China’s Plan for Military Reunification (9.2): Taiwan’s Fate (China and Taiwan Jointly Reject “One Country, Two Systems”)

[This article is a revised version of China’s plan for military unification (9): Taiwan’s destiny (2: the permanent loss of one country, two systems). Because I couldn’t bear to discard the original version, I specially kept both the old and new versions.]

 

 

summary:

Given the rise of pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan over the years, it’s reasonable to expect Taiwanese people to resent “one country, two systems.” At the same time, Taiwanese people have been misled into believing that the mainland is imposing “one country, two systems” on them, and that Taiwan’s refusal will not have negative consequences. However, the reality is quite the opposite. Due to the negative effects of the Hong Kong “one country, two systems” model, and the backlash against mainlanders’ resentment towards the mainland, “one country, two systems” is widely labeled as treasonous by mainland citizens. Furthermore, the Taiwanese government’s frequent manipulation of the pro-independence issue in recent years has angered the mainland central government, leading to the mainland formally stripping Taiwan of the political space for substantive “one country, two systems” in August 2022. Simultaneously, substantive “one country, two systems” harms China’s geopolitical interests, leaves a window for foreign interference in China’s internal affairs, hinders national integration, slows down China’s historical progress, and sows the seeds for future secession. These are all important reasons why the central government refuses to grant Taiwan “one country, two systems.”

Keywords:

One country, two systems; Taiwan; Mainland China; Public opinion; Opposition

I. Taiwan’s resistance to “one country, two systems”

1.1 The Political Aspirations of the Taiwanese People

The term “one country, two systems” carries a very negative, even sinister, connotation in Taiwan. In Taiwanese popular culture, it signifies “the mainland annexing Taiwan,” “the mainland enslaving Taiwan,” “the mainland forcing Taiwan,” and “the mainland trying to force ‘one country, two systems’ onto Taiwan,” among other things.

Poll statistics released by the Election Research Center of National Taiwan University show that since 1994, the proportion of those who support maintaining the status quo and pursuing independence in Taiwanese polls has far exceeded the proportion who support unification. Since 2002, the top three options have consistently been “maintaining the status quo,” “maintaining the status quo forever,” and “leaning towards independence.”

Reviewing the political aspirations of Taiwanese politicians and the Taiwanese people, we can list the following different levels of Taiwanese political demands: complete independence, confederate status, federal status, substantive autonomy, and maintaining the status quo. At least maintaining the status quo is a political fact that the Taiwanese people can currently largely accept. In the statistics of 2022 and 2023, the proportion of those who wanted “to maintain the status quo forever” became the highest.

Figure 1: Taiwanese people’s stance on unification and independence

(Source: Election Research Center, National Chengchi University, Taiwan)

1.2 The gap between “One Country, Two Systems” and Taiwan’s political aspirations

Since Ye Jianying proposed the “one country, two systems” solution for Taiwan in 1981, the mainland’s “one country, two systems” solution for Taiwan has actually undergone five evolutions. These five versions are…

A confederation-like structure based on Ye Jiutiao;

A substantive and comprehensive system of self-governance based on Deng Xiaoping’s Six Points;

A comprehensive autonomy system based on the Hong Kong demonstration version;

A scaled-down version of Hong Kong’s full autonomy system after 2020;

And the 2022 version of the two-system system without substance.

Table 1 shows the main content differences between the following five versions.

• The comparison in Table 1 clearly shows that there was no significant difference between the substantive content of the “one country, two systems” proposal put forward by the mainland before 2022 and Taiwan’s political aspirations. The only major difference lies in international recognition. In other aspects, Taiwan’s political aspirations and the promises made by the mainland are very similar to or equal to those made by the mainland.
• However, the white paper released by the central government on August 10, 2022 (the mainland version of the “Decision on Taiwan’s Future”) has already severely restricted Taiwan’s political space. These restrictions are mainly reflected in the following three points:
• Taiwan does not have the authority to command troops;
• Taiwan has no diplomatic power;
• Senior Taiwanese officials are subject to oversight by the central government.

1.3 Taiwan missed a historical juncture in the de facto “one country, two systems” framework.

1.3.1 Chiang Ching-kuo allowed Taiwan to decline

A review of the timelines of China’s proposal for unification negotiations, the release of Yeh’s Nine Points, and Deng’s Six Points reveals that these occurred in 1979, 1981, and 1983, respectively. The timing of China’s proposal for unification negotiations significantly overlapped with Chiang Ching-kuo’s consolidation and strengthening of his political power in Taiwan.

The “Jiangnan Case” of 1984 and the subsequent purge of Chiang Hsiao-yung by pro-independence forces are intricately linked to the emergence and development of pro-independence consciousness. The political purge of the Chiang family by pro-independence forces completely ended the Chiang family’s subsequent political progress in Taiwan. This is likely the main reason why Chiang Ching-kuo did not pursue political or historical achievements. Other reasons, such as economic factors and the American factor, are probably secondary.

