Alliance War Strength Calculation: Projection on USA-China War around East Asia

summary:

According to calculations from a new system for assessing the intensity of war among nations and groups, the United States and its allies are unable to defeat China in the theaters of war around East Asia. Faced with China’s defensive yet offensive actions in East Asia, the US and its allies are virtually helpless. In various scenarios and levels of conventional military conflict, the US-led alliance cannot gain an advantage. The premise that the US-led alliance will not suffer a major military defeat depends on the management and control of the war by politicians on both sides. Avoiding significant military losses to the enemy while ensuring one’s own side suffers minimal losses will be a peculiar characteristic of potential wars around East Asia. However, if the conflict spirals out of control and escalates into a full-scale war, there is a very high probability of nuclear war. Once public opinion in Western countries supporting nuclear war is aroused, Western politicians will be powerless to stop it. This forces China to assume the primary responsibility for curbing Western public opinion advocating the use of nuclear weapons. China may need to further rethink its nuclear armament doctrine to align with the objective needs of global security and stability, as well as the world’s expectations of China.

Keywords:

National war intensity; Alliance war intensity; East Asia; Total war between China and the United States; Nuclear war

The “National War Intensity” assessment system has successfully supported some of the early, wild predictions about a war between Russia and Ukraine. This calculation model determines that Russia and its allies would possess a stronger overall war capability than the Ukrainian alliance in the L1-L2 region. This tool can also be extended to assess the war intensity of any bloc or alliance that would engage in a full-scale war between China and the United States in East Asia and the surrounding region.

I. Framework for Assessing National War Intensity:

1.1 Components of a National War Intensity Assessment System

For details on the National War Intensity Assessment System, please refer to ‘National War Intensity Assessment System: (I) and Predicting the Course of the War in Ukraine'[1].

Table 1: National War Intensity Assessment Items
Geographical factors: 300 points	land area ratio	Key evaluation factors	High-powered, wide-area weapons are the most powerful force for a nation to withstand the impact of war in real-world applications.
	Geographical features	Reference coefficients in the evaluation	The complexity of a country’s geographical features increases its ability to withstand the impact of war.
Political factors: 320 points	Population factors 100 points	population ratio	The actual operational unit of a nation’s participation in war; the main counting unit that bears the impact of war; the counting basis for national recovery after war.
		Labor force ratio:	In a state of war, the actual capacity to support a nation’s political, economic, and military activities.
		Percentage of the dominant ethnic group:	Key factors for sustaining war-fighting capabilities, organizational capacity, and political stability under the brutal impact of war.
	Organizational ability 90 points	Centralized power:	The peacetime organizational model of a state reflects its ability to respond to war.
		Stability:	The degree to which citizens approve of the state structure during peacetime reflects their ability to follow the state’s policies.
	National History 10 points	10 points for historically leading world superpowers	National historical honors can appropriately enhance the public’s resilience to war.
		Historically or currently, regional powers receive 5 points.	The pursuit of national honor and leadership can appropriately enhance a nation’s resilience to war.
	Military Structure 120 points	Mathematical models calculate the ranking of existing military forces of various countries.	It generally acknowledges the rationality of the “national military strength ranking” formulated by the “Global Firepower Network” and recognizes that existing military assets have a significant influence on both the conduct and outcome of war.
Economic factors National score: 380 points War Alliance: 350 points	Agricultural productivity: 80 points	Agricultural GDP and the Global Food Security Index are the main indicators used in the calculation.	Agricultural productivity and security are the most important factors influencing a nation’s ability to withstand the pressures of war alone. A computational model is used to convert a nation’s agricultural GDP and food security index.
	Industrial productivity: 110 points	National industrial GDP and national innovation index are the main calculation indicators.	Industrial production capacity is the decisive factor for a country’s sustained investment and expenditure in war; it is the main means and primary capability for a country to win wars.
	Service industry capability (40 points)	The service sector is the main indicator for GDP calculation.	The capacity to serve production must be transformed into support for war operations through certain methods during wartime.
	Military spending capacity: 120 points	Peacetime military spending capacity can fundamentally determine a country’s ability to sustain military spending.	A nation’s capacity to invest in military spending reflects its long-term comprehensive ability to develop war assets.
	Military Technology (30 points)		High-tech warfare can bring considerable war benefits in short-term wars or in the early stages of a war.
State of war	Defense effect coefficient	2.2	War intensity coefficient of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council in a defensive war
		1.8	The war intensity coefficient when a “specific country” is waging a defensive war. This includes India, Pakistan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea.
		1.4	The intensity coefficient of war when other countries are waging a defensive war.

