First release date |
April 26, 2022 |
Reissue date |
May 23, 2022; |
September 18, 2022; |
February 23, 2023 |
summary:
In the Russo-Ukrainian War, the United States held the greatest influence in determining the ceasefire lines, although Russia, Western Europe, and China were also significant background factors. Theoretically, there were three ceasefire lines. The first was the geographical boundary line along the Dnieper River and the Black Sea coastline, which could also be defined as the western border of the battlefield. The second was the complete administrative border of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, which also served as the eastern border of the war. The third set of ceasefire lines consisted of arbitrary arcs drawn across a vast area between the western border line L1 and the eastern border line L2. If the US seeks only limited results in this Russo-Ukrainian war and does not want to directly involve more countries, it will have sufficient initiative to draw a stable ceasefire line somewhere along the L1, L2, or even L3 lines. For Russia, a ceasefire along the L1 and L2 lines offers a more certain prospect compared to the uncertainty of the L3 line. Ukraine is unwilling to accept the L1 line. However, Ukraine has no say in the continuation of the war or the ceasefire. The possibility of the L1 line persists because it will not harm US strategic interests. The primary reason for the possibility of the L2 line persists is the overwhelming US advantage on Ukrainian soil. The second major reason is that a ceasefire along the L2 line would not lead to a major political defeat for Russia. The third major reason is that China would support this line. Keywords: Russo-Ukrainian War, ceasefire line, battlefield border wall, Somaliization of Ukraine, Yugoslavization of Ukraine.The concept of “first launch” as discussed in this article
L1 ceasefire line
This is the ceasefire line along the Dnieper River and the Black Sea coastline. Western Ukraine will be clearly demarcated. The reason Ukraine does not accept this ceasefire line is easy to understand. This ceasefire line has cost Ukraine too much territory. Only an extremely weak Ukraine would accept this reality. It would also be a symbol of Western political and military failure. However, the possibility of this ceasefire line will theoretically persist indefinitely. The main reason is that this ceasefire line would not harm U.S. strategic interests. Moreover, the U.S. can better control the costs of war along this line.L2 ceasefire line
This is the ceasefire line along the complete administrative border of Donetsk and Luhansk. It will also be the bottom line that Russia must hold. The US camp cannot and will not cross this line (at least not until 2026). Pushing the war to this line is an extremely difficult choice for both the US and Ukraine. If Ukraine and its leaders insist on this line as their ultimate goal, Ukraine will face enormous risks: 1. Ukraine can only possibly push the front line to the L2 line after a series of brutal battles. The inevitable prospect is the complete destruction of the country’s economic and social foundations. 2. Ukraine can only possibly achieve this dream with the support of the armed forces of other countries. Once Ukraine’s allies establish multiple regimes outside the central government, Ukraine will lose control of its own territory. Somaliization of Ukraine will occur when these local states need to redeem their earlier investments. Worst of all, a repeat of the breakup of Yugoslavia is possible. 3. In the event of a prolonged struggle in central Ukraine, Russia will do everything possible to establish approximately seven autonomous local governments in central and southern Ukraine to alleviate long-term pressure from the United States. This would almost certainly lead to the Yugoslavization of Ukraine. 4. Accepting a ceasefire on the L2 line indicates that Russia is struggling to overcome its dual military and economic setbacks. However, a ceasefire along this line would not lead to a complete political defeat for Russia, and therefore would not raise discussions about nuclear options. 5. This line is undoubtedly Russia’s bottom line and the eastern border wall of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Any military attempt beyond this wall would certainly trigger discussions about nuclear options. 6. The L2 line is also a good option for China to deter NATO by land. It is politically, militarily, economically, and geopolitically feasible.L3 ceasefire line
This is a ceasefire line located between the L1 and L2 lines. The ceasefire in this area is relatively unstable because neither side has been completely defeated. The next conflict could easily erupt. However, maintaining a ceasefire in this region is an easy political maneuver. Powerful politicians can readily cash out their political gains in this political investment bank. They can initiate a ceasefire or reignite fighting in this vast area whenever they need political benefits.Somaliization of Ukraine
To sustain a protracted, or even medium-term, war, Ukraine must rely on the armed forces of its neighbors. Ukraine’s allies could potentially lead to the Somaliization of Ukraine once their neighbors send troops into the country to pursue their own national interests.The Yugoslavization of Ukraine
To alleviate long-standing pressure from the United States, establishing some local governments dependent on Russia would benefit Russia, including the creation of approximately seven autonomous local governments. This would lead to the Yugoslavization of Ukraine. Ukraine’s allies could also contribute to this Yugoslavization.European divisions
A swift ceasefire would help Europe avoid prolonged chaos. However, some countries, especially those neighboring Ukraine, want to prolong the war for their own national interests.China supports L2 lines
Preventing NATO’s eastward expansion is not only a pressing issue for Russia, but also a long-term challenge for China. Therefore, the context and region in which China establishes its denial-of-access line is a highly sensitive and complex political and military issue. Supporting Russia along the L2 line aligns with China’s medium-term interests and offers considerable political, military, and economic flexibility.The United States determined the course of the war.
