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Preview Date |
Mar. 29, 2023 |
Updated Date |
September 8, 2023 |
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(This is an outline of an incomplete research project.)
summary:
If China launches a cross-Taiwan military operation in 2026, the United States will find it difficult to respond appropriately. Mainland China possesses a clear military advantage in areas covered by intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as a political advantage in choosing the timing of its operations. Correspondingly, the United States will find it difficult to take effective political action before such an operation occurs, and equally difficult to take effective military action beforehand. Once the Chinese army completes its landing on Taiwan, the US-led coalition will completely lose the opportunity to land on any part of China. This military fact is sufficient to guarantee that China will not suffer a total military defeat in a series of military conflicts. However, this advantage does not fully guarantee China’s success. If the United States is able to take a series of actions that go beyond the conventional framework, it will also have a great chance to seriously weaken China’s military advantage, and may even permanently separate Taiwan from China.
Keywords:
Crossing the Taiwan Strait, military operations, unification, effective range, US-China conflict, anti-ship weapons
I. Overview:
1.1. Tone and Forecast:
The greatest risk to China’s reunification efforts comes from Europe’s attitude. Europe’s involvement in a military response against China is the biggest variable facing China.
Based on the need to maintain the existing imperial order, the greatest risk for the United States is its inability to afford failure. However, once war breaks out, American defeat is difficult to avoid because the United States will have difficulty controlling the withdrawal processes of South Korea and Japan. Essentially, this will be a war whose outcome is determined before it even begins.
Another theoretically possible option is for the United States to obscure and deny the anti-systemic nature of China’s military unification actions. However, this would require a reversal of the existing anti-China political atmosphere in the short term, which is practically an unrealistic option.
The ideal option for the United States is a pre-emptive peace negotiation to ensure a continued American political and military presence in Northeast Asia. This approach requires a series of in-depth negotiations and compromises. Until the United States faces significant real pressure, this option remains purely theoretical.
First, let’s set the tone, which will not be discussed in this section.
(1. China must unify Taiwan during Xi Jinping’s term of office [1].
(2. China has a great chance of launching a reunification movement in 2026 [1].
(3. China completed its full military occupation of Taiwan within 7 days. [2])
(4. Taiwan will not proactively submit a peace negotiation proposal before military action is initiated. [1])
1.2 The basis for China’s inability to suffer military defeat
If a cross-strait reunification operation is launched between April and September 2026, China may not suffer a military defeat. This prediction is supported by several key factors.
(1. The US-led coalition has no chance of landing on any Chinese territory (including Taiwan). This is the fundamental support for China’s invincible position;)
(2. The United States has no legal or political basis to station troops on the island of Taiwan before China launches military action;)
(3. China has the priority to choose its battlefield. China can choose not to engage the United States outside the range of its medium-range missiles;)
(4. China has a stronger capacity for attrition warfare;)
(5. China’s combat-grade weapons have a higher return on investment (cost-to-equity ratio).
(6. China’s strategic weapons have a higher return on investment (cost-to-cost ratio).
1.3 The Possibility of China Suffering Military Defeat
- (1. The United States had already prepared for a comprehensive war against China;)
(2. The United States successfully prevented the mainland from effectively occupying Taiwan.)
(3. The United States successfully concentrated European military forces in the first phase to participate in the overall operation;)
(4. A full-scale nuclear showdown;)
1.4 The Advantages of the United States
- (1. A global network of military and support bases;)
(2. A strong existing military force;)
(3. Global battlefield advantage;)
(4. An unparalleled alliance system that can concentrate the strongest military and economic capabilities;)
(5. Nuclear superiority and the determination to proactively escalate the level of war;)
1.5 The Disadvantages of the United States
- (1. Unable to withstand military defeat;)
(2. Unable to win a protracted war of attrition;)
(3. It is difficult to concentrate military forces from the periphery to the center of the battlefield;)
(4. Military policy has undergone significant changes due to fluctuations in domestic public opinion;)
(5. Unable to handle two full-scale wars simultaneously on the European and Asian fronts;)
(6. It is difficult to choose a military plan in advance, and it is also difficult to choose a peace plan in advance;)
(7. Unable to control the risk of Japan and South Korea withdrawing during the war;)
(8. The risk of being unable to stably control the restructuring of the European power system;)
