China's Armed Reunification Program (2): The Changing Face of the U.S. and China

(This is an unfinished research outline.)

Abstracts:

If China launches a trans-Taiwan Strait military operation in 2026, it will be difficult for the US to respond appropriately. China has a clear military power advantage in the area covered by medium-range ballistic missiles. It also has the political advantage of choosing the timing of the war. Correspondingly, the U.S. has difficulty in taking effective political action before military action occurs, and difficulty in taking effective military action before military action occurs. Once the Chinese Army completed its landings on Taiwan, the U.S. alliance lost all chance of landing on any part of the Chinese landmass. This military fact is enough to ensure that China will not suffer a total military defeat in a series of military raids. But this advantage is not a complete guarantee of China's success. If the U.S. is able to take a series of actions that go beyond the conventional framework, there is also a good chance that China's military advantage will be severely eroded, and that Taiwan may even be permanently severed from China.

Keywords:

Trans-Taiwan Strait, Military Operations, Reunification, Effective Range, U.S.-China Confrontation, Anti-Ship Weapons

I. Overview:

1.1 Base case and projections:

The greatest risk to China's united action comes from the attitude of Europe. Europe's participation in the military response to China is the biggest variable facing China.

Because of the need to preserve the existing imperial order, the greatest risk to the United States was that it could not afford to lose. But once the war started, the defeat of the United States was inevitable because it would be difficult for the United States to control the withdrawal process of Korea and Japan. Basically, this would be a war whose outcome would be decided before the war started.

Another theoretical option would be for the U.S. to obscure and deny the counter-regime nature of China's military unification efforts. But this would require reversing the existing anti-China political climate in a short period of time, and is in fact a difficult option to realize.

The most desirable option for the United States would be an ex ante program of peace talks to ensure a continued U.S. political and military presence in Northeast Asia. This option would require a series of in-depth negotiations and compromises. Until the U.S. comes under significant real pressure, this option is only theoretical.

Start by setting the following tone, which will not be discussed in this section.
(1. China must unify Taiwan within Xi Jinping's term [1].
(2. China has a very good chance of launching a unification campaign in 2026 [1].
(3) Mainland China completes full military occupation of Taiwan within 7 days. [2]
(4. Taiwan will not take the initiative to submit a peace negotiation proposal before military action is initiated [1]

1.2 The Basis for China's Non-Military Defeat

If a united action across the Strait is launched between April and September 2026, China may not suffer a military defeat. There are several key points that support this prediction.

(1. The American alliance has no chance to land on any of China's landmasses (including Taiwan Island). This is the most fundamental support for China's invincibility;
(2. The U.S. had no legal and political basis to station troops on Taiwan Island before China launched military operations;
(3) China has the priority of choosing the battlefield. China can choose not to engage the U.S. beyond the range of medium-range missiles;
(4. China has a greater ability to wage a war of attrition;
(5) China's war-grade weapons have a higher ROE (cost-exchange ratio);
(6. China's strategic weapons have a higher investment-output ratio (cost-exchange ratio);

1.3 Possibility of Military Failure in China

• (1. The U.S. had already prepared for a total and comprehensive war against China in advance;
  (2. The U.S. successfully prevented the mainland from effectively occupying Taiwan Island;
  (3) The United States succeeded in concentrating European military power into the overall operation in the first phase;
  (4. Comprehensive Vetting;

1.4 Strengths of the United States

• (1. Global military bases and support bases;
  (2. A strong stock of established military power;
  (3. Global battlefield advantage;
  (4. An unparalleled alliance system that centralizes the most powerful military and economic capabilities;
  (5) Nuclear superiority and the determination to take the initiative to escalate the level of war;

1.5 Disadvantages of the United States

• (1. Cannot afford to fail in the military;
  (2. Cannot win a long war of attrition;
  (3. It is difficult to concentrate military power from the periphery of the battlefield to the center of the battlefield;
  (4.) Military policy was subjected to dramatic changes in response to fluctuations in domestic public opinion;
  (5) Inability to deal with two full-scale wars, one in Europe and the other in Asia, at the same time;
  (6. It is difficult to choose in advance both the military option and the peace option;
  (7) The risk of withdrawal of Japan and Korea in the course of the war could not be controlled;
  (8) The risk of a restructuring of the European power system cannot be controlled in a stable way;

II. The Basis of China's Non-Military Defeat

2.1 China's Political Advantage in Choosing the Time of War

The probability is that China will launch the operation sometime between April and September, 2026 And the Chinese central government has the political and military advantage of choosing the best date for the operation. Although the US alliance can make all sorts of accusations against China, ultimately this is a domestic war. The U.S. alliance can find no good reason within the existing system of order to take pre-emptive action.