1.3.2 It is not in line with the political interests of the United States or the economic interests of Taiwan.

The United States, one of the major players in international politics, has chosen to align itself with mainland China in order to counter pressure from the communist empire. However, the reunification of mainland China and Taiwan is absolutely not in the political interest of the United States.

Taiwan’s economic boom in the 1970s was primarily driven by the US-led imperial order. In the 1980s, Taiwan could not make decisions that contradicted US political interests, as this would severely damage Taiwan’s economic interests.

1.3.3 Lee Teng-hui’s loyalty to his “mother country,” Japan

Figure 2: Changes in Taiwanese People’s Identity

Lee Teng-hui possessed a strong affinity for Japan. During his term, he bolstered the then-non-dominant pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan and hindered rapprochement between mainland China and Taiwan, aligning with his personal ideals. During his 12 years in power, Lee significantly strengthened pro-independence forces in Taiwan, thus becoming a key factor in the 2000 handover of power to pro-independence figures. Key actions by Lee in promoting Taiwanese independence included: freezing provincial government, misinterpreting the February 28 Incident, introducing the “Mainlanders’ Government Theory,” advocating the “Two-State Theory,” pushing for Taiwan’s ruling elections, and supporting Chen Shui-bian.

1.3.4 Chen Shui-bian promoted Taiwan independence

Chen Shui-bian seized a golden opportunity to promote Taiwanese independence. In 2000, the same year Chen Shui-bian took office, US President George W. Bush pursued a hardline policy towards China. Chen Shui-bian thus gained a favorable position to manipulate the Taiwanese independence movement. During his second term, he promoted the “one country on each side” principle, the “rectification of Taiwan’s name,” and Taiwan’s membership in the UN.

However, due to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the United States became involved in the campaign to suppress insurgents in the Arab world. The US needed China’s support, which effectively deprived Taiwan of its opportunity for independence.

The 2006 Red Shirt Movement in Taiwan, an anti-Chen Shui-bian and anti-corruption movement, was in essence a concentrated expression of pro-independence sentiment. While outwardly cloaked in anti-corruption efforts, it was in reality a manifestation of dissatisfaction with Chen Shui-bian’s slow pace of pro-independence actions. The Lafayette-class frigate scandal, already revealed at the time, involved far greater corruption than Chen Shui-bian’s secret government funds and was even easier to manipulate. Yet, no one seemed to oppose Lee Teng-hui because of the Lafayette-class frigate scandal.

Chen Shui-bian knew that Taiwanese independence was practically impossible, but others didn’t think so. They blamed Chen Shui-bian for wasting a historical opportunity. This is the underlying reason for the Red Shirt Army’s large-scale protests against Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan.

1.3.5 Ma Ying-jeou going with the flow

During Ma Ying-jeou’s two terms and eight years in office, pro-unification groups complained that he wasted a golden opportunity to promote cross-strait rapprochement. Analyzing the causes from the results reveals that Ma Ying-jeou exhibited typical opportunist characteristics. He only acted in areas with minimal resistance, avoiding both major failures and significant achievements. He clearly understood that the Red Shirt Army’s anti-Chen Shui-bian movement was not motivated by corruption, but by complaints about Taiwanese independence. During his term, he dared not even undertake tasks with minimal resistance, such as revising the history curriculum, let alone other anti-independence initiatives.

Ma Ying-jeou’s term coincided with the reigns of Hu Jintao and the early years of Xi Jinping’s administration. The economic, military, and political balances across the Taiwan Strait had completely reversed. During this historical period, “one country, two systems” represented Taiwan’s best political interest and available political space. This was the best historical opportunity for Taiwan to pursue “one country, two systems.”

The Jiang-Hu era did not deny the promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping, and Xi Jinping’s early years did not explicitly deny them either. This presented Taiwan with a historic window of opportunity to discuss the best “one country, two systems” solution based on the promises made by Ye and Deng. Unfortunately, Ma Ying-jeou, a man lacking ideals, squandered this historical opportunity for Taiwan.

1.3.6 Tsai Ing-wen goes against the tide.

• Although Taiwanese identity has significantly increased since Ma Ying-jeou took office, the reality is that Taiwan has completely and utterly lost any possibility of independence since then. In the later years of Ma’s administration, not only did mainland China possess political, economic, and military advantages over Taiwan, but China also gained military superiority over the United States in certain regions. This fact means that the United States is powerless to prevent the Chinese central government’s unification efforts.
• Under these historical conditions, actively embracing “one country, two systems” is the only correct path that best serves the political interests of Taiwan’s political space.
• A major drawback of democratic electoral systems is that politicians manipulate populism, leading to the loss of group interests. In order to win power, Tsai Ing-wen’s group deliberately concealed and misled the major political trends. In particular, their involvement in the 2019 Hong Kong unrest thoroughly angered mainland public opinion and the central government.
• In August 2022, the central government of mainland China officially released a white paper on its policy toward Taiwan. This white paper formally declared that “Taiwan has forever lost the substantive ‘one country, two systems’ principle”[1].