II. The basis for China’s inability to suffer military defeat
2.1 China has a political advantage in choosing the timing of war.
It is highly probable that mainland China will launch its operation sometime between April and September 2026. Furthermore, the Chinese central government possesses both political and military advantages in choosing the optimal date for action. Despite the various accusations the US-led coalition can level against China, this is ultimately a domestic war. The US-led coalition finds no sufficient justification within the existing order to take preemptive preventative action.
2.2 The US-led coalition is unlikely to prevent the Chinese central army from landing on Taiwan.
2.2.1 Unable to prevent landing in advance
The United States cannot find sufficient political or legal justification to deploy effective military forces on Taiwan in advance to prevent the Chinese central government’s army from landing on Taiwan.
2.2.2 Inability to accumulate troops in advance
Pre-emptively deploying large military forces in South Korea, Japan, and Okinawa to deter the Chinese army is not a preferred military-political or economic option. First, the Chinese military could use delaying tactics to deplete the economic and military resources of the US-led coalition. Second, a large military presence in Japan and Okinawa is an extremely negative political act, likely to provoke resistance from the Japanese public. Third, in the event of conflict, there is a significant risk of losing major military forces in a single battle.
2.2.3 Rapid military assistance could not prevent the landing.
Given the current military disparity, rapid military aid cannot bridge the gap between the military capabilities of mainland China and Taiwan. The timeline for completing the military operation depends on the Chinese central government’s resolve, its willingness to use force, and its political hesitation.
2.2.4 Difficulty in conducting effective military operations at the center of the battlefield.
Even with a large military presence in the Philippines beforehand, it would be difficult to project both land forces and sufficient long-range firepower to Taiwan.
2.2.5 Lack of confidence in directly confronting the Chinese Army.
Once the Chinese army completes its landing on the island, the US-led coalition will lose the opportunity to confront the Chinese army, unless an unconventional war is waged.
2.3. China has a military advantage in choosing battlefield areas.
2.3.1 China has an advantage in choosing the military outcome.
For China, as long as it doesn’t suffer defeat, it will be a complete military victory. China’s victory hinges on the military occupation of the entire island of Taiwan. In the subsequent war with the US-led coalition, as long as it doesn’t suffer a major, comprehensive defeat, it will be a double victory for China, both politically and militarily. There’s even a high probability that it will ultimately bring economic benefits as well.
2.3.2 China has a military advantage in choosing battlefield areas.
The United States possesses a significant advantage in global military deployment. However, China’s objective is very clear: to avoid conflict within the military advantage zones of the US-led coalition, and to conduct warfare only within the coverage areas of China’s intermediate-range missiles.
2.4. China already possesses an advantage in the effective range of its weapons.
2.4.1 The most advanced weapons are not necessarily the dominant weapons in war.
The most advanced bows and arrows (including crossbows and catapults) took over 1,000 years after their introduction into warfare to finally replace the spear as the dominant weapon. It also took about 100 years for the musket to replace the bow. The Napoleonic era briefly saw the dominance of artillery, but it wasn’t until World War II that mobile artillery replaced firing guns (rifles and machine guns) as the decisive weapon in the European wars.
2.4.2 The pursuit of greater effective range is the driving force behind military progress.
The spear replaced the club because of its greater effective range. The bow and arrow entered the battlefield because they could kill the enemy from a greater distance. The musket replaced the bow and arrow because its manufacturing, training, and usage costs were lower. The percussion rifle replaced the musket because of its greater effective range and higher lethality. Artillery entered the battlefield because of its irreplaceable long-range effectiveness and greater lethality. The application of combat aircraft in warfare, the emergence of the V1 and V2, and the use of mobile airfields, all aimed at achieving greater effective range, greater destructive power, and a higher cost-performance ratio. 2.4.3 Economic efficiency (i.e., large-scale application) is the most important characteristic of effective range.
