summary:
October 9, 2019, an important day. Some reminded Taiwan that “one country, two systems” was drifting away from Taiwan. It was hoped they would fight for it themselves rather than oppose it. August 10, 2022, an even more important day. The mainland officially declared that “one country, two systems” in de facto no longer existed. It specified: 1. All promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping were invalid; 2. Taiwan had no diplomatic power; 3. Taiwan had no command of the military; 4. Taiwanese officials must support the central government and be directly supervised by the central government. Now there is still a shell to discuss. This shell includes issues related to people’s livelihoods such as taxation, administrative plans, and the economic system. This white paper did not mention a specific time limit, but it specified that it must be within the term of the current mainland leader. The general estimate is that the final date will be between April and September 2026. If this is true, then there will be a three-year window for negotiations.
1. Taiwan has lost the “one country, two systems” principle.
I forget the exact date, but it must have been before October 2019, when I wrote an article on a website. The main point was that the most beneficial thing for Taiwanese people at present is not to oppose “one country, two systems,” but to strive for it as much as possible. I even forwarded this document to a well-known Taiwanese commentator. However, in reality, even the most radical pro-unification commentators in Taiwan dared not address this topic, nor did they dare to discuss striving for “one country, two systems.” This ultimately leads to my conclusion—Taiwan has lost the possibility of “one country, two systems.” It’s a well-known fact that “one country, two systems” has no place in Taiwan. Does it have a place in mainland China? Now I can confidently tell you the answer to this question: no. Taiwan, the United States, and Hong Kong have jointly ruined “one country, two systems in Taiwan”.
The reasons why the possibility of “one country, two systems” in Taiwan is no longer possible can be broken down as follows: 1. It leaves room for foreign powers to interfere in China’s affairs. 2. The Hong Kong model has left a negative impact. 3. Taiwanese people are “acting out”. 4. Mainland Chinese people resent it. 5. From a historical perspective, it increases the country’s governance costs.
Second: The fatal flaw of the “one country, two systems” model
-Leaves room for foreign powers to interfere in domestic issues.
1. After a sweet wedding, they ended up as a bitter couple.
Hong Kong’s return to China was a major political act, rare in modern Chinese history, undertaken under exceptionally favorable political conditions. Given the historical circumstances at the time, it almost perfectly achieved all the major political goals that the central government hoped to attain. However, even the political structure established under such favorable conditions left behind fatal flaws that were difficult to foresee at the time. It created space for foreign forces to interfere in domestic affairs. The facts, the process, and the results are vividly clear. There is no need to elaborate further on this conclusion.
2. A belated but necessary reflection.
2.1. Can restricting the Hong Kong SAR government’s diplomatic powers close the loophole?
Some might argue that this deficiency stems from the partial diplomatic privileges granted to the Hong Kong SAR government at the time, and that this loophole could be closed later under the Taiwan SAR framework. My view is that it cannot. Diplomatic interfaces can be easily established behind the scenes through the domestic policy framework. If domestic privileges are granted, wouldn’t approving the establishment of NGOs, cultural windows, and cultural exchanges constitute administrative power? Under such administrative power, without sufficient oversight, establishing diplomatic interfaces is remarkably easy. If the SAR government’s administrative privileges have been established, what kind of mechanism should be designed to curb diplomatic espionage under executive power? What would be the political cost of establishing such a mechanism? Would it add additional political risks on top of that? These all require careful consideration.
2.2. Can carefully selecting the leaders of the Special Administrative Region close this gap?
Some might think that this situation could have been avoided if the central government had been more cautious and comprehensive in its selection of the leaders of the Special Administrative Region. For example, Macau successfully completed its security legislation. However, I remain opposed to using the selection of the leaders of the Special Administrative Region to close loopholes in diplomatic channels.
2.2.1 The example of Mr. Tung. Whether judged by the standards of the time or by today’s standards more than 20 years later, Mr. Tung, the first Chief Executive of Hong Kong, was an exceptionally capable candidate. Even with such an excellent candidate, he could not complete security legislation despite his best efforts. This demonstrates that it is difficult for an individual to correct systemic flaws. 2.2.2 The example of Mr. Ho. The successful completion of Macau’s security legislation cannot serve as a systemic or routine example. Macau’s political and economic power remains vastly different from that of the mainland central government at any time in the past. Even minor adjustments made by the central government in economic and political spheres have a significant impact on the Macau Special Administrative Region. With the support of the central government, Macau’s economic power has grown rapidly. However, whether Macau’s political dependence on the central government is positive or negative after its rapid economic growth needs to be understood from a long-term perspective. The medium- and long-term effects of fiscal and economic policies supporting Macau have not yet fully materialized.
2.3. More political bias and more economic support can close the security gaps in diplomacy.
Anyone who holds this view can be considered an unqualified political professional.
2.3.1. The political effects of leasing the Hengqin campus remain positive to this day. However, how to measure them from a long-term perspective remains to be seen. 2.3.2. The impact of maintaining Macau’s casino economy on the central government and on the overall mainland economy is still under further evaluation. 2.3.3. How to maintain Macau’s political dependence in the future still requires long-term assessment. 2.3.4. In 1998, with the support of the central government, Macau thwarted Soros’s attack. Against the backdrop of a comprehensive financial crisis in Southeast Asia, Macau preserved its wealth. The central government’s support for Hong Kong is extremely significant in any economic and historical context. Such enormous support did not yield any return from any particular Chief Executive of Hong Kong. On the contrary, during their term, they allowed (supporting) the rapid growth of pro-independence forces in Hong Kong. 2.3.5. The vast majority of China’s support for Hong Kong has translated into profits for Hong Kong’s monopolistic capital. These monopolistic capital representatives enjoy immense power and influence both on the mainland and in Hong Kong. This is fundamentally a political and economic cost incurred by the central government. However, during the Hong Kong unrest, these Hong Kong monopolistic capital essentially betrayed the central government. They even dared to spout nonsense like “the gossip of X TV.” In layman’s terms, it’s like saying, “I’m just a lowly wife, always playing the subservient role, speaking and acting cautiously, just to survive to this day. How could I possibly repay you?” A more direct translation is, “You’ve always bullied me; now you want me to support you? No way!” 2.3.6. Since my interactions with Taiwanese businesspeople in 1995, I have gained a deep understanding of the Taiwanese people’s aversion to mainland China, a mentality that says, “Making money is fine, but don’t expect me to acknowledge you as my boss.” Like a watermelon siding with the bigger side, the wealthier they are, the more arrogant they become. Back in 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou was elected, I made a prediction contrary to popular opinion. I believed that under Ma Ying-jeou’s administration, relations between mainland China and Taiwan would only worsen, not improve. This was because, for the sake of “pacification,” mainland China would undoubtedly strongly support Taiwan’s economic development. And the consequence of Taiwan’s economic development would be only one: Taiwanese people would want to be the boss of mainland China, not the other way around. For a considerable period to come, this deep-seated understanding among Taiwanese people will not easily change. The idea of exchanging economic and political investment for political dependence is unworkable in Taiwan. Taiwanese people believe in the “power imbalance.” Phrases like “the bigger the watermelon, the louder the sound” and “the bigger the fist, the louder the voice” remain common expressions in Taiwanese parlance. Until Taiwanese people recognize the significant “power imbalance” between themselves and mainland China, they will not genuinely attach themselves to the mainland. Large-scale political and economic investments in Taiwan will only reduce, weaken, and negatively impact the “power imbalance” between top-level power (the central government) and secondary power (the Taiwan provincial government), thus causing instability in the power structure. (Note: The term “extreme power disparity” can be defined as the gap in overall strength between power levels, and is considered an important foundation for maintaining the stability of a power system. (For details, please follow ” National War Intensity ” and “The Rise and Fall of Empires”))
3. Forward-looking reflection – Is it necessary to establish an interface that is compatible and compatible with the Western system?
