| Extreme power imbalance is the fundamental force for maintaining power order. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Whether in a global imperial order or a dynastic internal order, the power imbalance is the fundamental force maintaining the stable operation of the power order. A system with a large power imbalance can maintain a stable operation for a long period. Once the power imbalance is weakened, the operation of the order system will be hindered, transformed, or overthrown. The shrinking power imbalance results in chaos, with various secondary forces constantly reorganizing, weakening, disappearing, and regenerating until a new power imbalance is established to cover a new system. The power imbalance between the top power and the second-level power determines the coverage of the top power. The larger the power imbalance, the larger the area of rule that can be established. A relatively weak power imbalance can only cover a relatively small area of rule. China’s 3,000 years of recorded history fully demonstrates this process. A new leadership group emerges during a period of chaos, and a large power imbalance is established through this chaos. A large power imbalance establishes a stable dynastic order. During the operation of the dynasty, the power of the second-level power layer gradually grows, leading to a shrinking power imbalance between the top power layer and the second-level power layer. The operation of the imperial or dynastic order becomes hindered and chaotic. Chaos brings about a new cycle of “establishment of power disparities” – “establishment of order” – “stable operation of order” – “chaotic operation of order” – and then a new cycle of “establishment of power disparities.” The inability of European system states (broadly including the United States and other US-European system states) to establish large-scale, wide-ranging, and long-term stable national and imperial order stems from two fundamental reasons. First, they have not found a method to establish vast power disparities. Second, the philosophical logic of the European system prevents them from discovering such a method. The underlying reason why European system states have long relied on war to maintain their existence is that “war has become the habitual path for maintaining power disparities in the European power system.” European states at the top of the power structure expand their tax base through war to maintain or expand their power disparities. European states at the bottom of the power structure are weakened by war, widening the gap between their economic base and economic needs. This “false power disparity” is used to maintain national order and lays the foundation for the next round of economic expansion. The theory that power disparities maintain power order may undergo various interpretations. This can be extended to various power order models, including global imperial order, dynastic internal order, and regional land power order. All derivative works built upon the above fundamental concepts are owned and copyrighted by Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. The Cycle of Imperial Rise and Fall. Coming soon. |
| Europe’s characteristics of “uncertain prospects” and “incompatibility among different groups” | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | European philosophical logic has two fundamental characteristics: “uncertainty about the future” and “incompatibility of different groups.” This philosophical logic is rooted in the long history of European civilization and the evolution of European states. References: Ye Qiquan. European Uncertainty. Coming soon. Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification Plan (6): Anomalies in Europe. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan6-eus-uncertainty/ |
| The root causes of Europe’s endogenous disasters | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Russia itself is not the root cause of European security. The inherent disasters of Europe stem from its philosophical logic: “uncertainty of the future” and “tribal incompatibility.” These two characteristics form the basis for European states’ widespread reliance on and enthusiasm for war. They also undermine the ability of European states to establish a broad-based power order and hinder national integration. Until this European philosophical logic, based on “tribal incompatibility” and “uncertainty of the future,” is corrected, no external solution can fundamentally address the issue of Europe being the root cause of world wars. All derivative content based on the above fundamental principles is the original concept and copyright of Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. Uncertainty in Europe. Coming soon. Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force (6): Anomalies in Europe. PPPNet. Mar. 29, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan6-eus-uncertainty/ |
| The “path of economic contraction” is a misfortune that humanity cannot avoid. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: In a period when an economic system faces stagnation in expansion, various attempts and experiments will emerge. After these experiments fail, an economic path that humanity tries to avoid but is ultimately unable to avoid will inevitably appear. This is the “economic contraction path.” The manifestation of the “economic contraction path” is to weaken, shrink, and destroy the existing economic foundation and total economic output, providing “false expansion space” for the next wave of “economic expansion.” China’s recorded history of over 3000 years provides substantial evidence for this theory. After a period of chaos, the economic foundation and population of ancient China may have been weakened to one-tenth to one-third of their pre-chaos levels. This “false expansion space” provided the foundation for the next round of “great order” (economic expansion). This theoretical finding suggests that humanity may find it difficult to avoid large-scale wars after failing to discover new paths to economic expansion. Discovering new economic development paths and new technological paths are effective methods to avoid large-scale wars. All derivative content based on the above fundamental content, the original concept ownership and copyright belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War. Coming Soon. |
| War is a genetic memory and a collective need | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: War memory is a memory factor parasitic within the genes of creation. These memories are inherited from generation to generation. They can also be activated or inhibited under certain external pressures. Plants distributed across multiple time zones can suddenly bloom and drop fruit simultaneously at a unified time. Some plants produce chemical or biological products to inhibit the growth of other species. These are all examples of plant warfare. Plants also need to engage in warfare to secure the right to continue their species. Although individuals instinctively reject death, group strategies are the warfare strategy of small animals. Genes, through group strategies, allow a few individuals to choose death to ensure the continuation of the species. This is a group warfare strategy stored within the DNA of organisms. Even animals at the top of the food chain need organizational abilities or group strategies to ensure the continuation of the species. Super predators can also, driven by genetic memory, relinquish their individual reproductive rights and food control rights to ensure the survival of the group under harsh conditions. All derivative content based on the above fundamental concepts is owned and copyrighted by Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War and National War Capacity. 2024. Ralph Press, Canada. First Edition. Toronto. Ye Qiquan. National War Strength Model and Prediction of the Ukraine War. PPPNet. Dec. 7, 2023. https://pppnet.net/nation-war-strength-model-and-prediction/ |
