China's Wu Shu Scenario (1): Formed in 2012, Realized in 2026 (1)

Abstracts:

Although China has not yet released any clear information about the date when its plan for Taiwan's unification took shape, there are many clues pointing to 2012. It is very likely that the plan for military unification of Taiwan took shape in 2012. In 2013, China's president publicly and officially promised the nation that the historic task of unifying Taiwan would be accomplished during his term of office, and in 2019, China's official media implicitly but firmly pointed to Taiwan's deep involvement in the Hong Kong anti-submission upheaval, and in October 2019, a blogger had already read into the Chinese government's official text that China was abandoning the “one country, two systems” principle. In October 2019, a blogger had already read from official Chinese government texts that China was abandoning its “one country, two systems” policy, and had tried in vain to urge Taiwan to proactively embrace "one country, two systems". On August 10, 2022, three years after this prediction, the mainland central government officially declared that Taiwan had lost "the substance of one country, two systems". In other words, there will be no military power, no diplomatic power, and the senior officials must embrace the mainland and accept the full supervision of the central government. So far, the mainland government has left room for Taiwan's administration to negotiate on government structure, economic system, and tax incentives. This negotiation window will probably close in 2026. Taiwan still has about 3 years to go.

Keywords:

Unification, Trans-Taiwan Strait, War, One Country, Two Systems, 2012, 2013, 2019, 2022, 2026, US-China Conflict

I: China's Unified Plan Takes Shape in 2012

Reviewing the political experience of Xi Jinping from 2010 to 2012, it can be concluded that the Chinese central government's plan for armed unification of Taiwan took shape in 2012. It was a political act of Xi Jinping to respond to the strong public opinion in the mainland and to unite the strong political resources in the mainland. On this basis, he united the scattered political forces in China, forming the strongest political power group at that time. In this way, he was able to win the political battle with Jiang Zemin's group and Hu Jintao's group. The following points are clues to support this hypothesis.

(1) Xi Jinping has experienced political crises. Table 1 below briefly sets out the process by which Xi Jinping encountered a political crisis and eventually reversed the unfavorable situation.

(2) Even during the 10 years of Hu Jintao's rule, Jiang Zemin's political clique continued to dominate China's political direction. Experts and scholars who follow the political situation in China know and recognize this fact.
(3) Even after 10 years of Hu Jintao's presidency, it is difficult to weaken the power of Jiang Zemin's clique. Therefore, one can imagine how difficult it is for Xi Jinping to challenge the Jiang Zemin clique and the Hu Jintao clique directly with his position as the Crown Prince, and how great the risk is. Tracing China's recorded history of nearly 3,000 years, there is almost no possibility of success in similar political situations.
(4) The result is that Xi Jinping was able to successfully win this difficult and arduous political battle. This proves that Xi Jinping has superb political mobilization skills. He has a super political ability. This special ability enabled him to discover a common political direction that could unite the other political forces in China and form a new unified political bloc in a complex situation.
(5) In turning around an unfavorable situation, Xi not only won a victory to preserve himself, but also a comprehensive and subversive victory. There are three important hallmarks. (1) stopping and interrupting the customary practice of preparing the next crop at the same time; (2) reducing the number of members of the Politburo Standing Committee from nine to seven; and (3) transforming the Politburo Standing Committee's co-ruling system into a fixed one.
(6) Other important political forces in China have different identities, backgrounds, positions and interests. In order to unite these political forces (groups) in China, Xi Jinping must be able to identify or find a common demand or common idea to unite these political forces. Under the circumstances, the strongest public opinion and political demand in China was the unification of Taiwan. This was the only aspiration that could transcend all the complicated situations at that time, and had the ability to unite all the important political forces in China.
(7) According to China's political decision-making process, major decisions have to go through a decision-making process of at least 8 to 10 months or even longer. In the 11th month of his rule, Xi Jinping made a formal political commitment to the Chinese public. He will complete the historical task of reunifying Taiwan in his near future. From this, it can be deduced that the political decision to reunify Taiwan took shape in 2012. Even before Xi Jinping came to power. It is entirely conceivable that Xi Jinping used this political commitment to reunify Taiwan to win the support of various important political forces in China, and thus to win the political battle against Jiang Zemin's clique.

Through the above analysis, it is well-founded to conclude that China's unification plan will take shape in 2012. Moreover, the judgment that the unification of Taiwan will be accomplished during Xi Jinping's term of office is also basically confirmed by professionals in the field of political science.

II. The Unification Plan will be completed during Xi Jinping's term of office.

2.1  Xi Jinping has publicly promised to accomplish the important task of national unification during his term of office.

2.1.1  2013October 6, 2009, the first public expression.

During their meeting in Indonesia, Mainland President Xi Jinping and Taiwanese figure Hsiao Wan-chang openly talked about how “the Taiwan issue cannot be passed on from generation to generation” [1]. Translation: The reunification of Taiwan will definitely be accomplished during my political term.

2.1.2 Excluding the diplomatic context, we have directly and openly committed ourselves to this historical task to the mainland public.

Since the statement on October 6, 2013, which was made in a diplomatic context, China has formally and comprehensively repeated what Xi Jinping said at least six times in the following four months, through national television broadcasts, confirmations by the spokespersons of the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office (SCOTAO) and the State Council, and many other channels. The centerpiece of this statement is that “the Taiwan issue cannot be passed on from one generation to the next”. Thus, the diplomatic language background of Xi Jinping's speech in Indonesia was formally excluded in a high profile manner. In this way, he formally reiterated his political commitment to the mainlanders. It is that the task of reunifying Taiwan will be accomplished during his term of office. This promise not only firmly solidifies the foundation of Xi Jinping's rule, but also adds tremendous political pressure to his path.

III. The events of 2019 have severed the public opinion base of the two systems given to Taiwan by the mainland.

3.1  2019Before 2007, the general public opinion in the Mainland was "one country, two systems" for the unification of Taiwan.

This section does not discuss the issue of Taiwan's public opinion against one country, two systems. before 2019, the general public opinion in Mainland China is friendly to Taiwan. Although this general goodwill has been unilaterally opposed and maliciously interpreted by Taiwan, the fact is that armed reunification of Taiwan is not supported by the mainstream public opinion on the mainland.