This European war is widely known as the Russo-Ukrainian War. The real players were the United States and Russia. They were the decisive forces in determining the location and timing of the ceasefire line. The United States held an absolute power advantage in Central and Western Ukraine.Ukraine was the most incompetent party in the war.
Ukraine has no real say in matters of war and ceasefire. Its power is even weaker than that of some of its neighbors.===Main Content====
Definition of the three ceasefire lines
In the Russo-Ukrainian War, there were theoretically three ceasefire lines. The L1 line was the geographical boundary drawn by the Dnepr River and the Black Sea coastline. It was a relatively stable but difficult-to-reach ceasefire line, serving as the final denial line or limitation wall in the combat zone. The L2 line was the complete administrative border of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. It was a relatively stable but also the most difficult to reach ceasefire line, marking the significant military and economic setbacks suffered by Russia. This line also served as the eastern border wall or denial line of the Russo-Ukrainian War. The L3 line was any ceasefire line drawn within a wide area between the L1 and L2 lines. It can remain stationary for a limited time, or it can constantly shift back and forth with the ebb and flow of fighting and ceasefire. It will not be stable, but it is easy to achieve.L1 line: Features, conditions, and prospects
1. Characteristics of L1 line
The L1 line is a geographical gully bisected by the Dnieper River, potentially extending to the Black Sea coastline. If both sides agree to a ceasefire along this line, it will remain relatively stable for a considerable period. The reasons are as follows:1.1 Military Functional Line. This line has important military attributes; it can effectively deter or delay any cross-river movement. This means that the ceasefire line there has the practical function of reducing the frequency and intensity of collisions.
1.2 Cultural Boundaries. Significant differences exist in the culture, psychology, and ethnic structure on either side of the river. This is a culturally and psychologically acceptable boundary between Russia and Ukraine, although the Kyiv region, as a special case, does not possess this characteristic. Both sides can agree to assign people with different ethnic orientations to different banks of the river. It may also carry some historical memories of East and West Ukraine. If used effectively, Russia can use this line to gradually restore the historical memories of East and West Ukraine.
1.3 Geographical Boundary. This is an excellent geopolitical dividing line that can prevent Russian power from moving into Western Europe, thereby reducing historical memories of “European” fear of Russia.
1.4 The Political Denial Line. This is a bottom line drawn by the US bloc to prevent Russia from crossing. This line, running along both banks of the Dnepr River (and possibly including coastal territories on the Black Sea), may be Russia’s biggest gain in this war. Russia cannot cross this line unilaterally without the consent of the US bloc. Clearly, the US bloc does not want Russia to cross the west bank of the Dnepr River and occupy parts of western Ukraine.
2. Timeline of the appearance of Line L1
A ceasefire along the L1 line emerged when the US consortium shared close political ties with Russia. Here are some of the factors that prompted them to sit down and discuss the L1 line as a ceasefire.2.1. After Russia successfully established its own front on the east bank of the Dnepr River.
Russia has successfully established its own front on the east bank of the Dnepr River and maintained it despite repeated counterattacks from the Western bloc. The United States may hesitate due to the enormous cost and even more severe consequences.