| Organizational capability is an important part of war memory. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Organizational ability is a group need and a crucial warfare capability. It is a fundamental ability that determines the continuation of a species. Organizational ability is a form of genetic memory. Species possessing exceptional individual survival abilities can also exhibit exceptional organizational abilities under specific conditions. Only the power of inherited warfare memories can persuade even the most powerful predators to relinquish reproductive and food control rights and form strong groups. Organizational ability can be stimulated, enhanced, or weakened by the environment. The famously fierce lion pride in Africa, through its exceptionally strong organizational ability, demonstrated exceptionally strong warfare capabilities. After confirming the absence of a survival threat, this pride split. Later, when the two split prides faced survival crises, the smaller groups reunited to enhance their warfare and survival capabilities. Organizational ability is also influenced by survival strategies (or philosophical models). The Irish Famine is the root cause of the current England-Ireland conflict. Comparatively, ancient China experienced several similar famines. However, each such famine became a significant opportunity for ancient Chinese people to integrate and unite. Strong core groups chose different survival philosophies and paths at critical moments, thus forming different types of organizational abilities. All derivative works based on the above basic content belong to Ye Qiquan in terms of original concept ownership and copyright. References: Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War and National War Capacity. 2024. Ralph Press, Canada. First Edition. Toronto. Ye Qiquan. National War Strength Model and Prediction of the Ukraine War. PPPNet. Dec. 7, 2023. https://pppnet.net/nation-war-strength-model-and-prediction/ |
| Territorial area and geographical features are the most important war assets and strategic deterrent capabilities. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: The application of high-yield, wide-coverage weapons is increasingly becoming a military reality. (1) Countries around the world are investing heavily in the research of high-yield bombs. Among conventional weapons, conventional weapons with a yield greater than 1,000 tons of TNT are nearing success; the application of high-yield conventional weapons is increasingly becoming a military reality; (2) 35 years after the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Soviet Union, the world’s fear of nuclear leaks has gradually decreased. This reality has reduced the moral constraints on the use of military nuclear devices; (3) After the Fukushima nuclear leak in Japan, the international community has been extremely tolerant of the discharge of nuclear pollutants. This has further lowered the moral threshold for the use of low-yield or even medium-yield nuclear weapons; (4) The miniaturization and practical application of low-radioactivity nuclear weapons has increased the possibility of using nuclear devices in total war; the total war model of a nation or group of nations has returned to political reality. This fact has enhanced the ability of vast areas and complex terrain to influence the outcome of war and has become the most powerful strategic deterrent capability to ensure national survival in the prospect of nuclear war. All derivative content based on the above basic content, the original concept ownership and copyright belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War and National War Capacity. 2024. Ralph Press, Canada. First Edition. Toronto. Ye Qiquan. National War Strength Model and Prediction of the Ukraine War. PPPNet. Dec. 7, 2023. https://pppnet.net/nation-war-strength-model-and-prediction/ |
| The weapon’s “effective range” | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: The effective range of a weapon is determined by three factors: effective range (kill range); lethal effect (damage effect); and economy (capability for large-scale use). All derivative content based on the above fundamentals is the original concept and copyright of Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War and National War Capability. 2024. Ralph Press, Canada. First Edition. Toronto. Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (1): Shaped by 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part 1). PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/ |
| The history of warfare is essentially the history of the advancement of “effective range”. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Spears replaced wooden clubs because they increased the kill distance while maintaining similar destructive effects. Bows and arrows (bows, crossbows, catapults) were the first generation of revolutionary long-range weapons, achieving non-contact kills for the first time. Muskets, percussion guns, cannons, heavy machine guns, modern artillery, mobile artillery, naval artillery, composite range weapons, modern long-range missiles, etc., all followed the goal of “pursuing greater kill distances.” The pursuit of maximum range is the original driving force behind weapon progress. However, weapons with the longest range generally fail to become the dominant weapons on the battlefield. The selection criterion for determining the dominant weapon in war is the organic combination of range, destructive power, and economy. The history of war is essentially the history of the advancement of “effective range.” All derivative content based on the above fundamentals is the original concept and copyright of Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War and National War Capability. 2024. Ralph Press, Canada. First Edition. Toronto. Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (1): Shaped by 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part 1). PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/ |