(1) On September 30, 1981, Yip Kim-ying issued the “Yip's Nine Rules”.Taiwan was promised to retain its army, retain its system, enjoy a high degree of autonomy, the Central Authorities would not intervene in Taiwan's affairs at all, it would retain its “economic and cultural relations with foreign countries”, Taiwan people would have exclusive seats in the Central Authorities, and the Central Authorities could subsidize Taiwan;
(2) On June 25, 1983, Deng Xiaoping elaborated on the “Deng Six Rules”.Taiwan can have its own army; the mainland will not send people to Taiwan (no military personnel, no administrative personnel); the party, government and military system will be managed by the Taiwanese themselves; the central government will set aside a special quota for the Taiwanese; the administration will be independent, the judiciary will be independent, and the final adjudication will not have to go to Beijing.
(3) Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.There are no factual new proposals on Taiwan affairs. CanIt is tacitly recognized that they have complied with the promises made in the “Yip's Nine-point Principles” and “Deng's Six-point Principles”.
(4) The mainstream public opinion in China is friendly to Taiwan.The long-term cultivation and education of the concept of “Treasure Island”, the folk hymn of “the most beautiful scenery in Taiwan is the people”, and the long-standing existence of the concept of “one country, two systems” have long supported the strong public opinion base of mainlanders for “peaceful reunification” of Taiwan and “opposition to armed reunification” of Taiwan. These concepts and ideas have long supported the strong public opinion base of mainlanders for "peaceful reunification" of Taiwan and "opposition to armed reunification" of Taiwan.

3.2  The public opinion base for the peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the Mainland is rapidly disappearing.

(1. regardless of the number of layers of yarn.Anti-send-in maneuvers happening in 2019I'm sure you'll be able to find your way to political science.Finally, it goes back to the roots of the U.S. and Taiwan.。
(2. ChinaOfficial Media in Mainland ChinaOn the other hand, the wording, although very subtle, isAttitude is veryIt is clear that Taiwan is a major participant in the anti-China operations.。
(3.) China's social media, ChineseMainlandersThe attitude of the Government is very clear.ConfirmationNot just.The Taiwan authorities are involved in “betrayal of national interests” and “betrayal of ethnic interests".”of the offense. AndConfirmationThe general public opinion in Taiwan is “betraying the country for glory".”This is the exact opposite of what public opinion was saying before the anti-submission crackdown. This is the exact opposite of the conclusion of public opinion before the anti-submission crackdown.
(4) Although the mainland Chinese officials try their best to suppress the voices of the people, they do not have the power to do so.Mainland public opinionexpressed in a variety of ways.Oppose peaceful reunification and strongly demand armed reunification of Taiwan.The call of “peace is tantamount to treason” has even been popularized on various social media. Even the argument that "peace and unity is tantamount to treason" has been popularized on various social media. The occasional blog post with an anti-war background is quickly reported by the public and shut down by the social media.
(5. September 3, 2019Xi Jinping (1936-), PRC politician, President of PRC from 2008Delivered a speech on “Struggle” at the Party School of the Central Committee of China [2]. This event was veryThe message was conveyed directly to the senior cadres of the Chinese leadership.Xi Jinping (1936-), PRC politician, President of PRC from 2008Will take a tough stance against the U.S. and Taiwan.The political keynote of the Government is that it is not a political party, but a political party.
(6. 2019On October 8, 2008, Yeh Chi-chuan predicted that “one country, two systems is leaving Taiwan”.” [3]. and published this blog post on Dovetail News, which is frequently visited by Taiwanese.

IV. August 10, 2022Taiwan has officially lost the "one country, two systems" concept.

4.1   2021On July 1, 2007, the Mainland omitted the expression “one country, two systems” for the first time in an important speech.

There is a very important regular program in the political operation procedure of mainland China. It is that on every important holiday and commemoration, a national leader must give a comprehensive speech. In this regular program, the mainland's approach to Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan must be discussed. The term “one country, two systems” must be mentioned in every speech about Taiwan.
On July 1, 2021, in his speech at the 100th anniversary celebration of the founding of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping, for the first time, omitted the phrase “one country, two systems” from a speech of this level [4].

4.2 On August 10, 2022, the Mainland formally deprived Taiwan of the right to “substantive one country, two systems”.

On August 10, 2022, the mainland central government officially released a white paper on its policy toward Taiwan [5], clearly announcing that “Taiwan has lost the substance of one country, two systems”.
The relevant remarks are reproduced below with a vernacular translation. Although this translation is not necessary, it may help those who are not familiar with the political language of Mainland China to understand the position of Mainland China.

4.2.1  General: no diplomatic power; no military power; senior officials must be under the supervision of the central government.

Taiwan has no diplomatic power; there is no military power; and senior administrative officials must support and be supervised by the central government. In terms of livelihood structure, the mainland central government still maintains a window for negotiation. It is clearly stated that through peaceful negotiations, the following privileges can be obtained: no taxation on Taiwan; no major changes to the administrative structure; and no major changes to the economic structure.
The following is taken from Part IV of “The Taiwan Issue and China's Reunification in the New Era”, which is entitled "Promoting the Reunification of the Motherland in the New Era and on the New Journey".

4.2.2 CentralThe window for peaceful negotiations is still open. Opportunity is Taiwan's choice

Original Part A:“Realizing the unification of the motherland by peaceful means is in the best interest of the Chinese nation as a whole, including our compatriots in Taiwan, and is most conducive to the long-term stable development of China, and is the first choice of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government in resolving the Taiwan question. Despite the difficulties and resistance we have encountered over the past decades, we have persisted in striving for peaceful reunification, which reflects our cherishing and safeguarding of national justice, the well-being of our compatriots and cross-strait peace.”
Translation: For the sake of national justice and the well-being of our compatriots, weNow.There's still a window for peaceful negotiation.I don't want to talk. If you want to talk about it, I'll do it.。

4.2.3 The two systems must be subject to the ceiling of one country. They must be subject to the direct jurisdiction of the Central Government.