An interface, in essence, is a channel. If you want to get out, you must allow others to get in. My personal feeling (a non-systematic thought) is that there’s no need to establish an interface to Western systems. My reasons are as follows.
3.1 Over thousands of years, China has built numerous strategic passes. A fundamental principle behind building these passes is to facilitate its own defense, aiming to achieve maximum defensive capability with minimal cost. Therefore, even when establishing an interface, the most advantageous location requires further in-depth discussion. It is particularly unsuitable to build them in areas with strong maritime characteristics but difficult (and costly) land-based coverage. 3.2 Recent empirical evidence demonstrates that under a system of decentralization, only amateurish, below-average intelligence can be elected as national leaders. Their role is to weaken national power. The performances of Hong Kong and Taiwanese politicians in recent years exemplify this fact. Of course, strongmen like Trump, Modi, Putin, Merkel, and Erdogan exist, but they are extremely rare. 3.3. The widespread support among European politicians for a war that divides and weakens Europe itself is absurd from political, historical, and philosophical perspectives. This demonstrates the general failure of the electoral system in Western Europe. 3.4. Canada and some US states have already legalized marijuana. More US states are striving to do so. Another fact is that the US and Canada have already decriminalized hard drugs in practice. To win votes, many US and Canadian states are pushing for the legal decriminalization of “hard drugs” (cocaine). This demonstrates the “power imbalance” that prevents the establishment of a strong and stable system under a system of separation of powers. Governments are forced to rely on the power of voters who lack political capacity. 3.5. For many years, the American discourse has consistently portrayed military and centralized governments as the foundation and root of corruption. However, recent unearthed evidence (including hard records such as trial records) reveals that corruption in democratically elected governments often occurs in the tens of billions of dollars, and virtually no specific individuals are ultimately held accountable. (Details regarding the relocation of the Mississippi power plant in Ontario are welcome. Details regarding a Hong Kong-based capital group’s massive real estate holdings in Mississippi worth $1 are welcome. Background information regarding the sudden resignation of former Ontario strongman John McCain is welcome.)
Third: The “one country, two systems” principle has had a negative impact on Hong Kong.
Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” policy was once hailed as a remarkable achievement in the political development of the People’s Republic of China. The establishment of Hong Kong’s unique system had both historical specificity and necessity, and could even be considered historically inevitable. Overall, this political system must be highly positively evaluated. However, even a slight political hesitation at the time left a huge void in Hong Kong’s political stability. It also added enormous political costs to the integration process between Hong Kong and the mainland. The honeymoon period between Hong Kong and the mainland from 1997 to the bitter conflict in 2020 lasted only about 20 years. The reasons for this negative outcome can be summarized as follows.
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- Political hesitation during the establishment of the system;
- The intervention of historical factors;
- The unsustainability of massive political costs;
- The central government’s governance is hesitant;
- Betrayal by Hong Kong’s political forces;
- Hong Kong’s overall political capacity is weak;
- Deep involvement of foreign powers;
- Taiwanese people’s emotional behavior
1. Political hesitation during the establishment of the system;
A few historical materials that have been disclosed have revealed some details of the negotiations between the Chinese and British sides. However, from a practical political science perspective, another set of tasks must have been involved in the negotiations at that time: the “consultation process” between the core Chinese leadership and “core Hong Kong figures.” This consultation process must have involved the basic framework of Hong Kong’s governance system after the handover of power.
1.1. This background is merely my personal inference based on “intuition.” It cannot confirm whether “key figures from Hong Kong” were involved in the negotiation process, nor can it confirm whether this “consultation process” occurred. 1.2. We can try to infer a complex (negotiation) process using traditional Chinese behavioral patterns. In traditional Chinese behavioral patterns, establishing an external negotiation framework is easy. The internal coordination process is often more difficult and complex than establishing an external framework. 1.3. Why was the task of constructing Article 23 assigned to Hong Kong locals when drafting the Basic Law of Hong Kong? And why was it allowed to do this work “at an appropriate time”? This question has tormented me for nearly 20 years. This is a question I’ve been pondering repeatedly.
1.3.1 Article 23 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong involves three key points. First, the Basic Law includes a section on security legislation. Second, the legislation of the security law is delegated to Hong Kong locals. Third, the legislation of the security law can be postponed until an appropriate time. 1.3.2 The first point specifies the power of the Central Government. The Central Government already possesses the power to include a section on security legislation in the Basic Law of Hong Kong. This power must have come from negotiations with the British government. That is, from a negotiation process with a foreign party. For the Central Government, this process was not too difficult, because at that time, the Chinese Central Government had comprehensive advantages compared to the British government. 1.3.3 The Central Government has delegated the power of security legislation to Hong Kong locals. The key point is the comprehensive delegation of this power. Hong Kong people are not only authorized to legislate on the details of the security law. Furthermore, Hong Kong people are empowered to decide when to legislate. This is an extremely high political cost. 1.3.4 Who benefits from this huge political cost? My intuition tells me there is only one beneficiary: Hong Kong’s monopolistic capital. Perhaps you think the beneficiaries should be the ordinary people of Hong Kong. Power should be delegated to the people of Hong Kong, allowing them to participate in the governance process. Of course, if you are a candidate, this is your right. But the reality is that ordinary people lack the professional ability to participate in the specific management of a country. Similarly, amateur politicians also lack this ability. Looking at the interactions between ordinary Hong Kong citizens and the central government over the past 20 years, the political capabilities of ordinary Hong Kong citizens (and even the Hong Kong elites) are far from sufficient to satisfy their desire to participate in politics. Reviewing the negotiations between mainland Chinese and British politicians at that time clearly shows that the comprehensive political capabilities of mainland politicians are entirely comparable to those of professional British politicians. They couldn’t possibly be unaware of the enormous political costs involved in Article 23. They couldn’t possibly invest this enormous political cost in an indiscriminate manner. You wouldn’t spend $1500 to buy 2 pounds of bananas. A reasonable purchase with $1500 would be a brand-new iPhone. Therefore, it is entirely reasonable to infer that the beneficiaries of the enormous political costs invested by the central government are undoubtedly Hong Kong’s monopolistic capitalists. At that time, only Hong Kong’s monopolistic capitalists had the power to negotiate governance terms with the central government. The terms of the deal, inferred from reasonable common sense, were that the central government would loosen capital controls to a certain extent, and Hong Kong capitalists would provide full political support for the central government’s governance of Hong Kong.
1.4 Political Hesitation. There was once a rumor that a politician stated the central government could choose not to station troops in Hong Kong. This statement immediately drew a stern rebuke from Deng Xiaoping. This rumor illustrates that political hesitation is ubiquitous, including in today’s review of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The first phase of Putin’s “special military operation” is, in fact, a real-life example of political hesitation. Even Putin, known as a political strongman, has moments of indecisiveness when making political decisions.