2.4.3 Economic efficiency (i.e., large-scale application or higher input-exchange ratio) is the most important characteristic of effective range.
Once bronze smelting technology matured, spears quickly replaced wooden clubs as the dominant weapon in warfare. This was based on economic affordability.
The bow and arrow represented the first revolutionary advancement in the history of weaponry. It not only improved military effectiveness but also advanced military theory. For the first time, humanity could fully utilize terrain to temporarily and briefly encircle the enemy in a confined space, achieving victory without direct contact. The advent of the bow and arrow led to the gradual demise of warfare primarily based on troop clashes.
However, for over 1000 years after its introduction to the battlefield, the bow and arrow failed to become the dominant weapon due to its unsustainable economic nature. During the Warring States period, the state of Han, possessing the most advanced military technology, had the highest bow-making skills and the largest production volume, even exporting them to other countries. Yet, Han was the first of the six states to be conquered. This led later dynasties in ancient China to consider the name Han a disgrace.
After the advent of the firearm, it quickly replaced the bow and arrow, even though its range was shorter and its use was affected by the weather. This was because its manufacturing cost was not higher than that of the bow and arrow, but its training, maintenance, and usage costs were far lower.
The main reason for replacing firearms with shotguns is the increased range and damage, while the increased cost is acceptable, resulting in a decrease in overall cost for the same damage output.
Even though heavy machine guns were key weapons on the battlefield during World War I, they ultimately did not become the dominant weapon on the battlefield due to the unsustainable cost of their manufacture.
Nazi Germany’s massive heavy artillery, V1 and V2 rockets, failed to create a firepower advantage. Economic cost was the fundamental reason.
The Tiger tank, the most advanced in Europe during World War II and boasting the best overall firepower, was ultimately defeated by the T-34 and Sherman tanks, whose firepower and protection were far inferior. Economic efficiency (i.e., scale) was the most fundamental reason.
Many countries possess long-range missiles with ranges exceeding 10,000 kilometers, but these missiles cannot be used in conventional warfare except in nuclear war. Even if used in conventional warfare, they are unlikely to have a significant impact. The root cause lies in their unsustainable economic nature.
It can be predicted that once weapons with comprehensive economic performance surpassing those of aircraft carrier battle groups emerge, the expensive carrier warfare method will quickly fade from the historical stage of dominating the outcome of wars.
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2.4.4 China’s operational-level weapons have an effective range exceeding that of the United States.
Assuming that the US’s mobile airports and fixed airports in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines remain intact; assuming that the US F-35 fighter jet has the same range and payload as the J-20 fighter jet; assuming that the range of US airborne cruise missiles is the same as that of Chinese products; and that the operating cost of China’s fixed airports is undoubtedly lower than that of the US; the production cost of Chinese-made cruise missiles is undoubtedly lower than that of the US; and the cost of China’s short-range missiles is certainly lower than that of the US. Economically speaking alone, this is sufficient to guarantee that the effective range of China’s operational weapons exceeds that of the US.
2.4.5 The effective range of China’s strategic weapons may exceed that of the United States.
If the United States deploys carrier strike groups as its primary weapon, China’s medium-range missiles will correspondingly join the fray. This is determined by the principle of reciprocity in warfare. Politicians’ strategies may delay or slightly postpone this response, but they cannot prevent it from happening. This is one of the essential attributes of war.