Original part B:“We advocate that, after peaceful reunification, Taiwan may practise a social system different from that of the motherland and exercise a high degree of autonomy in accordance with the law, so that the two social systems may coexist and develop together in the long term. One country“ is the premise and foundation for the implementation of ”two systems“, and ”two systems“ is subordinate to and derived from ”one country“ and unified within ”one country“. The ”two systems" are subordinate to and derived from the "one country" and are unified within the "one country".
Translation:Now we're talking about “one country, two systems”.”But it must be understood. But it must be understoodThe two systems must be subservient to the ceiling of one country. It must be directly governed by the central government.。

4.2.4 The "two systems" proposal must comply with the public opinion of the mainlanders.

Original part C:“We will continue to unite our compatriots in Taiwan.Actively exploring the “two systems” proposal for Taiwan.Enriching the practice of peaceful unification. The concrete realization of “one country, two systems” in Taiwan will take full account of the actual situation in Taiwan and willFully absorbing the views and suggestions of various sectors on both sides of the Strait, will fully take care of the interests and feelings of Taiwan compatriots.”
Translation: (direct meaning: that is)previouslyThe promise made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping is gone.）。Everything has to be renegotiated.The government can take proper care of the feelings of the Taiwanese, but it must obey the public opinion of the mainlanders. (Emphasis added:China's Public Opinion Leads the Way。）

4.2.5 Taiwan's “One Country, Two Systems” cannot go beyond the concessions granted to Hong Kong and Macao.

Original paragraph D:“For a period of time, under the influence of various internal and external factors, `anti-China and stirring up trouble in Hong Kong“ activities were rampant, and the situation in Hong Kong was once critical. The Communist Party of China and the Chinese Government took a series of measures to address both the symptoms and the root causes of the situation.Adherence and refinement“The ”One Country, Two Systems" system has helped Hong Kong realize a major turnaround from chaos to governance and enter a new phase of governance and prosperity, and has contributed to the advancement of the rule of Hong Kong and Macao in accordance with the law,Promoting the realization of “one country, two systems” for stability and prosperityA solid foundation has been laid.”
Translation:Don't forget about your Hong Kong shenanigans.Now “one country, two systems” is dominated by the Mainland. Now "one country, two systems" is dominated by the Mainland.Taiwan's “one country, two systems” cannot go beyond the scope of concessions given to Hong Kong and Macao.

4.2.6 The question of unification must be heard in the Mainland.

Original paragraph E:“In order to realize cross-strait peaceful reunification, we must face the fundamental problem of the differences in social systems and ideologies between the Mainland and Taiwan. “One country, two systems” is precisely the most inclusive solution to this problem. It is a peaceful, democratic, well-intentioned and win-win solution. The different systems on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are not an obstacle to unification, let alone an excuse for secession. We believe that, with the passage of time, “one country, two systems” will be reacquainted with the compatriots in Taiwan; and that, with the passage of time, "one country, two systems" will be reacquainted with the compatriots in Taiwan.The compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are working together to realizeIn the process of peaceful unification, the space and content of the “two systems” Taiwan proposal will be fully demonstrated.”
Translation:It's the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait who are working together for unification.(In plain words: the dominant power is now in the Mainland. I'm going to be serious now.I don't want to talk to you.）。

4.2.7. The unification issue will definitely be completed during Xi Jinping's term of office.

Original paragraph F:“Peaceful reunification means consultation on an equal footing and unification through joint discussion. The long-standing political differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are the root cause of the stabilization of cross-strait relations, and the total number of people who have been affected by these differences has been increasing.It can't be passed on from generation to generation.The negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can be conducted in a step-by-step manner. Cross-Strait consultations and negotiations can be conducted in a step-by-step and phased manner, and the modalities can be flexible and varied. On the basis of the one-China principle and the “1992 Consensus”, we are willing to engage in dialogue and communication with various political parties, organizations and individuals in Taiwan on the resolution of cross-strait political differences, and to exchange views extensively. We are also willing to continue to promote democratic consultations among representative persons elected by various political parties and sectors on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, so as to discuss the promotion of the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, the integration of development and the peaceful reunification of the motherland.”
Translation: Get someone to talk to.Anyway, this unification issue must be accomplished during my term of office.

4.2.8 No American Intervention

Original paragraph G:“At present, some forces in the United States seek to “use Taiwan to control China” and are determined to play the “Taiwan card” to stimulate the separatist forces of “Taiwan independence” to take risks and provoke provocations, which not only seriously jeopardize the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait, but also impede the efforts of the Chinese government for peaceful reunification. This not only seriously jeopardizes peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and impedes the Chinese government's efforts to strive for peaceful reunification, but also seriously affects the healthy and stable development of China-U.S. relations. If this development is allowed to continue, it will definitely lead to a continuous escalation of tension in the Taiwan Strait and give rise to a serious threat to the peace and stability of China and the United States.The U.S.-China Relationship Poses a Subversive and Enormous Risk.The U.S. should abide by the one-China principle in handling Taiwan-related issues. The U.S. should abide by the one-China principle, handle Taiwan-related issues in a prudent and proper manner, stop saying one thing but doing another, and fulfill its promise of not supporting the independence of Taiwan through practical actions.“
Translation:The Americans can't play anymore. If he plays the Taiwan card again, I'll whack him.

4.2.9 No taxation of Taiwan

Original paragraph H:“Taiwan's fiscal revenues can be used as much as possible to improve people's livelihoods and do more practical, good and difficult things for the people.”。
Translation:Talking about this now, the Central Authorities will not levy taxes on Taiwan.

4.2.10. The status of the Taiwan Special Administrative Region (SAR) is not a birthright; it is a matter of negotiation.

Original paragraph I:“Taiwan may exercise a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region.”
Translation:possible！！！！ It's not a given. If you don't talk about it, you might not.

4.2.11 Taiwan's governing officials must uphold mainland governance and be subject to the control and supervision of the central government.

Original paragraph J:“All Taiwan compatriots who support the unification of the motherland and the revitalization of the nation will truly be the masters of their own house in Taiwan, participate in the construction of the motherland, and enjoy the dividends of development to the fullest.”
Translation: TaiwaneseGoverning officials must uphold mainland governance and be subject to the governance and supervision of the central government.

4.2.12 No military power in Taiwan

Original paragraph K:“Compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will jointly explore the implementation of the “two systems” proposal for Taiwan, jointly develop and improve the “one country, two systems” system, and ensure the long-term stability and security of Taiwan.”
Translation: The two-system proposal must be in line with the keynote of the mainland central government. Ensure that Taiwan will not be subject to another rebellion.
Nonsense:There's no command of the army.