2.2. When some local neighboring countries have a strong desire to intervene in the war.
When some of the local neighbors, such as Poland, Romania, Hungary, Turkey, and Lithuania, express a strong desire to send troops into Ukraine, it will be a critical moment to establish a ceasefire line to prevent the war from being prolonged and escalated. Once these regional states intervene in the war, it will inevitably and rapidly increase the cost of managing the war for the United States. A significant risk is the loss of an effective buffer zone between the US and Russian blocs. The primary reason driving these regional states to send troops into the war will not be for Ukraine’s own interests, but rather the allure of Western and Central Ukraine. Once these local neighbors have finally and firmly occupied parts of Ukraine, western and central Ukraine will eventually lose their function as a major buffer zone separating Russia from “Europe”.
2.3. When political pressure arises on the front lines in China
Once significant political pressure emerges from the Chinese front, the United States must immediately shift its primary focus to China. Even if the Chinese, traditionally, do not initiate conflict, the latter half of 2026 presents a genuine high-risk period. The West should begin closely monitoring Chinese public media from the end of 2025.
3. The prospects and political foundation of Line L1
Rationally speaking, of the three ceasefire proposals, the L1 line is not the most difficult, because it is relatively easy for both the United States and Russia to accept it.3.1 For Russia, the L1 line is undoubtedly the best outcome it could achieve in the near future. Under this ceasefire line, Russia has fully realized its main objectives, including the demilitarization of the Ukrainian army, the elimination of anti-Russian forces, and the acquisition of a strategic buffer zone to protect its national interests. Russia will be happy to maintain the stability of this ceasefire line. Based on this significant interest, Russia will be relatively tolerant of low-level provocations from its hostile neighbors.
3.2 If the United States considers China its primary enemy, then establishing a ceasefire along the L1 line is both reasonable and realistic for the US . To date, the US has already achieved its main political objectives in this war, including weakening Europe, weakening Russia, and separating Russia from Europe through strong trenches in Ukraine. The US can halt its advance immediately after obtaining its predetermined strategic gains, avoiding further substantial economic costs. Of course, if the US were to quickly halt at the L1 line, it would certainly incur certain political costs for abandoning its allies.
3.3 Ukraine is unwilling to accept a ceasefire along the L1 line until its military and economic strength is exhausted. No Ukrainian politician dares to accept the reality of a ceasefire along the L1 line. A ceasefire anywhere before Ukraine completely loses its ability to retaliate against Russia is tantamount to suicide (this is not limited to the L1 line). A ceasefire along the L1 line may seem alarming, but it is actually not the worst outcome for Ukraine, because Ukraine cannot single-handedly drive Russia off its territory. If Ukraine must rely on the armed forces of its neighbors to confront Russia, it will inevitably face the disastrous consequences of becoming like Somalia or Yugoslavia during or after the war. Historically, a certainty of a bad outcome is far better than an uncertain one. However, from a political perspective, a certainty of a bad outcome is far worse than an uncertain one. Yet, Ukraine has no real say in the continuation of the war or a ceasefire. Its political capacity is even lower than that of its surrounding allies.
3.4 There are differing opinions within Europe regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war. Establishing a ceasefire agreement anywhere as quickly as possible is in the interest of all of Europe, especially its core major powers. A swift ceasefire would help Europe avoid prolonged chaos. However, some countries, particularly those surrounding Ukraine, wish to prolong the war for their own national interests. In fact, a divided and weakened Europe also benefits the long-term interests of the United States. It could enhance US influence over Europe and reduce the cost of managing the world. This is a major reason why the United States is willing to delay the war.
3.5 In any case, establishing a ceasefire line along the L1 line would not harm U.S. strategic interests, which is the biggest reason why the L1 line may always exist as a ceasefire line. Moreover, due to the four characteristics of the L1 line mentioned above, the cost for the United States to manage a war along this line is lower than in other regions.
L2 Line: Real-world characteristics, opportunities, and prospects
The L2 line is the complete administrative border demarcation of the Iluhansk and Donetsk regions. It is another relatively stable ceasefire line for many reasons.1. The Realistic Basis of the L2 Ceasefire Line
1.1 This line was likely one of the initial options Russia set out to pursue. It would have become a reality if Ukraine had fully aligned itself with Russia. However, this option quickly disappeared because Russia’s first phase of military operations was unsuccessful.