| Economic efficiency is the most important attribute of the “decisive weapon” in war. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Economy (i.e., the ability to apply at scale) is the most important characteristic of effective range and the most important attribute of a “decisive weapon” in warfare. However, the bow and arrow failed to become the dominant weapon in the more than 1,000 years after entering the battlefield, precisely because it was unsustainable in terms of economy. After the advent of the musket, even though its range was shorter than the bow and arrow and its use was affected by weather, it quickly replaced the bow and arrow. This was because its manufacturing cost was not higher than that of the bow and arrow, but its training, maintenance, and usage costs were far lower. The fundamental reason for the replacement of the musket by the percussion rifle was the increased range and lethality, while the increase in cost was acceptable, resulting in a decrease in cost under the overall lethality. Heavy machine guns, Germany’s massive heavy artillery, V1 and V2 rockets, did not achieve firepower superiority. Economic cost was the fundamental reason. The Tiger tank, the most advanced in Europe and with the best overall firepower, ultimately lost to the T-34 and Sherman tanks, whose firepower and protection were far inferior. Economy (i.e., scalability) was the most fundamental reason. Long-range missiles cannot be applied to conventional warfare. Even if applied to conventional warfare, they are unlikely to have a significant war effect. The root cause lies in their unsustainable economic viability. All derivative works based on the above fundamental principles are the original conceptual property and copyright of Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War and National War Capability. 2024. Ralph Press, Canada. First Edition. Toronto. Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (1): Shaped by 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part 1). PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/ |
| Aircraft carriers will gradually withdraw from the historical stage that dominates the outcome of wars. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Economy (i.e., the ability to be deployed on a large scale) is the most important characteristic of effective range and the most important attribute of “decisive weapons” in war. Once a weapon with overall economic performance exceeding that of an aircraft carrier battle group emerges, the expensive carrier warfare model will gradually (or rapidly) withdraw from the historical stage that dominates the outcome of war. China’s strategic weapons are considered to have an “effective range” superior to US shipborne weapons in both “economy” and “kill distance.” Another important indicator, “damage effect,” is awaiting verification. Once it is ultimately verified that the overall “effective range” of China’s land-based strategic weapons is superior to that of the US shipborne weapon system, then the gradual decline in the importance of sea-based weapons will be a reasonable expectation and assumption. All derivative content based on the above fundamental content, the original concept ownership and copyright of which belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War and National War Capability. 2024. Ralph Press, Canada. First Edition. Toronto. Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (1): Shaped by 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part 1). PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/ |
| The Decline of Sea Power | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: If the United States deploys carrier battle groups as its dominant weapon, China’s medium-range missiles will correspondingly join the battlefield. This is determined by the principle of reciprocal response in war. Politicians’ strategies may postpone or slightly delay this response process, but they cannot prevent it from happening. This is one of the essential attributes of war. Land-based weapons have experienced a 400-year period of weakness. If their comprehensive “effective range” advantage is validated in a war, naval power parasitic on “naval weapon superiority” will inevitably enter a historical process of decline. China’s land-based weapons are demonstrating their potential capabilities. And they are waiting for a war. The “effective range” advantage of land-based weapons has a relatively high probability of being validated. All derivative content based on the above basic content, the original concept ownership and copyright belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War and National War Capability. 2024. Ralph Press, Canada. First Edition. Toronto. Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (1): Shaped by 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part 1). PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/ |
| A nation’s economy and production capacity determine the outcome of a war. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: The capabilities of primary and secondary industries are the foundation of a nation’s war-fighting capacity. This capacity is particularly crucial when a nation is excluded from a financial exchange system, as it sustains its war-fighting capabilities. Industrial capacity is not only a nation’s ability to wage war, but also its ability to withstand the blows of war. Furthermore, it is the foundation for winning a protracted war of attrition. All derivative content based on the above fundamental principles is the original concept and copyright of Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War and National War Capability. 2024. Ralph Press, Canada. First Edition. Toronto. Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (1): Shaped by 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part 1). PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/ |
| “Land Sword” or “Land Bridge” Encroaching on Maritime Power | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: “Land Sword” or “Land Bridge” is not a geographical concept, but a geopolitical one. It specifically refers to peninsulas or outlying islands that jut out into water or sea, possessing a strong land-based foundation. Protected by robust land-based forces, they are not easily destroyed by sea-based forces. Furthermore, their protrusion into the sea or water extends the strike capability of land-based forces, thereby increasing the land power’s ability to suppress sea power. All derivative content based on the above fundamental concepts is the original concept of which Ye Qiquan owns the copyright. References: Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War and National War Capability. 2024. Ralph Press, Canada. First Edition. Toronto. Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (1): Shaped by 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part 1). PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/ |
| 2022 European War | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Starting in 2023, Ye Qiquan will refer to the war that began on February 24, 2022, on Ukrainian soil as the “2022 European War.” This term is used to refer to the war widely known as the “Ukrainian War,” “Russian-Ukrainian War,” “Ukrainian Conflict,” or “Special Military Operation,” because this war fully possesses “European characteristics.” Almost all European countries are involved, using various methods and means. Almost all European countries are affected. The economic power, economic prospects, political power, political prospects, and ability to respond to future crises of all European countries have been “negatively impacted” by this war. The whole of Europe is facing a new threat: the process of “border maneuvering” among European countries is in a state of being ready to start at any time, or has already started. All derivative content based on the above basic content, the original concept ownership and copyright belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. China’s Unifying Plan by Force (2): Variables Faced by China and the US. PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unifying Plan by Force (1): Shaped by 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part 1). PPPNet. Mar. 29. 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/ |