2.2 Difficulty of the US alliance in preventing the landing of the Chinese Central Army on Taiwan Island

2.2.1 No way to prevent landing in advance

The U.S. could not find sufficient political and legal reasons to place an effective military force on the island of Taiwan in advance to prevent Chinese central government forces from boarding the island;

2.2.2 Inability to build up forces in advance

Placing large military forces in Korea, Japan, and Okinawa beforehand to stop the Continental Army is also not an optimal military-political or economic choice. For one thing, the Chinese military could use delaying tactics to drain the economic and military power of the US alliance. Secondly, a large military presence in Japan and Okinawa would be an extremely negative political act that would create resistance to this reality among the Japanese people. Third, in the event of a conflict, there was a great risk of losing major military power in a single battle.

2.2.3 Rapid military assistance cannot prevent landings

Given the current gap in military power, rapid military assistance will not fill the gap between the mainland and Taiwan. The timetable for accomplishing military action depends on the central government's determination to act, violence, and political hesitation.

2.2.4 Difficulty in conducting effective military operations to the center of the battlefield

Even with a large prior military presence in the Philippines, it would have been difficult to put either land forces or sufficient long-range firepower on the island of Taiwan.

2.2.5 Lack of confidence in direct confrontation with the Chinese Army

Once the Chinese Army completes its landings, the U.S. alliance loses the chance to confront the Chinese Army; unless an unconventional war is fought.

2.3 China's Military Advantage in Choosing Battlefield Areas

2.3.1 China's Advantage in Choosing Military Settlements

For China, as long as there is no defeat, it is a total military victory. The basis of China's victory was the military occupation of the whole island of Taiwan. In a subsequent war with the U.S. alliance, as long as there is no major total defeat, it will be a double political and military victory for China. There is even a high probability that this will eventually lead to economic gains as well.

2.3.2 China's Military Advantage in Selecting Battlefield Areas

The U.S. has a huge advantage in terms of global military placement. But China's goal is very clear: no surprise in the U.S. coalition's areas of military superiority. It will only fight in the area covered by China's medium-range missiles.

2.4 China already has an advantage in the effective range of its weapons.

2.4.1 The most advanced weapon is not necessarily the dominant weapon of war

It took more than 1,000 years after the most advanced bows and arrows (including crossbows and catapults) were used in warfare before they finally replaced the lance as the dominant weapon of war. It took about 100 years for the gun to replace the bow and arrow. Napoleon's time was briefly an era of artillery victory, but it wasn't until World War II that mobile artillery replaced the repeating gun (rifle and machine gun) as the dominant weapon in determining the outcome of wars in Europe.

2.4.2 The pursuit of greater effective range is the driving force behind military progress

The spear replaced the stick because it had a longer range of action. Bows and arrows entered the battlefield because they could kill enemies at longer distances. Firearms replaced bows and arrows because they were cheaper to make, train, and use than bows and arrows. Blowguns replaced the firespray because of their longer range and higher lethality. Artillery was introduced into warfare because of its irreplaceable long range and greater lethality. The use of combat aircraft in warfare, the emergence of the V1 and V2, and the use of mobile airports are all in pursuit of the goals of greater range, greater lethality, and greater economy.2.4.3 Economy (i.e., application on a large scale) is the most important characteristic of effective range.

2.4.3 Economy (i.e., scale application or higher input-to-exchange ratio) is the most important characteristic of effective range

Once the technology of refining bronze matured, the lance quickly replaced the wooden stick as the dominant weapon of war. The basis for this was economic affordability.

The bow and arrow was the first revolutionary advance in the history of the progress of arms. It not only brought about the progress of military effect, but also the progress of military theory. For the first time, human beings were able to fully utilize the factor of geographical advantage to temporarily and transiently confine the enemy in a narrow space, and to win the war without contact. The emergence of the bow and arrow led to the gradual disappearance of the war model based on the clash of armies.

But the bow and arrow did not become the dominant weapon for more than 1,000 years after it entered the battlefield. This was because it was not economically sustainable. During the Warring States period, Korea, which possessed the highest technology of warfare, had the highest technology of making bows and arrows and produced the largest amount of arrows, and even exported them to other countries. However, Korea was the first of the Six Kingdoms to be annihilated. So much so, that later dynasties in ancient China were ashamed of the name of Korea.

The introduction of the gun quickly replaced the bow and arrow when the range was not as good as the bow and arrow and its use was affected by weather. The cost of manufacture was not higher than that of the bow and arrow, but the cost of training, maintenance, and use was much lower.

The basic reason for the replacement of the Fire Arrow by the Strike Gun comes from the increased range, the increased killing effect, the acceptable increase in cost, and the decrease in cost for the overall killing effect.

What ultimately prevented the heavy machine gun from becoming the dominant weapon of the war, even though it was the key weapon of the war in WWI, was the unsustainable cost of manufacturing it.