From both a historical and contemporary perspective, while consistently projecting collective strength, the Chinese have always emphasized internal coordination, compromise, and mutual concessions. In other words, political hesitation arising from internal coordination issues is quite common. This was likely a major reason for the political hesitation surrounding the 23 articles of the treaty.
Perhaps it was a belief that immense political costs could secure absolute loyalty; or perhaps it was an overestimation of the political commitment of key Hong Kong figures. The result was that the Chinese central government ultimately and completely handed over the power of security legislation to “Hong Kong locals.” This momentary political hesitation by mainland politicians left enormous room for foreign intervention in China’s political governance. This political hesitation has led to over two decades of political rebellion and betrayal.
The Taiwan issue has effectively devolved into a civil war between opposing sides. It’s unlikely that the major mistakes made on the Hong Kong issue will be repeated.
2. The intervention of historical factors;
Looking back at the political turmoil caused by Article 23 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong, its root cause cannot be entirely attributed to the political hesitation of Chinese politicians at the time. The intervention of historical factors is one of the important and unavoidable reasons. Several significant historical factors intervened in the establishment of Hong Kong’s governing system.
2.1. The urgent need for capital. The injection of external capital was China’s most pressing political need at the time. And the results proved that capital injected from Hong Kong played a significant role in promoting China’s modernization process. 2.2. The need to maintain communication channels with the Western world. Hong Kong has always played an important role in the diplomatic history of the People’s Republic of China. Even during the Korean War, the Western world did not completely close its channels of communication with China. Hong Kong was an important intermediary for communication between China and the Western world. The Chinese central government was unwilling to excessively violate the political needs of important figures in Hong Kong. 2.3. The need to establish a political system to attract Taiwan’s return. During that era, two powerful political figures, Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping, systematically presented a negotiation plan for Taiwan’s unification. The content was “anything is negotiable.” Furthermore, specific details have been outlined, including Taiwan’s right to independent diplomatic power, fully independent military force, a completely autonomous economic and political system, and fully autonomous legislative power. Just as Shang Yang needed people to believe in his political promises, mainland China also needs a model for Taiwanese people to see its political commitments. This may be an important historical context for the enactment of Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law.
3. The unsustainability of the enormous political costs;
We can review many major events from the process of governing Hong Kong. These include at least:
3.1 Michael Tien’s inconsistent maneuvering in the Legislative Yuan; 3.2 The pro-establishment camp’s repeated attempts to coordinate during crucial voting periods; 3.3 Various measures supporting pro-establishment politicians; 3.4 The pan-democrats’ repeated filibustering and provocations; 3.5 The pro-establishment Legislative Council President’s repeated concessions to the pan-democrats; 3.6 The opposition’s repeated marches; 3.7 The SAR government’s repeated interventions; Demanding the central government’s help in stopping Soros is, of course, a reasonable request. However, there are far too many other strange demands. For example, demanding the opening of Hong Kong to mainland tourists for individual travel, and then demanding restrictions on mainland tourists’ individual travel. Using the Lok Ma Chau area after the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone’s river channel improvement, etc. All sorts of things, some respectable and some not.
Behind all these phenomena lies a common fundamental logic: the need for the central government to continuously pay political costs. Using the word “requirement” to describe this process is actually a polite way of putting it; perhaps “coercion” would be a more accurate description. However, constantly investing massive political resources to appease a local regime is never a sustainable process. Looking back at Chinese history, we can learn from at least the following significant events: the Zhou Dynasty’s continuous enfeoffment system, to the point where even the emperor had to reside in the fiefdoms of his vassals, and it still didn’t stop; the Jin state’s foreign ministers in the Spring and Autumn period forcing the ruler to restore the Zhao family’s aristocratic status after the Zhao family was involved in a rebellion; the replacement of the Jiang family by the Tian (Chen) family in the Qi state; the military governor system of the Tang Dynasty; and the Northern Army of the Eastern Jin Dynasty, etc. All of this suggests that the central government’s continued investment of massive political resources in local governments is an unsustainable practice.
4. The central government’s hesitant governance;
Reviewing numerous crucial moments, the central government’s governance of Hong Kong did not lack opportunities to preemptively curb the growth of pro-independence forces. Early on, the central government may have believed that governance of Hong Kong was generally controllable. Especially in the first 20 years, the central government’s policy was primarily appeasement-based. It seemed that no major problems arose. However, in reality, a policy of relentless appeasement was unsustainable. To achieve a similar appeasement effect in later stages, the price of appeasement had to be continuously increased. The central government’s hesitation in governance fostered a habit among various political forces in Hong Kong of constantly demanding concessions from the central government.
5. Betrayal by Hong Kong’s political forces;
For many years, the discourse in Europe and America has been that China is not a free country. When I was in college, when listening to hostile radio stations, the switcher was always something like “This is Free China Radio” or “Welcome to Voice of Freedom Radio.” After living in Canada for more than 10 years, I suddenly realized that China is the truly free country, granting ordinary citizens far more freedom than Canadian residents.
Regarding capital controls, China’s constraints on Hong Kong’s capital are far less stringent than those in the United States and Canada. Hong Kong’s rankings for capital and investment freedom have consistently been among the highest in the world for many years (submissions of discussion or references are welcome). However, as a result, Hong Kong’s Gini coefficient has also consistently remained in the top ten, even the top five. (Note 1: This refers to rankings within free economies or major economies, excluding African countries and countries designated as military governments; Note 2: Submissions of detailed explanations or references are welcome). In layman’s terms, the Gini coefficient means that money is concentrated in the hands of the wealthy. The higher the concentration, the higher the Gini coefficient. Compared to the United States and Canada, capitalists’ capital is subject to at least the following controls. Mandatory union regulations, compound tax rates on annual profits; mandatory matching of workers’ wages with pensions; compound tax rates on salary income; and mandatory consumption tax on salary expenditures. The fact is, Hong Kong’s freedom of capital controls has consistently ranked higher than that of the United States and Canada for many years. As a result, Hong Kong’s Gini coefficient has also been far higher than that of the United States and Canada for many years (papers in this direction are welcome). In plain terms, Hong Kong’s money is concentrated in the hands of a few capitalists, with a concentration far higher than in the United States and Canada. Where does this capitalists’ money come from? It comes from the central government’s relaxation of constraints on capital. The political costs released by the central government when it established the Basic Law of Hong Kong ultimately became the profit income of Hong Kong’s monopolistic capital. Whether we trace the cause and effect from the perspective of “antecedent” or “effect,” Hong Kong’s monopolistic capitalists should be extremely grateful to the central government. However, the reality is quite the opposite. Hong Kong capital has never ceased its various forms of funding for independent research in Hong Kong, to the point that the entire Hong Kong education and academic system has shifted its research focus entirely towards independence. As a result, for over 20 years, it has been almost impossible to find a single research paper on research integration or unification. Nor has any research institution or group been established that supports unification and integration (statistical papers in this direction are welcome). When the central government demanded that politicians take a stance on the unrest in Hong Kong, a declaration resembling a formal rebellion was even issued. A representative of Hong Kong’s monopolistic capital even published an advertisement for “TVB gossip.” In layman’s terms, it means: “For years, I’ve been like a submissive wife, humbled and cautious, enduring humiliation to survive until today. What can I do now?” To put it even more bluntly, it’s like saying, “Damn it, you’ve bullied me all this time, and now you want me to stand up for you? No way!” But is this capitalist really a submissive wife? Is he a “gossipmonger”? Since the 1990s, he has long invested in mainland China and Hong Kong. While supporting the mainland’s economic development, he has also reaped huge profits. For many years, he has held the title of Asia’s richest man. It can be said directly that a large part of his wealth comes from the political costs incurred by the central government. For many years, he has consistently blocked the central government’s proposal to lower Hong Kong housing prices and open up more housing supply. Through capital and real estate monopolies, they relentlessly plunder the interests of Hong Kong’s lower classes. After inciting public resentment, they turn around and say, “This has nothing to do with me.” Don’t even think about me endorsing the central government. If you don’t want to endorse it, that’s fine too; there’s no need to publish such blatantly rebellious propaganda like “X-TV’s gossip.”