1.3.7 Taiwan’s attitude towards other preferential treatment under the “one country, two systems ” principle

The 2022 revised version of the “one country, two systems” plan from mainland China still retains policy preferences in the daily lives of Taiwanese people. These include: taxation, economic system, government structure, and the existence of special economic zones.

It can be predicted that Taiwan will not actively pursue this “one country, two systems” framework until 2026. The reasons are at least as follows:

• • The anti-“one country, two systems” public sentiment is irreversible.
  • Regardless of which camp wins the 2024 election, it is impossible for them to obtain the mandate of public opinion to negotiate with the mainland.
  • The mainland will not hold talks with any group that has not received public authorization, nor will it take the lead in extending further goodwill.
  • Aside from “one country, two systems,” the mainland will not discuss any other solutions.

II. Mainland China abandons “one country, two systems”

China’s policies toward the mainland have always been characterized by continuity and long-term commitment. While the Chinese central government continues to uphold the “one country, two systems” principle, this does not mean that the mainland continues to insist on the unilateral political preferential treatment granted to Taiwan under this principle. In fact, since 2016, public opinion on the mainland opposing the preferential treatment under the “one country, two systems” principle has been rising rapidly and steadily. This reached a very high level after the Taiwanese authorities’ deep involvement in the Hong Kong unrest in 2019. Finally, on August 10, 2022, the mainland central government formally abolished the most important political preferential treatment given to Taiwan. The white paper of August 10, 2022, officially declared the “abolition of one country, two systems.” This is because the essential elements of “one country, two systems,” including the power to command the military, diplomatic power, and the power to appoint high-ranking government officials, have all been transferred to the central government.

The main reasons why the mainland abandoned its 40-year-old “one country, two systems” policy are as follows:

• Since 2016, public opinion in mainland China has strongly opposed peace talks.
• Since 2016, Taiwan has seriously angered the central government of mainland China.
• Substantive two systems will harm China’s geopolitical interests
• The “one country, two systems” framework will leave a window for foreign interference in China’s internal affairs.
• The “one country, two systems” principle will hinder the progress of Chinese history.
• Empowering ethnic minorities with secondary identities can hinder ethnic integration.
• Special economic zone structure increases national governance costs
• The special administrative region structure and the empowerment of ethnic sub-identities may sow the seeds of another secession in Taiwan.

2.1 Strong opposition from the mainland public

Since 2016, anti-mainland, anti-mainlander, and anti-central government activities in Taiwan have increased and become more severe. This has led to a deterioration in the mainland public’s perception of the Taiwanese regime and the Taiwanese people. The previous view of Taiwan as a “treasure island” and “the most beautiful scenery in Taiwan is its people” has completely shifted to dislike, contempt, disdain, and hatred towards Taiwanese people.

With the advancement of media technology, some unorthodox television programs and programs featuring Taiwanese people insulting mainlanders have become known to mainlanders. For example, claims such as “Mainland China has no toilets,” “Mainlanders don’t close the toilet door,” “Mainlanders can’t afford tea eggs,” “Mainlanders can’t afford pickled vegetables,” “Mainlanders supplement their protein intake by catching field mice,” “Mainlanders are ruining Taiwan’s environment,” “Mainlanders are poor,” and “Mainlanders queue up to watch others eat instant noodles” abound. These examples are countless, leading mainlanders to simultaneously find Taiwanese people extremely annoying and, on the other hand, to believe that Taiwanese people have negative intelligence.

On the mainland Chinese internet, there are two terms specifically used to describe Taiwanese people: “One Country, Two Minds” and “Green Frog.” The former reflects the extreme contempt mainlanders have for Taiwanese people. The latter reflects both this contempt and widespread dislike towards them.

A 2018 poll showed that 97% of mainland Chinese netizens supported Tsai Ing-wen’s re-election [3]. The main reason was that Tsai Ing-wen’s re-election would promote or accelerate the mainland’s process of unification by force. This shows the strong public opinion in mainland China against peace talks.

Today, mainland Chinese generally dislike and oppose “one country, two systems.” In the minds of mainland Chinese today, “one country, two systems” carries at least the following negative connotations:

1. The history of concessions and the memory of historical humiliation;

2. Unequal national treatment;

3. Feelings of humiliation in reality;

4. Unequal economic distribution schemes;

5. Supporting acts of treason;

2.2 Mainland public opinion despises Taiwanese people

The feelings of mainland Chinese towards Taiwanese people have undergone dramatic changes.

Before the establishment of direct links between the mainland and Taiwan, mainlanders had a vague impression of Taiwanese people. Content about Taiwan was a mandatory part of elementary and middle school Chinese textbooks in mainland China. This traditional educational approach perpetuated the mainland public’s unclear concept of Taiwanese people.

