| China Affairs | Political Forecasting and In-Depth Studies Vol. 1 No. 3 August 2026 |
December 2026: The Key Line Shared by Taiwan and Xi Jinping
Ye, Qiquan
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First published: |
Monday, July 13, 2026 |
| Citation Format: (APA) |
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Ye Qiqian. (2026). December 2026: The Key Line Shared by Taiwan and Xi Jinping. Political Forecasting and In-Depth Studies. August 2026. Vol. 1 (3), 30–37.
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| Abstract: There are already very clear signs that China’s plan for military unification has been postponed until at least the end of 2027. It is highly likely that this action will be delayed until after 2029. Of course, what we are discussing today is a very low probability scenario—namely, that there is a certain chance China might suddenly launch its unification process in December 2026 or slightly earlier.
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| Keywords: | |
| Chinese unification; forecasting; | |
I. Background and Introduction
Rumors regarding Sino-Japanese relations, mainland-Taiwan relations, and U.S.-China relations abound. Moreover, political interactions concerning the Taiwan issue between China and Japan, the mainland and Taiwan, and the United States and China have never ceased. This has led to a constant, chaotic, and clamorous stream of speculation regarding China’s actions toward Taiwan.
Ye, Qiquan previously predicted the timing of China’s launch of unification operations in 2022 [1, 2, 3]. In April and May 2026, he revised his predictions regarding the timeline for Taiwan’s reunification. In these two revisions, he leaned toward the view that China’s reunification process would be postponed until after 2029 [4, 5].
Recently, relations between China and Japan, as well as between mainland China and Taiwan, have suddenly become tense. China has significantly increased the intensity and scope of its paramilitary activities in disputed areas between China and Japan and around the Taiwan Strait. However, this will not serve as the trigger for China to launch its reunification campaign. Nevertheless, uncertainties remain. Specifically, there is a certain probability that the Chinese central government will initiate the reunification process before December 2026, as this represents the only real opportunity to salvage the political futures of Xi Jinping, his political faction, and his family.
Let us take a comprehensive look back at my history of predictions regarding China’s reunification process.
Ye, Qiquan’s Track Record of Predictions on China’s Reunification Efforts
| Ye, Qiquan’s Track Record of Predictions on China’s Reunification Efforts | ||
| Publication Date | Prediction | Reasons and Background |
| June 18, 2022 [1][2]
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China’s unification campaign will be launched in 2026
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1. An agreement between Xi Jinping and political forces within China;
2. Sufficient preparation time; 3. The war in Ukraine has deprived Europe of the option to interfere in Asia; 4. China has gained an overwhelming political advantage over Europe as a whole; 5. The United States is unable to mobilize sufficient political resources to rebuild the “North America–Europe Axis”; 6. The U.S. cannot mobilize sufficient political resources to establish a new “North America–Europe–Russia Axis”; 7. U.S.-allied forces cannot land on Chinese territory to ensure China’s victory in a Sino-U.S. war; 8. Under the new evaluation system, China’s overall war-fighting capabilities surpassed those of the U.S. in 2022; 9. Numerous regional powers are psychologically prepared for widespread chaos and expect to gain national interests from it; 10. China holds the initiative in forming a grand alliance, and the potential for such an alliance to materialize will force the United States to make political compromises. |
| September 7, 2023 [3]
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September 15, 2026, is the critical juncture for launching a unified operation | If this date is missed, China’s unified operation will be delayed by at least three years.
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| March 4, 2025 [6]
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Unification efforts will not begin in 2027
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2027 is a major election year in China. All political forces will be focused on competing for positions within the next power structure.
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| March 19, 2025 [7]
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Delaying unification will pose enormous risks to Xi Jinping
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Postponing unification efforts will pose enormous risks to Xi Jinping and his family.
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| April 12, 2026 [4]
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China’s unification will be postponed until after 2029.
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Due to the need to prepare the political environment for the 2025 U.S.-China summit in Beijing, as well as the subsequent political repercussions, the process of China’s unification with Taiwan has been postponed until at least 2029 or even later. This has at least given the United States a critical four-year recovery period. The United States can use this window of opportunity to restore and even strengthen its overall war-fighting capabilities and national competitiveness. China, meanwhile, will find itself in a strategically passive position.
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| May 16, 2026 [5]
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China has promised the United States that it will not initiate the reunification process before the end of December 2027.