Table 2: Weapon Technology Rating Table (Total 30 points)
Military high technology (This item is not included in the Alliance War Intensity calculation)	Long-range projection technology 9 points (Score will be awarded based on the highest score)	Weapon range > 10K km	9
		Weapon range > 5,000 kilometers	7
		Weapon range > 3,000 kilometers	5
		Weapon range > 1,000 kilometers	3
	Flight Technology 7 points (Score will be awarded based on the highest score)	Hypersonic vehicle manufacturing	7
		Stealth fighter manufacturing	5
		4th generation aircraft manufacturing	4
		Manufacturing of 3rd generation light fighter jets	3
		Drone manufacturing	2.5
	High-altitude action technology 7 points (Score will be awarded based on the highest score)	Space or near-space stay	7
		Satellite navigation capabilities	5
		Weather/Image Satellite Capabilities	4
		Other 24-hour loiter capabilities	3
	Conventional weapons technology 7 points (Score will be awarded based on the highest score)	Aircraft carrier manufacturing	7
		Manufacturing of conventional bombs with a yield of 1,000 tons or more	7
		7K-ton warship manufacturing	6
		Manufacturing cruise bombs with ranges exceeding 800 kilometers	6
		Manufacturing air-launched bombs with ranges exceeding 500 kilometers	6
		3K-ton warship manufacturing	5
		Main battle tank manufacturing	4
		Light and medium tank manufacturing	3
		1K-ton warship manufacturing	3
		Manufacturing of projectile weapons with a range of over 30 kilometers	2

1.2 Calculation Model for War Process and Alliance War Intensity

War is a dynamic process; offensive or defensive postures alter a nation’s war-fighting capabilities. The acquisition and loss of land and resources change the baseline for assessment. As war progresses, the number of nations joining or withdrawing from the conflict constantly shifts. The depth and breadth of a nation’s involvement in the war also change with its development. Dynamic assessment of war is both important and essential.

Table 3: Alliance and Group War Intensity (Dynamic) Assessment Items
Defense mode	Geographical factors provide strong practical support for the defending side.	Automatically enters total war mode to increase the nation’s war capabilities.	Generally, it possesses a political environment that prioritizes escalating the war effort.	The country where the war takes place experiences a defensive effect. Other allies do not have their defensive effects calculated.
Belligerent countries (intervention coefficient 1)	Comprehensive and direct involvement in the combat process	Sharing the same political goals or even the same or similar philosophical goals with allies.	The country enters a state of war	The entire national economy and organizational structure were geared towards the objectives of war.
Frontline allies (intervention coefficient 0.6)	No direct involvement in the war	Sharing the same political goals as allies	The country has not entered a state of war.	The nation mobilized its full political resources to support the ongoing war and its allies.
Support allies (intervention coefficient 0.3)	No intervention in the war	Having closely similar political pursuits or demands with allies	The country was basically not involved in war.	Providing tangible military and economic support to allies at the government level.
Background allies (intervention coefficient 0.15)	We will not intervene in the war at this stage.	Because of practical factors, there are quite close political and economic ties with the countries that are at war.	They will not proactively get involved in war.	Provide economic and political background support to allies in the war. This support will not incur any losses.
Predictable ‘unpredictability’	Background Allies’ Changing Stance (National power valuation coefficient: 0.15)	Potentially Opposing States (States whose political and economic gains are closely tied to the outcome of the war) (National Power Value: 0.2)	Potential opposition states (existing non-hostile states with differing political stances) (country power counted as 0.25)	potential enemy allies (Countries whose political and economic stances are close to those of their adversaries) (National power value: 0.3).
Unpredictability (no measurement method available)	The Political and Military Genius Effects of War	The sudden change in the philosophical views and political leanings of ordinary people	Unpredictable sudden political events	Unpredictable geographical or environmental disasters
The defender in war	The defender’s assessment of the intensity of war remained unchanged over the following year. Overall strength was calculated in conjunction with the defense coefficient.	Territory and finances lost by a defending nation are not counted as lost within two years of their loss.	If the attacking side is defeated and becomes the defending side, the lost territory and finances of the country will not be considered lost within one year.	Once the defender becomes the attacker, the defensive effect that was previously included in the calculation model disappears.
The attacking side in war	The war intensity score remained unchanged for one year before the war.	The occupied territory and its finances are included in the calculation factors of the party after four years of stable occupation.	The defensive effect is not calculated if the attacking side retreats into its own territory within 6 months.	Six months after the attacking side was defeated and became the defending side, the defensive effect was calculated in the new environment.