Nazi Germany's giant heavy artillery, V1, and V2 rockets, did not create a firepower advantage. Economic cost was the root cause.

The Tiger tank, the most advanced tank in Europe during WWII and the first in terms of comprehensive firepower, eventually lost to the T34 and Sherman tanks, which were far inferior in terms of firepower and protection. Economy (i.e. scale) was the most fundamental reason.

Many countries have long range missiles with a range of over 10K kilometers, but these missiles cannot be used in conventional warfare except in nuclear warfare. Or if they are used in conventional wars, they are unlikely to have a significant war effect. The root cause is economic unsustainability.

Predictable.Once there is a weapon with a combined economic performance exceeding that of an aircraft carrier battle group, the expensive aircraft carrier mode of warfare will quickly withdraw from the historical stage of dominating the outcome of wars.

。

2.4.4 The effective range of China's war-grade weapons exceeds that of the United States.

Assuming that U.S. mobile airports and fixed airports in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines are not destroyed; assuming that U.S. F35s have the same range and payload as J20s; and assuming that U.S. airborne cruise missiles have the same range as Chinese products. China's fixed airports are unquestionably cheaper to use than the U.S.; China's cruise missiles are unquestionably cheaper to produce than the U.S.; and China's short-range missiles are certainly cheaper. OnlyWith its economicIt's enough to guarantee thatThe effective range of China's war-grade weapons exceeds that of the United States.。

2.4.5 Effective range of China's strategic weaponslikelihoodMore than the U.S.

If the U.S. puts in a carrier-based battle group as the dominant weapon, China's medium-range missiles will also join the battlefield correspondingly. This is determined by the reciprocal response strategy in war. A politician's strategy may delay or slightly postpone this response process, but it cannot prevent it from happening. This is one of the essential attributes of war.

2.4.5.1 Economy.

The cost of Chinese medium-range missiles:

The exact cost is not known. Unlike in the US, where you can find out the price of PAUC or APUC with no precision, it is difficult to find out the characteristics and price of Chinese military products. It is difficult to check the characteristics and prices of Chinese military products.
A U.S. legislator has argued that the cost of 1,238 Chinese anti-ship missiles is equivalent to the cost of an aircraft carrier. Another U.S. military commentator has put the cost of the Chinese DF21D in the million-dollar range. On the other hand, Chinese internet opinions have assessed the cost of Chinese anti-ship missiles to be much higher.
Chinese internet sources estimate the cost of a DF21D to be between US$10 million and US$24 million. The manufacturing cost of the DF26 is in the range of US$15 million to US$30 million. Today, we tentatively price the DF21D and DF26 at the higher price scenarios of US$24 million and US$30 million, and compare the exchange ratios.

From Tables 1 and 2, it can be seen that theThe economics of China's strategic weapons are far superior to those of the United States.This is also a tacit recognition of the fact that the Chinese and Western cyberworlds share a common goal. At the same time, it is also a tacit recognition by the Chinese and Western cyber worlds that the “Assuming facts”.

2.4.5.2 Role distance

From the examples in Table 3 and Figure 1, it can be seen that China has already shown a partial advantage in terms of the operational range of Chinese and U.S. combat weapons. In particular, the U.S. has a significant disadvantage in medium-range ballistic missiles. However, the U.S. has an advantage in the range of cruise missiles.

From the examples in Table 3 and Figure 2, it can be seen that if the U.S. military extends the range of its weapons with the help of mobile airfields and flying platforms, the U.S. weapons range can basically equal that of China's. The U.S. military can extend the range of its weapons with the help of mobile airfields and flying platforms.

on the three basic items that make up effective range.“In terms of ”distance", it can be tentatively considered that China and the United States are basically on an equal footing.。

2.4.5.3 Killing effect (destructive effect, cost-exchange ratio)

Prior to World War I, war was characterized by the killing of enemy soldiers. Killing or destroying the enemy's armed forces was the main way of destroying the enemy's ability to wage war. However, after World War I, in addition to killing and wounding soldiers, destroying the enemy's economic base became the main means of reducing the enemy's ability to sustain war. This feature was fully realized in the Second World War.

There are good reasons to believe that in future general and group comprehensive wars, weakening the enemy group's ability to sustain war will be the main principle of warfare. The destructive effect on targets of high economic value will become the main indicator of lethal effect. It will probably be more important than the lethal effect on soldiers.

The destructive effects of China's anti-ship ballistic missiles have never been demonstrated in previous wars. Although China has fired a number of anti-ship ballistic missiles in environments monitored by the U.S. military, the U.S. military has not publicly demonstrated the destructive effects of Chinese anti-ship missiles.

