The British’s New Tactics: Potentially Harm Their Long-Term Interests

By：叶 其泉

Long-Term Forecasting Review: Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 1, February 2026

 The British’s New Tactics: Potentially Harm Their Long-Term Interests

Ye Qiquan

First release date: Tuesday, July 1, 2003

 

Reference data element: (APA)
Ye Qiquan. (2026). The British are playing a new game: potentially harming their long-term interests. Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis. 2026. Vol. 1 (1), 1-3.
Abstract: The British are indeed adept at seizing opportunities when pursuing short-term gains. However, their new tactics in Hong Kong will inevitably harm their long-term interests. The British are attempting to achieve, through complex political maneuvering, what even hardline politicians like Margaret Thatcher failed to obtain before 1997. In the long run, the British pursuit of short-term gains will inevitably pose significant risks to their political and intelligence presence in Hong Kong.

Keywords: Hong Kong; demonstrations; 50-year agreement; United Kingdom; political presence; national interests; long-term interests

The message coming from the director’s stock trading machine said that Hong Kong was in complete chaos. Hundreds of thousands of people had taken to the streets. During dinner that evening, the director cautiously reminded everyone not to cross the border to Hong Kong for the next few days. Judging from everyone’s expressions, they didn’t seem to care much about his concerns.

I didn’t mind the director’s overly cautious attitude. After all, I’d experienced something far more outrageous in ’89. However, I have a natural enthusiasm for protests. After returning to my dorm at 9 PM, I immediately checked NetEase, and it was indeed reported.

Unlike the cautiousness of “officials” like the director, my overall feeling was one of resentment and disdain. My immediate, primary feeling was resentment. This sudden uproar at least suggests that some people in Hong Kong are politically short-sighted and quite willing to be pawns for others.

Of course, some might argue that this stems from Hong Kong people’s dissatisfaction with the central government. I certainly acknowledge that this factor plays a role. However, the same event, viewed from different perspectives and magnified from different angles, will lead to different “conclusions,” even completely contradictory ones.

Regarding the actions of the Hong Kong people, may I ask a few questions?

  1. Are the British obligated to return the 98% of land in the New Territories that make up Hong Kong’s total area?
  2. Can Britain still hold onto Hong Kong Island and that small piece of land south of Boundary Street?
  3. Does the Chinese government have the right to take back Hong Kong?
  4. Does the Chinese government have the right to implement “one country, one system” in Hong Kong?
  5. Is the Chinese government obligated to grant Hong Kong the “one country, two systems” principle?
  6. Is “one country, two systems” a natural right of Hong Kong people?
  7. Was Hong Kong’s defense against Soros’s attack in 1998 a credit to the people of Hong Kong?

A summary of Hong Kong people:

Hong Kong’s “two systems” policy is like the government issuing a driver’s license—it comes with conditions. Hong Kong people must abide by the terms of their licenses. Don’t overstep the boundaries. Political shortsightedness will only harm the interests of Hong Kong people themselves.

Now let’s talk about the feeling of “disrespect.” My intuition is that the British political acumen is declining. It’s completely unlike the political level one would expect from a long-established empire.

During the decolonization era, Britain planted political landmines around the world. This action was abhorred by anti-colonial movements worldwide. But at least from Britain’s perspective, doing so was politically correct. Moreover, this action has objectively protected the long-term interests of the United States and Europe to this day.

Regarding the return of Hong Kong to Britain, I don’t deny that the British did their best. And they got the most they could. At least in this matter, the British demonstrated considerable political acumen.

But today, with the British pulling this stunt in Hong Kong, I see no sign of their sophisticated politics. The only result of their actions is to “gain a tiny short-term profit while sacrificing enormous long-term benefits.” This political maneuver will inevitably harm Britain itself.

(Don’t argue that the Hong Kong issue has nothing to do with Britain. If you think that way, you don’t need to read what I’ve written.)

I just want to ask a few questions to British politicians.

  1. Was Margaret Thatcher considered a highly capable politician in Britain?
  2. Was Margaret Thatcher a tough politician?
  3. Was the period before 1997 the best time for Britain to make demands on China?
  4. There are some things that Britain couldn’t obtain from China before 1997, during Thatcher’s era. Can the British acquire these things today through complex political maneuvering?
  5. Does the British have a political presence in Hong Kong? Does the British have an intelligence presence in Hong Kong? Is Hong Kong important to the British global presence?
  6. If the answer to question 5 is yes, then are these rights something that Britain is naturally entitled to, or were they granted to you by the Chinese government in the same way that driver’s licenses are issued?
  7. If the Chinese government issues you a 50-year temporary driver’s license, and you insist on exchanging it for a permanent license without taking the test, is that possible? Even if it is, is it more likely to succeed through gentle means or through rebellion?

Summary of the British:

The timing of the Hong Kong people’s rebellion was opportune, and arguably very astute. The current Chinese government, at least in appearance, is not strong enough. There’s a chance, at least theoretically, that such a large-scale event could successfully achieve short-term political goals. From a short-term gain perspective, the British have no problem with what they’re doing. They’re willing to take risks, regardless of success, just to seize any opportunity.

In the long run, the British political acumen is truly lacking. The long-term trend shows that Britain will only weaken and China will only strengthen. If the British insist on confronting the Chinese regarding the conversion of temporary driving licenses to permanent ones, they will certainly face the risk of having their licenses revoked. The British political presence in Hong Kong risks prematurely ending.

Summarize:

Why were previous rallies sporadic, but this year it’s suddenly become such a large-scale event? It’s clear that Britain has been looking for an opportunity to cause trouble for China. It’s even possible that some within China instigated the British to do this. However, just because something has been staged doesn’t mean the outcome will necessarily go as the British hope. Those who want to cause trouble for the new Chinese government might use this event, the new Chinese government could use it, the British certainly could (which is what they’ve always hoped for), and some Hong Kong residents could also use it. It’s still unclear which side will benefit the most.

However, one thing is certain: the British government will suffer long-term losses. Their political and intelligence presence in Hong Kong may face premature termination if they continue to oppose the Chinese government. They constantly seek opportunities to cause trouble for the Chinese, and the Chinese will certainly find opportunities to retaliate. Moreover, in the long run, the British may not achieve their political goals. In contrast, the Chinese retaliation against the British will be real and effective.

Background and Explanation:

  1. This is a political commentary from a long time ago. It was first published on the NetEase blog “Liaoyinzhai”.
  2. Stock ticker: A type of Chinese pager. A tool used to broadcast information related to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.

2003 was the first year of the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao administration in power. The sudden outbreak of massive demonstrations in Hong Kong, which could be linked to political turmoil on the mainland, was a prime example. The British government seized this opportunity for sophisticated political maneuvering, demonstrating the British people’s remarkably high level of political skill.

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