Cross-strait exchanges began during the Lee Teng-hui era. During the Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou eras, these exchanges expanded to almost all areas of the economy and people’s livelihoods. Due to the large number of mainland Chinese visiting Taiwan and experiencing firsthand the actual living conditions of Taiwanese people, mainland Chinese feelings towards the Taiwanese reached their peak during this historical period. The famous mainland saying, “The most beautiful scenery in Taiwan is its people,” originated during this time. This saying fully reflects the mainland Chinese people’s warm embrace and praise for the Taiwanese.

However, starting in the later years of Ma Ying-jeou’s administration in Taiwan, hostile actions against mainland China began to emerge. These anti-mainland actions escalated further after 2016. Ultimately, these actions against the mainland, the central government, and mainlanders led to a decline in mainlanders’ evaluation of Taiwanese people. This negative evaluation process intensified as Taiwan’s hostile actions escalated.

The terms “One Country, Two Systems” and “Green Frog” were coined by mainland Chinese netizens specifically to describe Taiwanese people. Their exact origins are untraceable, but these terms began appearing online around 2007. Currently, mainland Chinese almost exclusively use these two terms to refer to Taiwanese people. These terms fully demonstrate the extreme contempt, disdain, and dislike that mainland Chinese people have for Taiwanese people.

In this political environment that despises and belittles Taiwanese people, if the central government of mainland China were to grant Taiwanese people higher political and economic treatment than mainland citizens, it would certainly have to consider the level of resistance from mainland citizens.

2.3 The Taiwanese government angered the central government of mainland China.

Since Tsai Ing-wen came to power in 2016, she has repeatedly manipulated the issue of Taiwan independence. She has used the “Taiwanese national theory” to define Taiwan as a “sovereign and independent country,” and to promote the “Taiwanese consensus,” “Taiwanese values,” and the “Republic of China (Taiwan).”

The deep involvement of the United States and Taiwan in the anti-extradition bill protests in Hong Kong in 2019 severely angered the central government of mainland China.

In August 2021, Tsai Ing-wen made a “neighboring country” statement.

Multiple groups of US lawmakers will visit Taiwan starting in 2022.

The Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives visited Taiwan in August 2022.

2.4 The “one country, two systems” principle harms China’s geopolitical interests.

From the perspective of international political relations, China’s reunification is an inevitable result of its continuously rising political and economic power. However, it must also be recognized that the relationship between China and the United States has not been properly handled. Before and for some time after China initiates its reunification efforts, the relationship between the two countries will remain fraught with uncertainty. This uncertainty could potentially trigger significant risks. Under these circumstances, both China and the United States will have different understandings of international relations and geopolitics. It is reasonable to expect that either side, based on its differing stances, might take actions that protect themselves while harming the other.

It is highly probable that the United States will expel China from its current economic system, or that China will expel the United States from the geopolitical sphere of East Asia.

It would be reasonable to expect the United States to block China’s economic and political expansion worldwide, or for China to try to build a massive anti-US alliance on the world island.

Against this backdrop, maximizing China’s geopolitical advantages in East Asia is both an inevitable political pursuit and a rational action plan for China. However, making too many political concessions to Taiwan would severely limit China’s geopolitical advantages in East Asia, and consequently restrict its operational capabilities there.

2.4.1 Common economic progress requires China’s geopolitical security

• • The reunification of mainland China and Taiwan is an inevitable result of China’s rising comprehensive national strength. To try to stop this trend, or even to reverse it, is unrealistic and irrational. The tide has turned; there is no other way but to accept it.
  • As China’s national strength rises, it will inevitably expand its economic markets and lead other countries to enhance their economic power.
  • Just as the United States propelled European economic progress through the Marshall Plan and led Asian economic development through the “flying geese” model from the 1950s to the 1970s, China will become a major force driving economic growth in South America, Africa, Asia, and even Europe in the coming period.
  • China’s economic expansion will primarily or exclusively target developing countries. Given China’s strength and experience in developing the real economy, it has the capacity to lead more countries into or near the industrialization process. This trend is also what most developing countries aspire to.

  Initiating a joint industrialization process requires the ability to ensure its fundamental balance. This ability depends first and foremost on China’s national security capabilities. China’s geopolitical security in its eastern and southeastern regions becomes an extremely important factor. This factor can significantly weaken or strengthen China’s ability to advance economic progress.

2.4.2 The “one country, two systems” principle will weaken China’s geopolitical capabilities.

• Implementing “one country, two systems” in Taiwan would weaken the central government’s ability to centralize power and maintain security in Taiwan, thereby severely undermining China’s geopolitical security in the East and its ability to lead other countries in industrialization.
• China’s geopolitical weakness on the island of Taiwan will lead to another, even more serious outcome. The inability to suppress the maritime power of Japan and South Korea leaves a significant strategic gap in China’s east.
• China’s geopolitical weakness on the island of Taiwan will weaken its ability to engage in geopolitical cooperation with Russia. This will impact China’s ability to suppress the maritime power of Japan and South Korea, and weaken its overall geopolitical strength in Northeast Asia. It may even seriously affect China’s international political influence in Europe.