1.2 The L2 line has a clear historical footprint. Ukraine has administratively lost control of this region for over eight years. Russia, in launching its special military operation, declared that these two regions had achieved a status similar to Croatia, or at least Kosovo. Simultaneously, Russia possesses sufficient power to maintain governance over these regions. The United States cannot or will not cross this line (due to uncontrollable costs).
1.3 The L2 line will be the highest achievement the US bloc can make in this turmoil. The US has virtually no chance of pushing Russia east of the L2 line.
1.4 Politically speaking, this is the bottom line that the Russian elite and ordinary people can accept after experiencing a series of war losses.
The L2 line will also be a bottom line for China’s support. The relationship between China and Russia has always been complex and delicate. For the past 40 years, they have been polite and courteous neighbors. The two countries have been both wary and cooperative, mutually guarding while cooperating. However, China will certainly support Russia within certain boundaries to prevent Russia from suffering a complete political and military defeat. The L2 line is such a line, protecting both China and Russia and preventing NATO’s eastward expansion. At the same time, there is considerable room for political maneuvering here.
2. L2 line, timing and contributing factors
Although this route is relatively stable, it will be very difficult to achieve. It must be combined with the following timing factors.2.1 Russia has suffered a series of defeats on the battlefield; at the same time, it has also suffered severe economic hardship during the protracted war. Russian public opinion is unlikely to continue to support a protracted war.
2.2 Some Ukrainian military forces broke free from US control. They successfully seized the initiative in the war, then reached a comprehensive political compromise with Russia, and put the ceasefire line back on that line.
2.3 China will issue a formal statement indicating that the line is a crucial factor for European stability should Russia face significant pressure.
3. Prospects for L2 lines: Extremely low probability of realization.
3.1 The United States will not actively pursue this line.
Accepting this line signifies a genuine acceptance of oppressive defeat by Russia’s elites after repeated struggles. It also marks Russia’s failure in both the military and economic spheres. Establishing a defensive wall along this line could prevent potential political collapse. However, the United States will not actively pursue this goal because the cost of reaching it would be too high, violating American political tradition.
3.2 Ukraine is incapable of achieving this goal.
To achieve this goal, Ukraine must rely on two pillars. One is economic and equipment support from the United States and the European Union. The other is the armed forces from its local allies.
3.3 Pursuing this goal will lead to the division of Ukraine.
Even with the support of its neighboring countries, if Ukraine were to push the front line to the L2 front, it would effectively lose control of its own territory. This is because these neighboring armies would certainly recoup their early investments on Ukrainian lands. This recoupment would involve establishing multiple small, independent local governments separate from the Ukrainian central government. This would lead to the Somaliization of Ukraine. The worst-case scenario is a potential repeat of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
L3 line, third ceasefire line
1. Features and related background
In reality, there is another ceasefire line between L1 and L2. This involves a temporary ceasefire over a large area. In such areas, ceasefires are easily achieved through low-intensity compromise. It can also be broken by the low-intensity political needs of either side in the war. This ceasefire line in this area can even be established unilaterally by one side of the war. Either or both sides can easily establish a ceasefire line in this wide area and then easily break it. This game of ceasefire and open fire can be repeated repeatedly in this area. Establishing a ceasefire line in this area is the easiest of the three ceasefire schemes. It does not require either side to be completely defeated. In other words, either side on the ceasefire line retains sufficient capability to provoke the next confrontation. Starting the next war doesn’t require particularly high political and economic costs.2. Value to all relevant parties
2.1 Uncertainties surrounding Russia
For Russia, a ceasefire in this region is a deep trap. The United States’ overall dominance in the region could drag Russia into the uncertainty of a protracted war.
2.2 Beneficial to the United States
(1. The L3 ceasefire line has completely different political values for the United States and Russia. For the United States, the L3 line is a perfect tool for managing the duration and scale of the war.)
(2. The United States is actually the most powerful force in the Russia-Ukraine war. The United States not only has the ability to decide when and where to establish a ceasefire line, but also has the magic to turn unfavorable situations into favorable ones. If the United States wants to establish a ceasefire line in the L3 region, it means that the United States plans to maintain its super influence in this region for a long time. Every other country, including Russia, must dance to the tune of the United States.)