| The 2022 European war will not end before 2026. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: America’s strategic goals have not been achieved. War and chaos have become America’s pursuit. Maintaining world order through sea power is a costly model for managing imperial order. When the US loses its ability to peacefully “increase tax revenue,” it will inevitably resort to war and chaos to maintain the “power imbalance” needed to maintain order. Poland, Romania, and Hungary have not yet gained strategic benefits. Weakening Russia, enhancing regional political power, and obtaining geopolitical dividends should be the three main political goals of Ukraine’s three neighbors. Apart from a temporary increase in regional political power, Poland has not yet gained any other political dividends. Romania and Hungary have clearly stated their political and geopolitical pursuits. Prolonging the 2022 European war process and increasing chaos in western Ukraine is a reasonable way for Poland, Romania, and Hungary to gain political dividends. The Baltic states hope the war will continue. If Russia’s national power is not significantly weakened, the Baltic states will face even greater political pressure than they do now. These three countries currently dare not stand in the center of the stage to oppose Russia. However, pushing for a prolonged war behind the scenes will be their most important political goal. Russia has clearly abandoned its political hesitation from the early stages of the war. They are now adopting a pragmatic approach to pursue their national interests. China anticipates a continued war in Europe and has essentially confirmed that Europe will be a political burden for China in the future. Preventing Europe from becoming a US war machine has become China’s new national policy. Weakening Europe serves this goal. Many countries are preparing to join a major upheaval; many countries have completed their political and ideological preparations and are ready to join a major upheaval at any time to expand their national interests. Driven by these factors, a European war in 2022 is unlikely to end or achieve an effective ceasefire by the end of 2026. All interpretations based on the above fundamental content are the original concept and copyright of Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. European Uncertainty. Upcoming release: Ye Qiquan. Unification of Taiwan in 2026: Impact, Influence, and Risks. Chapter Seven (European Uncertainty). |
| China’s new European policy (already launched) | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: In the copyright statement page dated February 18, 2023, Ye Qiquan predicted a fundamental shift in China’s European policy. The statement by Lu Shaye, the Chinese Ambassador to France, on April 23, 2023, truly reflects this fact: China has indeed fundamentally changed its policy towards Europe, despite higher-level Chinese officials denying that Lu’s statement represented the official Chinese position. Before 2019, China was more supportive of a strong Europe than European countries themselves. China hoped Europe would act as a political pressure relief valve, helping to alleviate pressure from the United States. The 2022 European War, which broke out in 2022, suggests that Europe possesses a completely colonial nature. Europe cannot fulfill China’s expectations—acting as a political pressure relief valve. On the contrary, as a colony of the United States, Europe can only become a political burden for China in the event of a conflict between the two countries. From then on, weakening Europe became China’s fundamental policy. Weakening Europe is an essential element in weakening the United States’ long-term war of attrition capabilities. Inciting turmoil in Europe is a reliable path to impacting the overall political dominance of the United States. Europe and Israel are the two major military and political pillars for the United States to maintain its imperial power. Weakening Europe and inciting chaos there would simultaneously weaken two pillars of the American imperial order. All derivative works built upon the above fundamental principles are the original conceptual property and copyright of Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. Uncertainty in Europe. Coming soon: Ye Qiquan. Whose War? Winners and Losers in the Russia-Ukraine War. PPPNet. Feb. 11, 2023. https://pppnet.net/players-winning-or-losing-from-russia-ukraine-war-2/ |
| Europe on the eve of major chaos (high risk) | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: The 2022 European war weakened Europe’s political power; the 2026 Asian war will impact Europe; the European “border maneuvering” process has been initiated; NATO’s collective protection mechanism has been breached; Europe’s power to formulate economic rules has been weakened; Europe’s ability to launch conceptual warfare has been significantly reduced; Europe’s existing power structure is at risk of being dismantled. New geopolitical powers have emerged, and geopolitical forces have been reorganized or reintegrated; all derivative content based on the above fundamental content, the original concept ownership and copyright belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. Uncertainty in Europe. Upcoming release: Ye Qiquan. Whose War? Winners and Losers in the Russia-Ukraine War. PPPNet. Feb. 11, 2023. https://pppnet.net/players-winning-or-losing-from-russia-ukraine-war-2/ Ye Qiquan. Chapter Seven; Uncertainty in Europe. Unification of Taiwan in 2026: Impact, Influence, and Risks. |
| Europe faces the dilemma of joining or avoiding an Asian war in 2026. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: As a colony of the United States, Europe can hardly escape joining any US-initiated military action against China. Europe possesses a strong, “endogenous” hostility towards China. Europe is ready to join any action aimed at “completely defeating China.” China holds a significant political advantage over Europe. China can easily and formally initiate the “European border maneuvering” process. China can trigger, accelerate, and exacerbate chaos in the core of Europe at any time. The maintenance and dismantling of Europe’s power system mainly depends on the complex game between China, the US, and Europe. This is mainly reflected in the following: ● Whether Europe as a whole directly intervenes in the military conflict between China and the US; ● Whether the US is determined to exclude China from the existing power system; ● Whether China ultimately decides to completely break with the US; All derivative content based on the above fundamental content, the original concept ownership and copyright belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. Uncertainty in Europe. Upcoming release: Ye Qiquan. Whose War? Winners and Losers in the Russia-Ukraine War. PPPNet. Feb. 11, 2023. https://pppnet.net/players-winning-or-losing-from-russia-ukraine-war-2/ Ye Qiquan. Chapter Seven; Uncertainty in Europe. Unification of Taiwan in 2026: Impact, Influence, and Risks. |