II. The Complexity of the Sino-US War Model

China’s launch of a unified military operation will likely provoke a reaction from the United States and its allies. A difficult situation for the US and its allies is the difficulty in choosing a response. Theoretically, the US and its allies have multiple plans to address the challenge posed by China. These plans can be found in other relevant articles [2,3,4].

This article does not discuss the limited war situation between China and the United States. This is because the calculation basis of the national war intensity calculation model and the group war intensity calculation model is based on the total war of the nation.

The following calculations are based on China adopting a defensive mode, limiting the battlefield to the coverage area of Chinese medium-range missiles. For the reasons explained, please refer to the relevant articles [4,5].

III. The Course and Changes of Total War

3.1 The formation of alliances when European countries do not directly intervene in a US-China war

In the event of a full-scale military conflict between the US and China over the Taiwan issue, Japan and South Korea would inevitably be involved. The Philippines also has a very high probability of direct involvement, as it is one of the key pillars of the US’s East Asian strategy.

European countries are facing a major decision-making crisis. If Europe can ultimately determine its own destiny, the chances of Europe as a whole intervening in a full-blown conflict between China and the United States are extremely small.

If China makes significant political arrangements in Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East beforehand, it can not only suppress Europe’s proactive impulse to intervene in the Sino-US conflict, but also suppress Europe’s passive driving force to intervene in the Sino-US war.

Table 4: Structure of the China Alliance
China Alliance 1: (1178.8)
belligerent countries	China	Triggers a defensive effect; coefficient 2.2
Frontline allies		National war capability is valued at 60%.
Support allies	Russia, Iran	National war capability is valued at 30%.
Background Allies	Cambodia, Laos, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates	National war capability is valued at 15%.
Possible opposition to the country	Indonesia, Myanmar	Geopolitical and historical factors
Potential opposing countries	Kazakhstan, Mongolia	Geopolitical and historical factors
Potential allies of the other party	Afghanistan, Myanmar, and other small countries in South and the Americas	Economic and political factors

Table 5: Structure of the United States Alliance
United States Alliance 1: (1010.1)
belligerent countries	United States, Japan, South Korea, Philippines
Frontline allies	Australia	National war capability is valued at 60%.
Support allies	Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Lithuania, United Kingdom	National war capability is valued at 30%.
Background Allies	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.	National war capability is valued at 15%.
Possible opposition to the country	Some North African countries	Against the existing imperial order
Potential opposing countries	Middle Eastern and North African Arab countries	Multiple factors
Potential allies of the other party	Serbia, one of many countries opposed to the existing system	Historical factors

3.2 Alliance War Intensity Without European Participation

Table 6: Alliance War Intensity Without European Participation
	China Alliance 1	United States Alliance	Benchmark score
Geographical factors scoring	353.9	318.1	/300
Demographic factors scoring	196.6	117.0	/130
Political scoring	110.9	99.2	/90
History bonus	10	10	/10
Military factors scoring	146.5	162.4	/120
Agricultural industry capacity	78.5	44.6	/80
Industrial capacity	117.8	94.1	/110
Service industry capabilities	31.7	34.5	/40
Arms input capability	132.8	133.4	/120
Alliance War Strength Total	1178.8	1013.2

Figure 1: Alliance War Intensity Without European Involvement

3.3 The intensity of alliance wars when Europe joins a full-scale war with the United States and China

• If Europe were to intervene as a whole in a full-scale war between China and the United States, it would once again prove Ye Qiquan’s judgment made in 2022. Europe is a colony of the United States. It has the attributes of a full-scale colony.[6]

Even without prior political arrangements by China to suppress Europe, European intervention in a full-scale war between China and the United States would be a fatal move for Europe. It would directly accelerate and exacerbate the process of border shifts in Europe. It would also inevitably lead to the disintegration and restructuring of Europe’s existing power structure [7,8].

• However, European involvement in a full-scale war between China and the United States would also put China in a difficult situation [7,8]. Joining forces with Russia to completely shake the European power structure is a solution and countermeasure that China has no choice but to adopt. This is the basis for the emergence of China Alliance II.
• If the strength of the second Chinese alliance is insufficient to stop European oppression of China, China will inevitably launch a comprehensive campaign to destroy the American imperial system. Its main characteristic is the full mobilization and unity of all existing and potential forces opposing the existing imperial system. Once this comprehensive alliance is formed, Europe and the United States will face multi-point and multi-dimensional resistance globally. The existing American imperial system will face the risk of collapse [3,5].

The components of the China Alliance III are briefly listed below. China’s increased political involvement in the Middle East and North Africa alone can produce enormous political effects. These effects allow China to directly deter major European powers prone to rash actions.