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This conclusion is drawn from a series of public news reports.
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| Today (July 13, 2026)
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Whether or not the unification campaign can be launched in December 2026 is critical to whether Xi Jinping and his family can recover from their political dead end.
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Launching the unification campaign in December 2026 is the final deadline for Xi Jinping and his political faction to make a comeback. Beyond this date, Xi Jinping, his political faction, and his family will undoubtedly and gradually head toward political death according to the established procedures.
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| Compiled by: Ye, Qiquan from PPPNet | ||
II. Overall Probability of Launching the Chinese Unification Process Before the End of 2026
The overall probability is very low. If one were to quantify the probability of China launching the unification process by the end of 2026, that figure would not exceed 20%. Theoretically, this possibility exists, and there will be those who vigorously push for it. However, in practice, it is nearly impossible to achieve.
The factors influencing this overall probability are primarily reflected in the following aspects.
2.1 The “Resurrection Switch” for the Xi Jinping Faction
A very clear and consistent trend is that the Xi Jinping faction is “slowly, procedurally, and step by step, moving toward its predetermined political demise.”
The Xi Jinping faction will not sit idly by and wait for its demise; as long as there is even a one percent chance, it will exert 100 percent effort.
The only opportunity for the Xi Jinping faction to resurrect itself from this predetermined path to political demise is to successfully initiate the process of China’s reunification.
2.2 The Military’s Current De Facto Leaders Are in a State of Wait-and-See and Indecision
The military currently serves as a stabilizer for China’s political situation. However, in reality, the Chinese military is the greatest variable within China’s tripartite political structure.
The reasons are as follows:
2.2.1 The Military Is the Most Powerful Political Stabilizer
This is the reality, this is how it manifests, and this is its weight in actual political operations. There is no need to provide an in-depth and detailed description of this critical factor.
2.2.2 The military is the weakest political force within China’s tripartite political structure
This conclusion is the most controversial. It is particularly difficult for military leaders and de facto military commanders to comprehend. This is precisely the fundamental reason for Zhang Youxia’s downfall [8].
2.2.3 The Military’s Actual Leaders Face Enormous Political Risks
Even though Zhang Youxia has been sidelined from the Chinese military, the Xi Jinping faction has not thereby gained control over military power. The military’s actual leaders currently remain subordinate to the deep-seated political power group operating under the “July 1 Mechanism.”
Examining this reality from the perspective of the executive branch leads to a clear conclusion: China’s deep-state political forces currently maintain a firm grip on military power. The military plays a vital role in maintaining China’s current political stability.
If all parties accept this conclusion, then China’s three political leaders may all end up repeating the mistakes of Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping.
- The Xi Jinping faction must understand one key point: even if the military’s current de facto leader was appointed through the “July 1 Mechanism,” that leader may still slip out of the control of China’s deep political power groups. This is because the “current de facto military leader” faces a serious disconnect between responsibility and reward.
- This “current de facto military leader” must grasp the following reality: without the protection of legitimate “traditional authority,” his political future is even more precarious than that of Zhang Youxia—and certainly far more fragile than that of Wu De or Chen Xilian.
The power transfer on July 1, 2025, will be subject to historical scrutiny. This scrutiny will be far more severe than the doubts cast on the “Candlelight and Axe Shadows” incident or the “Gaoliang River Incident.”
What is even worse than historical scrutiny is that the questioning will occur in the present—it is merely a matter of time, whether sooner or later. And the de facto military leader is precisely the person most likely to be singled out to bear the blame for this historical scrutiny.
- The current “leaders of China’s deep political forces” must understand one fact: you made a serious mistake when designing the “July 1 Mechanism.” Regardless of whether this mistake was led by Zhang Youxia or by the leaders of the “deep political forces” at the time.
Regardless of the original intent, the fact now is that the military leadership is effectively in a “semi-detached state.” This may make it impossible for your plans to proceed entirely smoothly, and there is even the possibility of worse outcomes.
2.2.4 The Current Military Leadership Seeks a Stable Political Outlook
Wu De, Wang Dongxing, and even Chen Xilian, Geng Biao, and Li Desheng have all indicated that without the protection of strong political armor, military leaders are the most likely to be singled out to bear political responsibility.