6. Hong Kong’s overall political capacity is weak;
As conventional indicators of a region’s intellectual level and political competence, the civil service and education systems have always been highly regarded. However, in reality, Hong Kong’s civil service and education systems have consistently demonstrated extremely low political judgment. For years, these Hong Kong elites have failed to see the growing power and influence of mainland China within the global power structure. For years, they have been foolishly and frantically investing in completely unprofitable research and initiatives aimed at Hong Kong independence. This is akin to a spoiled child or a shrewish village woman yelling: “Give me candy? Give me candy? If you don’t, I’ll kick down your door!” No wonder I wrote that overly strong-tongued article (titled: Two words to describe Hong Kong people: greedy, foolish).
It is unbelievable that a certain Hong Kong Chief Executive failed to see the harm of Hong Kong independence. He used various excuses to evade and deflect the central government’s request for him to suppress Hong Kong independence, in fact, he helped to encourage the spread of Hong Kong independence forces.
7. Deep involvement of foreign powers;
Foreign forces, using Hong Kong as a platform, interfere in China’s internal affairs and hinder China’s growth, which is another major reason for the unrest in Hong Kong. For many years, Hong Kong has been the largest base for US and British intelligence agencies in the Asia-Pacific region. Various political forces, through various platforms, have deeply intervened in all aspects and levels of Hong Kong’s political structure. During the 2019 unrest in Hong Kong, a large amount of funding poured in. Foreign forces openly or semi-openly met with and trained forces opposing the central government. They incited opposition to the Chinese central government in public opinion. Diplomatically, they claimed the Hong Kong rebels were acting for freedom and human rights. In reality, however, this unrest was filled with acts of arson, traffic blockades, burning people, and serious injury to bystanders. In contrast, on January 6, 2021, a mere few hundred people stormed into the U.S. Capitol, took photos, and took away some property, which was defined as a criminal offense by the U.S. legal system.
8. Taiwanese people’s emotional behavior.
Another significant political force involved in the chaos of 2019 was the Taiwanese authorities. It’s unclear what their motivations were. Personally, I believe it was driven by anti-China sentiment. In recent years, anti-China and anti-central government sentiment has spread widely throughout Taiwan. However, actions driven by such sentiment are unlikely to bring any real positive benefits to the residents of Taiwan. The benefit is that ordinary people on the mainland dislike, hate, and despise Taiwanese people, thus increasing pressure for a military unification of Taiwan.
Fourth: Taiwanese people have “made” the “one country, two systems” principle disappear.
I really like the new word “作” (zuò), coined by people in mainland China. I wonder if people in Chinese-speaking regions outside mainland China understand this word. My personal understanding is: doing things beyond one’s actual control, accompanied by exaggerated performances to attract attention, ultimately leading to the loss of one’s own interests. There’s a rhyme that might help us understand this word: “NO 作NO DIE, you insist on trying. ” The “作” of Taiwanese people has completely destroyed the possibility of “one country, two systems.” I imagine all Taiwanese people would cheer if they heard that “one country, two systems” was gone. Because for many years, Taiwanese people have opposed and hated the term “one country, two systems.” But in fact, they don’t understand the meaning of losing “one country, two systems” for them. One day, I suddenly came across a Facebook comment. The message was posted on October 9, 2019, the day before Taiwan’s Double Ten Day. I recommended one of my blog posts to a well-known pro-unification radio host in Taiwan. The blog post was titled “How to strive for the possibility of ‘one country, two systems’ is a reality that Taiwan needs to consider now.”
To summarize my points simply: 1. “One Country, Two Systems” aligns with the medium- and long-term interests of the Taiwanese people; 2. Taiwanese people should calm down and rationally understand “One Country, Two Systems”; 3. The opportunity presented by “One Country, Two Systems” is slipping away from Taiwan, and Taiwanese people must strive to seize it, rather than opposing or condemning it.
It’s a real shame! After wasting three years, Taiwan suddenly lost its chance for “one country, two systems”.
On October 9, 2019, I did my best to convey my concerns to the people of Taiwan, reminding them that they were losing the “one country, two systems” principle. On August 10, 2022, the mainland officially announced that Taiwan had lost the “one country, two systems” principle.
Now let’s read the announcement from the mainland dated August 10, 2022. Part Four: Advancing National Reunification on the New Era and New Journey.
Original Text, Part A: “Achieving national reunification peacefully best serves the overall interests of the Chinese nation, including our compatriots in Taiwan, and is most conducive to China’s long-term stable development. It is the first choice for the Communist Party of China and the Chinese government to resolve the Taiwan issue. Despite encountering difficulties and obstacles over the decades, we have persevered in striving for peaceful reunification, which reflects our cherishing and safeguarding of national interests, the well-being of our compatriots, and peace across the Taiwan Strait.” Translation: For the sake of national interests, we still maintain a window for peaceful negotiations. Whether you want to negotiate or not is up to you.
Original text, Part B: “We advocate that after peaceful reunification, Taiwan can implement a social system different from that of the mainland, exercise a high degree of autonomy in accordance with the law, and allow the two social systems to coexist and develop together for a long time. ‘One country’ is the premise and foundation for implementing ‘two systems,’ and ‘two systems’ are subordinate to and derived from ‘one country’ and unified within ‘one country.’ We will continue to unite our compatriots in Taiwan, actively explore a ‘two systems’ solution for Taiwan, and enrich the practice of peaceful reunification. The specific form of ‘one country, two systems’ implementation in Taiwan will fully consider the realities of Taiwan, fully absorb opinions and suggestions from all sectors on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and fully take into account the interests and feelings of our compatriots in Taiwan.” Translation: Now, let’s talk about “one country, two systems.” However, it must be understood that this “two systems” principle must be subject to the “one country” framework. It must directly accept the central government’s jurisdiction. Details can be discussed later ( the direct meaning is that the promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping are no longer valid). Everything needs to be renegotiated. Taiwanese feelings can be appropriately considered, but the will of the mainland people must be respected. (Important: Mainland public opinion should be the guiding principle.)
Paragraph C of the original text: “For a period of time, influenced by various complex internal and external factors, ‘anti-China and destabilizing Hong Kong’ activities were rampant, and the situation in Hong Kong once reached a critical point. The Communist Party of China and the Chinese government, assessing the situation, adopted a series of measures that addressed both the symptoms and root causes, upheld and improved the ‘one country, two systems’ framework, and propelled Hong Kong to achieve a major turning point from chaos to order, entering a new stage of prosperity, laying a solid foundation for advancing the rule of law in Hong Kong and Macau and ensuring the steady and long-term implementation of ‘one country, two systems.'” Translation: Don’t forget what you did in Hong Kong. The current “one country, two systems” framework is now primarily based on the mainland. Taiwan’s “one country, two systems” cannot exceed the preferential treatment given to Hong Kong and Macau.