2.4.5.1 Economic viability:
| Table 1: Cost of a U.S. Carrier Strike Group (Manufacturing Cost) $26,935.3 (million USD) | |||
| Composition[3] | Quantity[3] | Original manufacturing unit price (million US dollars) (2021) [4] | Original manufacturing cost |
| Aircraft carrier (CVN-78) | 1 | 12471.0 [5](2021) | 12471.0 |
| Cruiser (CG) | 1-2 | 1000 [4] | 2000 |
| Destroyer (DDG-51) | 2-3 | 739.2 [6](2021) | 2217.6 |
| Frigate (FFG62) | 2-3 | 943.73 [7](2021) | 2831.2 |
| Submarine (SSN774) | 1 | 1807.4 [8] | 1807.4 |
| Support ship (TAO 205) | 1 | 591.6 [9] | 591.6 |
| F-35 air superiority fighter | 20-28* | 94.4 [4] | 2360 |
| F/A-18 strike fighter | 30-36 | 29 [4] | 1044 |
| Early warning aircraft (E-2C/D) | 4 | 80 [4] | 320 |
| Electronic warfare aircraft (S, ES, EA, E-2D) | 14 | 80 [4] | 1120 |
| UH-60M gyroplane | 6 | 15.8 [10] | 94.6 |
| Transport aircraft (C-2A) | 2 | 38.96 [4] | 77.92 |
| Total manufacturing cost | 26,935.3 | ||
The cost of China’s intermediate-range missiles:
The exact cost is unknown. Unlike in the US, where prices for PAUC or APUC are not readily available, it is difficult to find information on the characteristics and prices of Chinese military products.
Some US lawmakers have argued that the cost of 1,238 Chinese anti-ship missiles is equivalent to the cost of an aircraft carrier. Other US military commentators believe that the cost of China’s DF-21D is in the millions of dollars. However, online opinions in China tend to estimate the cost of Chinese anti-ship missiles much higher.
Online opinions in China estimate that a single Dongfeng-21D missile costs between $10 million and $24 million. The Dongfeng-26’s manufacturing cost is estimated at between $15 million and $30 million. Today, we will tentatively price the Dongfeng-21D and Dongfeng-26 based on the higher price scenarios of $24 million and $30 million, and compare their trade-offs.
| Table 2: Cost-Effective Ratio of Chinese Anti-Ship Missiles to US Airborne Fighter Groups | |||
| Project | Unit price (million US dollars) | Exchange value (millions of US dollars) | Equivalent quantity (pieces) |
| Dongfeng 21D | 24 | 26935.3 | 1122 |
| Dongfeng 26 | 30 | 26935.3 | 898 |
As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, China’s strategic weapons are far more economical than those of the United States. This is also a tacitly accepted ” assumption” in both the Chinese and Western cyber worlds.
2.4.5.2 Distance of action
| Table 3: Current Short- and Medium-Range Missile Ranges of China and the United States | |||
| Group | missile | Weapon Classification [Source] (Data Update Date) | Range (km) |
| China | DF27 | Hypersonic highway movement, medium-range ballistic/anti-ship ballistic missile [11](2023) | 8000 |
| China | DF26 | Road-mobile medium-range ballistic missile/anti-ship ballistic missile [11] (2018) | 4000 |
| China | DF17 | Hypersonic, road-mobile, air-launched, medium-range ballistic missile [11] (2023) | 2500 |
| China | DF21D | Road-based, medium-range ballistic missiles/anti-ship ballistic missiles [11] (2017) | 2000 |
| China | DH10 | Road-based mobile land-attack cruise missile [11](2023) | 2000 |
| China | CJ20 | Air-launched, land-attack cruise missile [11](2023) | 2000 |
| China | J20 | Weapon platform [15] (2022) | 2000 |
| China | DF16 | Road-mobile short-range surface-to-surface missile [11] (2017) | 1000 |
| China | YJ18 | Air-launched, anti-ship cruise missile [11] (2023) | 540 |
| China | YJ12 | Air-launched, anti-ship cruise missile [11] (2022) | 460 |
| China | DF11 | Road-mobile short-range surface-to-surface missile [11] (2017) | 300 |
| China | YJ63 | Air-launched, land-attack cruise missile [11] (2016) | 200 |
| America | AGM86 | Air-launched cruise missile [12] (2021); [13] (2021) | 2500 |
| America | Tomahawk | Ship-launched/submarine-launched long-range cruise missiles [12](2023); [13](2021) | 2500 |
| America | F35 | Weapon platform, [14](2022) | 1100 |
| America | JASSM | Joint air-to-ground standoff missile [12](2021);[13](2021) | 1000 |