Table 7: Structure of the Second Alliance of China
China Alliance II: (1258.5)
belligerent countries	China, Russia	China triggers a defensive effect; coefficient 2.2
Frontline allies	Iran, Syria	National war capability is valued at 60%.
Support allies	Saudi Arabia, UAE	National war capability is valued at 30%.
Background Allies	Algeria, Argentina, Cambodia, Laos, Nigeria, Pakistan, Serbia, Türkiye	National war capability is valued at 15%.
Possible opposition to the country	Indonesia, Myanmar	Geopolitical and historical factors
Potential opposing countries	Kazakhstan, Mongolia	Geopolitical and historical factors
Potential allies of the other party	Afghanistan, Myanmar, and other small countries in South and the Americas	Economic and political factors

Table 8: The United States Alliance II Structure
United States Alliance II: (1133.6)
belligerent countries	United States, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, United Kingdom	Ukraine triggers a defensive effect. Coefficient 1.4.
Frontline allies	Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Sweden	National war capability is valued at 60%.
Support allies	Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland.	National war capability is valued at 30%.
Background Allies	India, Mongolia, Myanmar	National war capability is valued at 15%.
Possible opposition to the country	Some North African countries	Against the existing imperial order
Potential opposing countries	Middle Eastern and North African Arab countries	Multiple factors
Potential allies of the other party	Many countries that oppose the existing system	Historical factors

Table 9: Structure of China Alliance III
China Alliance III: (1280.4)
belligerent countries	China, Iran, Russia, Syria, Türkiye	China triggers a defensive effect; coefficient 2.2
Frontline allies	Saudi Arabia	National war capability is valued at 60%.
Support allies	Egypt, UAE	National war capability is valued at 30%.
Background Allies	Algeria, Argentina, Cambodia, Laos, Nigeria, Pakistan, Serbia	National war capability is valued at 15%.
Possible opposition to the country	Indonesia, Myanmar	Geopolitical and historical factors
Potential opposing countries	Kazakhstan, Mongolia	Geopolitical and historical factors
Potential allies of the other party	Afghanistan, Myanmar, and other small countries in South and the Americas	Economic and political factors

Table 10: Intensity of Alliance Wars When Europe Entered the War
	China Alliance II	China Alliance III	United States Alliance II	Benchmark score
Geographical factors scoring	405.7	413.2	361.8	/300
Demographic factors scoring	199.4	201.3	132.4	/130
Political scoring	109.2	108.8	101.9	/90
History bonus	10	10	10	/10
Military factors scoring	164.1	171.7	192.1	/120
Agricultural industry capacity	79.3	80.0	49.9	/80
Industrial capacity	119.3	120.3	104.1	/110
Service industry capabilities	32.1	32.4	37.7	/40
Arms input capability	139.4	142.7	143.8	/120
Alliance War Strength Total	1258.5	1280.4	1133.6

Figure 2: Intensity of Alliance Warfare in East Asia during the European Participation in the War

Speculations on the Outcome of Wars in East Asia and the Americas

Figure 3: Battlefields around East Asia: Changes in the intensity of alliance wars

4.1 Wars in the East Asian region were primarily political and economic wars.

Wars in East Asia are primarily political and economic, with multiple options for military action. Furthermore, military operations are strictly managed by politicians on both sides, who strive to avoid inflicting significant losses on the opposing side while simultaneously minimizing their own. This is a unique characteristic of Sino-US wars in East Asia.

4.2 Avoiding a full-scale military conflict between China and the United States is the primary goal of politicians on both sides.

A full-scale military conflict poses enormous risks to both China and the United States. It could even have a significant impact on stability in Europe and globally. Given this immense risk, it is a predictable political choice for politicians on all sides to avoid it.

4.3 The enormous risk of total war cannot be ruled out.

There are many factors in China that drive total war[5]. There are also many factors in the United States that drive total war[3]. There are also many factors in Europe that drive total war[8]. Many other countries have completed their psychological and political preparations to intervene in a massive chaos to gain their national interests[5]. A large group of countries that oppose the existing political power structure and economic distribution system are waiting for leadership to join, promote and expand the chaos[5].

4.4 Faced with China’s defensive offensive tactics, the United States and its allies have virtually no solution.

The National War Intensity Assessment System is a new type of national war capability calculator. Although it will only be launched at the end of 2023, the calculation framework was designed from the beginning of 2022 when assessing the dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine war.

Its calculations almost perfectly supported a series of outlandish predictions made by Ye Qiquan just two months after the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War. These astonishing predictions were gradually validated by the course of the war over the past two years.