Paragraph D of the original text: “To achieve peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Strait, we must confront the fundamental issue of the differences in social systems and ideologies between the mainland and Taiwan. ‘One country, two systems’ is precisely the most inclusive solution proposed to resolve this issue. It is a peaceful, democratic, benevolent, and win-win solution. The differences in systems across the Strait are not an obstacle to reunification, much less an excuse for division. We believe that, as time goes by, ‘one country, two systems’ will be re-recognized by the vast majority of Taiwanese compatriots; in the process of compatriots on both sides of the Strait working together to achieve peaceful reunification, the space and connotation of the ‘two systems’ Taiwan solution will be fully demonstrated.” Translation: Playing the game of complete autonomy and de facto independence is no longer viable. Now, compatriots on both sides of the Strait are jointly promoting reunification. (In plain language: I’m serious now, no more nonsense.)
Paragraph E of the original text: “Peaceful reunification means equal consultation and joint discussion on reunification. The long-standing political differences between the two sides are the root cause affecting the steady and long-term development of cross-strait relations, and they cannot be passed down from generation to generation. Cross-strait consultations and negotiations can be conducted in stages and with flexible and diverse methods. We are willing to conduct dialogue and communication with all political parties, groups, and individuals in Taiwan on resolving cross-strait political differences and exchange views extensively, based on the one-China principle and the ‘1992 Consensus.’ We are also willing to continue to promote democratic consultations among representative figures nominated by political parties and sectors on both sides of the strait to jointly discuss the grand plan for promoting the peaceful development and integrated development of cross-strait relations and the peaceful reunification of the motherland.”
Translation: Hurry up and find someone to talk to; this unification issue must be resolved within Lao Tzu’s term.
Paragraph F of the original text: “Currently, some forces in the United States are attempting to ‘use Taiwan to contain China,’ deliberately playing the ‘Taiwan card’ to provoke ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces into risky provocations. This not only seriously endangers peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and hinders the Chinese government’s efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, but also seriously affects the healthy and stable development of China-US relations. If this trend continues, it will inevitably lead to a sustained escalation of tensions across the Taiwan Strait, posing a subversive and enormous risk to China-US relations and seriously damaging US interests. The United States should adhere to the one-China principle, handle Taiwan-related issues prudently and properly, stop saying one thing and doing another, and fulfill its commitment not to support ‘Taiwan independence’ with concrete actions.” Translation: The Americans can’t play this game anymore. If he keeps playing like that, I’ll beat him up.
Paragraph G of the original text: “Taiwan’s fiscal revenue should be used to improve people’s livelihoods, and to do practical things, good things, and solve difficulties for the people.” Translation: Now, it is said that the central government will not levy taxes on Taiwan.
Original text, paragraph H: “Taiwan can exercise a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region.” Translation: Yes!!!
Paragraph I of the original text: “All Taiwanese compatriots who support the reunification of the motherland and the rejuvenation of the nation will truly be masters of their own affairs in Taiwan, participate in the construction of the motherland, and fully enjoy the dividends of development.” Translation: Taiwanese officials must support the rule of the mainland and accept the rule and supervision of the central government.
Paragraph J of the original text: “Compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait shall jointly explore and implement a ‘two systems’ solution for Taiwan, jointly develop and improve the ‘one country, two systems’ system, and ensure Taiwan’s long-term stability and security.” Translation: The two systems solution must conform to the tone of the mainland central government. It must ensure that Taiwan does not experience another rebellion.
Original text, paragraph K: “After reunification, relevant countries may continue to develop economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. With the approval of the Chinese central government, foreign countries may establish consulates or other official or semi-official institutions in Taiwan; international organizations and institutions may establish offices in Taiwan; relevant international conventions may apply in Taiwan; and relevant international conferences may be held in Taiwan.” Translation: Taiwan will no longer possess diplomatic privileges equivalent to those of Hong Kong. All diplomatic licenses and powers must be completely placed under the control of the central government.
Key points translated literally: 1. All promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping are null and void . (Original paragraph B) 2. Taiwan shall not possess diplomatic power; all diplomatic permits must be entirely in the hands of the central government. (Original paragraph K) 3. Taiwan shall no longer possess any directly administered military force; all military forces must be entirely under the control of the central government. (Original paragraph J) 4. Taiwanese administrative officials must uphold mainland governance. Administrative officials must accept the jurisdiction and supervision of the central government. (Original paragraph I)
5. Come and talk quickly. The content of the talks is that we won’t levy taxes on Taiwan, Taiwan’s administrative system will remain unchanged, and we will support its economic system. 6. Talk it or not, I’ll resolve this issue during my term. The outcome of unification by force will definitely be different from the outcome of negotiations. 7. Stop playing games. If the Americans dare to interfere, I’ll crush them just the same.
Personal feeling: Taiwan has already lost its chance for “one country, two systems.” Now, if it tries to seize it, it can only grasp a small remnant. And even that small remnant, Taiwan probably won’t be able to hold onto.
When Chang Ya-chung was running for chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT), I wrote an article titled “Even if Chang Ya-chung wins, he won’t be a great hero.” My conclusion at the time was based on the following judgment:
1. No Taiwanese politician is authorized by the Taiwanese people to discuss “one country, two systems” with the mainland. 2. The mainland will not discuss any other solutions with the Taiwanese people besides “one country, two systems.” 3. The mainland will no longer waste time on politicians who are not authorized. Even if a member of the pan-blue camp is not authorized by public opinion, the mainland will not make any promises beforehand.
I don’t understand why so many Taiwanese people, 23 million in total, couldn’t foresee the eventual unification of Taiwan? They chose to play the “I don’t want it, I don’t want it” game, pursuing interests they should be pursuing! August 10, 2022, was an extremely important day for Taiwan. On this day, Taiwan officially lost its true meaning of “one country, two systems.” October 9, 2019, another less important day. On this day, some urged Taiwanese people to quickly pursue “one country, two systems” because they saw it slipping away from Taiwan. What a pity.
Fifth: Mainland Chinese people hate “one country, two systems”.
Now, when you ask mainlanders about their impressions of “one country, two systems,” the conclusion is overwhelmingly negative. The conclusion is: hatred, dislike, alienation, and opposition. There was a time when mainlanders unanimously and enthusiastically embraced “one country, two systems.” Mainlanders also once unanimously loved Taiwanese people, unanimously called Taiwan a “treasure island,” and unanimously said that Taiwan’s most beautiful scenery was its people. When I registered my marriage, I specifically chose October 11th because mainland China’s National Day is October 1st, while Taiwan’s National Day is October 10th. This shows the expectations mainlanders had for Taiwanese people. As a result, Taiwanese people have consistently treated mainlanders with disdain. The repeated manipulation of anti-China, anti-mainland, and anti-mainlander sentiments ultimately incited international hatred and resentment. Before 2009, mainlanders generally embraced Taiwan with great enthusiasm. Anything or anyone associated with the word “Taiwan” enjoyed VIP treatment in mainland China. I’m probably one of the few mainlanders who has maintained a calm attitude towards Taiwanese people. I’ve never enthusiastically embraced them, nor have I ever vehemently opposed them. But I was someone who foresaw Taiwan’s fate very early on. It’s a pity that Taiwan is destined to follow a certain path, one from which there is no escape. This is why I titled this part “Taiwan’s Destiny.”