4.2.13 Taiwan has no diplomatic rights.

Original paragraph L:“After reunification, the countries concerned may continue to develop economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. With the approval of the Central Government of the People's Republic of China, foreign countries may set up consular offices or other official or semi-official institutions in Taiwan, international organizations and institutions may set up offices in Taiwan, relevant international conventions may be applied in Taiwan, and relevant international conferences may be held in Taiwan.”
Translation: Taiwan shall no longer have diplomatic privileges equivalent to those of Hong Kong.All diplomatic licenses and diplomatic powers，MustCompletely under the control of the central government。

V. Taiwan has no chance to initiate peace talks

5.1. Taiwan built a strong barrier against unification.

5.1.1 The barrier against "one country, two systems" has been progressively raised and thickened.

In the process of creating an atmosphere of independence in Taiwan, the barrier against one country, two systems has been gradually raised and thickened. From 1992 to 2021, the proportion of people who consider themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese has been decreasing. From 46.4% to 30.5%, the proportion of people identifying themselves as Taiwanese increased steadily from 17.6% to 62.8%, while the proportion of people identifying themselves as Chinese decreased steadily from 25.5% to 2.5%.

5.1.2. The political climate against the mainland is consciously manipulated and elevated.

For example, in a wide range of English-language databases and even in various Chinese-language databases overseas, various historical materials have been added with the perspective and context of the political stance in favor of Taiwan's independence. In the high-profile criticism of Mainland China's missile test launch in 1996, the tensions between the United States, China and Taiwan provoked by Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States in his capacity as President were intentionally erased. When criticizing Mainland China in a high profile manner for enacting the “anti-secession law”, he deliberately ignored Lee Teng-hui's “freeze” and his “two states theory”. The “one country, one side” theory, Chen Shui-bian's talk about “one country, one side”, and the “referendum on unification and independence of Taiwan” were all provocative incidents. In order to increase the hatred towards the mainland background, he even went so far as to distort the historical basis. For example, they repeatedly and in a high profile criticized the "February 28th Incident", in which the death toll did not exceed 10 people. Define this incident as the persecution of Taiwanese by mainlanders. At the same time, they deliberately ignored the historical tragedy of the massacre of more than 400,000 Taiwanese by the Japanese, and instead considered Japan to be the friendliest country to Taiwan.
All instances, both true and untrue, are moved toward the linguistic context of support for Taiwan's independence on the island, in English-language databases, and in overseas Chinese-language databases.

5.1.3 The overall political situation is not favorable to Mainland China.

Some examples of international politics have been interpreted in a localized and one-sided manner, thus encouraging an atmosphere of independence in Taiwan. Examples such as the successful independence of East Timor, the semi-independence of Kosovo, the success of U.S. involvement in Syria, and the expansion of Israeli settlements have been extrapolated to mean that the U.S. can dictate the direction of major world politics.
The trend of US suppression of China does not start with TRUMP, from Clinton, Bush Jr. to TRUMP, in fact, it is a continuous process. The Wassenaar Agreement; the seizure of the Galaxy cargo ship on the high seas; the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the Southern League; the launch of the sweatshop concept in Europe; the deification and elevation of the Dalai Lama's political status; the nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands in Japan; the placement of the SAD anti-missile system in South Korea; international arbitration in the South China Sea; the fabrication of the Xinjiang Concentration Camp Incident; the fabrication of the Xinjiang Cotton Incident; the 2019 Anti-Send China Overturning; and COVID 19. China's guilt theory, the blockade of Huawei, DJI and other Chinese companies; in this series of political conflicts, China is a passive party.
All of these appearances are automatically categorized by the Taiwanese as political factors in support of Taiwan's independence. And it is to be expected that the U.S. bloc's blockade and repression of China will automatically continue to intensify - if there is no strong political force to stop this trend.

5.2 Taiwan's loss of ability to rationally judge the international situation and atmosphere.

5.2.1 Failure to Understand China's Current Strength and Capabilities in the International System

Even as we enter 2019, the dominant judgment in Taiwan remains that the United States is the political force on which Taiwan can rely. Taiwan has demonstrated a flawed understanding of international power in the following ways.

（1. Failure to understand that political power is based on and dependent on economic capacity.A superficial understanding of military power determinism suggests that military power is the essence of political power. According to the World Bank, China has officially surpassed the United States in terms of purchasing power in terms of GDP income since 2016. The real power that maximizes GDP in terms of war power is industrial and agricultural output. China's industrial GDP, in dollar terms only, has exceeded the combined industrial GDP of the three North American countries since 2012, as well as the combined industrial GDP of the European Union.
(2) Failure to understand the actual ratio of China's military input output to that of the United States.If we roughly calculate that China's cost of producing the same class of aircraft carrier is 1/6 of that of the United States, China's cost of producing the same class of cruiser is 1/6 of that of the United States, and China's cost of military personnel is 1/5 of that of the United States, then China's value of military output is in fact already basically the same as that of the United States. While the US has the power to defend the world, China's military power only needs to defend one corner of the world.
(3. In a hypothetical conflict in 2026, according to Yeh's model for calculating the intensity of state (group) wars.The U.S. bloc is unable to form a superior war effort around Taiwan.And it is possible that a new window of history in which land power suppresses sea power will be completely opened.

5.2.2 Lack of mature political judgment

(1. does not understand the present impotence of the United States in maintaining the present world order.
According to Ye Qiquan's prediction in April 2022, the power of the U.S. coalition (Ukrainian coalition) will not be able to maintain a sufficient advantage in the Central-Ukrainian region. The Russian-Ukrainian war will be entangled in Central Ukraine for a longer period of time. This prediction has been largely confirmed by the current dynamics of the battlefield. However, up to now, the main public opinion in Taiwan still unanimously believes that the U.S. is the absolute power that dominates world politics.
(2) Failure to understand that total and bloc wars have actually returned to the world political scene.
In fact, the U.S. will not be able to stand alone against Russia, against the rise of the Arab world, or against the challenge posed by China in 2026. But even with bloc warfare, the U.S. bloc will not be able to gain a power advantage over China in the Taiwan Strait in 2026, according to Ip Chi Chuen's model of national (bloc) war strength.
(3) Failure to understand the importance of public opinion in Mainland China to Taiwan's security.The Taiwanese have always rejected the political proposal of “one country, two systems” from the Mainland. They stubbornly believe that the mainland is keen to force “one country, two systems” on them. Therefore, the Taiwanese think that they have the ability and the opportunity to reject this proposal without the risk of losing their political advantage. However, the fact is that once the mainlanders recognized that the Taiwanese had betrayed their national interests, the foundation of Taiwan's political advantage collapsed. Even though Yeh Chi-chuan called out to Taiwan in 2019 that they should take the risk of losing “one country, two systems” seriously, they did not respond. However, Taiwan did not respond at all, thus missing a three-year historical opportunity. Finally, on August 10, 2022, Taiwan officially lost the substance of "one country, two systems".
(4) Not understanding mainland political language.Yeh Chi-chuan was able to read from the public media of China in 2019 that Taiwan would lose "one country, two systems" and realize it three years later. But Taiwan has never read this political declaration from the mainland. One year has passed since August 10, 2022, and no one from Taiwan, no matter scholars or officials, has come out to interpret the content of the political announcement in the White Paper on Mainland China's policy towards Taiwan. It can be deduced from this that the political communication between Taiwan and the mainland has been completely cut off. But this kind of severance is an absolutely fatal flaw for the weak Taiwan side.

