s group. As long as they and their immediate family members do not face criminal charges after January 2028, this is the highest objective for key members of Xi Jinping’s group. Clearly, they are working towards this goal, with different members using different methods and means to seek future security guarantees or assurances.

2.3 Future Prospects and Future Outlook

The vast majority of Xi Jinping’s faction has ample time to reach compromises with emerging political forces in exchange for political security or criminal immunity after 2028. However, one thing is certain: the fate of each member will not be entirely the same. A small number will be fortunate enough to join the next power group, most will land safely, but a very small minority will face severe repercussions.

On January 24, 2026, the Xi Jinping faction successfully “isolated Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from military forces.” This event effectively squandered a crucial opportunity for rebirth for the Xi Jinping faction. It also demonstrates a complete disconnect between the core of the Xi Jinping faction and lower-level officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, preventing Ye Qiquan’s suggestions from reaching the faction’s decision-making center.

The outlook for Xi Jinping is bleak. Ye Qiquan made this prediction as early as February and March 2025. He pointed out that Xi Jinping only has two possible outcomes: success or failure. If he succeeds, he can be deified. He and his family can be assured of becoming gods of the Chinese people and gods of Chinese history. They could even become national heroes and historical heroes surpassing the Mao Zedong family. If he fails, not only will he himself suffer political persecution, but this persecution will also extend to his family, his mother’s family, and his wife’s family (Ye Qiquan, February and March 2025).

2.4 Opportunities for Xi Jinping’s Group to Escape Predicament

Xi Jinping’s group has not completely lost the possibility of collectively escaping its predicament.

In a September 2025 email to Chinese Foreign Ministry officials, Ye Qiquan pointed out that the key to Xi Jinping’s group’s extrication from its predicament lies in “re-establishing a deep, complex, and non-decoupling cooperation program with the military” (Ye Qiquan, November 2025).

Xi Jinping’s ability to extricate himself from difficult situations cannot be denied. He has staged numerous dramatic reversals. However, time is running out for him. He must complete the reversal by February 2027. Once this period is missed, Xi Jinping’s fate can only be “a quiet and slow march towards his predetermined end.”

It’s premature to conclude that the Xi Jinping faction is doomed, despite their bleak future. They still possess one crucial resource: the power of the established moral tradition. In China, this tradition is power, the root of all power, and the foundation for their resurgence.

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III. The Dilemma of Deep-Seated Political Forces in China

Overall, the deep-rooted political forces are currently the most established, powerful, and resilient of the three political forces. However, these strengths are also their weaknesses.

3.1 Features and Attributes

Abundant talent pool

The most prominent characteristic of deep-seated political forces is their abundant talent pool. They can continuously introduce new leaders and representatives, and the current ruling class cannot fundamentally weaken this group of political forces.

Leaders live on

Thanks to the abundant talent pool, even if a number of leaders have their political careers ended, there is an endless supply of potential leaders.

Difficult to form a joint force

Due to the large number of potential leaders, the region has long been in a state of chaotic competition. It is often easily divided by hostile political forces at crucial moments, making it difficult to form a united front and achieve success.

3.2 Highlight Period

The political announcement of July 1, 2025, explicitly established the absolute authority of deep-seated political forces in China. From August to October 2025, they staged a series of impressive performances on the Chinese political stage, including a series of displays of “spring blossoms and autumn fruits,” culminating in the early release of the political schedule for disciplining nine senior military generals on October 17. This schedule was subsequently confirmed and approved at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China .

3.3 Current Dilemma

The political agenda released ahead of schedule was subsequently confirmed at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee. This can be seen as another major political victory for China’s deep-seated political forces. However, this event also reflects another side of the political situation: the rise of China’s deep-seated political forces has been halted. After this meeting, the glamorous image of these forces began to fade. Not only were their pronouncements of “spring blossoms and autumn fruits” discontinued, but Hu Chunhua’s public appearances also decreased rapidly.

The announcement on January 24, 2025, regarding the quarantine of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, can be considered a major setback for China’s deep-seated political forces. This setback should not be simply viewed as a tactical defeat; it may indicate that Hu Jintao is leading the current deep-seated political forces in China. If this inference is true, it suggests a strategic flaw in the current deep-seated political forces in China.

3.4 Future Prospects and Future Outlook

The military has installed a mediocre person as its political leader.

By revisiting the content of the first page of the People’s Daily on July 1, 2025, several conclusions can be easily drawn.

