Modeling the Intensity of State War, and Predicting the Course of the War in Ukraine

Abstracts:

A new National War Intensity Assessment System (NWIS) and Coalition War Intensity Assessment System (CWIS) did a good job of reviewing and validating a series of predictions that were posted online in April and May of 2022. These predictions about the course of the Russo-Ukrainian war were completely implausible and unacceptable at the time. Yet they were confirmed by the course of the war a year later. They are also supported by this new system of assessing war capabilities. Those predictions of a year ago indicated that the Russo-Ukrainian war would be confined for a long time between the L1 and L2 lines; that Russia would establish up to seven or so autonomous governments on Ukrainian soil; and that, at least until the end of 2026, Russia would not incur a military defeat. In this war capability assessment system, geographic factors, demographic factors, organizational capabilities, military capabilities, and economic capabilities are listed as the top war capability assets. Geography, in particular, is elevated to a level never before recognized. It is seen as the nation's strongest deterrent component. According to this war capability assessment system, the most powerful countries in terms of overall war capability are: China, the United States, Russia, India, Brazil, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Indonesia. According to the extended algorithm of this assessment system, the current Ukrainian coalition is weaker than the Russian coalition in terms of overall war capacity. This is the fundamental reason why the Ukrainian side is limited in the war in the Central and South Ukraine regions. This model also speculates that if Russia attempts to move its war effort westward across the L1 line, it will almost certainly inspire an upgraded and updated Ukrainian coalition. An updated Ukrainian alliance would be significantly more warlike than Russia's current alliance. It could lead to Russian defeats in Central and South Ukraine. But the new Ukrainian coalition's boundary of advance eastward could almost certainly not extend beyond east of the L2 line either. This is because once the battle line crosses east of the L2 line, it will inspire a renewed and upgraded Russian alliance. The war capacity of the renewed Russian coalition would once again exceed that of the Ukrainian coalition, resulting in another power flip.

Keywords:

Intensity of State War, Russo-Ukrainian War, Intensity of Coalition War

Only two months into the Russian-Ukrainian war, predictions have emerged that are disgusting to Westerners and border on the fantastical. Among them were that “the Russo-Ukrainian war will be confined to the Dnieper River and the Donbass”; that “Russia is invincible”; that “Russia will not experience military defeat until at least 2026”; and that “Russia will establish seven or so local self-governments on Ukrainian soil”. "; and "Russia will create about seven local self-governments on Ukrainian soil" [1,2,3,4]. These predictions are still extremely annoying for the West. But unfortunately they are becoming reality and facts step by step.

Do these predictions have a supportable rationale or factual basis on which they can be relied upon? After eliminating the emotional factor, can political science professionals think about the Russo-Ukrainian war from a different perspective.

Perhaps now there is an assessment tool that can test the predictions that emerged last year and that many rejected as unbelievable and repugnant, but that are becoming more and more realistic. That tool is the “National Intensity of War” scale. It can also be extended to assess the war intensity of warring groups or coalitions.

Here is the structure of what could be named the “National War Intensity” scale.

I. National War Intensity Assessment Framework:

1.1 Components of the National War Intensity Evaluation System.

1. Territorial Domain and Geographic Patterns: In this rating system, the territorial domain and geographic patterns are the most important assets of the country to withstand the impact of a total war. It accounts for 300 points in a single category. This factor is particularly important now or in the future, when the application of weapons of great power and coverage becomes the norm in warfare.
2. Emphasizes that demographic factors possess a significant influence on the final outcome of the war. It is worth 100 points. (130 points in the evaluation of groups of countries or war coalitions). This factor is very important in influencing the course and outcome of wars at a time when bloc and total wars are increasingly the norm, now or in the future.
3. The organizational capacity of the state is an important factor influencing the course of the war. Score 90. When other military and political factors are fairly close, the organizational capacity of the state can significantly affect the chances of victory in a campaign or even a series of campaigns.
4. A nation's “war-ready assets” and capabilities are also an important component of its war-fighting capacity. Its importance is particularly pronounced in short- and medium-range wars, as well as in the initial and early stages of a long war.
5. The most important factor in determining the outcome of a war is a nation's economic and productive capacity. This accounts for 350 points. Of these, industrial production capacity is particularly important, with 110 points; agriculture, 80 points; services, 40 points; and the ability to sustain military spending, 120 points.
6. National history and the science and technology of war, in moderation, exerts an influence on the course of the war.
7. Defense effects in war. Countries that go on the defensive are generally able to move quickly into a universal war mode; consistently increase the effectiveness of their wars; make better use of the war effects of geography; have a political environment that spearheads the escalation of the war hierarchy; and are easily tolerated by the real world, and by the historical record, when they use extreme means of warfare.