2.5 The “one country, two systems” framework will leave a window for external interference in China’s internal affairs.

2.5.1 The Turmoil in the Hong Kong Sample

The return of Hong Kong to China was a significant event in modern Chinese history. It is also a rare example in world history of resolving complex historical issues through peaceful negotiations, and a remarkable achievement in the political development of the People’s Republic of China.

However, since Hong Kong’s return to China, it has never enjoyed a stable political situation. This instability peaked in 2019.

2.5.2 A trivial excuse caused huge chaos

• The 2019 anti-extradition bill protests, like previous ones, are a typical example of how a small pretext can trigger social unrest in Hong Kong.
• A young couple from Hong Kong traveled to Taiwan. The male youth murdered the female youth in Taiwan and fled back to Hong Kong. Taiwan was unable to arrest the murder suspect and thus unable to prosecute the case. Hong Kong operates under territorial jurisdiction; since the crime occurred in Taiwan, Hong Kong was also unable to arrest and prosecute the murder suspect. Knowing that a murder suspect is openly operating in society yet being unable to be prosecuted is a grave challenge to and blatant disregard for the entire world order and legal system.
• Hong Kong has no extradition laws governing the transfer of criminals between Taiwan and mainland China. This murder case exposes this loophole in Hong Kong law. Repairing these legal loopholes is a natural and logical procedure.
• Such a legal, reasonable, and orderly event has somehow triggered chaos throughout Hong Kong. What would be completely illogical elsewhere is commonplace in Hong Kong.

2.5.3 Foreign forces interfering in China’s internal affairs

The deep involvement of the United States and Taiwan in the 2019 Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests is an indisputable fact. This section will not discuss this fact. It will only discuss the structural problems in Hong Kong and the flaws in the “one country, two systems” principle.

A comparison between the 2019 Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests and the 2021 storming of the US Capitol.
Country	Reason/Example	Legal basis of the incident	level of chaos	Impact on the legal level	American public opinion characterization	Subsequent legal consequences
China	Questioning the negative effects of amending the law	Oppose amending an existing legal provision	Triggering 15 months of chaos	Extremely serious	It’s a beautiful sight.	Hong Kong government withdraws amendment; more than 500 arrested.
USA	Questioning the fairness of the election results/election fraud	Freedom of speech	Caused hours of chaos	Extremely slight	“It was a criminal offense,” “a domestic terrorism incident,” “a failed rebellion.”	Multiple participants have been criminally prosecuted, with several facing sentences of up to 33 years.
China	Scope: Impacting the entire Hong Kong	Unauthorized assembly	serious	Extremely serious	Democratic and freedom actions, actions to uphold human rights	The matter was quelled by amendments to the law by the central government; 589 people were arrested during the period.
USA	Scope: Attack on the U.S. Capitol	Unauthorized assembly	slight	Very slight	“Criminal offenses”, “rebellion”, “terrorism”	Military forces (National Guard) and police were deployed; a curfew was imposed; 13 people were arrested and one was shot dead; the FBI intervened, initiating more than 500 searches and more than 400 criminal charges.
China	They stormed the Hong Kong Legislative Council building, damaged Legislative Council property, attacked police officers with powder and liquid, openly displayed rebellion flags, and publicly demanded the establishment of a provisional government.	It is essentially a violation of the law and borders on sedition.	serious	Serious, involving serious crimes of rebellion or treason.	Actions to promote freedom of speech and protect human rights	589 people arrested
USA	They stormed the U.S. Capitol; took photos, and took away small items as souvenirs.	Security personnel led the way; no property was damaged; and no treasonous remarks were made.	slight	No words or deeds of rebellion or treason	Rebellion, criminal offenses, terrorism	970 people were arrested; More than 500 search warrants; More than 400 criminal prosecutions;
China	The following materials were used openly: roadblocks, iron fences, iron bars, umbrellas, Molotov cocktails, helmets, shields, laser pointers, wooden strips, chemical powders, corrosive liquids, bricks, and stones.			Lasting for more than 1 year	Peace actions, peace appeals
USA	Public use of masks, cell phones, and cameras			Less than 24 hours	riots, terrorism
China	Seizing a police officer’s gun, biting off a police officer’s finger, assaulting a police officer, binding and beating others, seriously injuring dissidents, and setting fire to and burning dissidents.				Peaceful appeals, democratic actions, a beautiful sight	Most were exempted by the central government, and 589 people were arrested.
USA	They squeezed into the Capitol to take photos and took away lights, files, and tables from inside the Capitol.				Riots, criminal offenses, domestic terrorism	Using the military and police, and the FBI, criminal prosecution

• There’s no need to discuss whether foreign forces are interfering in China’s internal affairs; simply looking at this table is enough to draw a conclusion: the United States and its allies will not apply the same standards to similar events that occur in China and the United States.
• The “one country, two systems” principle has given foreign powers a tool and platform to interfere in China’s internal affairs, thereby posing a significant risk to China’s national security.