Xi Jinping has been stripped of his “final political decision-making power,” which has been completely transferred to a body called the “Party Central Committee Decision-Making and Deliberation Body,” and has officially become a regulation for the exercise of power.

B has fully preserved the “traditional power” of Xi Jinping and his team. This provides the foundation for the resurgence of the Xi Jinping group, while placing military leaders and leaders of deep-seated forces at high risk.

C. The development of the political situation left a strong “Hu Jintao style “.

The developments in the political situation clearly indicate that the military has appointed a political mediocre individual. A series of political developments suggest that the leader of the deep-seated political forces is indecisive and hesitant, or simply incompetent and unable to resolve complex issues.

While there is no clear evidence to confirm that Hu Chunhua’s visit to three African countries on April 17, 2025, marked the beginning of the military taking control of the political situation, such an inference is reasonable. This is because, at least as early as February 2025, Ye Qiquan had already detected signals that “Xi Jinping may face significant risks.” Furthermore, the arrangement of a 10-day visit to three African countries clearly shows signs of deliberate, last-minute additions to the itinerary.

If the military took control of the political situation starting in April 2025, then the new rules for exercising power wouldn’t be announced until July 1, 2025. This is completely contrary to the usual scenario of a “drastic power shift.” In such a critical period where lives could be at stake, delaying the political process for a full two and a half months is utterly unthinkable. However, if this scenario were to unfold under Hu Jintao, it would be perfectly normal. Ye Qiquan, in an email sent to a group of Chinese Foreign Ministry officials in September 2025, almost explicitly stated that Hu Jintao lacked the ability to lead a complex political situation.

Zhang Youxia’s failure can be traced back to the mediocrity of the leaders of the current deep-seated political forces.

Zhang Youxia’s isolation from the military was due not only to a lack of top political talent within his team, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to the mediocrity and weakness of the political leaders they elected. They preferred to retain the “traditional power” within the Xi Jinping faction rather than explicitly granting it to the military. This, however, is the primary reason for the military leader’s ultimate failure.

Deep-seated political forces cannot guarantee victory.

In the best-case scenario, deep-seated political forces and the military would work together to smoothly ensure that Xi Jinping and his faction cannot be resurrected before February 2027. This would be the deep-seated political forces’ biggest victory in this wave of political struggle. However, even with this achievement, it is not guaranteed that the current deep-seated political forces will dominate the formation of the 21st Chinese power group. Even the expectation of introducing Hu Chunhua as the next political leader faces numerous difficulties. If the current “leader of China’s deep-seated political forces” cannot win the initiative in the 21st power struggle, it cannot be said that “the current leader of China’s deep-seated political forces has won the political struggle.”

3.5 Needs to Overcome Difficulties

For the deep-seated political forces in China, there is no need to extricate themselves from their predicament. As long as the Xi Jinping faction has not been fully reborn before February 2027, a power transition will occur naturally. A new leadership group will emerge from the deep-seated political forces in China.

For the current leaders of China’s deep-seated political forces, the need to extricate themselves from this predicament is real and urgent. Hu Jintao certainly has the shield of immunity from criminal prosecution, but for Hu Chunhua and those who followed him, supported him, or participated in military operations now or before July 2025, the need to extricate themselves from this predicament is real and urgent. If they make another major mistake, even if the Xi Jinping faction does not manage to recover by February 2027, their political future will be at significant risk.

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IV. The Dilemma and Prospects of China’s Military Power

4.1 The Underlying Logic of Chinese Politics

The military is a powerful political force

Mao Zedong famously said, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” This is the foundation of political power transitions in China. There’s no need to cite numerous examples to prove this point; recalling the stories of Mao Zedong, Chiang Kai-shek, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin is sufficient. Ye Qiquan’s basic definition of military power is “a surging, overwhelming force capable of defeating the enemy with overwhelming force.”

The military is a fragile political force

Ye Qiquan also offered another perspective on the Chinese military: “easily broken and easily bent, making it difficult to ensure the safety of its generals.” Ye pointed out that the Chinese military is actually the most vulnerable of the three political forces (Ye Qiquan, November 2025). Unfortunately, military leaders did not see the email Ye Qiquan sent to Chinese diplomats in November 2025.

The military’s default is the blade, not the hilt.

In China’s political and cultural traditions, the military has never been endowed with the power of moral authority. Mao Zedong consistently sought to maintain both military and moral authority through a dual identity. Deng Xiaoping always issued orders for governing the country in the name of the government. Although Jiang Zemin effectively held military power, he could not completely disregard Hu Jintao’s moral authority.