(3. The United States also has another great advantage, namely that it has the opportunity to exert its influence in Belarus and Kazakhstan and cause Russia to bleed slowly and for a long time.
2.3 The division of Ukraine
(1) Armed forces from Ukraine’s neighboring countries, once they gain the upper hand in central Ukraine, will pursue their own national interests. This means Ukraine’s allies will lead to the Somaliization of Ukraine. (2) If Russia gains the upper hand in a protracted conflict, it will certainly establish as many as seven autonomous governments on Ukrainian soil to counter the pressure of a prolonged war from the United States. This will ultimately lead to the Yugoslavization of Ukraine. In other words, Russia will bring about the Yugoslavization of Ukraine.
2.4 The Fragmentation of Europe
European countries were not capable of responding appropriately to the Russo-Ukrainian war.
(1. A few European countries benefited from the Russo-Ukrainian war)
Some European countries—possibly Poland, Romania, Hungary, Turkey, and the Baltic states—will be driven by their youthful hormones to plunge into a protracted war. The Ukrainian-surrounding countries are among the very few European nations that could potentially benefit from this Russo-Ukrainian conflict.
(2) Europe suffered widespread damage
For the core European powers, prolonged turmoil in the region will only bring them short-, medium-, and long-term losses. Unfortunately, they are also incapable of responding appropriately.
(3) The United States promoted and facilitated the division of Europe.
In other words, the core European powers want a swift ceasefire anywhere to minimize losses. Ukraine’s neighbors, on the other hand, hope to profit from a prolonged war. This forms the basis for further divisions within Europe, and the United States is happy to see this rift widen.
Building trenches to divide Russia and Europe through war was also a means for the United States to split Europe.
Eliminating a major raw material base in Europe would allow the United States to gain greater economic control over the continent.
3. Opportunity on the L3 line (truce in central Ukraine)
If the major powers in the Russia-Ukraine war, the United States and Russia, share the same expectation of controlling the costs of war, establishing a ceasefire line in the L3 region may be the first option for both sides. If Russia fails to establish a stable denial-of-service (DOS) line by the winter of this year (2022), the chances of establishing a ceasefire line in the L3 region will increase rapidly. A ceasefire in the L3 region would be achieved when Russia faces strong military pressure and the United States faces strong economic pressure.4. Prospects for a ceasefire along the L3 line
Any ceasefire line in the L3 region is risky, not only for Russia, but also for other players who are currently or will be participating in the war.4.1 Russia (at risk)
(1. The United States possesses a strong integrated force in the L3 region between the Dnepr and Dobas. If a ceasefire is established there, Russia faces the enormous risk of being drawn into a protracted war. (2. A strong denial line is necessary for Russia to alleviate the long-term political and military pressure from the US bloc. However, this will come at a great economic and military cost to Russia. Therefore, establishing multiple local governments dependent on Russia would be an important response. (3. At the same time, Russia must accelerate its integration into the China-led economic system to strengthen its own economic base. (4. Another strategy is for Russia to try to entice Europe to help stabilize the ceasefire line in the region. (5. If Russia’s efforts to entice Europe to participate in stabilizing the ceasefire fail, Russia will participate in or create greater chaos in Europe to alleviate the pressure.
4.2 Towards neighboring countries (short-term gains, long-term losses)
For many of the local neighboring countries, drawing a ceasefire line in the L3 area could be a good opportunity to participate in and intervene in this protracted war.(1. This opportunity could increase their voice in Europe and their influence on the regional situation.) (2. It could enhance the confidence and sense of honor of their citizens.) (3. It could increase their chances of aligning with the United States, thereby gaining military and economic benefits.) (4. It could revitalize Europe’s tradition of constantly shifting its borders in hopes of gaining benefits.) (5. In the medium term, they face pressure. Under pressure from several major powers such as the United States, China, Russia, France, Germany, Iran, and Turkey, Ukraine’s neighboring countries do not have much room to maneuver.) (6. Long-term crisis. In the long run, Ukraine’s neighboring countries will face pressure from three major powers: Russia, Iran, and Turkey. This situation will be accelerated, especially if a high-intensity conflict occurs between China and the United States. Once Europe is pressured by these three powers, these countries, driven by youthful hormones, will face the challenge of how to protect themselves.)