2.6 Empowering ‘secondary ethnic identities’ hinders the process of ethnic integration.

2.6.1 Identity alienation is the breeding ground for political alienation

One major psychological factor contributing to Europeans’ prejudice against Russians is the belief that “every Russian carries Mongol blood.”

A review of research literature from the 1960s and 1970s suggests that, at least during that period in eastern and southern Ukraine, no Ukrainian resident denied being Russian or part of the Russian nation. Prior to the 2013 coup, Ukrainian residents also lacked a typical sense of Ukrainian identity.

However, we must acknowledge a political fact: the separation of Ukraine and Belarus from the former Soviet Union is the premise and foundation for the current political hostility between Ukraine and Russia. The people, who were almost completely assimilated into a single ethnic group during the Soviet era, gradually developed distinct ethnic markers due to the separation of the countries. These secondary ethnic markers have gradually become the soil and breeding ground for political alienation. The current predicament Russia faces in Ukraine is a product of this alienation of ethnic identity.

It can be simply predicted that, for a certain period of history, Russia will find it difficult to avoid the Belarusian predicament stemming from the alienation of national identity. Although Belarus and Russia are currently deeply intertwined strategic allies, dissenting voices have begun to emerge. “Belarus has a history of thousands of years”; “Don’t say we have any connection with Russia”; “I am Belarusian”; “Chinese people, please don’t call us Belarusians, we are Belarusians.”

China has also demonstrated the consequences of identity alienation leading to political alienation. The “one country, two systems” model in Hong Kong and Macau was once used as a roadshow to attract Taiwan to political negotiations. This model, especially the Hong Kong model, fully demonstrates the fatal flaw of “one country, two systems”: it leaves a window for external interference in China’s internal affairs.

For nearly a century during British colonization of Hong Kong, Hong Kong people have consistently identified themselves as “Chinese” or “Guangdong people.” During the Republic of China era, there was a football tournament called the “Guangdong-Hong Kong Cup.” This tournament wasn’t named the Guangdong-Hong Kong Cup, the Twin Cities Cup, or the Brothers Cup. It didn’t contain any terms implying equality. The meaning of the term was that Guangdong was Hong Kong’s province. Between the 1950s and 1970s, regardless of whether they identified with the mainland government or the Taiwanese government, Hong Kong saw numerous instances of people pursuing Chinese political identity.

After Hong Kong adopted the “one country, two systems” principle and became a special administrative region, a new sub-identity emerged: “Hong Konger.” The meaning of “Hong Konger” is different from the commonly used terms like “Beijinger,” “Guizhou Person,” “Guangdong Person,” or “Guangxi Person.” It represents a special group of people. Not only do many Hong Kongers no longer identify as Guangdong natives, but a significant portion even deny being Chinese. This is another example of political alienation caused by identity alienation.

Since Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997, anti-mainland and anti-China sentiments have gradually emerged. These sentiments have fermented and developed on the basis of the secondary identity of “Hong Konger.” This process of political alienation reached its peak during the 2019 anti-extradition bill protests. It was only after the enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law in June 2020 that this dynamic process of political alienation was halted. In the past three years, this process of political alienation has clearly weakened. This lesson fully demonstrates the importance of preventing the alienation of national identity for the political integration of a country.

2.6.2 ‘Ethnic sub-identity’ hinders ethnic integration

• China’s history of ethnic integration is one of the most successful examples in the world.

Reviewing China’s more than 2,000 years of clearly recorded history, China is the most successful country in terms of ethnic integration. At least eight recorded ethnic minorities have completely assimilated into the Han Chinese. Even today, the Miao, Tujia, Dong, and Yi ethnic groups do not exhibit significant cultural separation from the Han Chinese. In contrast, the Anglo-Saxons occupied Great Britain for over a thousand years, yet the distinctions between the English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish remain unresolved. The United States has been a superpower for nearly a century, yet a single, unified “American nation” has not yet emerged.

• Empowering “ethnic sub-identities” hinders ethnic integration.

Sichuan, Guizhou, and parts of Yunnan have a long history of Tusi (chieftain) rule. The Yi people, in particular, lived almost entirely under the Tusi system in these regions. However, since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the ethnic minority policies in these three provinces have served as a successful example of China’s ethnic policies. Especially the Yi people of Sichuan, despite their vastly different historical trajectories, lifestyles, and cultural backgrounds, have not been prevented from successfully integrating into the modern Chinese civilization.

