The Fears of China’s Moderates (1): The Greatest Obstacle to China’s Unification Efforts

China Affairs

Political Forecasting and In-Depth Studies  Vol. 1 No. 3 August 2026

The Fears of China’s Moderates (1): The Greatest Obstacle to China’s Unification Efforts

Ye, Qiquan

First published:

Tuesday, July 14, 2026

 

Citation Format: (APA)

Ye, Qiquan. (2026). The Fears of China’s Moderates (1): The Greatest Obstacle to China’s Unification Efforts.  Political Forecasting and In-Depth Studies. August 2026. Vol. 1 (3), 38–48.

Abstract: Because China’s strategic assessment system is rooted in Western models, the Chinese political system is filled with political elites trained according to these Western models. Even though these elites remain steadfast in their patriotic commitment to China, their assessment frameworks regarding the nation’s overall strength, total war capabilities, and overall competitiveness are entirely subservient to Western evaluation systems. This leads them to unanimously oppose any plan for China to unify Taiwan by force. Their opposition is rooted in their fears, which are primarily manifested in the following pillars: China’s overall national power is insufficient to counter the U.S.-led bloc; the intervention of Japan and South Korea would drag China into a prolonged process of national power depletion; Continued resistance from the Taiwanese public will cause China to bleed resources for an extended period. The use of force to unify Taiwan will set back China’s development process. However, Ye, Qiquan’s views are entirely contrary to theirs. He argues that: China’s overall national war-fighting capabilities had already comprehensively surpassed those of the United States by 2022; Japan and South Korea would inevitably be participants in a Sino-American war in the early stages but would inevitably join China’s camp in the middle to late stages; the use of force to unify Taiwan is a shortcut to rapidly establishing a New East Asian Order; the New East Asian Order is the cornerstone of the Sino-Asian Empire; the New East Asian Order is the cornerstone for compelling USA to choose the “North America–East Asia Axis”; the establishment of the next-generation world order will inevitably go through a period of chaos; the Taiwan base, the New East Asian Order, and China’s military unification campaign are the keys to shortening this period of chaos; compared to other options, the “North America–East Asia Axis” is more readily acceptable to Americans

 

Keywords:
China; moderates; Chinese unification;

 

It cannot be denied that Chinese politicians have long been influenced by China’s heroic view of history, and patriotism has become an important component of their moral framework. However, a segment of China’s political moderate elite is inherently opposed to the plan for China’s military unification of Taiwan. Their opposition to military unification is based entirely on their fear of this plan.

I. Background and Summary

1.1 A Segment of China’s Ruling Elite Opposes the Military Unification of Taiwan

There currently exists a powerful force in China opposed to the military unification of Taiwan. This force primarily stems from the so-called “moderates” within China’s ruling elite. Moreover, there is fairly clear evidence indicating that they are shaping China’s current political direction.

It cannot be ruled out that the comprehensive capitulation proposal put forward by the Chinese side during the U.S.-China summit in May 2026 was the result of their leadership [1, 2].

Regardless of whether this set of surrender agreements was privately orchestrated by the Xi Jinping faction outside of official control, or whether the dominant elites within the “July 1 Mechanism” forced the Xi Jinping faction to put them forward, the conclusion is very clear. That is, China’s surrender faction has already taken control of the country’s political direction. They have publicly acknowledged to the United States that they will not launch China’s unification campaign before the end of 2027. According to Ye, Qiquan’s speculation, China’s unification campaign has in fact been postponed until after 2029 [1].

1.2 China’s National Power Assessment Framework Derives from Western Power Assessment Models

Since the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening-Up, China has comprehensively adopted European (including some North American) educational and training systems, legal and judicial enforcement systems, cultural narratives, and national power assessment models. The Chinese elite, who have been educated within this system, now dominate China’s power structure and governance system.

Under this framework of narratives and assessment models, a set of seemingly indisputable conclusions regarding national power has taken shape. Namely: China’s overall national power may converge with that of the United States around 2050.

1.3 China’s Ruling Elite Is Deeply Entrapped in the “Soft Power Trap”

Although the term “soft power” emerged relatively late, European politicians and political elites have long been working to promote the European-style “speed bump effect” [3] through soft power. Every one of China’s current social problems stems from the European-style soft power trap.