1.2 Importance of land area and geomorphology.

1.2.1 High-power, wide-coverage weapons applications are increasingly becoming a military reality

(1) Countries around the world are investing heavily in research on high-power bombs. Among conventional weapons, those with a yield greater than 1,000 tons of TNT equivalent are approaching success; the application of large-yield conventional weapons is increasingly becoming a military reality;

(2) Thirty-five years after the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Soviet Union, the world's fear of nuclear leaks is diminishing. This reality has lowered the moral constraints on the use of military nuclear devices;

(3) Following the Fukushima nuclear leak in Japan, the international community has been extremely tolerant of the release of nuclear contaminants. The morally restrictive threshold for the use of small and even medium-yield nuclear weapons has been further lowered;

(4) The process of miniaturization and operationalization of low-radiation nuclear weapons has increased the likelihood of the use of nuclear devices in warfare as a whole;

1.2.2 High-power, high-reach weapons have become a realpolitik tool for Russia and other countries

(1) Russians define themselves as Europeans in terms of their national origins, their cultural identity and their philosophical thinking. In the culture wars of recent years, under the mask of the so-called “civil”, “popular”, “non-governmental”, “spontaneous”, "popular", "non-governmental", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous" and "spontaneous". Under the mask of so-called "civil", "popular", "non-governmental", "spontaneous", a large number of online media repeatedly emphasize that Ukraine is the largest country in Europe. This cultural process is a typical process of cultural war to expel Russia from Europe culturally (and even philosophically thinking). In this war, Russia is virtually defenseless.

(2) The inevitable outcome of the war in Ukraine will be the establishment of a solid “Ukrainian trench” [3]. This trench will physically expel Russia from Europe, both politically and economically. Without a war that completely deconstructs Europe, Russia will not be able to fully reverse its disadvantage for the next 50 to 100 years.

(3) The prolonged war in Ukraine is an attempt to economically and militarily weaken the Russian presence in Europe. This is a real and ongoing process. It is a process in which Russia is at a similar disadvantage.

(4) Russia is clearly at a general disadvantage in the face of the comprehensive, multilayered attack by the United States bloc.

(5) The defense of the European identity of the Russian people is an imperative for all Russians. This involves the cultural roots and philosophical attributes of the Russian nation. The mighty and powerful weapons of mass coverage became the political instrument they had to use. This choice could not be avoided. It is impossible to try to solve political dilemmas and philosophical dilemmas by moral means.

(6) Other countries are increasingly looking at the nuclear option as an operational option to protect their own polity structures and national interests. The Israel issue, India and Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, all revolve around this thread. Nuclear arms control will only get harder, not easier.

1.2.3 The overall war paradigm of the State or group of States returns to political reality.

At present the United States cannot deal with or face the challenge of Russia, or the challenge of China, or the challenge from the Arab world, alone. The paradigm of dealing with political strife as a group of nations has de facto become a political reality. When groups of states engage in total war, the vastness and geographic diversity of the country becomes an important factor in a state's ability to withstand war and influence the final outcome of the war.

It cannot be ruled out that there is a chance that a center of power leadership will peacefully cede leadership. But it is more common for the alternation of power to take place under strong pressure. Confrontations between powerful old leadership centers and powerful growing forces often take place in the form of armed groups.

1.2.4 Historical references.

Russia stopped the Germans in World War II by virtue of its land and climate, even though Germany had the most advanced weapons technology and mode of war operations.

The Channel terrain protected Britain. The vast country protected the Soviet Union and ultimately saved Europe. Meanwhile the ‘advanced and powerful' military powers of Northern and Western Europe were unable to stop the rapid onslaught of Nazi Germany.