| A war in Asia is highly likely to occur in 2026. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: After China initiated its action to unify Taiwan, the United States was forced to take countermeasures against China. This is an essential requirement for maintaining the US-led imperial order. The US cannot initiate pre-emptive peace talks to mitigate the anti-establishment nature of China’s unification actions. The lack of a military response plan makes it difficult to appease collective public opinion in the West. Military action itself has inherent characteristics. These characteristics may escape the control of politicians, leading to a gradual escalation of the war response level, eventually reaching the level of all-out war or even nuclear war. Many countries have already completed their preparations and are ready to join the chaos. Other third parties are unwilling to stand idly by while the US and China share power. All interpretations based on the above fundamental content, and the original concept ownership and copyright belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. China’s Unifying Plan (2): Variables for Both China and the US. PPPNet. Sep. 8, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables-02/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unifying Plan (4): US Options. PPPNet. Sep. 9, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan4-usas-options-04/ |
| Prior negotiations best serve US interests, but are the most difficult to implement. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Regarding China’s actions to unify Taiwan, the United States has the option of prior negotiation. Prior negotiation can involve comprehensive and multi-dimensional exchanges. It involves exchanging interests that one side can forgo for interests that one side cannot relinquish, and using interests that one side can forgo to appease the other side’s interests that it cannot relinquish. This maximizes national interests while avoiding the enormous risks of military response. However, due to the strong hostility towards China from Western public opinion, any prior negotiation proposal could potentially end a politician’s political career. Currently, there seems to be no opportunity for powerful politicians to reverse the current atmosphere of “political correctness.” The solution that best serves national interests often gets the chance to be implemented. All derivative content based on the above fundamental content, the original concept ownership and copyright of which belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. China’s Unifying Plan by Force (1): Shaped by 2012, Implemented in 2026. PPPNet. Sep. 7, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026-1cn/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unifying Plan by Force (4): US Options. PPPNet. Sep. 9, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan4-usas-options-04/ |
| The cost of campaign warfare in the United States is higher than that in China. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: The input-output efficiency of land-based airfields plus short-range missiles is far higher than that of mobile airfields (aircraft carriers) plus short-range missiles. Even if China does not destroy US mobile airfields, the US F-35’s range and payload are both weaker than China’s J-20. Assuming the US air-launched missiles have the same range as China’s, China could still defeat the US through economic attrition in a prolonged conflict by using cheaper land-based airfields and cheaper missiles. In all three of these assumptions, the US is the relatively weaker party. All derivative content based on the above fundamental content, the original concept ownership and copyright belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (1): Shaped by 2012, Implemented in 2026. PPPNet. Sep. 7, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026-1cn/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (2): Variables for Both China and the United States. PPPNet. Sep. 8, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables-02/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (5): Hypothetical Scenario of Total War Between China and the United States. PPPNet. Sep. 10, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan5-imagined-conflict-scenario-05/ |
| The cost of strategic warfare for the United States is higher than that for China. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Based on current online cost estimates, approximately 400-600 Chinese medium-range missiles would cost roughly the same as a US Ford-class aircraft carrier; 900-1100 would cost about the same as a US carrier strike group. Even if these estimates are halved, with 200 Chinese medium-range missiles costing the same as a US aircraft carrier and 450 as the same as a carrier strike group, it’s plausible that these numbers could offset the combat capability of a US aircraft carrier. This demonstrates that the US also faces cost disadvantages in the use of strategic weapons. The prevailing online assumption is that the range of Chinese-made medium-range missiles exceeds the combined range of a US aircraft carrier, F-35 fighter jet, and air-launched cruise missiles. Furthermore, online speculation suggests that China possesses approximately 3000 medium-range missiles. It is certain that if a Sino-US conflict were to materialize, China’s production rate of medium-range missiles would surpass the US’s aircraft carrier production rate. All interpretations based on the above fundamental information are the original concept and copyright of Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (1): Shaped by 2012, Implemented in 2026. PPPNet. Sep. 7, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026-1cn/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (2): Variables for Both China and the United States. PPPNet. Sep. 8, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables-02/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification by Force Plan (5): Hypothetical Scenario of Total War Between China and the United States. PPPNet. Sep. 10, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan5-imagined-conflict-scenario-05/ |
| A full-scale war between the US and China increases the risk of nuclear war. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: The overall probability of a nuclear war is extremely low. However, a full-scale war increases the likelihood of nuclear war. The assumption that the United States cannot defeat China in a conventional war is extremely high. This high-probability assumption simultaneously puts China and the United States in a dilemma regarding the use of nuclear devices. The application of nuclear devices is an unavoidable option in the escalation of war between China and the United States. The United States has a psychological advantage in being the first to escalate its war response. There is an impulse in Western public opinion to completely defeat China. Western public opinion and underlying logic are not consistent with their “anti-nuclear concept war” propaganda. Once Western public opinion supporting the “use of nuclear devices” is activated, Western politicians will be powerless to stop it. The responsibility of preventing a nuclear war primarily falls on China’s shoulders. All interpretations based on the above fundamental content, the original concept ownership and copyright belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification Plan (2): Variables for Both China and the US. PPPNet. Sep. 8, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables-02/ Ye Qiquan. Group War Strength System: Predicting the Outcome of a Full-Scale War Between China and the US Around East Asia. PPPNet. Dec. 9, 2023. https://pppnet.net/group-war-strength-system-predicting-china-usa-war-around-east-asia/ Ye Qiquan. Nation War Strength Model and Prediction of the Ukraine War. PPPNet. Dec. 7, 2023. https://pppnet.net/nation-war-strength-model-and-prediction/ |