| America | MGM140 | Highway movement, short-range ground-to-ground [12](2021);[13](2021) | 300 |
| America | Harpoon | Air/land/submarine-launched cruise missiles [12] (2023); [13] (2021) | 250 |
| Table 4: Comparison of the ranges of Chinese anti-ship weapons and US ship-launched weapons | ||||
| Group | Weapon Classification | missile | Range (km) | Total range (weapon + platform) |
| China | Anti-ship ballistics | DF26 | 4000 | 4000 |
| China | Air-launched ballistics | DF17 | 2500 | 4000 |
| America | Air-launched cruise | AGM86 | 2500 | 3600 |
| America | ship-launched cruise | Tomahawk | 2500 | 2500 |
| America | Air-to-ground cruise | JASSM | 1000 | 2100 |
| China | air-to-ship cruise | YJ18 | 540 | 2040 |
| China | Anti-ship ballistics | DF21D | 2000 | 2000 |
| China | Flight platform | J20 | 2000 (out of 1500) | |
| China | air-to-ship cruise | YJ12 | 460 | 1960 |
| China | Air-launched cruise | YJ63 | 200 | 1700 |
| China | Flight platform | J15 | 1500 (Total 1500) | |
| America | cruise | Harpoon | 250 | 1350 |
| America | Flight platform | F/A18 | 1100 (Total 1100) | |
| America | Flight platform | F35 | 1100 (Total 1100) | |
As can be seen from the examples in Table 3 and Figure 1, China has gained some advantages in the effective range of its combat weapons compared to the United States. This is especially true for medium-range ballistic missiles, where the United States holds a significant disadvantage. However, the United States has a certain advantage in the range of its cruise missiles.
As can be seen from the examples in Table 3 and Figure 2, if the U.S. military extends its weapon range by using mobile airfields and flight platforms, the U.S. weapon range can be roughly on par with China’s weapon range.
Regarding “effective range,” one of the three basic components of effective range, it can be temporarily assumed that China and the United States are basically on par.
2.4.5.3 Killing effect (damage effect, cost-to-trade ratio)
Before World War I, warfare primarily involved killing enemy soldiers. Destroying or eliminating enemy armed forces was the main way to cripple an enemy nation’s war-making capabilities. However, since World War I, in addition to killing soldiers, destroying the enemy’s economic base has become the primary means of weakening their ability to sustain a war. This characteristic was fully demonstrated in World War II.
There is ample reason to believe that in future total wars of a holistic and group nature, weakening the enemy group’s ability to sustain combat will be a primary operational principle. The destructive effect on high-economic-value targets will become the main metric for evaluating lethality. Its importance may even surpass that of lethality to personnel.
The destructive effects of China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles have never been proven in past wars. Although China has launched anti-ship ballistic missiles multiple times in a U.S. military surveillance environment, the U.S. military has not publicly confirmed the destructive effects of China’s anti-ship missiles.
The vulnerabilities of land-based and sea-based facilities differ significantly. It is difficult to completely destroy or disable a land-based system. However, sea-based facilities are different. Even partially disabling a sea-based system often leads to its complete disabling. This exposes aircraft carrier fleets to a high-risk reality: losing one-third to one-half of their escort capabilities can render an aircraft carrier unable to sail forward.
High-explosive warhead damage radius diagram (Image source: MDAA: Missle Defense Advocacy Alliance)
If a warship is within 1 kilometer of the blast radius of an anti-ship missile, it will inevitably be rendered inoperable due to unbearable casualties. If four anti-ship missiles explode simultaneously, they will create an effective kill zone with a diameter of at least 2 to 4 kilometers. An aircraft carrier may become completely inoperable due to unbearable casualties, damage to its deck alone, or damage to its propulsion system.