The hilly and mountainous terrain of southwestern China prevented the Japanese from attacking in World War II. And consumed the vast majority of Japan's armed forces. This was despite the fact that while Japan had entered an industrialized country, China at that time was in an agrarian stage. Although there was a generational difference in the level of technology and productivity between these two countries at that time.

1.2.5 Vast national territory is the most powerful strategic deterrent.

In the case of large-yield, large-coverage weapons, or in the case of rapid military movement patterns, small countries can quickly lose their ability to wage war. They may even lose their national production capacity.

Vast national territory is the most powerful asset that can ultimately withstand the impact of large-yield, large-coverage weapons. Strategically, it is the most fundamental support for a nation's ability to rapidly escalate to the highest levels of war. It is also the basis for countering an enemy's “war leveling“ deterrent. Therefore, vast territory is, in fact, a country's most powerful strategic deterrent.

1.3 The importance of demographic factors in the re-establishment of order.

1.3.1 Period of world disorder.

It is clear that there are difficulties in the functioning of the existing world power system. The United States is clearly finding it difficult to maintain world order through the operation of an expensive system of naval power. The countries that challenge the US, including Russia and China, are mainly trying to win national interests by challenging US authority. At the same time they are not willing to take over the management of a costly world order. The United States, on the other hand, is directly confronted with the reality of shrinking power differentials. When the U.S. voluntarily abdicates its management responsibilities, or is forced to do so, the world loses its power differential altogether and enters a state of chaos.

1.3.2. a period of exploration of philosophical models.

It is very clear that the Chinese are not willing to take over world power with the old expensive system. And they will not be able to run the system until they have fully seized the power of economic adjudication and financial decision-making. Finding a new philosophical paradigm to establish a new world order that is widely recognized and accepted will not be an inexpensive process. Often this process is dependent on a war that borders on devastation. It is not uncommon in history for times of chaos to be characterized by population declines in excess of 70%. During long periods of chaos, the demographic factor becomes one of the extremely important factors that ultimately determines victory. In the long history of warfare in ancient China, the side that was most successful in competing for population often became the side that ultimately won the war.

Indeed barbarian population pressure is considered by many historical scholars to be a major reason for the collapse of the Roman Empire.

1.3.3 Historical review and realistic outlook:

As early as April through June of last year, there were prophecies stating that Ukraine would have to rely on the human resources or armed forces of allied countries to sustain the war [2, 3]. More and more revealed facts have confirmed this reality. With the further reduction of its population, Ukraine is at risk of losing all of its land east of the entire Dnieper River. The US bloc can expect to win the Russo-Ukrainian war by means of a war of economic attrition, while Russia can expect to win the war by means of a war of demographic attrition.

1.4 The importance of economic forces.

1.4.1 The war machine is ultimately characterized by productive capacity.

Economic power is the basis on which war is sustained. And the war machine is manifested primarily through industrial production capacity. Especially under the harsh conditions of economic fragmentation and economic blockade, the industrial production capacity of a country is of paramount importance.

In the history of war in ancient China, every large-scale war was a process of mutual economic and human consumption, and even the victor of a large-scale war would suffer huge war losses. Even the victor of a large-scale war would suffer huge war losses. Only countries with strong economic productivity and production recovery ability could afford to engage in repeated large-scale wars. There are many examples of countries that have won wars and lost them as a whole.

The First World War and the Second World War were, at their root, still economic wars. It was still a war in which the most economically powerful side took over the less economically powerful side.

A strong economy can withstand numerous military failures. Whereas a side dominated only by military capability can lead to total defeat with just one large failure.

1.4.2 Historical examples

In the second great unification dynasty in Chinese history, the Han Dynasty, the process of its establishment is a typical example. The eventual victory of the earlier militarily weaker side over the earlier militarily stronger side depended on strong economic resilience.

The establishment of the Ming dynasty in ancient China is another example of the triumph of economic power over military power. A group that was initially weak in overall power was committed to economic development. This early relatively weak group used the development path of “building high walls, accumulating grain, and claiming the title of king slowly” to eventually become the most powerful party in terms of overall strength. It became the winner of a long war.

A number of warring groups in the history of British and French wars have incurred defeat for economic reasons, or even admitted defeat voluntarily for economic reasons.