4.3 At risk to core European countries
(1. For the core European countries, regardless of where the ceasefire line is, stabilizing the situation in Europe as quickly as possible is their top priority. Prolonged chaos will plunge Europe into a double recession of economy and politics. (2. The core European countries are also worried that a protracted war will involve China. If so, they will have to confront the dispute with China directly. (3. In the event of a fierce and high-intensity conflict between China and the United States, inducing chaos and recession in Europe would certainly be a reasonable choice for China.)
4.4 Regarding Ukraine (inevitable division)
(1. It is a basic fact that Ukraine itself does not have sufficient strength to confront Russia on the L3 front. (2. Ukraine must rely on the economic and equipment support of the United States and Europe, as well as the support of the armed forces of local countries. These local countries are sending troops to the battlefield certainly for their own national interests, not for Ukraine’s interests. They will definitely recoup their investment in some way. A simple way is to establish some local regimes independent of the Ukrainian central government. This is equivalent to the Somaliization of Ukraine. The worst outcome is to read the script of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. (3. If Russia has the upper hand in Ukraine, the fate of Ukraine being divided will be even more unavoidable. The script of the disintegration of Yugoslavia will certainly be played out in Ukraine. (4. Looking at it over a 200-year cycle, the script of Russia gradually encroaching upon and expanding along the Dnieper River is in line with Russia’s national and ethnic interests.
4.5 For the United States (both advantages and disadvantages)
(1. Establishing a ceasefire line in the L3 region would be very beneficial for the United States. The country has sufficient power to dominate the situation in the region, including a ceasefire or the resumption of hostilities, to control the scale and duration of the war. The United States would thus have the initiative to exert pressure on Russia at any time. (2. Maintain the political, military, and economic functions of the Ukrainian trenches, at least for the next 50 years, to sever cooperation between Europe and Russia. (3. Increase the administrative and control power over Europe, reducing the cost of managing Europe. (4. If multiple countries actively intervene in the Russo-Ukrainian war, the cost for the United States to manage this war will certainly increase dramatically. (5. The United States could use the pressure of war to establish a new military-political alliance in Asia. The US might also expand NATO into Asia to contain China. (6. If a high-intensity conflict were to occur between China and the US, the US is not confident of victory. Of course, China is not confident of defeating the US either. But for a major power, uncertainty is political failure. (7. If the US cannot defeat China in a medium-scale, medium-intensity war, the cost of US world governance will rise sharply.)
Summary
In short, there are theoretically three ceasefire lines. The L1 line is a geographical boundary established along the Dnepr River and the Black Sea coastline. The L2 line is the complete administrative border established along Donetsk and Luhansk. The L3 line is any ceasefire line set in the vast area between the L1 and L2 lines. The L2 line is a relatively stable ceasefire line, but it is extremely difficult to achieve and is unlikely to be reached until at least the end of 2026. The L3 line currently appears to be the most achievable. The major powers in the war are likely considering this issue. However, it also exposes all parties to various risks. Although the L1 line is not easy to obtain, it seems relatively stable to all parties. If the major powers involved in the war do not want to continue investing huge costs, a ceasefire on the L1 line would be an ideal solution for them. Ukraine would certainly oppose a ceasefire along the L1 line, as it lacks a voice in this war. A key reason why the L1 line is a long-term possibility is that a ceasefire there would not harm US strategic interests.References:
- Ye, QiQuan. Where will be ceasefire line chosen in Ukrainian War. The submitted recept from Opinion Channel @guardian.co.uk on April 26, 2022.
- Ye, QiQuan. Three Possible Ceasefire Lines of Russia-Ukraine War: Reality Basis, Opportunity, and Prospects. The submitted recept from International Security on May 23, 2022.
- Ye, QiQuan. Three Possible Ceasefire Lines of Russia-Ukraine War: Reality Basis, Opportunity, and Prospects. [Blogger Version of this Article]https://destinedfating.blogspot.com/2022/09/three-possible-ceasefire-lines-of.html
- Ye, QiQuan. Whose War? Players winning or losing in the Russia-Ukraine War. https://destinedfating.blogspot.com/2022/09/whose-war-players-winning-or-losing-in.html