5.2.3 It is unlikely that Taiwan will be able to retreat significantly from its current political position.

(1. The mainstream public opinion in Taiwan has been pursuing independence.Their minimum goal was at least a structure like the Czech-Slovak, Austro-Hungarian empire.
(2. Taiwan missed the political promises of Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping.The promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping at this level included: Taiwan would have high-level diplomatic power; Taiwan would have full military command; Taiwan would have full administrative power; Taiwan would have full economic autonomy; Taiwan would have the right to final adjudication; the mainland would not send military or administrative personnel to Taiwan; and Taiwan would have a fixed political position in the national power structure. These political conditions are far superior to the political rights possessed by the states of the United States, but Taiwan has finally refused this historic opportunity.
(3. Due to Taiwan's deep involvement in the Hong Kong unrest in 2019, it wasMainlanders recognize Taiwan as a traitor to its country and its national interests.This puts the Central Government of China under serious pressure for armed reunification. This has also led to the central government of Mainland China formally depriving Taiwan on August 10, 2022, of the political preference of the substantive "one country, two systems". Under such conditions, if any Taiwanese politicians try to make political contact with China under pressure, the result will be negative. It is impossible for the people of Taiwan to accept the current political restrictions in China.
(4. Taiwan has no chance to produceSimilarly, Thaksin, Modi, Erdogan, TRUMP can partially or fullyThe Man Who Turned the Tide of PoliticsThe above political power players were created on the basis of serious group confrontation, class confrontation, political confrontation and religious confrontation. The basis for the emergence of these politically powerful persons is the existence of serious group, class, political and religious antagonisms in the country. These factors are the basis for the emergence of politically powerful people under the electoral politics model. However, Taiwan has already formed a de facto flat structure. The political basis for objective friendship with the mainland is almost statistically meaningless in Taiwan. There is no serious economic disparity, no serious religious antagonism, and no serious ethnic group differences. Therefore, there is no room or basis for the emergence of politically powerful people. Therefore, it is impossible for a chance to suddenly arise to produce a powerful person to reverse the politically correct direction and conduct peaceful negotiations with the mainland.

The Mainland has no incentive to conduct peace talks.

After at least 14 years of systematic preparations, China is convinced that an act of war would bring enormous national benefits to China. At the same time, if the peaceful route is chosen, it will result in a serious retrenchment of China's national interests.

(1) Based on the model of calculating the intensity of war of countries (groups) of Ye Qiquan in theIn the course of the Taiwan Strait unrest in 2026, the U.S. bloc does not have the advantage of war capability:
(2.) China will show, through a surprise attack.The land advantage among the warring forces is returning, or has returned, to the stage of history.China is trying to force a gradual and automatic retreat of sea power from the political system through a modest assault. China is attempting to force sea power to gradually and automatically retreat from the political system through a not-so-serious assault. This will allow China to acquire political power at the lowest possible cost;
(3) Parallelism would severely limit China's geopolitical gains;
(4.) The parallel movement will severely deplete the cost of governance (political, economic, and historical) in China;
(5) and parallelism will seriously slow down the pace of China's historical progress.

6.1 The U.S. Faces Important Shortcomings in the 2026 Scenario of a U.S.-China Conflict

In a hypothetical scenario of Taiwan Strait turbulence and U.S.-China conflict in 2026, the U.S. faces several important flaws, including the following

6.1.1 U.S. troops cannot land on Chinese soil (including Taiwan Island)

China has the inherent advantage of initiating an action in the Taiwan Strait, as long as the Chinese mainland fully occupies the whole island of Taiwan within 4-7 days. The entire Western bloc would lose the opportunity to confront the Chinese land forces. There is no chance that they will be able to land on Chinese soil. This military fact fundamentally deprives the American bloc of the possibility of winning the war.

6.1.2 Higher Costs of Combat Warfare in the U.S.

The input/output efficiency of land airports and short-range missiles is much higher than that of mobile airports and short-range missiles. Assuming that China will not destroy American mobile airports; assuming that the range and payload of American F35 and Chinese J20 are the same; assuming that the range of American air-launched missiles is the same as that of Chinese ones; China will be able to defeat the United States through cheaper land airports and cheaper missiles, and through economic consumption in the long term. In fact, in all three scenarios, the U.S. is the weaker party.

6.1.3 U.S. Strategic Weapons Cost More

If one assumes that the U.S. aircraft carrier and the Chinese intermediate-range missiles are both strategic weapons that will go to war, one can compare their costs of use.
According to the current cost estimates on the internet, the cost of 250-350 Chinese intermediate-range missiles could be equivalent to the cost of one U.S. Ford-class aircraft carrier. Even if this estimate is further halved, it is plausible that 125 Chinese intermediate-range missiles could offset the combat power of one U.S. aircraft carrier at the cost of 125 Chinese intermediate-range missiles. This shows that the U.S. also suffers from a cost disadvantage when it comes to the use of strategic weapons.

6.1.4 The range of land weapons has exceeded that of sea weapons.

Due to the cost and scale advantages of the Chinese manufacturing industry, Chinese medium-range missiles are economically feasible for battlefield applications on a large scale.
The currently accepted concept is that the range of Chinese medium-range missiles exceeds the range of US aircraft carriers plus the range of the F35 plus air-launched cruise missiles. This is the first time in nearly 400 years that the range of land-launched weapons has exceeded that of seapower weapons. This will definitely start the historical process of land weapons suppressing sea power weapons.
At the same time, the Internet speculates that China has about 3,000 medium-range missiles in its stockpile. It is certain that once the US-China conflict becomes a reality, China's production of medium-range missiles will be faster than the US production of aircraft carriers.