1.5 The modest role of military science and technology.

1.5.1 Upgrading of military science and technology leads to upgrading of military models and doctrines

The essence of war is the pursuit (grabbing, seizing) of economic gain (long-term or medium-term goals). Any methods and programs that contribute to victory in combat, victory on the battlefield, and victory in war are maximally pursued and applied. The revolutionary role of military high technology is well documented. Revolutionary advances in weaponry often bring about simultaneous revolutions in military doctrine and military operating systems.

Ever since the use of the bow and arrow began in the history of Chinese warfare, the shape of war has entered an era in which terrain and geographical advantage were utilized to win. One side could set up ambushes in high mountains, corridors, and canyons, trap the enemy, and then kill them with bows and arrows at long range and non-contact. When artillery technology matured, Napoleon relied on a military doctrine based on artillery coverage to dominate Europe. The invention of the railroad revolutionized the way armed forces were concentrated and transferred. Airplanes allowed humans to strike the enemy from the air. Giant guns equipped on ships opened an era when sea power overwhelmed land power.The widespread use of medium- and short-range missiles plus airborne information combinations will also surely restore the era of land power over sea power.

1.5.2 High-tech weapons are not a necessary element of victory

But Korea, which was the best at making high-tech (bow and arrow) weapons, was the first of the six kingdoms to be destroyed. Napoleon would also fail quickly after losing his supply of artillery shells and military rations. The most advanced and least destructible Tiger tanks lost to the T34 and Sherman tanks, which were far behind in technical specifications.

The bow and arrow, a high-tech weapon, replaced the lance as the main decisive weapon about 1,500 years after its emergence. It was when it had become a good and economical weapon with the highest input-output ratio.

Artillery, the cannon-like firearms, also waited nearly 200 years before comprehensively replacing the bow and arrow's historic place as the decisive weapon of war. The epoch-making and revolutionary VI and VII rockets did not change Nazi Germany's air inferiority.

1.5.3 Economy as a fundamental attribute of the “decisive weapon”

The true essence of a weapon is maximum range and cheapest input. Not sophistication and power. Range comes from technology and cheapness comes from economic power. But the root is still economics. Weapons without cheap economy cannot sustain a long term state of war and national competition.

When cost prevented the mass application of bows and arrows, the decisive weapon of war remained the cheap lance.

When costs prevented the mass equipping of cannons and guns, the decisive weapons of war remained the cheap lance and bow and arrow.

When the cost of long-range artillery prevented it from being used universally, the decisive weapon of war remained the cheap light infantry.

When cost prevents the widespread use of modern medium and short-range missiles, the decisive weapons of war remain cheap light infantry plus tanks plus airplanes.

“Once the economics (input-output ratio) of the ”medium- and short-range missiles plus airborne information“ combination exceeds the economics of the ”carrier plus aircraft plus air-launched missiles" combination, the decline of aircraft carriers, the decline of fighters and bombers.A decline in the power of the sea was bound to follow.

Even if a 1K-ton TNT-equivalent conventional bomb is developed, it will not quickly become a decisive weapon until the cost is good enough for widespread use.

The benefits of nuclear weapons that are less than the costs of their use (combined political, economic, and military costs) dictate that they will not quickly become decisive weapons either.

This is the fundamental reason why this National War Intensity Rating System, attached to this article, assigns only 30 points to weapons science and technology.

1.6 Importance of organizational capacity

1.6.1 War as a genetic memory and group need

Memories of war, the need for war, group success, all of these factors that are discussed today as theories, when traced back to the lowest level of justification, it becomes clear that they are in fact a number of parasitic memory factors within the genes of organisms. These traits are inherited from generation to generation. They are stimulated or repressed by certain factors.

Certain plants, distributed across multiple time zones in the world, can suddenly bloom and drop fruit at a uniform time. Certain plants produce chemical or biological products to inhibit the growth of other specialties. These traits are in fact part of the plant's behavior with war. Plants also acquire the right to perpetuate specialties through acts of war.

The vast majority of marine organisms rely on group strategies for survival. Organizational ability determines species continuation for small-bodied organisms. Group strategy is in fact a group characteristic of the behavior of war. Although individuals all instinctively reject death, genes ensure the continuation of specialization through group strategies that allow a few individuals to choose death.

1.6.2 Organizational capacity is an important part of war memory

(1) Organizational capacity is a group need. It is also a vital war-fighting capability. Organizational capacity is an essential capacity that determines the continuation of the species.