The military cannot be directly involved in China’s political management process. The traditional order accepted by the Chinese grassroots is that the military is the blade, and the government is the handle. The inability to easily obtain the support of this traditional order is the fatal weakness of the Chinese military.

4.2 The Military’s Dilemma and Its Causes

Undeniably, the military was the direct driving force behind this political power shift. Without the military’s actions, this change in political power would not have occurred.

Unfortunately, military leaders see the military’s strength but fail to see its weakness. This is the underlying reason for the military’s current predicament and its philosophical dilemma.

4.2.1 The military failed to recognize the fragility and weakness of its own forces.

The military was the original driving force behind this political power shift. If the military had valued the importance of “traditional authority,” they certainly would have been able to seize a portion of that authority’s support and protection, thus securing their invincibility. Unfortunately, they missed their best opportunity.

4.2.2 The military encountered difficulties in electing political leaders.

If April marked the initial consolidation of political power by the military, and the new power implementation procedures weren’t promulgated until July, there’s a two-and-a-half-month gap (or a period of hesitation). This situation suggests that the military encountered significant difficulties in seeking the support (protection) of the orthodox tradition. There are generally four possibilities for this situation.

A political leader rejected the military’s overtures; political leadership candidates were unwilling to take historical responsibility for the military’s actions.

B. The political leader chosen by the military was unwilling to grant the military sufficient legitimacy; the military and the political leader had been negotiating repeatedly, delaying the opportunity.

C. The military lacks top-notch political talent; the military cannot find a way to obtain “the blessing of the orthodox tradition” on its own.

D. There is excessive tension between the military and the Xi Jinping group; neither side can find a solution to “rebuild a deep, complex and irreversible cooperative relationship,” or is unwilling to choose this very difficult option.

4.2.3 Political leaders are unwilling to grant the military any legitimacy or authority.

Since the new power structure was announced on July 1, 2025, no measures have been introduced to endorse or protect the military’s legitimacy. This is the underlying reason for the military leaders’ setbacks. The deep-seated political forces in China are unwilling to grant the military legitimacy, and this may be due to one or more of the following factors combined.

A is unwilling to bear historical responsibility for the military’s actions, since the seizure of power under military leadership has never been recognized by the historical inertia of China. Giving legitimacy to the military’s actions could be written into negative history.

B is unwilling to grant the military more power. They fear that the combination of military and traditional forces would make the military too powerful to control.

C. The military’s demands are too high, or the political leader’s demands are too high, causing a lack of coordination between the two sides. The military and deep-seated political forces have reached a tacit understanding of “taking it one step at a time and discussing it as we go.”

4.2.4 Mistakes by military leaders

From the announcement of the new power execution procedures on July 1, 2025, to Zhang Youxia’s isolation on January 24, 2026, it not only proves that the military leaders made a series of mistakes, but also verifies Ye Qiquan’s prediction that “military force cannot guarantee the safety of generals in the long run.” The military leaders’ mistakes include at least the following.

A did not fully recognize the importance of the power of the orthodox tradition.

Not only did it fail to bolster the military’s moral authority, it actually preserved the complete moral authority of the Xi Jinping faction. This has become the Xi Jinping faction’s strongest shield and the source of its counterattack power.

B made a major mistake in selecting political leaders.

The failure to provide the military with the necessary legitimacy was not only a mistake on the part of the military, but also a strategic error on the part of the leaders of the deep-seated political forces. Combined with the weakening of these deep-seated political forces after the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee, this fully demonstrates that the military made a major mistake in selecting its political leaders.

C lacks political acumen

If top political talent emerges within the military, they will understand the importance of legitimacy and patronage. Furthermore, if the deep-seated political leaders chosen by the military are unwilling to grant it legitimacy and patronage, the military has the initiative to rebuild a “deep, complex, and difficult-to-dismantle cooperation plan” with the Xi Jinping group under the new circumstances, thereby gaining legitimacy and patronage. Moreover, with the assistance of top political talent, the military might be able to bypass the above two sets of “legitimacy and patronage” schemes and independently discover a “scheme to gain legitimacy and patronage.”

D. Tactical error

After this series of strategic blunders, defeat for the military leaders is a highly probable outcome. Even a small tactical error could trigger a major defeat.

4.3 The Military’s Prospects

After December 2027, the prospects for current senior military officers and political leaders who have participated in military operations are as follows.

A. The military was given a special status

In complex and turbulent situations, the military often unexpectedly gains special status or treatment. After Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli have already taken responsibility for the political turmoil, current senior military leaders may gain unexpected political benefits without bearing any political responsibility.