Correspondingly, there are also some lessons worth reviewing after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. For example, people from a certain province had been selling traditional knives inland since the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, market management and even social management relied on a very small number of administrative personnel, carried out through communes, production brigades, militia teams, and industrial and commercial bureaus. Although cities had public security bureaus and police stations, they did not actually intervene in social administration. However, the people of this province were generally docile and rarely caused trouble (at least, none were heard of). But later, during a period of emphasis on ethnic unity, people from this province began to cause trouble throughout the inland areas. Although by this time, public security forces and police stations were already operating regularly, and the state had the force to maintain order, the marker of sub-ethnic identity led to greater estrangement rather than closer ethnic relations. The subsequent development resulted not only in the people of this province causing trouble, but also in people from neighboring provinces that were originally predominantly Han Chinese, who began to cause widespread trouble inland. It is evident that even without a clearly legally empowered ‘ethnic sub-identity,’ it can hinder the process of ethnic integration.

• “Taiwanese” has become a “sub-ethnic identity”.

Although the majority of Taiwanese are Han Chinese, primarily speaking Hokkien and Mandarin, and worshipping the same Mazu as the Fujianese, the term “Taiwanese” has effectively become a sub-identity. Taiwanese people deliberately deny these facts, asserting that their various markers of life are identical to those of the Fujianese. They also attempt to erase any associations or memories with China. Because Taiwan is not yet a fully independent political entity, nor a “Special Administrative Region” authorized by the Chinese central government, the identity of “Taiwanese” has not yet received full legal authorization. Whether to grant political authority to the sub-identity of “Taiwanese” or to diminish its political significance is a major choice facing the Chinese central government.

2.6 The Special Administrative Region structure increases the cost of national governance.

In the course of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government’s operation, many strange things can be observed. At least…

• The strange Tien Pei-Chen, sometimes supporting the pro-establishment camp, sometimes opposing it;
• The pan-democrats repeatedly filibustered and used procedures to obstruct the agenda;
• The parties that hold a majority of seats have repeatedly made concessions and coordinated with the minority parties;
• Once the pan-democrats lose in the Legislative Yuan, they immediately launch street movements;
• The Hong Kong SAR government emphasizes its independence while repeatedly asking the central government for concessions;

In fact, behind these strange phenomena lies a common logic: the need for the central government to continuously pay political costs to various political forces within the special administrative region.

A review of Chinese history reveals that, without exception, all special operating institutions imposed additional economic costs on the central government. The Jiedushi system quickly crippled the Tang Dynasty’s central government’s tax collection capacity. The Zhoumu system also weakened the Han Dynasty’s central government’s financial resources. The promotion of Buddhism further hampered the central government’s ability to collect substantial taxes. These shortcomings stemmed from their initial advantages in enabling the central government to implement significant policies and initiatives. Initially, they all had valid reasons for existence and considerable value. In fact, they made significant contributions to achieving certain political goals for the central government. However, ultimately, they all became burdens to the central government and major causes of dynastic collapse.

Hong Kong, as a special administrative region bordering the mainland, is entirely under the control of China’s mainland. The central government is still unable to completely escape the constant demands from various political forces in Hong Kong. Taiwan, separated from the mainland by the strait, is expected to incur greater administrative costs. How to increase the mainland’s administrative strength over Taiwan while reducing its costs from a historical perspective is a major research topic.

2.8 The structure of Taiwan as a special administrative region would hinder the pace of Chinese history.

China has reached this historical juncture and completed the reunification of Taiwan. At the same time, China also faces another critical juncture: how to move forward. Whether it can fully utilize the geopolitical advantages brought about by the reunification of Taiwan will determine the speed and pace of China’s continued progress.

China’s geopolitical security to the east and southeast is crucial to the pace and speed of its progress. The Taiwan Special Administrative Region under the “one country, two systems” framework will significantly limit the Chinese central government’s ability to leverage Taiwan’s geopolitical power. Correspondingly, it will weaken China’s overall geopolitical power in East Asia. Consequently, it will inevitably weaken China’s geopolitical cooperation capabilities with Russia in East and Central Asia. Correspondingly, it will inevitably weaken China’s execution and action capabilities in other political directions.

If the United States does not initiate pre- and post-reunification negotiations when China completes the reunification of Taiwan, the China-US alliance will inevitably face a comprehensive soft or even hot confrontation that could last for 3 to 7 years. During this confrontation, if China does not decouple Japan and South Korea from the US system, it will face a prolonged period of geopolitical disadvantage. Implementing “one country, two systems” in Taiwan will severely restrict China’s ability to utilize Taiwan’s geopolitical power.

China’s political path after unifying Taiwan may involve the following steps.

(1. Using Taiwan as a base, establish a solid support point for a land-island, land bridge, or land sword. Extend China’s land power into the Sea of Japan.)

(2. To suppress the naval power of Japan and South Korea. This goal can be achieved by using Taiwan as a base, or even by cooperating with other third parties in the northern Sea of Japan. In any case, fully leveraging the geopolitical power of Taiwan is the foundation for all possibilities.)

(3. Expel US forces from the East Asian geopolitical region. By independently utilizing Taiwan’s geographical advantages, it is possible to achieve the goal of expelling US military forces from East Asia. At the very least, it is possible to independently suppress the US geopolitical capabilities in East Asia.)