2.25 Both Other Factions Will Do Their Utmost to Win Over the Military
2.3 China’s Deep-Seated Political Forces Will Do Everything in Their Power to Delay the Launch of China’s Unification
The analysis in the previous section leads to the conclusion that launching China’s unification before the end of 2026 will be the Xi Jinping faction’s only opportunity for a full-scale comeback. To completely cut off this path, China’s deep-seated political forces will inevitably do everything in their power to prevent this event from occurring.
Discussion:
A review of past and recent reports in China’s official media clearly reveals a pattern: the Xi Jinping faction has already semi-publicly acknowledged one thing—namely, that they will not initiate the unification of China before the end of 2027. They have abandoned their previous approach of pursuing their own national interests and have instead shifted toward aligning with the United States [5]. Furthermore, China has requested a summit meeting with the United States in the fall of 2026.
This official statement should not be regarded as an indisputable fact, especially given the complex political landscape in which all three major political forces in China are currently in a predicament. Any political signal issued could be a “temporary stopgap measure” introduced amid a multi-party power struggle.
In particular, the Chinese side’s explicit signal—that it will not launch a unified Chinese campaign before the end of 2027—remains subject to change. This is because it represents the Xi Jinping faction’s only opportunity for a full political resurgence. Should they be able to seize this opportunity, they will not hesitate to act.
More importantly, the Xi Jinping faction is not fighting alone; the current military leadership is, in fact, in a “semi-detached” state. There is a very real possibility that they could be co-opted by the Xi Jinping faction into supporting Xi’s plan.
Of course, the leaders of China’s deep political forces will not allow this possibility to materialize. They will do everything in their power to prevent it. Given that these deep political leaders already have a firm grip on the actual power-execution mechanisms, the probability of the Xi Jinping faction making a full political comeback is indeed very low.
However, however. There are always twists and turns in the world. Xi Jinping is a rather shrewd politician. People should not underestimate his ability to rise from the ashes. He has demonstrated this formidable ability on numerous occasions.
At present, China’s state-run media has not released enough information to speculate on the current leadership of China’s deep political forces. If we examine the political trajectory from April 2025 to January 2026, this period bears a distinct “Hu Jintao imprint.” If this situation cannot be effectively altered, the probability of the Xi Jinping faction’s resurgence will increase significantly.
There is also a less likely possibility: that China’s three current political factions will finally find a mutually acceptable plan for deep cooperation, thereby jointly initiating the process of China’s unification.
Summary:
There are already very clear signals indicating that China’s plan for military unification has been postponed until at least the end of 2027. It is highly likely that this action will be delayed until after 2029. Of course, what we are discussing today is a very low-probability scenario—namely, that there is a certain chance China might suddenly launch its unification process in December 2026 or slightly earlier.
References
- Ye, Qiquan. (2023). China’s Plan for Military Unification (1): Formulated in 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part I). PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/
- Ye, Qiquan. (2024). Unifying Taiwan in 2026: Impacts, Consequences, and Risks. Canadian LiZhe Publishing. 2024. 1st ed. https://books2read.com/u/bPr6pz
- Ye, Qiquan. (2023). China’s Military Unification Plan (1): The Watershed and the Critical Line, September 15, 2026 (Part 2). PPPNet. Sep. 7, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026-2/
- Ye, Qiquan. (2026). Delaying China’s Unification: The U.S. Wins a Critical Battle. Political Forecasting and Insights. August 2026. Vol. 1(3), 1–14.
- Ye, Qiquan. (2026). Another Win for the U.S.: At the Summit, Chinese Politicians Plead for U.S. Protection in the Name of National Interest. Political Forecasting and Insights. August 2026. Vol. 1 (3), 19–26.
- Ye, Qiquan. (2025). A2a2: Why Won’t Unification Happen in 2027? YouTube. Mar. 4, 2025. https://youtu.be/JbznRtpSWWY.
- Ye, Qiquan. (2025). 02a3: The Risks to Xi Jinping of Delaying Unification (First published March 19, 2025). YouTube. Sep. 20, 2025. https://youtu.be/An2jC9SfgDo
- Ye, Qiquan (2026). Ye, Qiquan: China’s Current Priority Is to Find a Comprehensive Solution for the Unity of the Three Powers. PPPNET. July 13, 2026. https://pppnet.net/3-powers-in-china-need-to-be-integrated/