B. The military thus gained some of the power of the Taoist tradition.

Although the probability of this happening is extremely low, the possibility of the military gaining short-term or even long-term control over the traditional authority cannot be theoretically ruled out. If this event were to occur, it would have significant historical importance, becoming a major event in Chinese political history.

C. A large-scale purge of senior military officers

Regardless, the military is the primary force responsible for the chaos in the political order. This deficiency could make the military a scapegoat in future power struggles among various political factions.

The new power group could also use this as an excuse to carry out a large-scale purge of military generals. Political forces unwilling to accept defeat can always bring up this period of history to settle scores with current military generals.

D will land smoothly after December 2027.

If the current deep-seated political forces and the Xi Jinping faction maintain the status quo and avoid conflict over the next two years, the current senior military officers are highly likely to retire peacefully after December 2027. However, the probability of these two political forces maintaining the status quo and avoiding conflict is close to zero.

E uses its own capabilities to create a controllable future.

Since Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were isolated from the military, the military is currently clearly in a passive position among the three political forces. However, one possibility cannot be completely ruled out: the military’s predicament may force the discovery of its top political talents, thereby regaining political initiative. The military might even find a “hidden path” to gain mainstream power, thus securing its invincible position .

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V. The International Impact of China’s Current Situation

5.1 Significant Gains for the United States

There is currently no evidence that the United States has intervened in the current situation in China. However, one clear outcome is that China has been drawn into a scenario most favorable to the United States.

In his previous discussion of “US Response Plans to China,” Ye Qiquan pointed out that the US has two main groups of eight response plans to China’s actions to unify Taiwan. One of the most advantageous plans for the US is the “delaying strategy.” China’s current situation is that it has formally entered into this most advantageous “delaying strategy” for the US.

5.2 Significant Benefits for Europe

In his 2022 article, Ye Qiquan pointed out that China currently holds a political advantage over Europe. This advantage manifests in Europe’s dilemma: if a military conflict breaks out between the US and China in East Asia, Europe loses its initiative. Conversely, if China’s instability persists, China will lose its political advantage over Europe, and Europe will regain the initiative in deciding whether to participate in an East Asian war.

5.3 Japan’s Excitement

Japan has yet to find the right solution to its century-old political predicament. Following its current political inertia, it is happy to see China face difficulties and setbacks. The current turmoil in China will encourage Japan to accelerate along its established path.

5.4 Russia’s Observation

The political situation in China will not have a significant impact on the current situation in Ukraine. Russia is not worried that the current situation in China will be detrimental to them, and indeed, it will not have a clear negative impact.

The difficulties China encounters in its development will not have a negative impact on Russia’s national future.

5.5 China’s Setback

1. Ye Qiquan believes that China currently holds a political advantage over Europe because “Europe has been expelled from the imperial power bloc” and “China possesses the ability to incite chaos in the core of Europe and to cause changes in the European map.” If China loses its political advantage over Europe, Europe may regain “the initiative to decide whether to join a war in East Asia.”
2. Ye Qiquan believes that the United States has clearly expressed its political intention to court Russia. However, the US currently lacks sufficient political resources to do so. Once the US overcomes its current predicament, Russia may find it difficult to refuse the overtures from the US and Europe.
3. Compared to the “North America-China axis” proposal, Americans naturally prefer the “reconstruction of the North America-Europe axis” proposal, or the “establishment of a new North America-Europe-Russia axis” proposal. If China’s efforts to advance the “North America-China axis” proposal weaken, China may forever lose the opportunity to join the leadership of the imperial order.

summary:

China’s current political situation has entered a complex and entangled phase. All three major political forces are in trouble. Xi Jinping’s faction holds significant “legacy power,” but they are suppressed by the “deep-seated political forces” in internal power-executing procedures. In terms of actual power, the Xi Jinping group is also suppressed by the military. The military currently holds the actual ability to control the situation, but it lacks the protection of legitimacy. They are a typical example of being “both the strongest and the most vulnerable.” The “deep-seated political forces” are not currently in the limelight. There are three possibilities: First, they are unwilling to provide the military with legitimacy. Second, the military is unwilling to relinquish too much power to them. Third, they have been deceived into a dead end by the “current legitimacy holder.” None of these three factions are completely dead, nor are any completely alive. They all need to find a way out of their predicament. The current political chaos in China may have a series of international repercussions.