| “Technical solutions” and “substantive solutions” for deterring nuclear war | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: (1. Tactical Deterrence ● Tactical deterrence of nuclear war refers to politicians on both sides using their influence over the political and military situation to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war at the decision-making level. ● Politicians on both sides must maintain complete control over the war process throughout the entire war and ensure that the political and military capabilities of frontline commanders are coordinated. At the same time, both China and the United States must avoid inflicting significant military strikes on each other. For example, they should not sink either side’s aircraft carriers or cause more than 5,000 casualties to the other side in a single battle. ● Risk. The final decision-making power for the national policies of the United States and its allies rests with the voters. The final decision-making power to prevent or initiate nuclear war rests with the voters. As the war response level escalates, the decision to de-escalate or continue the war cannot be actually controlled by politicians. (2. Substantive Deterrence ● Substantive deterrence of the nuclear war option refers to preventing the nuclear option based on public opinion. ● Due to the inability of Western politicians to prevent voters from using nuclear devices, the main responsibility for preventing nuclear war inevitably shifts to China. ● To fundamentally deter the nuclear option, China must substantially leak or disclose that it possesses more than 3,500 nuclear warheads before launching military action against Taiwan. This would allow the United States and its allies to deter the nuclear option at the level of public opinion. All derivative works based on the above fundamental principles are the original concept and copyright of Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. China’s Unifying Plan (2): Variables for Both China and the US. PPPNet. Sep. 8, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables-02/ Ye Qiquan. China’s Unifying Plan (5): Hypothetical Total War Scenario Between China and the US. PPPNet. Sep. 10, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan5-imagined-conflict-scenario-05/ |
| US Post-Disaster Defense Plans (Types) | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Contents: **Absorption-based Defense:** This includes “pre-emptive negotiation” or “post-emptive negotiation.” Its starting point is to obscure, ignore, or even deny the anti-establishment nature of China’s unification actions. It involves relinquishing some political and economic power to reduce (or even deny) the impact of China’s actions on the imperial order. Unless a super-political figure emerges, this type of plan exists only in theory. However, it will provide a practical path for post-emptive appeasement military plans and lay the foundation for final peace talks. **Coexistence-based Defense:** This primarily involves using “appeasement military plans” to limit military conflict to a low level, while simultaneously guiding domestic public opinion in the US and Europe through low-level military conflict. The goal is to make public opinion ultimately acknowledge the inability to defeat China militarily. Then, based on this understanding, comprehensive negotiations can be conducted to achieve coexistence. **Offensive Defense:** This is a set of solutions that primarily use military intervention to achieve political objectives. Due to the various characteristics of China and the United States, two superpowers, a comprehensive military conflict will mainly focus on destroying or weakening the other side’s sustained war capability. This unique characteristic dictates that the battlefield will inevitably expand, spread, and penetrate into the core regions of Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, Australia, and even South America through certain channels or methods. This possibility can be bluntly described as triggering a global war. A divisive defense plan may not actually exist; it may simply be an evolution of an offensive or coexistence-based plan. Its characteristic is that neither the Chinese nor the American bloc can defeat the other, nor are they willing to compromise. It may also be based on the fear of compromise between China and the United States. The result of a divisive defense plan is the splitting of the world economic system into two parallel systems: a Western system with the United States, North America, and Europe as its core framework, and an Eastern system with China, Japan, and Russia as its core framework. Other countries will fluctuate between the two blocs. However, this plan will bring about a sustained period of chaos. Political and economic chaos will coexist, making this plan unsustainable. All derivative content based on the above fundamental concepts belongs to Ye Qiquan as the original concept owner and copyright holder. References: Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification Plan by Force (6): An Anomaly in Europe. PPPNet. Sep. 10, 2023. https://www.pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan6-eus-uncertainty-06/ |
| The L1 line becomes a new national security target for Russia. | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: The Ukrainian trenches will politically, economically, and culturally isolate Russia from Europe for at least 50 years. Expelling Russia from Europe and stripping Russians of their European identity has become a new pursuit for the West. Anti-Russian movements have comprehensively ignited a philosophical and spiritual crisis among Russians. Russia will continue to suffer the pain of the “aftermath of imperial fragmentation.” Relations between the Russian, Belarusian, and Russian ethnic groups face a complex and unpredictable interactive process. The L1 line has been seen by Russians as a necessary barrier to protect the nation’s survival. Over a period of 100 to 200 years, the possibility of Russians moving to this geopolitical boundary is very real. New unrest in other parts of the world may indicate that Russians are accelerating this process. All derivative content based on the above fundamental content is the original concept and copyright of Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. Uncertainty in Europe. Coming soon. Ye Qiquan. China’s Unifying Plan (1): Shaped by 2012, Implemented in 2026. PPPNet. Sep. 7, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026-1cn/ Ye Qiquan. Predicting the border wall in the Russia-Ukraine war as early as April 26, 2022. PPPNET. 2023. https://pppnet.net/early-prophecy-on-confined-walls-in-russia-ukraine-war/ Ye Qiquan. Theoretical three ceasefire lines in the Russia-Ukraine war. PPPNET. 2023. https://pppnet.net/three-possible-ceasefire-lines-in-russia-ukraine-war/ |
| China’s “Cognitiveists” and “Actionists” | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: The cognitive forces in China are keenly aware of the hostility of the US-Western alliance. They consciously deny or obscure this process of political hostility in an attempt to postpone full-scale hostility with the US alliance as much as possible, thereby maximizing China’s national interests. The action-oriented forces in China may not yet fundamentally recognize that the continued hostile actions of the US (alliance) are the main political thread of the West. They may view these “political conflicts” between China and the US as fluctuations and deviations occurring around a timeline. They believe (or fantasize) that through their efforts, they can correct or reduce these fluctuations and deviations. This understanding motivates them to work harder to repair relations between China and the various countries in the US alliance. All derivative content based on the above fundamental content, the original concept ownership and copyright of which belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification Plan (3): China’s Variable Design Basis. PPPNET. Sep. 9, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-3-chinas-design-bk-03/ Ye Qiquan. Chapter 2, The Design Background of China’s Unification Plan and the Internal Flaws of the United States. Unification of Taiwan in 2026: Impact, Influence, and Risks. |