Back in 1995, when Beijing was still largely a bus-based society, I encountered a Taiwanese businessman several times on the same bus route. At that time, the term “Taiwanese businessman” carried a dazzling aura. This man, however, was very well-mannered, neither servile nor arrogant. We could converse casually. But the topic of unification was off-limits. Even tentatively probing the subject was unacceptable. The moment the topic came up, his face would immediately turn cold. From that moment, I knew that although the mainland had bestowed upon them dazzling prestige and honors, allowing them to confidently amass wealth there, there was no way they would submit to you. Because they were richer than mainlanders. Later, while working in Quanzhou, I was told by strangers from southern Fujian that I was going to a Ghost Festival (a Buddhist festival). I wanted to see different villages carrying different deities, and to witness the local gentry hiring gods for the entire village to worship. People from the same hometown would line up their cell phones next to the hospital bed when visiting patients. (Back then, cell phones were a symbol of status; every visitor would place their phone beside the bed, and the more phones a patient had, the higher their status). Hospitalization required hosting a feast and giving red envelopes (cash gifts). Refusing was considered disrespectful. This gradually revealed the cliquishness of the Hokkien people. This cliquishness extended to the point where members were unconditionally protected—the only principle being membership in a small circle. It also revealed an ingrained mentality of siding with the most powerful. There was a subservient system of power, a tendency to prioritize familiarity over principle, and a sectarian, blindly obedient mentality. It’s likely that the core values of Taiwanese people are similar to those of the Hokkien people. However, upon closer examination, these traits aren’t necessarily wrong. Because people in inland areas, to varying degrees, share similar behaviors and mindsets. I remember in the 1970s, the norms of interaction among people in Guizhou were roughly the same. When someone traveled to a new place, the first thing they would do was to get acquainted with all their relatives. Then they would go to the production team leader’s house to say hello and introduce themselves. If a daughter was bullied by her husband’s family after marriage, her maternal family would form a group to “reason” with her. In reality, it was all about force and rhetoric. The weaker side would give in first. How similar this is to the way people in southern Fujian handle things today! It’s just that in Guizhou and Sichuan, the patriarchal and clan-based culture has rapidly disappeared under the impact of modern urban petty-bourgeois culture. The Minnan people still retain many traditions. In other words, the cultural mentality and norms of the Minnan people are not fundamentally different from those of people from Guizhou and Sichuan. So why are Taiwanese and mainland Chinese drifting further and further apart, even disliking and hating each other? Closed-mindedness and arrogance are probably the most fundamental reasons.
Around 1995, Taiwanese and Hong Kong businessmen were synonymous with prestige. Anything, object, or person even remotely connected to Hong Kong or Taiwan enjoyed unimpeded access to the mainland. Mainlanders bestowed unparalleled glory upon Taiwanese people. However, the topic of unification was off-limits; the moment it was brought up, a confrontation erupted. Even though we rode the same bus and briefly shared a position of equality, deep down he considered himself superior and couldn’t accept a mainlander as his boss. In reality, he was probably just an ordinary small-time Taiwanese businessman, while I was doing research at a top-tier research institute in Asia. But he disregarded all that; in his mind, even an ordinary Taiwanese was a level above a mainland elite. When I worked in Quanzhou, there was a young local… He interacted with everyone with a very traditional Hui’an mindset. He was a top-level core figure in his workplace. However, the tradition within professional institutions still distinguishes social status based on professional competence. Thus, these two mindsets and rules of conduct frequently clashed. He publicly clashed with several department heads on multiple occasions. Once, I said to one department head, “I told you, this person can’t change, why didn’t you listen then?” The department head replied, “Back then, he would pick me up from my house every day to go to work, and drive me home after get off work, what could I do?” See, this is how some people with a Minnan cultural background behave. When they’re humble and unassuming, they can be incredibly humble. But when they have the power to trample on you, they suddenly become incredibly powerful. This is a behavior that inland people (or those with inland backgrounds) completely cannot accept. The problem is that even the department head couldn’t get rid of this arrogant person with no professional foundation because he had connections. This is another rule of conduct that inlanders can’t tolerate: first, the inner circle; then, the rules. For their circle, the inner circle is the biggest rule. It’s just that this rule is disliked by many outside the circle. Another example: A person who seemed to be a gang leader invited us. Three young underlings were busy running around. I was actually in a new environment and a little nervous. I was just being cautious according to the insurance plan, hence the relatively quiet conversation. I think one of the young men (or perhaps all three) must have misunderstood, thinking I looked down on him/her. After finding an opportunity, the young man tactfully told me, “Isn’t there always a day when society helps each other out? We’re university graduates too. You helped us today, so who knows, maybe one day we’ll help you, right?” I immediately realized there was a misunderstanding, so I quickly clasped my hands in apology and explained. See, this is the mindset of some people with a Hokkien background. “Hmph! So what if I’m a dog? I’m a dog for my boss, not for you. I’m willing to be a dog for my boss, so don’t try to act superior.” This mentality can explain many things that have happened in Taiwan in recent years. But ordinary people in mainland China don’t have the kind of opportunity I had—the opportunity to get so close to Hokkien people and Taiwanese people. They can only see a series of completely low-IQ and out-of-the-box statements made by Taiwanese people from the mass media. For example, “Mainland China has no toilets,” “Mainland Chinese don’t close the toilet door,” “Mainland Chinese can’t afford tea eggs,” “Mainland Chinese can’t afford pickled vegetables,” “Mainland Chinese supplement their protein intake by catching field mice,” “Mainland Chinese are ruining Taiwan’s environment,” “Mainland Chinese are poor,” and “Mainland Chinese queue up to watch others eat instant noodles.” These examples are countless, leading mainland Chinese to think that Taiwanese people are both extremely annoying and have negative IQs.
The term “One Country, Two Intelligences” – I wonder if it’s become popular in Taiwan yet? This term has been circulating on the mainland internet for over 20 years. This kind of informal term (what mainlanders call a “meme”) actually best represents the common perception among mainlanders. It means “a country with two groups of people with vastly different levels of intelligence.” Mainlanders now believe that Taiwanese people are generally low in intelligence and emotional intelligence, and are annoying. Another mainland term used to describe Taiwanese people is “green frog.” The “frog” refers to the frog in the well, who is narrow-minded and prejudiced. The “green” implies that Taiwanese people are generally pro-independence and generally reject mainland China. This term fully reflects the common mainland Chinese perception of Taiwanese people’s political and social status. Therefore, even if the mainland central government wanted to grant Taiwan the “one country, two systems” principle, the mainland population as a whole would likely not agree. Mainlanders also value social hierarchy, and today they categorize Taiwanese people as having low intelligence, low emotional intelligence, and a lower social standing. How could they willingly grant Taiwanese people superior social treatment? With 1.4 billion people on the mainland and 23 million on Taiwan, the central government simply wouldn’t dare risk offending the mainland by trying to appease the Taiwanese!
Perhaps some Taiwanese will say I’m not seeing things from a Taiwanese perspective. What can I say? Is your principle “might makes right”? Today, who has the bigger fist, the mainland Chinese or the Taiwanese? Who has the bigger fist, the mainland Chinese or the Americans? Sigh! If you continue to believe the Americans have the bigger fist, then that’s truly your own business. When the day comes that the mainland Chinese fists land on you, and you stage another performance like the 228 Incident, then it will be utterly meaningless.