At least regarding the Taiwan issue, the syndrome of side effects caused by the soft power trap includes the following:

1. The trap of the concept that “human rights trump sovereignty”;
2. The trap of viewing liberalism as the supreme standard;
3. The trap of believing that Western political structures are universally superior to Eastern ones;
4. The theoretical trap that war leads to national impoverishment;
5. The conceptual trap that the U.S. alliance is unbreakable;
6. The theoretical trap that the U.S. imperial order is unbreakable;
7. The conceptual trap that Japan is a natural military ally of the United States;
8. The conceptual trap that Japan is the most powerful force opposing China’s reunification with Taiwan;
9. The theoretical trap that reunifying Taiwan will lead to China’s comprehensive regression.

1.4 The Fears of China’s Moderate Elite

China’s moderate elite generally opposes plans for China to reunify with Taiwan by force. Their opposition to this plan is not based on the reasons cited by Chinese radicals—such as treason, corruption, or being held hostage by foreign powers. The true primary reason is their fear of U.S. national power. Their fears can be summarized as follows.

1. Fear of U.S. overall power. They believe that any plan to antagonize the United States would lead to China’s national failure. China’s national power would be severely damaged, and its international standing would plummet.
2. Japan is another powerful force opposing China’s unification of Taiwan. Japan’s geopolitical power would drag China into the quagmire of a protracted war. The combined national power of the United States and Japan would deal a crushing blow to China. China would not only suffer severe losses in international political clout but also face a major defeat in geopolitical power, thereby completely derailing China’s prospects for national development.
3. The pro-independence forces among Taiwan’s civilian population are powerful and tenacious. The Chinese central government’s unification efforts would be drawn into the trap of a “protracted people’s war,” thereby leading to China’s national failure.
4. Once China becomes mired in a protracted war, it will inevitably face national failure.

This section focuses on discussing the fears of China’s moderates. The next section will focus on Ye, Qiquan’s assessment and rebuttal of these fears.

II. Fears Regarding U.S. National Power

In the fields of international relations, strategic studies, and economic forecasting, “China will approach the United States around 2050”, or briefly surpass the United States, or possibly never surpass the United States, have been the most common predictions over the past 20 years. Even the most optimistic reports regarding China suggest that it will “approach or briefly surpass the United States around 2050.” The primary implication of this conclusion is that China may approach the United States in terms of overall national power by 2025, but will never be able to surpass it.

These narrative models are based on various “current internationally recognized assessment systems.” They include:

Economic Size Forecasts (GDP)

The use of GDP indicators to evaluate national power, assess officials’ performance, and gauge a government’s governance capabilities has been a constant throughout the entire process of China’s reform and opening-up.

The economic scale (GDP) forecast model supports the most optimistic conclusions regarding China. Even so, it only maintains the projection that China will slightly lead the United States by 2050.

The Carnegie Endowment notes that by 2050, China’s GDP may be 20% larger than that of the United States. Goldman Sachs indicates that China’s economy will lead the United States by 2050. John Thornton (former president of Goldman Sachs) noted that by 2050, China’s GDP will be $42 trillion, while the United States’ will be $38 trillion. The Foreign Affairs Forum pointed out that China may approach or briefly surpass the United States by 2050, but demographic structure poses the greatest risk.

Comprehensive National Power Index (CNP/CNPI)

Currently, both Chinese and international academic circles uniformly use a single model to assess “overall national power.” This model is the “Comprehensive National Power Index” (Comprehensive National Power Index—CNPI).

The conclusion drawn from this model is that the United States still maintains a comprehensive advantage, while China is rising rapidly but has not yet reached the level of a “peer competitor.”

This assessment model is regarded as one of the most systematic and transparent comprehensive national power models currently available.

The Asia-Pacific Power Index(Lowy Institute Asia Power Index) is another important assessment model. It concludes that the United States will continue to score highest in terms of resources in the future.

Military Capability Growth Models

It is now widely known among the Chinese public that various international models for assessing military power exist. Examples include the Global Firepower rankings; the Global Air Power Ranking (WDMMA); and the Global Naval Power Ranking (WDMMW), among others.

In these assessment systems, China’s overall military strength consistently ranks third, behind Russia. Its air force has long been ranked 8th or 9th, trailing both the Indian Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps in terms of military strength.

Unlike the widespread skepticism among the Chinese public regarding the validity of the air force rankings, the Chinese—whether ordinary citizens or the ruling elite—do not question the rankings of the Global Firepower index. They accept by default that China’s overall military strength lags behind Russia’s. Given Russia’s performance in the war in Ukraine, China’s ruling elite harbors serious fears of a military confrontation with the U.S.-led alliance.