6.1.5 Extremely difficult political process

Whether from the perspective of the impossibility of the United States landing on Chinese soil, or by referring to Ye Qiquan's model for calculating the strength of bloc warfare, there is a tacit recognition of one base point: China will not fail militarily.
But the United States cannot afford a military defeat in order to maintain the current direction of the basic world order. This is another necessary basis for this U.S.-China conflict.
To successfully move between these two bases, politicians in both China and the United States face a difficult political decision-making process.

6.2. The land advantage in war power is returning or has returned to the historical stage.

6.2.1 The history of warfare is essentially a history of advances in effective range.

(1) Effective range of the weaponarmedEffective rangeIt is composed of three main substrates.Distance of action (range); lethal effect; and scale of use (economy)。
(2. Sticks and guns:
Reviewing the records of ancient Chinese history, there are records showing that before the maturity of bronze technology, the dominant weapon in war was the wooden stick. After bronze technology was applied to warfare, the dominant weapon of war was the gun. This is because the distance of the gun is longer than that of the wooden stick. Then the use of bows and arrows appeared in ancient Chinese war records.
(3. Bows and crossbows:
The bow and arrow is a long-range weapon of destruction, the first revolutionary advancement in weaponry. The emergence of this weapon changed the shape of war. For the first time, it was possible to achieve victory in battle by killing the enemy without touching them after using the terrain to block them.
But the bow and arrow has not replaced the spear as the primary weapon of war for over a thousand years of recorded history. The main reason for this is that the cost of the bow and arrow has limited its effect on scale. The high cost of production, the high cost of storage and maintenance, and the high cost of manpower training were all economic factors that prevented the spear from being upgraded to become the dominant weapon of the ancient Chinese army for more than 1,000 years after its co-existence with the bow and arrow. It was only when the economic cost of the bow and arrow finally fell that it was elevated to the status of the primary weapon of war in ancient China.
(4. Firebombs:
Firearms quickly replaced the bow and arrow when they were not as useful as the bow and arrow. This is because the cost of manufacturing a firearm is not more expensive than that of a precision bow and arrow, but the cost of training and use is significantly higher than that of a bow and arrow. This shows that effective range is much more important than distance.
(5. Strike gun:
Subsequently, the developed striking musket has better range, faster striking speed, and more efficient use. The pursuit of greater range was realized in the simultaneous pursuit of distance and speed of fire, while at the same time taking into account the economic cost. Heavy machine guns had a longer range and a higher rate of fire, but the economic cost made the heavy machine gun a key weapon in World War I, rather than a decisive or dominant weapon.
(6. Artillery:
Longer ranges and more effective kills dictated that artillery would always be on the battlefield. Napoleon's time was a brief period of artillery victory. But the economic characteristics of artillery limited its historical importance. It was not until World War II that mobile artillery finally became the dominant force in European warfare.
(7. The Age of Maritime Power:
Due to the high load-bearing characteristics of ships, heavy and large guns could be placed on ships. This led to the emergence of super-powerful naval guns, both in caliber and range. The mobility of the ship, in essence, provided these guns with repeatability in both time and space windows. The mobility of the ship provided these artillery pieces with repeatability in both the time and space windows, thus giving them a comprehensive advantage over land-based artillery pieces in terms of range, lethality, and cost. With the advantage of effective range, shipboard guns could destroy land artillery, while land artillery could not destroy warships. This opened the era of naval superiority in the history of warfare. Naval superiority protected the military and political superiority of the Spanish, British, and American empires.
(8. Repeating range weapons:
The Asian battlefields of World War II were the forefront of technological advances in weaponry. It fully realized that the effective range of weapons determined the final outcome of the war. After the range of mobile airports and fighter planes far exceeded the range of the battleships' guns, the battleships and cruisers completely lost their expected operational effectiveness. Even one of the most advanced battleships of the time was destroyed by an airplane taking off from an aircraft carrier on its maiden voyage into battle.
(9. Long-range weapons:
A new generation of long-range weapons, represented by the V1 and V2 rockets, officially entered the battlefield. However, the revolutionary V1 and V2 could not reverse the air superiority of Nazi Germany. The reason was that the V1 and V2 did not have the economy that was necessary for a war-oriented weapon.
The longest range of missiles now exceeds 10K kilometers. However, long-range missiles are not yet the leading weapons of war. Because of economic reasons, long-range missiles do not have the power to dominate the course of conventional warfare. For example, Ukraine has chosen to discard its existing long-range missiles because it cannot afford to maintain them. Even if the DPRK had the capability to launch long-range missiles, it would not be able to utilize such weapons in actual warfare.

6.2.2 Reopen the Land Rights Era window:

There are two important features of China's medium-range missiles that have been tacitly recognized by the cyber forces. They areDistance和EconomyThe Internet is now tacitly recognizing that China's medium-range missiles are far beyond the range of U.S. mobile airports plus carrier aircraft plus carrier-based cruise missiles. Internet opinion now tacitly recognizes that the range of China's medium-range missiles far exceeds the range of U.S. mobile airports plus carrier-based aircraft plus carrier-based cruise missiles. Economically, it is tacitly recognized that the actual cost of 600-850 intermediate-range missiles (production, maintenance, and use) is comparable to the cost of a U.S. carrier fleet (one carrier plus six combat ships plus 50 carrier aircraft plus two submarines). If the third feature thatKilling effectIf this is proven true by a small-scale exploratory battle, then China's intermediate-range missiles have a significant role to play in the formation of theThree aspects of effective rangeAll of them are likely to outperform the U.S. weapons system in all aspects.
If this possibility is finally confirmed, it will not only lead to the decline of American power, but will reopen the era when land war power suppressed sea war power.
If this possibility is finally confirmed, the US will automatically shrink its sphere of influence.。China does not have to force the United States back through a full-scale war. This is a great temptation for China. So starting a small-scale exploratory war or a demonstration war is a temptation that China can hardly refuse.

6.3 The parallelism would severely limit China's geopolitical gains;

6.3.1 Parallelism Limits China's Geopolitical Potential in the Northern Japan Sea

There is an important geopolitical context in which the U.S. coalition (Ukrainian coalition) is engaged in a political struggle with the Russian coalition. This struggle provides an opportunity or possibility for political cooperation between China and Russia in the northern part of the Sea of Japan. It is even possible that China will utilize the South Chishima Islands to start an experiment of trilateral cooperation between China, Japan and Russia. However, there are many political obstacles to this kind of cooperation without Japan's intervention in the war. Therefore, dragging Japan into a military conflict would be beneficial to China's long-term geopolitical gains.