(2. Species with super individual survivability can also have organizational capacity that plays an important role in survival competition. Lions and tigers are among the species with top-level survival abilities that also develop super-organizational abilities under certain conditions. For super-beasts to give up their reproductive power and food dominance in favor of strong groups, only the power of inherited memories of war can achieve this goal.

Africa's famous bad boy lions have demonstrated a superb ability to wage war through superb organizational skills. After a confirmed loss of an existential threat, this pride split. At a later stage after the two split lions suffered an existential crisis, the split cliques were once again reunited to enhance their war-fighting and survival capabilities.

1.6.3 Organizational capacity can be stimulated, enhanced, or weakened by the environment

(1) For human beings, the ability to organize is even more crucial for the survival and continuity of groups. Ancient China had an advanced agricultural civilization. This advanced agricultural civilization depended on strict adherence to the seasons, to the seasons. The next year's harvest had to follow a strict planting schedule. The predictable course of operations, the predictable number of harvests, led the ancient Chinese to embrace centralization. The more centralized the group's ability, the more it was able to accomplish huge projects of land reclamation, water conservancy, and river trough transportation. The more powerful the group, the greater the ability to cope with bad years and natural disasters by providing relief to each other.

(2. Unlike the Chinese agricultural civilization, Europe has long relied on fishing and hunting, with herding as the mainstay. This type of survival involves too much randomness. Groups, or clusters, were unable to predict and control the source of food and the safety of their survival for the following year. Thus the ability to organize has an upper limit on European populations. It is a double-edged sword in Europe. On the one hand numerically powerful groups have a survival advantage in the plundering process. At the same time, large groups are more prone to existential crises in the distribution process. This has led European civilization into the philosophical paradox of pursuing both moderately strong groups and small groups and individualism.

(3) Organizational capacity is very much influenced by the environment. When the survival environment is adverse, groups move toward larger groups and larger organizations. When survival risks are eliminated or improved, small groupism or individualism grows.

Almost all of the developed countries today are rife with non-marriage and non-life. Many countries have 0 or even negative population growth rates. In the early days of European immigration to North America, they faced a serious existential crisis. In the face of an existential crisis, groups subconsciously choose the survival of the larger group. We were able to consult a document that recorded a woman from Ireland who pioneered North America. It had raised as many as 37 children. This historical fact has a complete record of the names of the family members (see the chart at the front of the article). This completely reverses the perception that white women were unwilling to have children.

(4) Organizational capacity is certainly also affected by survival patterns. The Great Irish Famine is the biggest source of the problems in England and Ireland today. Comparatively speaking, there were many times in ancient China when there was a famine similar to the Irish Famine. But each such famine became a major opportunity for the ancient Chinese to integrate and unite with each other. The English have ruled the British Isles for nearly 1,000 years, and to this day have been unable to resolve the distinction between English, Welsh, and Irish identities. The reason for the serious differences in the results of similar starting points is that the core group of powerful people chose different philosophies and paths of survival at the critical moment.

1.6.4 This assessment model clearly has deficiencies in the rating of organizational strength that cannot be addressed today.

There are obvious shortcomings in the assessment of organizational strength that cannot be solved today. The main reason for this is the inability to accurately introduce computational factors for country history, philosophy of existence, ethnic structure, linguistic composition, religious divergence, etc. It may be that further work is needed when dealing with multi-ethnic countries like India. We need more information from previous studies combined with more in-depth mathematical computational modeling to more accurately rate their national cohesion and national war capacity. Looking forward to future opportunities to improve it.

II. Framework for assessing war groups or war coalitions

2.1 Grading of war involvement of coalition countries

The scheme for calculating the war intensity of a group of countries or a war coalition basically follows the framework for evaluating the war intensity of countries. According to the breadth and depth of a country's commitment to war, countries within a war coalition enter the grading according to different depths of involvement. They are graded as: belligerent countries; frontline allies; supporting allies; and background allies. And accordingly, the intensity of different levels of involvement is calculated.

2.2 Assessment of the unpredictability of alliances

Introduction of unpredictability assessment (looking forward to further introduction of computational modeling).