Population and Labor Force Models

Lowy, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and the IMF all project that China’s working-age population will decline by approximately 18% by 2050. In contrast, the United States maintains population resilience through immigration. This dynamic of one country’s decline and another’s rise will significantly impact the long-term trends in the comprehensive national power of both China and the United States. In this regard, the United States will outperform China by 2050.

Scientific and Technological Innovation Capability Model

The Global Innovation Index (GII) is currently the widely accepted framework for assessing a nation’s innovation prospects. Other evaluation models include the AI Competitiveness Index (Stanford AI Index); the Patent and R&D Investment Model (OECD); and the Science and Technology Talent Pool Model (UNESCO).

Virtually none of these assessment models—proposed by Europeans (including North Americans)—offer an optimistic forecast regarding China’s ability to surpass the United States.

The Chinese have long held the narrative that science and technology drive a nation’s progress in the highest regard. Consequently, these types of assessment results are one of the root causes of the Chinese ruling elite’s deep-seated fear of the United States’ overall national power.

III. Fear of Japan’s National Power

In addition to fearing the United States’ overall national power, China’s elite also generally fear Japan’s overall national power. This fear is primarily manifested in the following ways.

2.1 Fear of Japan’s Scientific, Technological, and Innovative Capabilities

The Chinese public harbors generally negative sentiments toward Japan as a whole. However, this does not affect their recognition of Japan’s scientific, technological, and innovative capabilities.

China’s journey of reform and opening-up has always been accompanied by Japan’s influence in science and technology. Various Japanese industrial brands have long been widely recognized in China. The history of China’s industrial development has been closely intertwined with Japanese brands. This began with early products such as refrigerators, washing machines, rice cookers, VCDs, DVDs, and toilet seats, and later expanded to include joint-venture automobiles, cell phones, cameras, printers, and copiers.

It is a widely accepted conclusion among both North Americans and Chinese that while German and American cars can only last 200,000 kilometers, Japanese cars can last 400,000 kilometers. Although the Chinese constantly highlight the various shortcomings of Japanese cars, they actually hold a significant market share in China.

On the internet, the Chinese often mock the Japanese for “constantly choosing the wrong tech tree.” Yet this mockery itself reflects the Chinese people’s admiration and recognition of the Japanese people’s innovative capabilities. Myths surrounding Japanese technology have also long circulated among the Chinese public, even though many have been proven to be misinformation.

2.2 Fear of the Japanese People’s Resilience

The Chinese have long been wary of the Japanese people’s endurance and resilience. Moreover, Japan’s social structure has consistently supported and sustained this national resilience. Two examples illustrate this fact.

Ma Weidu, a famous Chinese internet celebrity, once recounted an incident in which he purchased a pair of scissors in Japan. The Japanese craftsman who made them came from a family that had operated a small workshop dedicated to crafting various types of blades This tradition has been passed down for over 100 years. Operating as a small family workshop and producing a product with a very small market share, they have managed to tenaciously carry on this tradition for over a century. In addition to the resilience of the Japanese people themselves, the support provided by the social structure for this national resilience is also a key factor.

Another example that is extremely negative in the eyes of the Chinese is the Japanese practice of paying homage at the Yasukuni Shrine. Deep down, the Japanese have always harbored serious concerns that the Chinese will hold them accountable for or dwell on their historical responsibilities. Even so, they have not backed down from paying homage at the Yasukuni Shrine.

2.3 Fear of the Japanese Spirit of Sacrifice

More than 80 years have passed since the end of World War II. In the Chinese collective memory, the image of Japanese soldiers’ combat prowess and spirit of sacrifice has never faded with time. In Chinese folklore, American and British soldiers have never been held in high regard. In contrast, while the Chinese have consistently harbored hostility toward Japanese soldiers, they have never underestimated their spirit of sacrifice or combat prowess.

In recent decades, Chinese folklore has continuously produced various derogatory terms to refer to neighboring forces opposed to China. These contemptuous nicknames encompass Koreans, Vietnamese, Indians, Hong Kong separatists, Taiwanese separatists, and so on. However, the use of derogatory terms for Japanese people by the Chinese began 100 years ago. This proves that the Chinese have never believed the Japanese national character has undergone any significant change. Therefore, there is no need to invent new derogatory terms to characterize the Japanese.