6.3.2 Parallelism Would Limit China's Utilization of Taiwan Island's Geographic Advantage

(1.) Harmonization cannot remove the political meaning of the label “Taiwanese”. It cannot remove the draining effect of this political meaning on China's political power.
(2) The parallelism has resulted in serious limitations on the Chinese central government's use of Taiwan's geopolitical power. If the Chinese central government fails to build the “land bridge” or “land sword” function of Taiwan, it will not only fail to suppress or weaken the maritime attributes of Japan and South Korea, but also leave open the possibility of Taiwan drifting again to another powerful sea power from a historical perspective.
(3) The opportunity for geopolitical cooperation in the northern part of the Sea of Japan will be a waste of time if the geopolitical advantage of the island of Taiwan is not effectively utilized by the central government of China. It is an investment and waste of political power that will not produce any obvious benefits.

6.4. and parallel actions will severely deplete the costs (political, economic, historical) of governance in China;

The contents of this section are in full agreement with the concepts presented by Ip Kee Chuen in the past. There is no new content beyond that. Please refer to Yeh's article [3].

6.5 The parallelism will seriously slow down the pace of China's historical progress.

6.5.1 Concerted action would lose or delay the opportunity to establish the Northeast Asian Partnership.

(1) As can be seen from the history of the early part of this century, the possibility of a peaceful and gradual approach to the establishment of a zone of cooperation in Northeast Asia does not exist; even such an endeavor would have negative political and economic consequences;
(2) The way to establish the Northeast Asian Zone of Cooperation in a non-exclusively peaceful manner must depend on the following factors: the compression of the maritime character of Japan and Korea; and the retreat of U.S. power in Northeast Asia;
(3) The compression of Japan's and Korea's maritime attributes necessarily depends on the establishment of two “land anchor points” on Taiwan Island and in the northern part of the Sea of Japan;
(4) The surest way to establish a firm land anchor on the island of Taiwan is through military means, not through peaceful means;
(5) The establishment of bases for Sino-Japanese-Russian cooperation in the northern part of the Sea of Japan and even in the South Chishima Islands cannot be achieved by peaceful means, and peaceful means do not help to take advantage of the historical opportunity for the reorganization of power in Europe;
(6) There has not been a single military upheaval that has failed to set in motion the historic retreat of U.S. power in Northeast Asia.

6.5.2 Parallelism increases China's historical difficulties

(1) Postponing the establishment of the Northeast Asian Cooperation Area (NACA) is tantamount to wasting China's considerable political costs from a historical perspective.
(2) Historically speaking, China has a greater historical problem or task than the establishment of the Northeast Asian Cooperation Area.
(3) The postponement of the Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation Area (NEACEA) is tantamount to allowing China's greatest historical problems to be stabilized, fixed, and strengthened.

VII. 2026 is a Double Choice between the World Situation and China's History

The year 2026 will surely be a year of greater political unrest in the international arena. In this year, war has in fact become a common demand of many countries or political groups.

7.1 The US could not quell the chaos in Europe.

The United States could not quell the war in Europe. War and chaos became the only options for the United States. Maintaining world order by sea power is a costly way of management. If the U.S. lost its ability to “raise taxes” peacefully, it would have to resort to war and chaos to maintain the “power deficit” needed to manage order.
Quickly quelling the chaos in Europe is not in the strategic interest of the United States at this time. Weakening the overall power of the EU and Russia at the same time is a preferred way for the U.S. to achieve “power extremes”.

7.2 Many countries are ready to join the process of European deconstruction.

There could be many different reasons, and many different starting points for a Russian-Ukrainian war.2022 The actual effects of the European war have already been realized. That is, the historical script of the destabilization of Europe's borders has been rewritten. The process of reorganization of power in Europe has already begun, or at least it is getting ready to begin. At the same time, many countries are politically and psychologically prepared. They are ready to seize the historical opportunity to join the process with a view to expanding their national interests.

7.3 Russia has taken aim at the L1 line.

Since 2014, the notion that “the biggest country in Europe is Ukraine” has been widely and intensively hyped by non-governmental organizations and the mass media in Europe and the United States. In fact, a cultural and philosophical war has been waged to define the “non-European identity” of the Russians. The expulsion of the Russians from Europe has provoked a philosophical crisis and a crisis of faith among the Russians in a comprehensive manner. The L1 line formed by the Dnieper River and the Black Sea [6, 7] was regarded by the Russians (the general public) as a necessary barrier to protect the survival of the nation. From the historical point of view of 100 to 200 years, the possibility of the Russians moving to this geopolitical line is very realistic. New disturbances or military actions in other parts of the world may help and accelerate this historical process of the Russians.

7.4 The New Economic Distribution Order Needs a Window to Realize Its Power

If the world economy were to fall into a prolonged period of stagnation, the call for a new distribution scheme or a new pricing order would arise. If revolutionary technological advances do not occur quickly enough to restore the growth and expansion of the world's economic aggregates, the call for redistribution of wealth will arise naturally. The world's power leadership will be subject to total, multi-point, multi-dimensional resistance. Total political chaos would be a reasonable expectation.
The search for a new world order through political or philosophical revolutions will occur naturally, if there is no great economic revolution to turn the tide. These needs will automatically seek a window to fulfill that need. These needs will have a negative effect on the existing forces of order.

7.5 A display window is required for land rights to be raised.

Of the three characteristics that make up a weapon's effective range [8], land-based intermediate-range missiles have already demonstrated an advantage in two categories, “range of action” and “economy”. The other important characteristic, i.e., “lethal effect (capability)”, has not yet been verified. Historically, a new weapon must seize an opportunity to verify its capability. That is, a land-based long-range weapon needs a window to validate its third important attribute.

