GeoPolitica

The moderate elites within China’s political system unanimously oppose the idea of ​​China unifying Taiwan by force. Their opposition stems from their fears, including: China’s overall national strength is insufficient to counter the US bloc; the involvement of Japan and South Korea would drag China into a prolonged period of economic depletion; continued resistance from the Taiwanese people would cause China to suffer long-term losses; and the forceful unification of Taiwan would set back China’s development. However, Ye, Qiquan holds a completely opposite view. Ye argues that China’s overall national war capability will have surpassed that of the United States by 2022; Japan and South Korea, while initially likely participants in a Sino-US war, will inevitably join China’s camp in the later stages; forceful unification is a shortcut to quickly establishing a new East Asian order; this new East Asian order is the cornerstone of the Sino-Asian empire; it is the cornerstone that forces the United States to choose the “North American-East Asian axis”; establishing the next generation of world order inevitably involves a period of chaos; the Taiwan base, the new East Asian order, and China’s forceful unification action are key to shortening this chaotic period; and compared to other options, the “North American-East Asian axis” is more readily accepted by the Americans.

Abstract: There are already very clear signs that China’s plan for military unification has been postponed until at least the end of 2027. It is highly likely that this action will be delayed until after 2029. Of course, what we are discussing today is a very low probability scenario—namely, that there is a certain chance China might suddenly launch its unification process in December 2026 or slightly earlier.

Ye, Qiquan believes that: 1. China’s major political families are currently all embroiled in political turmoil. 2. China is currently in a state of separation among its three major political powers. 3. China’s top priority at present is to find a solution to effectively integrate these three power entities into a single entity. 4. The vision of effectively integrating these three power entities into a single entity is difficult to achieve because there is no clear entry point. 5. Ye, Qiquan suggests that launching a “China Unification Initiative” might serve as a starting point for effectively integrating these three power entities. 6. He points out that although the Chinese military is powerful, it is in fact extremely vulnerable. (This assessment was validated on January 24, 2026, when Zhang Youxia was cut off from the Chinese military.) 7. He notes that while the “Daoist Tradition” faction (the Xi Jinping group) possesses philosophical appeal, it struggles to ensure its own security.

Chinese Current Affairs Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 3, August 2026                          USA Beats China again and Wait the Next Win Ye, Qiquan First release date: Saturday, May 16, 2026 (Published in advance) Reference data element: (APA) Ye, Qiquan. (2026). The United States wins another game and awaits the next victory. Political…

Chinese Politics  Political Forecasting and In-Depth Studies  Vol 1 ( 3).   Agu. 2026 Delaying China’s Unification: The U.S. Wins a Crucial Battle Ye, Qiquan Publication Date: Sunday, April 12, 2026   Cite this article: (APA)   Ye, Qiquan.(2026). Delaying China’s Unification: The U.S. Wins a Crucial Battle. Political Forecasting and In-Depth Studies.   Agu. 2026. Vol 1…

From the perspective of phenomena and realpolitik, Israelis possess not only regional competitive advantages but also global ones. These overall competitive advantages (overall war capability advantages) are the foundation for ensuring the existence of the Israeli state and for guaranteeing its continued existence. However, “Crazy Ye” (Ye, Qiquan) proposes a different narrative. He believes that in the near future, key elements for guaranteeing and maintaining the existence of the Israeli state will face challenges. Israelis need to deeply consider the potential crises in their national and state strategies.

Under the current mainstream interpretations and narrative frameworks, China’s overall national competitiveness curve is projected to intersect with that of the United States around 2050. However, under an alternative assessment system that transcends these current narratives, China is deemed to have surpassed the United States in overall military capability as early as 2022. China is believed to hold three major trump cards: its advantage in overall national war-fighting capabilities; its power to trigger political turmoil and territorial changes in Europe; and its ultimate trump card—the ability to force the United States to accept a “U.S.-China Axis” system. These three advantages form the conceptual and philosophical foundation for China’s challenge to the unipolar U.S. imperial order.

Regarding the process of China’s unification, Ye, Qiquan believes that the primary risk stems from Europe. Europe is, in fact, the political force in the world that harbors the strongest hostility toward China. Should a military conflict break out between China and the United States, Europe would not only face pressure to be drawn into the conflict against its will but would also have a powerful “endogenous impulse” to seek China’s complete defeat. Once Europe is able to rule out the likelihood of a major defeat, it may actively participate in a war against China. In contrast, China has consistently underestimated the hostility coming from Europe. This could lead to major flaws in China’s contingency plans. Should Europe join a war against China, it would not only force China to bear significant political costs during the conflict but also make it difficult for China to withstand political defeat in the post-war period. China’s strategy toward Europe should be closely aligned with its political objectives—namely, to effectively prevent Europe from becoming a production base for the United States’ war of attrition. China should pursue and compel the United States to accept a next-generation imperial order based on the blueprint of a “U.S.-China Axis.”

China’s three major political forces—the Confucian tradition, the military, and the deep state—are all currently facing difficulties. A clear understanding of their respective power bases and practical shortcomings is the foundation for them to find a way out of their predicament.

The announcement on July 1, 2025, could be termed the “July 1 Power Mechanism” or the “July 1 Power Transfer.” From then on, Chinese politics will enter a complex tripartite structure. Currently, all three parties are in trouble. The ruling faction (Xi Jinping’s group) still holds all the important metaphysical power; the military holds the actual power to stabilize the situation; and the background political forces effectively control the ruling power. Currently, none of these three parties is completely dead, nor is any completely alive. They all need to find a way out of their predicament.