2.4 Fear of Japan’s Comprehensive National Power

Japan has always been a global power; whether in terms of economic, technological, or military strength, it has consistently been a major power.

A review of China’s millennia-long history of warfare reveals a recurring pattern: the attacking side strives to avoid fighting on multiple fronts, while the defending side’s primary strategy is to launch harassment attacks across multiple fronts. For many years, the United States and Japan have occupied the top two spots in the rankings of national power. Now, as a rising power, China seeks to challenge both of these long-standing giants simultaneously—a prospect that naturally stirs deep-seated feelings of insecurity in the Chinese psyche.

2.5 Fear of Japan’s Geopolitical Power

China and Japan are inescapable geopolitical neighbors. Living in harmony with neighbors is the essence of China’s cultural DNA. Education on harmonious neighborly relations has always been a key focus in Chinese cultural textbooks. From childhood, the Chinese are trained within a philosophical and moral framework centered on living in harmony with neighbors. This means, first and foremost, requiring oneself to do one’s utmost to fulfill the responsibility of living in harmony with neighbors.

The Chinese people have always harbored deep-seated anxieties about going to war with Japan, their geopolitical neighbor. Moreover, throughout Chinese history, there has never been an instance of China conquering the Japanese archipelago. Even during powerful dynasties such as the Tang and Yuan, the Chinese central government never succeeded in conquering the Japanese archipelago.

IV. Fear of Civilian Resistance in Taiwan

The Chinese government, the Chinese military, and the Chinese public have never regarded Taiwan’s regular military forces as an obstacle to reunification efforts. However, they have always harbored a deep fear of civilian resistance in Taiwan.

Looking for similar cases in Chinese history: Zhao Xiangzi resisted the three clans of Zhi, Wei, and Han; though besieged for several years (this figure requires verification), the people’s resolve did not waver, and he ultimately defeated his enemies.

Looking for similar cases in world history: The primary reason South Korea was able to establish itself as a medium-sized nation after World War II was the civilian resistance movements during the war.

Looking at modern history, both the Soviet Empire and the American Empire suffered defeats in Afghanistan. Moreover, the civilian resistance in the Fallujah region of Iraq inflicted more casualties on U.S. soldiers than the entire U.S. military campaign to occupy Iraq.

5. Fear of Historical Accountability

Chinese politicians harbor another fear that is virtually nonexistent among politicians elsewhere: the pursuit of historical innocence.

Reviewing world history, the Maya Empire suddenly vanished into thin air. The Native American population in North America plummeted from tens of millions to just a few million. During Europe’s early age of banditry, entire villages were routinely massacred. At war sites left over from Europe’s major conflicts—or from the era of conquest—the skeletal remains of tens of thousands of people are frequently discovered. Nowhere in European or world history has there ever been a historical reckoning for individual crimes of mass murder (with the exception of Hitler). Nor is there any evidence that modern European politicians harbor a deep, moral fear regarding military intervention and the taking of lives.

However, Chinese politicians are bound by moral constraints that are the exact opposite of those held by their European counterparts; they possess an innate fear of historical culpability. Three examples illustrate this particular fear among Chinese politicians.

1. The 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident in China.

Several iconic photographs can now be found online. One shows a young man standing alone in front of a line of tanks, blocking their advance. You can see that the tanks behind him are changing course to avoid him.

Another photograph centers on several burned-out armored vehicles, with the frame filled with countless young people standing on top of them, celebrating wildly.

Another photograph shows a charred corpse hung on a pedestrian overpass as a spectacle. The surrounding area is filled with a crowd of young people dressed as students, cheering and jumping. It is reasonable to infer that this charred corpse was definitely not a student participating in the occupation movement.

While this evidence—which could have justified police in the U.S. and Europe opening fire to suppress such unrest a thousand times over—has instead been used to condemn Chinese politicians for “massacring and slaughtering students.” Moreover, this evidence has been cited for nearly four decades. Even when, in 1992, U.S. police, the National Guard, and the U.S. Army jointly suppressed a riot, there was no public outcry accusing Americans of massacring their own citizens. Nor did it prevent Europeans from continuing to use “uncertain evidence” to accuse Chinese politicians of “massacres.”

1. The 228 Incident in Taiwan.

We can apply the exact same standards used to evaluate the U.S. suppression of the 1992 Los Angeles riots to conclusively prove that the Republic of China government’s actions to restore social order in 1947 were both lawful and justified.