| Characteristics of China’s Action to Reunify Taiwan by 2026 | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: There will be no significant political hesitation; the number of troops deployed will be at least four times the actual required number; the focus will be on pursuing political objectives; a rapid and comprehensive military advance will be undertaken; a slow and protracted political process will be followed; a slow and substantial response from the US bloc will be triggered; a comprehensive soft confrontation between China and the West lasting more than three years will be initiated; significant political steps will be taken in the European, North African, and Arab regions. A political structure without military oversight will not be established in Taiwan relatively quickly . All derivative works based on the above fundamental content are the original concept and copyright of Yeh Chi-Chuan. References: Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification Plan (9): (3: The Path and Characteristics of Unification). PPPNet. Sep. 17, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan9-taiwans-destiny-03/ |
| Ye Qiquan’s comments on South Korea | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: South Korea is an inevitable participant and key player in the early and low-level conflicts of a Sino-US military conflict. South Korea lacks the political capacity to wage a full-scale war with China, Russia, or even North Korea. South Korea is incapable of engaging in medium- or higher-level warfare. The assumption that South Korea will rapidly withdraw from the war process is foreseeable. All derivative content based on the above fundamental premises is the original concept and copyright of Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. China’s Plan for Military Unification (8): A Difficult Path for South Korea. PPPNet. Sep. 11, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan8-s-koreas-thorn-08/ |
| Ye Qiquan comments on Japan | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: The hypothetical probability of Japan participating in a military conflict with the US and China is infinitely close to 1. Japan has a strong impulse and need to completely defeat China. Once China gains the initiative on the Asian battlefield, or the level of the US-China conflict escalates to a medium level, Japan and its allies will inevitably move their effective military forces to other deployment sites to escape the effective range of China’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Japan’s opportunity to independently determine its foreign policy will also arise with the withdrawal of US military forces from East Asia. Once the US demonstrates its inability to defeat China in a medium- or higher-level conflict, Japan will certainly quickly turn away from the US and join the China alliance. Once it is confirmed that Japan cannot defeat China, it will seize the historical opportunity to reduce its historical debts rather than continue to increase its historical costs. Japan does not have the ability to face political pressure from China alone. Once it is confirmed that China has established its geopolitical advantage, reducing its own historical burdens and current geopolitical pressures will be Japan’s inevitable choice. Once Japan decides to withdraw from the US alliance, the probability of taking more political and military steps is very high. All derivative content based on the above basic content, the original concept ownership and copyright belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. China’s Unifying Plan (7): Japan’s Dilemma. PPPNet. Sep. 10, 2023. https://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan7-japans-struggle-07/ |
| Ye Qiquan’s Commentary on India | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: India’s strong hostility towards China. India supports any action against China. India has the opportunity to participate in military conflicts ranging from harassment warfare to semi-contact warfare. India will not join any hot war conflict of any intensity against China. Even if some rash figures in India attempt to do so, the Chinese are capable of easily preventing India from entering the hot war stage. India’s ability to mobilize China’s political and military resources in the course of a Sino-US military conflict is very weak. China can completely treat India’s hostility during a Sino-US conflict with a cool-headed attitude. All derivative content based on the above basic content, the original concept ownership and copyright belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. Chapter Six, Geopolitics of China’s Surrounding Areas. Unification of Taiwan in 2026: Impacts, Consequences, and Risks. |
| Ye Qiquan’s Commentary on the Philippines | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: The Philippines is the most important pillar supporting the outcome of any US-led war in East Asia. If the US decides to launch a war of medium intensity or higher, finding a forward military base that is both close to the combat zone and within the range of China’s short- and medium-range missiles will be essential. The Philippines is almost the only realistic option that meets these requirements. Given the Philippines’ significant weight in US military strategy, the US will inevitably and must invest substantial political resources in it. Before a relatively stable G2 political order is established, the desire for a positive and interactive political relationship between China and the Philippines is difficult to realize. Even after a medium-intensity or higher war between China and the US, and even after a relatively stable G2 political order is established, the Philippines will still maintain its important position in the US alliance and may grow into a pillar replacing Japan and South Korea in terms of military and political functions. All derivative content based on the above fundamental content is the original concept and copyright of Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. Chapter Six, Geopolitics of China’s Surrounding Areas. Unification of Taiwan in 2026: Impacts, Consequences, and Risks. |
| Five versions of “one country, two systems” in mainland China | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Ye Qiquan’s Nine-Point Taiwan “One Country, Two Systems” proposal is close to (and even surpasses) a confederation system in some aspects. Deng Xiaoping’s Six-Point proposal recognizes de facto complete autonomy. The roadshow version of the Hong Kong “One Country, Two Systems” proposal is equivalent to a modern super-military governor system, far exceeding the decentralization of power in the Tang Dynasty. The abridged version of Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” still equates to de facto autonomy. The official version in 2022 stripped Hong Kong of de facto “Two Systems.” All derivative content based on the above basic content, the original concept ownership and copyright belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. Chapter Six, Geopolitics of China’s Surrounding Areas. Unification of Taiwan in 2026: Impacts, Consequences, and Risks. |