References:

Ye Qiquan. (2025). A2a1 Node 2026, cannot be postponed. YouTube. Feb. 27, 2025. https://youtu.be/JBHBw95HBnM?si=8syjlvvy8fYIq7I6

Ye Qiquan. (2025)..A2a2 Why not unify in 2027?. YouTube. Mar. 4, 2025. https://youtu.be/1Et8rEpC7Xw?si=gmLj8AEyqyjIquFq.

Ye Qiquan. (2025). Risks of Delaying Unification for Xi Jinping (First published March 19, 2025). YouTube. Mar. 19, 2025. https://youtu.be/An2jC9SfgDo?si=vCZU0g61DFJ-zYna

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Geopolitical and historical challenges to Israel’s national and ethnic strategy Base offer: US$10 million Abstract: Since its establishment, Israel has consistently achieved military victories and become a de facto regional power. These victories have created the illusion, among Israelites and others, that Israel’s success depends on its overall competitive advantage. The continued existence of the Israeli state relies on four fundamental pillars: geopolitical needs; geopolitical values; national competitive advantages; and philosophical values. With the advent of the new imperial order, all four factors have faced severe challenges. Payment Risk: Purchasing involves significant risks. Please carefully weigh the potential risks against the value. Attachment: An interview opportunity may be provided free of charge.

The most dangerous scenario for China to force the US to compromise Base offer: US$10 million Synopsis: Lack Target customers: national entities and national alliances. Risk Warning: The contents of the project proposal have not been, and will not be, disclosed in advance. Potential buyers are advised to carefully assess the transaction risks. In addition to the written proposal, we will provide a one-month opportunity for joint communication.

What kind of policy should major powers have towards Iran? Offer: $10 million Content disclosure: It’s difficult to say that major powers, including the United States, China, Russia, and Europe, have had successful policies toward Iran. The United States and Europe pursue a policy of containing Iran. Even with a series of tactical successes, their decades-long efforts can be summarized as “failure and frustration.” The repeated military strikes by the US-led coalition against Iran have not significantly weakened Iran’s overall national competitiveness and overall war-fighting capabilities. Russia’s and China’s policies toward Iran cannot be considered successful either. Neither country has gained significant economic or political benefits from their strategies toward Iran. Israel’s policy toward Iran can be summarized as a failure. Israel’s series of tactical successes cannot mask its strategic losses. Target customers: National entities, military alliances, and long-term investment capital that are deeply concerned with shifts in geopolitical power. risk: Before making any payments, please fully understand the seller’s political analysis capabilities, the potential returns of the investment, and the risks involved.

How can Japan shed its historical baggage and become a normal country and a regional leader ? Base price: $50 million Content: Japan’s long-standing mission is to reconnect with Asia. However, Japan’s historical baggage not only hinders this process but also prevents it from developing into a nation with equal standing in the region. Without revolutionary or groundbreaking ideas, Japan’s path to development will be extremely difficult. Risk Warning: Returns cannot be guaranteed. Please communicate thoroughly with the seller before making payment and carefully assess potential returns and investment risks.

China’s extreme governance plan for Taiwan after reunification Base price: $1 million (sales will only begin after at least ten orders are received) or an exclusive purchase for $100 million. Content: China’s reunification is projected to be completed within the next decade. The Chinese central government faces pressure to ensure political stability in Taiwan, yet fears the historical responsibility it would have to bear. This is not only a significant contradiction but also a psychological obstacle to achieving reunification. The Chinese central government urgently needs to take action to find a solution that can simultaneously achieve both goals. Meanwhile, global long-term investors, political investors, large Taiwanese conglomerates, and mainland Chinese monopoly capital can reap substantial profits by understanding China’s fundamental policies and adjusting their investment strategies accordingly. Disclaimer: This article does not constitute investment advice.

European Policy in China’s Unification Process Offer: $5 million Synopsis 1. How to fundamentally prevent Europe from joining the East Asian war as a whole, thereby eliminating the possibility of Europe becoming a production base for the United States’ war of attrition. 2. How to effectively compel the United States to accept a next-generation imperial order based on the “US-China axis” blueprint.

Predictions: Hong Kong ‘s political system, administrative divisions, and corresponding investment opportunities after 2047 . Price: $1 million This information can be used as background data by large corporations, long-term investors, and political forecasting and policy-making bodies when formulating long-term policies. (Not intended as investment advice.) Prediction: Hong Kong’s political system and administrative divisions after 2047 Price: $100 Provides general political predictions. Suitable as background information for personal interest, academic research, or background studies.