Despite the United States’ extensive war experience and multiple countermeasures against China’s military actions, this new war capability assessment system concludes that the US cannot win a war with China. Faced with China’s defensive offensive actions, the US is virtually helpless.

4.5 Probability of nuclear war

The probability of nuclear war is as low as the probability of a full-scale war between the United States and China.

However, the probability of a total war triggering a nuclear war is extremely high, even reaching a level unprecedented in history.

The main reason is that the United States is almost incapable of winning in conventional warfare under various scenarios[4]. The reason why the United States does not suffer a major defeat is due to the control and management of the war level by politicians on both sides. This makes it impossible for the side with the psychological advantage in war to have an advantage in the outcome of the war. This psychological distance has become an important force driving the application of nuclear devices in war.

4.6 Efforts to deter nuclear war

Western philosophy rests on two main pillars. One is the belief in the unpredictability and lack of control over the future. The other is the survival strategy of small groups and incompatibility with other groups. This is the philosophical reason why the European system states were so keen on military action.

European countries generally have an inherent hostile impulse towards China. China needs to unveil the veil of European conceptual innovation and conceptual control to gain a deeper understanding of this inherent attribute[8].

The hostile public opinion towards China in European countries will ultimately be the greatest force driving nuclear war. Once this force is activated, politicians in European countries will be virtually powerless to stop it. Under these objective pressures, China has no choice but to assume the primary responsibility for deterring nuclear impulses. Preventing nuclear war has become an expectation and responsibility placed upon China for global stability and security.

Revealing a reliable nuclear force, sufficient to destroy Europe and North America, at the opportune moment is a credible way to prevent European public opinion from initiating a nuclear war. China’s doctrine of a moderate nuclear counterattack may be seriously outdated and no longer suited to current and future political needs. China may need to further rethink its nuclear armament doctrine to align with the objective needs of global stability and security, as well as the world’s expectations of China.

summary

According to calculations from a new system for assessing the intensity of war among nations and groups, the United States and its allies are unable to defeat China in the theaters of war around East Asia. Faced with China’s defensive yet offensive actions in East Asia, the US and its allies are virtually helpless. In various scenarios and levels of conventional military conflict, the US-led alliance cannot gain an advantage. The premise that the US-led alliance will not suffer a major military defeat depends on the management and control of the war by politicians on both sides. Avoiding significant military losses to the enemy while ensuring one’s own side suffers minimal losses will be a peculiar characteristic of potential wars around East Asia. However, if the conflict spirals out of control and escalates into a full-scale war, there is a very high probability of nuclear war. Once public opinion in Western countries supporting nuclear war is aroused, Western politicians will be powerless to stop it. This forces China to assume the primary responsibility for curbing Western public opinion advocating the use of nuclear weapons. China may need to further rethink its nuclear armament doctrine to align with the objective needs of global security and stability, as well as the world’s expectations of China.

References:

[1] Ye Qiquan. National War Strength Assessment System: (I) and Prediction of the Ukrainian War. Dec. 7, 2023. http://pppnet.net/nation-war-strength-model-and-prediction/

[2] Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification Plan by Force (2): Variables Between China and the United States. Sep. 8, 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables-02/

[3] Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (4): US Options. Sep. 9, 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan4-usas-options-04/

[4] Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force (5): A Hypothetical Scenario of a Total War Between China and the United States. Sep. 10, 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan5-imagined-conflict-scenario-05/

[5] Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (1): Shaped in 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part 1). Sep. 7, 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026-1cn/

[6] Ye Qiquan. Whose War? Winners and Losers in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Feb. 11, 2023. http://pppnet.net/players-winning-or-losing-from-russia-ukraine-war-2/

[7] Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification Plan by Force (3): The Design Basis of China’s Variables. Sep. 9, 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-3-chinas-design-bk-03/

[8] Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification Plan by Force (6): An Anomaly in Europe. Sep. 10, 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan6-eus-uncertainty-06/

Other data sources involved in model computation:

I. World Development Indicators. World Bank. 2022. https://www.databank.worldbank.org/

II. Countryreports 2022. Countryreports.Org. 2022. https://www.countryreports.org/

III. The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. 2023. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/

IV. 2023 Military Strength Ranking. Global Firepower. 2023. https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php

V. Global Food Security Index(GFSI) 2022. The Economist. 2023. https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/

VI. 2022 Report. Global Innovation Index. 2023. https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/gii-2022-report

VII. Global Hunger Index Scores by 2022 GHI Rank. Global Hunger Index. 2023. https://www.globalhungerindex.org/ranking.html