Perhaps Taiwanese people still cling to the belief that mainlanders are forcing “one country, two systems” onto them. The truth is, mainland China has simply never publicly acknowledged a fact in the mainstream media: mainlanders today generally dislike and oppose “one country, two systems.” In the minds of mainlanders today, “one country, two systems” carries at least the following negative connotations:
1. The history of concessions and the memory of historical humiliation; 2. Unequal treatment of citizens; 3. The feeling of humiliation in reality; 4. Unequal economic distribution schemes; 5. Support for acts of treason;
These negative labels will lead to, or will certainly lead to, mainland Chinese opposition to granting special treatment to Taiwanese people. This is also a major reason why there is strong public opinion in mainland China demanding unification by force rather than peaceful unification. This is also the strong public opinion base for unification by force in the future.
Sixth: From a historical perspective, “one country, two systems” increases the country’s governance costs.
From a political, historical, and philosophical perspective, the “one country, two systems” principle has at least the following major flaws.
1. It hinders the process of integrating the sentiments of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait; 2. It hinders the process of integrating the lifestyles of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait; 3. It hinders the process of integrating ethnic identities; 4. It increases the political costs of national governance; 5. It increases the economic costs of national governance; 6. It sows the seeds for the risk of the next separation in the long term.
1. It hinders the process of integrating public sentiment between the mainland and the island;
The political model of Hong Kong clearly demonstrates how “one country, two systems” divides people into different sub-identities and reinforces these sub-identities through a legal framework. In reality, the historical trajectories and life memories of Hong Kongers and Cantonese people are essentially the same. However, the reality is that after “one country, two systems,” their differences in thinking and behavior have rapidly widened. Previously, Hong Kongers implicitly identified themselves as Cantonese. Now, Hong Kongers not only refuse to acknowledge themselves as Cantonese, but they even refuse to acknowledge themselves as Chinese. Hong Kongers and mainlanders, who once shared a sweet marriage, have now reached this point. Moreover, Taiwan and the mainland have already accumulated such deep mutual hostility. If we further separate them using the “one country, two systems” framework, the animosity and hatred among the people will likely escalate rapidly and exponentially. The possibility of civil war breaking out spontaneously among the people may even become unavoidable.
There might be dissenting opinions arguing that such opportunities can be reduced through administrative oversight and control. However, the reality is that as long as there is isolation, there will be loopholes. As long as there are barriers, there will be passages. Take, for example, a certain Hong Kong Chief Executive who performed excellently in all aspects before and in the early stages of his term. Later, he manipulated various means to support Hong Kong independence.
Integrating the existing differences between Hong Kong and Guangdong, as well as between Hong Kong and the mainland, could incur enormous social management costs in the future. It might even require unconventional methods. Those in power must be wary of countless historical examples.
Not only do tangible frameworks increase integration costs, but intangible but intentional barriers of separation also increase integration costs. A typical example can be seen through domestic governance experience. In the 1960s and 70s, people from a border province in mainland China were selling traditional knives. Their behavior was very mild. At that time, there were almost no police stations in mainland China (the system existed, but the personnel were extremely few). State management was mainly carried out through the industrial and commercial bureaus. In other words, there was almost no state coercion to manage the market. However, these people almost never caused trouble in the mainland. Later, when XXX emphasized national unity, the result was that these people caused trouble in the mainland, and no one dared to interfere. By then, public security forces and police stations had been widely established. In other words, the state’s coercive power was used to manage the market, and national unity was emphasized. The result was that people from that region caused trouble everywhere. And some of these incidents had a large and widespread impact. The result wasn’t greater national unity, but rather greater division. Now, the evolution is that it’s not just people from this region causing trouble; people from a neighboring province that was originally predominantly Han Chinese have also jumped on this bandwagon, causing widespread unrest inland. It’s clear that providing special treatment is definitely not the path to national integration. A combination of appeasement and direct rule is the only long-term solution. The Han Emperor’s settlement of the Xiongnu and the Ming Dynasty’s conversion of native chieftains to imperial officials are both worthy of study.
2. It hinders the integration of lifestyles between the mainland and the island;
Remember that young man from Hui’an in the example above? He’s someone whose lifestyle is very different from mine. He was getting married, and in the Minnan region, face is of paramount importance. If no one from the workplace attends, it’s a huge deal. But no one in the entire department was willing to go. The hospital started pressuring us, demanding at least one representative attend. The department head had no choice but to beg me. I couldn’t put the head in a difficult position, so I went. After that, I didn’t get involved in this young man’s affairs. But if I really couldn’t stand something, I would lower my head, not look at anyone, and cough lightly twice, and he would quickly find a way to end the matter. It’s clear that despite our vastly different lifestyles, and despite his greater social influence, in our interactions, he would appropriately gravitate towards my ways, thus drawing us closer. But if I never intervene in his environment, not only will my coughing be useless, but even if I stand up and reprimand him, it might be completely futile. Mutual communication, without artificially increasing isolation, is a good way to understand each other’s lifestyles and grow closer. If we increase the prevalence of Taiwanese and unique characteristics, Taiwanese people will not be able to better understand the mainland, and mainland people will also lack opportunities to deeply understand Taiwanese people.
3. It hinders the process of ethnic identity integration;
Now let’s look back at the research literature from the 1960s and 70s. Many documents suggest that at least during that period, at least in East and South Ukraine, almost no Ukrainians denied being Russian or part of the Russian people. Even before the 2013 coup, Ukrainians lacked a typical Ukrainian identity. Today, Ukrainians have finally become Ukrainians. And enemies of Russia. This is the consequence of identity segregation. Historically, the difference between Ukrainians and Russians is not even as great as the difference between people from Guizhou and Guangxi. I find this set of examples quite interesting for comparison. People from Guizhou generally speak Sichuan dialect. In Guangxi, some people speak Mandarin, which is also Sichuanese. Others speak Cantonese. Most Ukrainians speak Russian, with a smaller minority speaking Ukrainian. The difference between Ukrainian and Russian is far smaller than the difference between Sichuanese and Cantonese. Russians and Ukrainians, with even smaller linguistic differences, are now enemies. Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking people within the country are fighting each other. Meanwhile, people from Guizhou and Guangxi get along very well. Sichuanese-speaking and Cantonese-speaking people in Guangxi also get along well. Before “One Country, Two Systems,” Hong Kong people didn’t have a clear concept of “Hong Kong people.” From the time of the Guangdong-Hong Kong Cup during the Republic of China era to the large-scale smuggling of Cantonese people to Hong Kong, Hong Kong people implicitly identified themselves as Cantonese. Notice the term: it’s called the Guangdong-Hong Kong Cup. Not the City-Hong Kong Cup, not the Guangdong-Hong Kong Cup, not the Twin Cities Cup, not the Brothers Cup, not the Sisters Cup—it contains no terms implying equality. It’s called the Guangdong-Hong Kong Cup. Guangdong was Hong Kong’s province. Now things are different. There’s an additional identity of “Hong Konger.” This “Hong Konger” is different from the labels we use for “I’m from Sichuan,” “I’m from Guizhou,” or “I’m from Guangxi.” They are a different person. Erasing the specific connotations attached to this term might take generations. There’s no need to create another label for “Taiwanese” with a specific meaning. Taiwanese people speak Hokkien, and their Mazu is the Hokkien Mazu. What we need to do is let them know this fact, not let them continue to deny it.