| Yeh Chi-chuan’s comments on Chiang Ching-kuo | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Chiang Ching-kuo was not a political strongman and was powerless to prevent pro-independence forces in Taiwan from politically purging the Chiang family. During his term, he ended the Chiang family’s political influence in Taiwan. Yeh’s Nine Points were published in 1981. Deng’s Six Points were published in 1983. Both dates coincide with the stabilization of Chiang Ching-kuo’s political position in Taiwan. Chiang Ching-kuo ultimately relinquished the historical opportunity for national reunification. Whether due to disappointment with the pro-independence purge of the Chiang family or his own fear of the mainland, this resulted in his loss of significant historical importance. All derivative content based on the above fundamental content is the original concept and copyright of Yeh Chi-chuan. References: Ye Qiquan. Chapter 10, The Implementation Path and Accompanying Characteristics of China’s Reunification. Reunification of Taiwan in 2026: Impact, Influence, and Risks. |
| Yeh Chi-chuan’s comment on Lee Teng-hui | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Lee Teng-hui was a mediocre to above-average talent. His era was the best time for Taiwan to pursue independence, and also a good opportunity to pursue national reunification. Lee Teng-hui was the first (and only) politician in Taiwan’s governance history to have the opportunity to achieve more in both directions of unification and independence. However, his indecisiveness prevented him from becoming a significant figure in the history of either independence or unification. Anyone else could have likely achieved more in either direction than Lee Teng-hui. All interpretations based on the above fundamental content are the original concept and copyright of Yeh Chi-chuan. References: Ye Qiquan. Chapter 10, The Implementation Path and Accompanying Characteristics of China’s Reunification. Reunification of Taiwan in 2026: Impact, Influence, and Risks. |
| Ye Qiquan’s comments on Chen Shui-bian | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Chen Shui-bian’s “demon sword” was shrewd but not ruthless. Chen Shui-bian’s victory in the Taiwan election relied on both Lee Teng-hui’s support and his own shrewdness. However, he was never one to dare to wield power or possess significant power. Ultimately, Chen Shui-bian halted the progress of Taiwan independence. Even though he was arguably the biggest contributor to the Taiwan independence movement, he still could not quell the criticism from pro-independence forces. All interpretations based on the above fundamental content are the original concept and copyright of Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. Chapter 10, The Implementation Path and Accompanying Characteristics of China’s Reunification. Reunification of Taiwan in 2026: Impact, Influence, and Risks. |
| Yeh Chi-chuan’s comments on Ma Ying-jeou | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: The pro-independence forces cultivated by opportunistic politicians Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Shui-bian provided Ma with leverage in his dealings with the mainland. The “Anti-Secession Law” provided Ma with space to maintain the status quo and also provided him with leverage to appease pro-independence forces. Ma Ying-jeou is the politician in Taiwan’s history with the least political ambition and sense of responsibility. In terms of both execution ability and ideals, Ma Ying-jeou is even inferior to an unsuccessful politician like Su Tseng-chang. Although Ma Ying-jeou had the privilege of meeting with central leaders, he will not leave a mark on history. Whether moving towards independence or unification, Ma Ying-jeou has done nothing worthy of historical record. All interpretations based on the above fundamental content belong to Yeh Chi-chuan as the original concept owner and copyright holder. References: Ye Qiquan. Chapter 10, The Implementation Path and Accompanying Characteristics of China’s Reunification. Reunification of Taiwan in 2026: Impact, Influence, and Risks. |
| Yeh Chi-chuan’s comments on Tsai Ing-wen | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Tsai Ing-wen is the real culprit behind Taiwan’s downfall. Her ability to manipulate the Taiwan independence issue even surpasses that of Chen Shui-bian. This ability masks her other flaws. Given the substantial changes in political, economic, and military power, going against the tide only leads to more harm the harder she tries. Tsai Ing-wen is, in fact, the weakest leader in Taiwan’s history. The biggest event that truly and seriously damaged Taiwan’s political interests was causing “Taiwan to lose its de facto ‘one country, two systems’ framework.” In the future, whether discussing the history of China’s national reunification or the history of Taiwan’s independence, historians from both opposing factions will list Tsai Ing-wen as a historical sinner. All interpretations based on the above fundamental content are the original concept and copyright of Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. Chapter 10, The Implementation Path and Accompanying Characteristics of China’s Reunification. Reunification of Taiwan in 2026: Impact, Influence, and Risks. |
| Yeh Chi-chuan’s comments on Lien Chan | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Lien Chan, the Missed Opportunity. In 2004, Chen Shui-bian, through orchestrating the March 19th shooting incident, ultimately defeated Lien Chan in the election by a negligible margin. Lien Chan’s defeat was not only due to Chen Shui-bian’s “demon sword,” but also to the hesitation of the Taiwanese people regarding the unification/independence path at the time. Although history cannot be rewritten, Lien Chan’s scholarly spirit, similar to Huang Wei’s, was the foundation for his success against the odds. The greater significance of Lien Chan’s defeat was that it deprived Taiwan of one of the closest opportunities to “one country, two systems. ” All interpretations based on the above fundamental content are the original concept and copyright of Yeh Chi-chuan. References: Ye Qiquan. Chapter 10, The Implementation Path and Accompanying Characteristics of China’s Reunification. Reunification of Taiwan in 2026: Impact, Influence, and Risks. |
| Ye Qiquan’s comment on Wang Jinping | Creation by Ye Qiquan |
| | Content: Wang Jin-pyng, a typical Taiwanese, cultivated himself into an important political figure in a short historical period through a “hands-off” and “laissez-faire” approach. Wang Jin-pyng once said that cross-strait relations should be treated like a company merger; both sides should pursue their maximum interests. This statement by Wang Jin-pyng represents another aspect of the simple philosophy of most Taiwanese people. In fact, one of the major reasons why Taiwanese people are unwilling to acknowledge the mainland as their superior is based on economic interests. All derivative content based on the above fundamental content, the original concept ownership and copyright belong to Ye Qiquan. References: Ye Qiquan. Chapter 10, The Implementation Path and Accompanying Characteristics of China’s Reunification. Reunification of Taiwan in 2026: Impact, Influence, and Risks. |
| Compiled by: Ye Qiquan (PPPNet www.pppnet.net) |