Another contrasting example is the central system of an Iranian power plant, which was compromised by a virus and rendered inoperable. Although the damage was severe, it wasn’t completely disabled and was able to be restored to function after various efforts.
If aircraft carriers are indeed unable to defend against ballistic missile attacks, then in terms of damage ratio or exchange ratio, it can be generally concluded that the US carrier fleet system is weaker than China’s medium-range ballistic missile system. The only thing that needs to be verified is the functionality of China’s ballistic missile homing and command systems.
2.4.6 The significance of improvements in weapon effective range
In the above description, China is implicitly considered to be ahead in two of the three elements of effective weapon range, and on par with the United States in the other. Therefore, it can be basically assumed that China’s weapons have a leading effective range. This lead has the following implications.
2.4.6.1 The United States has lost its safe environment for using weapons. U.S. weapon systems would be at great risk if conventional weapons were used against China.
2.4.6.2 For the first time in nearly 400 years of history, land-based weapons have exceeded the range of sea-based weapons.
2.4.6.3 Even if the United States once again takes the lead over China through space or ballistic missile routes, it will be fundamentally unable to change the historical trend of relatively short ranges for naval weapons.
2.4.6.4 The scale effect of China’s secondary industry will ensure that the cost of China’s superior weapons is further reduced, thereby enhancing China’s leading advantage in effective range.
2.4.6.5 The difficulty of resisting the temptation to prove its own superiority with land-based weapons will become another trigger for the outbreak of war.
III. The Possibility of China’s Failure
So far, it seems that China has a certain advantage in operating within the coverage area of its medium-range ballistic missiles. However, military operations are always highly contingent events. Statistically speaking, there is no event with a probability of 1.
If any of the following scenarios occur, the US-led coalition could significantly weaken China’s military advantage, and might even permanently separate Taiwan from China.
- Successfully prevented the People’s Liberation Army from landing on Taiwan Island;
- Successfully destroyed China’s naval power in the early stages of the People’s Liberation Army’s military operation;
- To swiftly launch a full-scale war against China, isolating mainland China from Taiwan. Then, to quickly support Taiwan’s independence, thereby gaining the political foundation to deploy military forces on the island.
- Having pre-emptively addressed domestic party-level coordination issues, the US immediately deployed a small nuclear device on a small reef in the South China Sea with no clear ownership rights upon initial contact, demonstrating its complete break with China with the toughest political stance.
IV. America’s Advantages
- A global network of military and support bases;
- A formidable existing military force;
- Global battlefield advantage;
- An unparalleled alliance system that can concentrate the most powerful military and economic capabilities;
- Nuclear superiority and the determination to proactively escalate the level of war.
V. The Disadvantages of the United States
- Unable to bear military defeat;
- It is impossible to win in a protracted war of attrition;
- It is difficult to concentrate military forces from the periphery to the center of the battlefield;
- Military policy has undergone significant changes due to fluctuations in domestic public opinion;
- Unable to handle two full-scale wars simultaneously on the European and Asian fronts;
- It is difficult to choose a military plan in advance, and it is also difficult to choose a peace plan in advance;
- Unable to control the risk of Japan and South Korea withdrawing during the war;
- The risk of being unable to stably control the restructuring of the European power system.
Summary:
If China launches a cross-Taiwan military operation in 2026, the United States will find it difficult to respond appropriately. Mainland China possesses a clear military advantage in areas covered by intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as a political advantage in choosing the timing of its operations. Correspondingly, the United States will find it difficult to take effective political action before such an operation occurs, and equally difficult to take effective military action beforehand. Once the Chinese army completes its landing on Taiwan, the US-led coalition will completely lose the opportunity to land on any part of China. This military fact is sufficient to guarantee that China will not suffer a total military defeat in a series of military conflicts. However, this advantage does not fully guarantee China’s success. If the United States is able to take a series of actions that go beyond the conventional framework, it will also have a great chance to seriously weaken China’s military advantage, and may even permanently separate Taiwan from China.
References
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