4. Increases the political costs of national governance;
1. I remember that 20 years ago, when the Hong Kong Chief Executive visited the mainland, he and the mainland leaders sat in a circular seating arrangement. This showed that the policies the central government gave to Hong Kong were what they were supposed to be. Hong Kong people have always advocated “two systems.” Even with Article 23 legislation, the central government couldn’t do anything about it. One Hong Kong Chief Executive even personally expressed concern to the head of state of another country regarding a specific event. Hong Kong and Macau people still take it for granted that they are classified as special regions in various legal systems. In the diplomatic arena, various fields effectively grant Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau the status of federal entities. The central government effectively grants extraterritorial rights to Hong Kong and Macau. From a historical perspective, this reality certainly undermines the central government’s ability to centralize power (don’t be afraid to discuss centralization; it’s a crucial indicator of national capacity, national competitiveness, and national war-fighting capability. For details, please refer to the article on “National War-Fighting Capability” (in the writing plan, to be released later). It also damages the grassroots people’s loyalty to the central government. The unjust suicides, the usurpation of power by Quwo, the restoration of the Zhao clan, the division of Jin into four states, and the replacement of the Jiang by the Tian (Chen) clan all originated from weak local forces that gradually amassed popular support to erode central authority. 2. The head of a special administrative region, holding a special status, inevitably possesses relatively unique administrative powers. These powers can easily be transferred to the diplomatic sphere. To prevent and deter this possibility, more institutions or mechanisms must be established to limit or restrain this risk. Each additional system incurs additional political operating costs. Each additional political institution brings additional political risks, requiring another mechanism to oversee its operation. This leads to ever-increasing political costs. The more layers in the structure, the greater the attenuation and depletion of vertically transmitted power. This is not only a physical law but also a political one.
5. Increases the economic costs of national governance;
A review of Chinese history reveals that, without exception, all special operating institutions have brought additional economic costs to the central government. The Jiedushi system quickly deprived the central government of its tax collection capacity. The Zhoumu system also weakened its fiscal capacity. The promotion of Buddhism hindered the central government’s ability to collect substantial taxes. These shortcomings stemmed from their initial advantages in enabling the central government to implement significant policies and measures. In their early stages, they all had ample justification for their existence and considerable value. In fact, they made significant contributions to achieving certain political goals for the central government. Take Hong Kong as an example. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region system certainly has historical factors. The SAR system has also made significant contributions to China’s reform and opening-up process. However, are there further political risks? Is there a risk of continued economic drain? We also need to make long-term observations.
6. This sows the seeds for the next separation.
Russia’s current risks are not limited to Ukraine, but also extend to Belarus and Kazakhstan. Leaving Kazakhstan aside for now, Belarus is a prime example of political landmines planted by identity differences. Tracing history back to Ukraine, one can find a brief period where the label “Ukraine” existed. However, in Belarus, it’s incredibly difficult to find a clear “Belarusian” label. Even from my personal perspective, the historical label of Cossackism is far more definite than “Belarusian” (I’m going to get yelled at for this). But now, Belarusians are saying, “We have thousands of years of history. Don’t tell me we have any connection to Russia. I’m Belarusian.” Chinese people, please don’t call us “Belarusians,” we are “Belarusians.” If we keep emphasizing that Zengcheng people are different from Guangzhou people, and Hui’an people are different from Quanzhou people, they will definitely think, “We are different.” Gradually, this mentality will be exploited by politicians. Isn’t the current exploitation of the Taiwanese label the same principle? “Hey, why do mainlanders also speak Taiwanese?” They don’t know they are Minnan people. They don’t know they speak Minnan dialect. They are currently creating a new identity. This new identity is “Taiwanese.” This new Taiwanese identity is the political foundation for their next rebellion against the mainland. Yeltsin, in an effort to escape the financial hardship of supporting his family, separated Belarus from Ukraine. The political risks are not only present now, but even greater risks lie within the next 50 to 100 years. Ukrainians have already gone from being brothers (or at least cousins) to enemies. Within 50 to 100 years (and possibly less), there is a greater than 50% probability that Belarusians will become enemies of Russia.
Whether we like it or not, the term “Taiwanese” is now, politically speaking, an enemy of “Chinese.” The good news is that it hasn’t been “empowered.” Therefore, it’s easily weakened, diluted, and eventually disappeared. Preventing the “empowerment” of this label should be a top priority for the central government of mainland China. (Papers in this direction are welcome.)
7. What should Taiwanese people do?
To be honest, there aren’t many options left. It’s very clear that the line was drawn on August 10, 2022. There are no diplomatic powers, no military powers, and regional leaders are directly supervised by the central government.
1. However, there are still two to three years until 2026. Seizing this time to help ordinary people psychologically transition towards unification is something those who truly care about Taiwan should do. 2. If they can do more, they should approach the mainland and negotiate. What they get in return will be the best. To be a great hero, one must have great courage. (But I’m afraid my expectation will be dashed.) 3. The worst course of action is to act rashly. During the Hong Kong unrest, a Hong Kong tycoon placed an advertisement in the newspaper saying “X-Taiwan’s gossip.” This was tantamount to an open declaration of rebellion. I predicted at the time that the central government would try to de-escalate the unrest and then introduce a comprehensive and strict plan to regulate Hong Kong two years later. The plan was to spend two years suppressing the monopolistic capital forces in Hong Kong and forcing them to align themselves with the central government. However, these politically inept individuals completely forgot their own interests and wholeheartedly cooperated with the United States. More importantly, the low intelligence of the US diplomatic system led to a complete miscalculation of the situation, resulting in the mainland central government’s immediate and decisive action to quell the unrest in Hong Kong. In reality, they squandered those two years of their own actions.
I really don’t want Taiwan to cause any more trouble. They’ve ruined my 2026 timeline prediction. Let’s hurry up and do something worthwhile.
Summary:
October 9, 2019, a significant day. I did my best to remind Taiwan that “one country, two systems” is drifting away from Taiwan. I hoped they would fight for it themselves. August 10, 2022, an extremely important day. The mainland officially outlined its plan, and in reality, “one country, two systems” no longer exists. The mainland’s plan is: Taiwan has no diplomatic power; Taiwan has no command of the military; and high-ranking Taiwanese officials must support the mainland and accept direct supervision from the central government. But there is still a shell. This shell is the administrative plan and the economic system. There is still time to fight for this shell.
Note:
Originally, the Taiwan section was planned to be the final part of the entire document on the plan for the unification of China. It was originally scheduled to be released in February 2024. However, in response to the recent recurring hot topic regarding the situation in Taiwan, this section is being written upfront.
Please heed my advice. The moment the news of the shooting broke, I immediately predicted Chen Shui-bian would win; the moment Ma Ying-jeou was elected, I immediately predicted that cross-strait relations would definitely deteriorate under his rule; the moment the “X-TV gossip” advertisement came out, I immediately predicted that the central government would take strong measures to regulate Hong Kong (of course, the timing was off); by reading articles in mainland newspapers, I immediately concluded that “one country, two systems” was drifting away from Taiwan, and this prediction came true three years later. Now my prediction is that Taiwan has three years to strive for a better outcome; don’t continue to waste time. Time is precious.
Love yourself; take action.