There is a clear difference in the vulnerability of land-based and sea-based facilities. It is very difficult to completely destroy a land-based system, and it is very difficult to completely deactivate a land-based system. However, this is not the case for offshore facilities. Partial disablement of a maritime system often leads to total disablement of the system. This puts the carrier fleet in a high-risk reality. By losing one-third to one-half of its escort capability, the carrier loses its confidence in moving forward.

High-explosive warhead damage radius (Photo courtesy of MDAA: Missle Defense Advocacy Alliance)

As long as a warship is within 1 km of the detonation point of an anti-ship missile, it will be deactivated with unbearable casualties. If four anti-ship missiles explode at the same time, an effective kill zone of at least 2 to 4 kilometers in diameter will be created. The carrier may be completely deactivated due to intolerable casualties, damage to the deck only, or power damage.

Another example of the opposite is the Iranian power plant's centralized system, which was invaded by a virus and rendered dysfunctional. Although the damage was severe, it was not completely deactivated. It was restored after various efforts.

in the event thatIt's true that aircraft carriers can't defend themselves against ballistic missiles.in that caseIn terms of damage or exchange ratio.The company can basicallyConsiders the U.S. carrier fleet system to be weaker than China's medium-range ballistic missile system.The only thing that needs to be verified is the functionality of the Chinese ballistic missile search and command system. The only thing that needs to be verified is the functionality of the Chinese ballistic missile seeker and command system.

2.4.6 Significance of the progress of the effective range of a weapon

In the above narrative, China has been implicitly recognized as leading in two of the three elements of effective range of weapons, and equal to the United States in the other. Therefore, it can be basically assumed that China's weapons are already ahead in terms of effective range. This lead has the following implications.

2.4.6.1 The United States has lost the security environment in which it uses its weapons. In the event of a conventional weapons attack on China, U.S. weapons systems are at great risk.

2.4.6.2 For the first time in its nearly 400-year history, land-based weapons have exceeded the range of sea-based weapons.

2.4.6.3 Even if the U.S. were to take another lead over China, either through the space route or the ballistic missile route, it would be largely impossible to change the historical progression of the relatively short range of seapower weapons.

2.4.6.4 The economies of scale in China's secondary sector will ensure that China's superior weapons will further reduce costs, thus pushing China's weapons ahead in terms of effective range.

2.4.6.5 The difficulty of restraining the temptation of land power weapons to prove their superiority will be another incentive for war to break out.

III. The Possibility of China's Failure

So far, it seems that China has a definite advantage in fighting under the coverage of its medium-range ballistic missiles. But military operations have always been events of the highest degree of chance. Statistically speaking, there is no such thing as a probability of one.

The U.S. coalition could undermine China's military advantage to a considerable extent if the following scenarios were to occur. It may even be possible to cut off Taiwan permanently.

• Successfully prevented the PLA from landing on Taiwan Island;
• It succeeded in completely destroying mainland China's naval power at the beginning of the PLA's military campaign;
• Rapidly launch an all-out war against China and isolate the Chinese mainland from Taiwan. Then quickly support the independence of the island of Taiwan, thus obtaining the political basis for the placement of military power on the island.
• The issue of domestic partisan coordination was dealt with in advance, and as soon as contact was made, a small nuclear device was dropped on a small reef in the South China Sea with no clear right of attribution, thus demonstrating in the strongest political manner a complete break with China.

 IV. U.S. Strengths

• Military bases and support bases around the world;
• A strong stock of established military power;
• Global Battlefield Advantage;
• An unparalleled alliance system that centralizes the greatest military and economic power;
• The nuclear power advantage and the determination to take the initiative to escalate the level of war.

V. U.S. Disadvantages

• Can't afford to fail in the military;
• Can't win a long war of attrition;
• It is difficult to concentrate military power from the periphery of the battlefield to the center of the battlefield;
• Military policy is subject to huge changes in response to fluctuations in domestic public opinion;
• It was impossible to deal with two full-scale wars on the European and Asian fronts at the same time;
• It is difficult to choose in advance both the military option and the peace option;
• There was no way to control the exit risk of Japan and Korea in the course of the war;
• The risk of a restructuring of the European power system cannot be controlled in a stable manner.

Tiny knots:

If China launches a trans-Taiwan Strait military operation in 2026, it will be difficult for the US to respond appropriately. China has a clear military power advantage in the area covered by medium-range ballistic missiles. It also has the political advantage of choosing the timing of the war. Correspondingly, the U.S. has difficulty in taking effective political action before military action occurs, and difficulty in taking effective military action before military action occurs. Once the Chinese Army completed its landings on Taiwan, the U.S. alliance lost all chance of landing on any part of the Chinese landmass. This military fact is enough to ensure that China will not suffer a total military defeat in a series of military raids. But this advantage is not a complete guarantee of China's success. If the U.S. is able to take a series of actions that go beyond the conventional framework, there is also a good chance that China's military advantage will be severely eroded, and that Taiwan may even be permanently severed from China.

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