(4. To achieve regional cooperation in East and Northeast Asia. This goal is a further objective after expelling the United States from East Asia. However, achieving this goal is more difficult and requires greater chaos, greater geopolitical pressure, and a more complex international situation.)

(5. If China is unwilling to completely overthrow the existing international order, its geopolitical power in East and Northeast Asia is the basis for negotiations on the division of power shares.)

(6. If the United States wants to expel China from the existing economic order, China’s geopolitical power in East and Northeast Asia is the foundation for integrating regional power and establishing a parallel economic order.)

(7. Making full use of Taiwan’s geographical advantages is the basis for the above assumptions. Whether or not to establish a special administrative region structure in Taiwan will be a major choice for the Chinese central government.)

2.9 The special administrative region structure and the empowerment of ethnic sub-identities may sow the seeds of another secession in Taiwan.

Russia’s current risks are not limited to Ukraine. Over a 50- to 100-year period, Russia will inevitably face political separatist pressures from Belarus and Kazakhstan. Leaving Kazakhstan aside for now, Belarus is at least a prime example of a political minefield planted due to identity differences (ethnic alienation).

Tracing history back to Ukraine, one can find a brief period where the label “Ukraine” existed. However, for Belarus, it’s extremely difficult to find a clearly marked historical label of “Belarus.” Even the historical label of the sub-state of “Cossacks” is far more definite than “Belarus.” Yet, Belarusians now emphasize in various formal and informal settings that they have “thousands of years of history.” Don’t mention any connection to Russia. “I’m Belarusian.” Chinese people, please don’t call us “Belarusians,” we are “Belarusians.”

Yeltsin, in an effort to escape poverty and the inability to support his people, separated Belarus from Ukraine. The political risks are not only present now, but even greater risks lie in the next 50 to 100 years. Ukrainians have already gone from being brothers (or at least cousins) to enemies. Within 50 to 100 years (or possibly even less), there is a greater than 50% probability that Belarusians will become enemies of Russia.

The term “Taiwanese,” whether we like it or not, is now politically considered an enemy of “Chinese.” The good news is that it hasn’t yet been “empowered.” Therefore, it’s easily weakened, diluted, and eventually disappears. How to prevent the “empowerment” of the label “Taiwanese” is likely a major challenge facing the central government of mainland China.

If someone keeps emphasizing that people from Zengcheng are different from people from Guangzhou, or people from Hui’an are different from people from Quanzhou, they will inevitably think, “We are different.” This mentality will gradually be exploited by politicians. In the United States, politicians can use the differences between “red states” and “blue states” and identity to seek political gain. In Turkey, politicians can exploit the differences between “secular seekers” and “anti-secular forces.” In India, politicians can exploit religious conflicts. In Thailand, the differences between rural and urban residents cause national instability. In Ukraine, the alienation and distinction of identity are the basis of war. The current exploitation of the “Taiwanese” label by politicians follows the same principle. Taiwanese people are currently creating a new identity for themselves. This new identity is “Taiwanese.” This new Taiwanese identity will become the political basis for their next rebellion against the mainland.

summary

Given the rise of pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan over the years, it’s reasonable to expect Taiwanese people to resent “one country, two systems.” Therefore, it’s also reasonable to expect Taiwan (both the Taiwanese people and the Taiwanese government) to refuse peaceful negotiations with the central government of mainland China before 2026. Currently, there’s a misconception among Taiwanese that the mainland is imposing “one country, two systems” on Taiwan, and that Taiwan’s rejection of it won’t have negative effects. However, the reality is the opposite. Both the mainland public and the central government substantially oppose granting Taiwan special privileges under the “two systems” framework. The central government of mainland China officially deprived Taiwan of its substantive political space under “one country, two systems” in August 2022. The reasons why the central government deprives Taiwan of its substantive “one country, two systems” status are as follows: the negative effects of the “one country, two systems” model in Hong Kong; the backlash from the mainland people’s hatred of Taiwanese people towards mainlanders; the widespread labeling of “one country, two systems” as treasonous by the mainland people; the Taiwanese government’s anger towards the central government; the “two systems” plan harming China’s overall national interests; the “two systems” harming China’s geopolitical interests; the special administrative region structure leaving a window for foreign forces to interfere in China’s internal affairs; empowering ethnic sub-identities would hinder ethnic integration; the special administrative region structure slowing down China’s historical progress; and empowering sub-ethnic identities would sow the seeds of Taiwan’s next secession.

References

1. The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification Cause in the New Era. White Paper. People’s Republic of China. Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2022-08/10/content_5704839.htm
2. Yeh Chi-chuan. China’s Plan for Military Reunification (9): Taiwan’s Destiny (1: The Evolution of the Taiwan Version of “One Country, Two Systems” ) . https://pppnet.at/chinas-unifying-plan9-taiwans-destiny-01/
3. Wang Fan. Why are mainland netizens overwhelmingly supporting Tsai Ing-wen’s re-election? Deutsche Welle. 2018. https://p.dw.com/p/2qwJ3