7.6 China's Realistic Needs

(1) The historical experience of unfair treatment has aroused the discontent of Chinese public opinion.
Looking back at the history of colonial wars since the First Opium War, China has always been the target of exploitation. Even though China gained the status of a victorious nation in World War I and World War II, the world power order did not give China a truly just and equal opportunity for development. This is the basis of Chinese people's dissatisfaction with the existing world power order.
(2) Popular resistance is difficult to stop.
The forced searches of Chinese ships on the high seas, missile strikes on Chinese embassies, Japan's nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands, South Korea's introduction of the SAD anti-missile system, the invention of the sweatshop concept, the promotion of the Dalai Lama's political influence, the fabrication of Xinjiang's concentration camps, the fabrication of Xinjiang's cotton incident, the permission for a country to break through its nuclear limitations, the initiation of the South China Sea Arbitration Case, the triggering of Hong Kong's anti-Chinese riots, and the systematic blockade of China's economy, are just some of a series of humiliating events that have greatly stirred up the Chinese people's resistance. The widespread, active and deep involvement of Taiwan's executive government and ordinary people in the Hong Kong anti-China crackdown in 2019 has further galvanized ordinary people in China to resist the existing imperial order, and to focus their frustration on the rapid armed reunification of Taiwan. This strong public opinion has made it more difficult for the Chinese Central Government to make political compromises. If the unification of Taiwan is delayed too much, not only will the Chinese power leadership group face great political pressure, but it may also seriously affect China's next political arrangement and the pace of China's history.

7.7 China's Historical Needs

(1. Philosophical needs:
One of the cornerstones of Chinese ancestor worship is the worship of historical heroes. The cult of historical heroes has established the foundation of the Chinese philosophy and worldview. The Qin Emperor, the Han Emperor, and the Tang Emperor are lofty humanistic monuments in Chinese history. Their common denominator is that they have defended and strengthened the overall national interests of the Chinese nation. This philosophical foundation of ancestor worship also forms the basis of the Chinese people's strong nationalistic sentiment.
In modern history, there have been many historical heroes in the political arena of China. There were even heroes who were widely respected and worshipped around the world. However, when discussed from a historical perspective, they could not be compared to the above three heroes due to the historical constraints at that time. The Unification of Taiwan has created a window of opportunity for China to produce great heroes in history. The hero-worship complex of the Chinese people does not allow this window of history to be missed. The activation of China's unification movement is not only the emotional need of the Chinese people, but also the need of the Chinese philosophical concept of history.
(2. The character window:
A review of the political history from 2009 to 2012, and the handling of the 2019 Hong Kong upheaval, has shown that the current Chinese leader, in many dimensions, has the attributes to be a historical hero intact. He has the ability to quickly identify the crux of the problem in the midst of the chaos and confusion. He has the political ability to unite forces in almost impossible situations. He was able to achieve unforeseen victories by turning unfavorable situations around. Missing this historic figure could have seriously slowed down the pace of China's history.
(3 Power window:
Whether measured in terms of GDP in terms of parity purchasing power, in terms of war capacity supported by the secondary industry, or in terms of Ye Qiquan's system for calculating the strength of a nation's war effort [8], China has fully equipped itself with the material, power, and military-political foundations for a unified state.
(4 The History Record window:
A common feature of Chinese and foreign history is that the recorders will make moral evaluations of historical facts from their own standpoints. Inevitably, the same fact may be given different moral weights depending on the stance of the recorder or the interpreter. For example, when Zheng Zhuangzhu fought against the rebellion of his brother, Jingcheng Daxue, the recorder called it “Zheng Bo Ke Ke Duan Yu Yan”. While criticizing the rebels, he also criticized the rebels for failing to fulfill their responsibilities as older brothers. Sima Qian, one of the most famous historians in China, gave Li Guang very high praise. At the same time, Wei Huo's monumental achievements were given an obviously unfairly low rating. Chen Shou, in his history books, was obviously not in line with the historical facts in honoring the Han and belittling Wei. Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty had his great contribution to the history of the country erased because of his short history.
The year 2026 is the best window for Xi Jinping to independently and completely demonstrate his extraordinary leadership and superb political skills. The great achievements made during this period of time have the opportunity to be recorded and expressed by history in a complete and accurate manner. It is less prone to bias in evaluation due to differences in recording methods. It is less likely to be blurred by historical preferences. Evaluations are less likely to be fragmented by political preferences. In this way, we can have the opportunity to record a historical hero who had a significant impact on Chinese history in a complete and unabridged manner.
Once the window of history is mixed with opportunities for easy misreading, misinterpretation and misinterpretation, such opportunities for misinterpretation will surely be maximized by subsequent interpreters to suit their respective political needs. Examples of such conscious utilization of opportunities for misreading, expansion of opportunities for misinterpretation, and even creation of opportunities for misinterpretation are numerous in Chinese and foreign history. For example, in world history, the interpretation of the disappearance of the Mayan civilization, and the interpretation of Abraham Lincoln's emancipation of the black slaves. In Chinese history, for example, there is a multiplicity of evaluations of Dou Xian, Cao Cao, Emperor Yang, and the Iron Ring. Even in the case of such epic figures as Wei Huo, Sima Qian dared to make an obviously unfair and unjust judgment.
Delaying the launch of the unification of China in 2026 is tantamount to adding opportunities for misinterpretation and misinterpretation to the window of historical record. Thus, it provides a ground for downgrading historical figures or misinterpreting their historical value.

General

Although China has not yet released any clear information about the date when its plan for Taiwan's unification took shape, there are many clues pointing to 2012. It is very likely that the plan for military unification of Taiwan took shape in 2012. In 2013, China's president publicly and officially promised the nation that the historic task of unifying Taiwan would be accomplished during his term of office, and in 2019, China's official media implicitly but firmly pointed to Taiwan's deep involvement in the Hong Kong anti-submission upheaval, and in October 2019, a blogger had already read into the Chinese government's official text that China was abandoning the “one country, two systems” principle. In October 2019, a blogger had already read from the Chinese government's official text that China was abandoning its “one country, two systems” policy and was trying to urge Taiwan to proactively embrace one country, two systems. This prediction was realized on August 10, 2022, three years later. On this day, the Central Government of the Mainland officially declared through the White Paper that Taiwan had lost the "substantive one country, two systems". That is to say, there will be no military power, no diplomatic power, and the senior officials must embrace the mainland and accept the full supervision of the central government. The mainland central government has left room for negotiation on government structure, economic system, and tax concessions for the Taiwan administration. There is a very good chance that this negotiation window will close in 2026. There are still about 3 years left for Taiwan to negotiate.

References:

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[4] Xinhua News Agency. Xi Jinping's speech at the conference to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China. China.gov.cn. 2021. https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-07/01/content_5621847.htm
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