However, this incident—in which the death toll remains unknown—has been held against the Taiwanese people for 80 years. It ultimately became the most powerful force that completely destroyed the Kuomintang’s foundation of governance at its very roots.

1. Xu Qinxian’s Disobedience of Military Orders

A short video has recently circulated online featuring Xu Qinxian, who served as commander of China’s 38th Army in 1989. The video shows this military commander refusing to carry out the order to “use military force to disperse the students occupying Tiananmen Square.” In the comments section of this video, almost no one condemns this officer for violating his military code of ethics. Most express understanding for his refusal to obey orders. These comments further heighten the psychological fear among Chinese politicians regarding the use of force against civilians.

How is it that this example—which is completely useless to European politicians—can so easily strike a blow against Chinese politicians and the Chinese ruling party? This is the restraining force rooted in the moral DNA of the Chinese people and Chinese politicians: namely, the prohibition against using force against civilians. If a politician is recorded in history as having violently suppressed civilians, both his family and future generations will bear historical responsibility. This, in turn, limits their family’s political standing and economic gains throughout history.

This moral constraint—this pursuit of historical integrity—has become the greatest foundation within the hearts of Chinese politicians for opposing the use of force to unify Taiwan.

Discussion:

Because China’s strategic assessment system is rooted in Western models, the Chinese political system is filled with political elites trained according to these Western templates. Even though these elites still adhere to a patriotic foundation, their assessment frameworks regarding the nation’s overall strength, overall war-fighting capabilities, and overall competitiveness are entirely subservient to Western assessment systems. This leads them to unanimously oppose any plan for China to unify Taiwan by force. Their opposition is rooted in fear, which is primarily manifested in the following key concerns: China’s overall national power cannot match that of the U.S.-led bloc; the intervention of Japan and South Korea would drag China into a prolonged process of national power depletion; and sustained resistance from the Taiwanese public would cause China to bleed resources over the long term. Furthermore, they believe that unifying Taiwan by force would set back China’s development process. However, Ye, Qiquan’s perspective is entirely at odds with theirs. As evidenced by: China’s overall national war-fighting capabilities had already comprehensively surpassed those of the United States by 2022; Japan and South Korea would inevitably be participants in a Sino-U.S. war in the early stages but would inevitably join China’s camp in the middle and late stages; the use of force to unify Taiwan is a shortcut to rapidly establishing a New East Asian Order; the New East Asian Order is the cornerstone of the Sino-Asian Empire; the New East Asian Order is the cornerstone for forcing USA to choose the “North America–East Asia Axis”; the establishment of the next-generation world order will inevitably go through a period of chaos; Taiwan bases, the New East Asian Order, and China’s military unification campaign are key to shortening this period of chaos; compared to other options, the “North America–East Asia Axis” is more readily acceptable to Americans

This section discusses only the fears held by Chinese politicians regarding the plan for the military unification of Taiwan. Ye, Qiquan’s assessment and rebuttal of these fears will be presented in the next section.

References

1. Ye, Qiquan. (2026). Delaying China’s Unification: The U.S. Wins a Critical Battle. Political Forecasting and Insights. August 2026. Vol. 1 (3), 1–14.
2. Ye, Qiquan. (2026). Delaying China’s Unification by at Least Four Years: The U.S. Wins a Key Battle Through a Single Meeting. PPPNet. Apr. 12, 2026. https://pppnet.net/usa-wins-on-delaying-chinas-reunification/
3. Ye, Qiquan. (2026). Another Win for the U.S.: During the U.S.-China Summit, Chinese Politicians Pleaded for U.S. Protection in the Name of National Interest. Political Forecasting and Insights. August 2026. Vol. 1 (3), 20–27.
4. Ye, Qiquan. (2026). The U.S. Wins Another Round Against China and Awaits Its Next Victory. PPPNet. May 17, 2026. https://pppnet.net/usa-beats-china-again-and-wait-next-win/
5. Ye, Qiquan. (2026). The Instrumental Nature of “Soft Power” (1): The Speed Bump Effect. Political Forecasting and Insights. April 2026. Vol. 1 (2), 70–77.
6. Ye, Qiquan. (2026). The Instrumental Nature of “Soft Power” (1): The Speed Bump Effect. PPPNet. Mar. 26, 2026. https://pppnet.net/instrumental-nature-of-soft-power1/