In the early stages of a war, the risk of change in alliance or bloc strength can be roughly assessed based on the reality of the political context. If the degree of risk is over-represented, it can be assumed that the assessment of the strength of the bloc at war is less accurate and more variable. If the degree of risk is low, it can be assumed that the assessment of the war coalition (bloc) is more accurate.

From a political perspective, some of the unpredictability is in fact in the predictable zone. When these factors can be assessed less rigorously, the risk can be graded as follows: change in position of background allies; possible opposition countries; potential opposition countries; and potential allies of the enemy.

But there are other unpredictable aspects of the war process that are completely unpredictable at the beginning of the war. For example, political and war geniuses can only be sifted out and recognized in the course of a war. Political geniuses and war geniuses cannot be discovered before or at the beginning of a war. Sudden catastrophes of nature, geographical catastrophes, environmental catastrophes, are also unpredictable factors.

2.3 Assessment of the course of the war

War is a dynamic process, and an offensive or defensive situation can change a country's ability to wage war. The possession and loss of land and resources will trigger a change in the assessment base. As the war progresses, the countries that join or leave the war state will keep changing. The depth and breadth of a state's involvement in a war will also change as the war progresses. A dynamic assessment of war is important and necessary.

2.4 Renewal and Turnover of War Coalitions

As the course of the war progresses and changes, a change in the roster of countries participating in the war alliance without a change in the operational core can be considered a renewal of the war alliance. If the Operational Core changes, it is considered a turnover of the war alliance. In the event of a major war alliance renewal or alliance turnover, the naming and calculation of alliances will change significantly accordingly.

III. Static ranking of countries in terms of intensity of war

According to the National War Intensity Assessment System (NWIS), the national war intensity rankings are listed below.

IV: European War Coalition Scoring and Endgame Predictions

4.1 Progress and projections of the war in Europe between the L1 and L2 lines.

Figure 1: Comparative Table of Intensity of Union Warfare in the European Theater of Operations

Figure 2. map of trends in the Russo-Ukrainian war (image source: https://pppnet.at/confined-walls-still-work-in-russia-ukraine-war-by-2026-2/）

4.1.1 War coalitions when the battlefield is between the L1 and L2 lines

With reference to the setting of the L1 and L2 lines of the Russian-Ukrainian War Restriction Wall [1] delineated in Ye Qiquan's article, the composition of the Ukrainian War Coalition and the Russian War Coalition when the Russo-Ukrainian War was fought to the east of the Dnipro River (the L1 line) and to the west of the Donbass (the L2 line) was as follows.

4.1.2 Intensity of alliance warfare when the battlefield is located between the L1 and L2 lines

Figure 3: Map of the intensity of alliance wars where the battle lines are located between the L1 and L2 lines

Referring to Table 7, the visualization of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, the following inferential conclusions can be seen.

• The overall intensity of the war in Russian Union I was greater than in Ukrainian Union I;
• Between the L1 and L2 lines, it can be inferred that the Russian coalition has a greater chance of winning than the Ukrainian coalition;
• The Ukrainian coalition is stronger than the Russian coalition in terms of military capability, arms investment capability, agro-industrial capability, and industrial capability. In long-term projections, the Ukrainian coalition has the potential to seize the war advantage through military and industrial superiority;
• The Russian coalition is stronger than the other in terms of geography, demographics, and political factors. The long-term trend is that Russia can seize the war advantage by utilizing its demographic and political environment.

4.1.3 Prediction of the outcome of the war when the battlefield is located between the L1 and L2 lines

(1) According to the conclusions of the War Intensity Assessment System (WIAS), the Russian coalition has the advantage in this vast area between the L1 and L2 lines;

(2) Russia's ability to forcefully take possession of the deep blue zone (Crimea, Luhansk, and Dnetsk) on Figure 2 is not in doubt, as the crossing of the L2 line to the east will inspire the formation of “Russian Alliance II.”

(3) There is a very high probability that Russia will take strong possession of the dark and dark blue areas of Figure 2 (Crimea, Luhansk, Dnetsk, most of the Zaporozhye Oblast, and most of the Kherson Oblast);

(4) There is a better chance that Russia will occupy the dark blue, dark blue, and lake blue zones on map 2 (Crimea, Luhansk, Dnetsk, Zaporozhye, Kherson, most of Nikolaev Oblast, and a part of Odessa Oblast);

(5) The worst-case scenario for Ukraine would be the loss of the entire territory of the eastern bank of the Dnieper River;

(6) It is unlikely that Russia will cross the L1 line to the west. This is because crossing the L1 line to the west would inspire an escalation of the Ukrainian Union to “Ukrainian Union II”. This would result in a reversal of war power.

4.2 Progress and projections as the war in Europe crosses west of the L1 line

4.2.1 Changes in the structure of the war coalition (update)

Once the Russian-Ukrainian war crosses west of the L1 line, it will seriously damage the interests of the US bloc, thus inspiring the upgrading and renewal of the ‘Ukrainian Union I‘ into the ’Ukrainian Union II'. This change will significantly upgrade the composition of the Ukrainian coalition's war forces. The composition of the Russian coalition, on the other hand, will not change significantly. As a result, the ratio of combat forces on the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield will be reversed. The Ukrainian side will gain an advantage in battlefield strength, while the Russian coalition will become weaker.

4.2.2 Coalition war intensity when the battlefield is west of the L1 line

Figure 4: Intensity of alliance warfare west of the L1 line

As can be seen from the information in Figure 4 and Table 9, once the formation of the Ukrainian Union II was triggered, the war capacity represented by the intensity of the war immediately flipped. The Ukrainian Union is ahead of the Russian Union in terms of overall scores, as well as in terms of military capabilities, armament investment, industrial productivity, and service industries.

4.2.3 Predictions of the outcome of the war after the stimulation of “Ukrainian Union II”

(1) The war power of the Ukrainian coalition II is significantly stronger than that of the Russian coalition, which could lead to a counterattack on Russia's withdrawal from the territories it already occupies;

(2) There is a very high probability that Russia will be compressed back into the deep blue and true blue areas shown in Figure 2 (Crimea, Luhansk, Dnetsk, most of the Zaporizhia Oblast, and most of the Kherson Oblast). And here a prolonged confrontation with the American bloc will take place. Because this line is very much in the long-term interests of the American bloc.

(3) There is still a high probability that Russia will continue to occupy the dark blue, dark blue, and lake blue areas shown in figure 2 (Crimea, Luhansk, Dnetsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, most of Nikolaev Oblast, and part of Odessa Oblast). This line of confrontation remains in the long-term interests of the American bloc.

(4.) There is one outcome that the American bloc does not generally pursue. It is to compress Russia east of the L2 line. Once the battlefield crosses east of the L2 line, it will inspire the formation of “Russian Alliance II”. This will cause another reversal of power on the battlefield.

4.3 Progress and projections of the war in Europe while east of the L2 line

Once the war is pushed eastward and crosses the L2 line, the various political and war combinations on the battlefield will once again undergo great upheaval and change. Characterized by the stimulation of Russia's national defense mentality, and the reorganization of new war alliance structures.

4.3.1 Changes in the structure of the war coalition

(1) The Donbass region east of the L2 line is of special political significance for Russia, and since 2014 Donbass east of the L2 line has had de facto autonomous powers beyond those of the Kosovo region;

(2) Regardless of the point of departure of the Minsk Agreements, this series of international agreements de facto confirmed the autonomy of Luhansk and Dnetsk beyond the Kosovo region;

(3) Despite the fact that four oblasts have declared referendums on joining the Russian Federation, it is clear that the turbulent history of Luhansk and Dunnetzk is markedly different from that of Kherson and Zaporozhye;

(4) If it is assumed that Russia could tolerate the loss of the Kherson and Zaporozhye oblasts again in the war. But the loss of Luhansk and Dunnetzk must have galvanized the Russians into a national defensive mood;

(5) Assuming that the small probability event comes true and the battlefield is pushed east of the L2 line, it will inevitably inspire the formation of Russian Alliance II.

4.3.2 Intensity of alliance warfare when the battlefield is east of the L2 line

Russian Federation II

4.3.3 Predictions of the course of the war after the triggering of “Russian Federation II”

(1) The triggering of “Russian Federation II” has led to a renewed change in battlefield war-fighting capabilities. The Russian Federation's war-fighting capabilities are once again dominant;

(2) The formation of the “Russian Alliance II” will cause major political upheavals as China enters the ranks of Russia's supportive allies. This could have successive political effects in the European region.

(3) There is a high probability that the political effects of “Russian Federation II” will trigger a further change in the composition of the subsequent war coalition, thus triggering a real all-European war.

(4) The composition of alliances and the intensity of the war across Europe require further study.

5. Summary

The application of high-power, high-coverage weapons is now increasingly a realistic possibility. The rapid deployment and movement of armed forces is becoming more and more sophisticated. The modes of bloc warfare and total war have returned to political reality. Under these new circumstances, there is a need for a new type of tool for assessing the country's overall war capability and the group's total war capability. This is the original purpose of this paper, which proposes a system for assessing the “intensity of national war”.

In this assessment system, geographic factors, demographic factors, organizational capabilities, military capabilities, and economic capabilities are ranked as the most important war-fighting capability assets. Geography, in particular, is elevated to a level never before recognized. It is seen as the most powerful component of a nation's deterrent power.

According to this assessment system, the countries with the strongest overall national war-fighting capabilities are China, the United States, Russia, India, Brazil, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Indonesia.

Based on the extended arithmetic of this assessment system, it is possible to calculate the war intensity of each war coalition involved in the European war. According to the current structure of the Ukrainian coalition, the overall war intensity of the Ukrainian coalition is weaker than that of the Russian coalition. This should be the fundamental reason for the limitation of the Ukrainian side in the war in the region of Central and South Ukraine.

The current stalemate in the region is also due to the fact that the Russian coalition does not have an overwhelming advantage in terms of the intensity of the war. The Ukrainian coalition has an advantage in terms of military equipment, armament investment capacity, industrial capacity, and service industry capacity. The Ukrainian coalition can strive for war advantage through armament consumption and industrial consumption. The Russian coalition has advantages in terms of geography, organization, and population. Russia can gain further battlefield advantages through manpower depletion and the support of relative political stability.

If Russia tries to push the war effort west of the L1 line, it will inspire an upgraded and renewed Ukrainian coalition. An updated Ukrainian alliance would be significantly stronger in war intensity than Russia's current alliance. It could lead to Russian defeats in Central and South Ukraine.

But the boundary of the new Ukrainian coalition's eastward push can hardly be more than east of the L2 line. Because once the front crosses east of the L2 line, it will inspire an escalation and renewal of the Russian coalition. And thus another power flip will occur.

The application of this assessment system provides a better explanation for the predictions of the direction of the Russo-Ukrainian war made in April, May, and June 2022 by Kichizumi Ye. These predictions indicate that the Russo-Ukrainian war will be confined between the L1 and L2 lines for a relatively long period of time; that Russia will establish up to seven or so autonomous governments on Ukrainian soil; and that Russia will not incur a military defeat at least until the end of 2026 [1,2,3,4].

References:

1. Ye Qiquan . Predicting the Border Wall in the Russo-Ukrainian War as Early as April 26, 2022 . PPPNET, Webpage:https://pppnet.at/early-prophecy-on-confined-walls-in-russia-ukraine-war/
2. Ye Qiquan. Theoretical Three Ceasefire Lines in the Russo-Ukrainian War. PPPNET, webpage:https://pppnet.at/three-possible-ceasefire-lines-in-russia-ukraine-war/
3. Ye Qiquan. Whose War? Winners and Losers in the Russia-Ukraine War. PPPNET, 2023. webpage: https://pppnet.at/players-winning-or-losing-from-russia-ukraine-war-2/
4. Ye Qiquan. Border wall for Russia-Ukraine war works at least until the end of 2026. PPPNET, 2023. webpage:https://pppnet.at/confined-walls-still-work-in-russia-ukraine-war-by-2026-2/

Other data sources involved in model calculations

World Development Indicators. World Bank. 2022. https://www.databank.worldbank.org/

Countryreports 2022. countryreports.Org. 2022. https://www.countryreports.org/

The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. 2023. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/

2023 Military Strength Ranking. global firepower. 2023. https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php

Global Food Security Index (GFSI) 2022. the Economist. 2023. https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/

2022 Report. Global Innovation Index. 2023. https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/gii-2022-report

Global Hunger Index Scores by 2022 GHI Rank. 2023. https://www.globalhungerindex.org/ranking.html