China’s reunification by force (1): Formulated in 2012, to be implemented in 2026 (Part 1)

 

First Released

June 18, 2022

Updated Date

October 2, 2022

Mar. 29, 2023

September 3, 2023

summary:

Although China has not released explicit information regarding the finalization date of its Taiwan unification plan, numerous clues point to 2012. It is highly likely that the plan for military unification of Taiwan took shape in 2012. In 2013, the Chinese President publicly and formally promised the nation that the historical task of unifying Taiwan would be completed during his term. In 2019, Chinese state media, while veiled, firmly stated that Taiwan was deeply involved in the Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests. In October 2019, a blogger interpreted official Chinese government statements as indicating that mainland China was abandoning the “one country, two systems” policy and had unsuccessfully attempted to urge Taiwan to embrace it. Three years after this prediction, on August 10, 2022, the Chinese central government officially declared that Taiwan had lost its “substantive ‘one country, two systems'” status. This means Taiwan has no command of the military, no diplomatic power, and its high-ranking officials must support the mainland and accept full central government oversight. The Chinese central government still retains room for negotiation with the Taiwanese administration regarding government structure, economic system, and tax incentives. This window of opportunity for negotiation may close in 2026, leaving Taiwan with approximately three years.

Keywords:

Unification, Taiwan Strait, war, “one country, two systems”, 2012, 2013, 2019, 2022, 2026, US-China conflict

1. China’s unification plan was finalized in 2012.

Reviewing Xi Jinping’s political experience from 2010 to 2012, it can be argued that the Chinese central government’s plan for the armed reunification of Taiwan took shape in 2012. This was a political act by Xi Jinping, responding to strong public opinion on the mainland and uniting its powerful political resources. He used this as a foundation to unite the scattered political forces within China, forming the most powerful political force group at the time. Based on this, he gained the upper hand in the political struggles against the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao factions. The following points are clues supporting this hypothesis.

(1. Xi Jinping once encountered a political crisis. The attached table 1 briefly lists the process of Xi Jinping encountering a political crisis and ultimately turning the unfavorable situation around.)

 

(2. Even during Hu Jintao’s 10-year rule, the Jiang Zemin political group still dominated China’s political direction. Experts and scholars who track China’s political situation know and acknowledge this fact.)
(3. Even during Hu Jintao’s 10 years as President of China, he was unable to weaken the power of the Jiang Zemin faction. Therefore, it is conceivable that Xi Jinping, as the heir apparent, would directly challenge both the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao factions, two major political groups. The difficulty and risk involved are immense. Tracing China’s nearly three thousand years of recorded history, under similar political circumstances, there is almost no possibility of success.)
(4. The result is that Xi Jinping was able to successfully win this arduous and difficult political struggle. This proves that Xi Jinping has an extremely strong political mobilization ability. He has a super political ability. This special ability enables him to discover a common political direction that can unite other political forces in China and form a new unified political group in a complex situation.)
(5. In the process of reversing the unfavorable situation, Xi Jinping not only achieved the victory of preserving himself, but also the victory of comprehensive and subversive. There are three important signs. (1) He stopped and interrupted the practice of simultaneously appointing the next heir apparent; (2) He reduced the number of members of the Politburo Standing Committee from 9 to 7; (3) He transformed the system of joint governance by the Politburo Standing Committee into a system of one supreme leader.
(6. The other important political forces in China have different identities, backgrounds, positions, and interests. To unite these political forces (groups) in China, Xi Jinping must be able to discover or find common demands or common ideals to unite them. Under the circumstances at the time, the strongest public opinion base and political demand in China was the unification of Taiwan. Only this demand could transcend the various complex situations at the time and had the ability to unite the various important political forces in China.)
(7. According to China’s political decision-making process, major decisions typically take at least 8 to 10 months, or even longer. In the 11th month after Xi Jinping took office, he formally made a political commitment to the Chinese public: he would complete the historical task of unifying Taiwan in the near future. Therefore, it can be inferred that the proposal and initial formation of the political decision to unify Taiwan occurred in 2012, or even before Xi Jinping officially took office. It is entirely conceivable that Xi Jinping used this political commitment to unify Taiwan to win the support of various important political forces in China, thereby gaining the upper hand in the political struggle against the Jiang Zemin faction.)

Based on the above analysis, there is ample evidence to conclude that China’s reunification plan took shape in 2012. Moreover, the reunification of Taiwan will be completed during Xi Jinping’s term, a judgment that has also been largely affirmed by professionals in the field of political science.

II. The reunification plan will be completed during Xi Jinping’s term.

 

2.1 Xi Jinping publicly pledged that he would complete the important task of national reunification during his term.

2.1.1 First public statement on October 6, 2013.

When Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Taiwanese figure Vincent Siew in Indonesia, he publicly stated that “the Taiwan issue cannot be passed down from generation to generation” [1]. Plain language translation: The reunification of Taiwan will definitely be completed during my political term.

2.1.2 Excluding the diplomatic context, directly and publicly promise this historical mission to the people of mainland China.

Since his diplomatic remarks on October 6, 2013, mainland China has, over the following four months, formally and comprehensively reiterated Xi Jinping’s message at least six times through various channels, including national television broadcasts and confirmations from spokespersons of the Taiwan Affairs Office and the State Council. The core message is that “the Taiwan issue cannot be passed down from generation to generation.” This formally and at a high level dispelled the diplomatic context of Xi Jinping’s speech in Indonesia. In this way, he solemnly reiterated his political commitment to the mainland people: the task of unifying Taiwan will be completed during his term. This commitment has both solidified Xi Jinping’s ruling foundation and added tremendous political pressure to his path of governance.

III. The events of 2019 severed the public opinion foundation for the mainland to grant Taiwan the “one country, two systems” principle.

 

3.1 Before 2019, the general public opinion in mainland China was that Taiwan should be unified under the “one country, two systems” principle.

This section will not discuss the issue of Taiwanese public opinion opposing “one country, two systems.” Before 2019, the general public opinion in mainland China was friendly towards Taiwan. Although this general goodwill was met with unilateral opposition and malicious interpretation in Taiwan, the fact remains that the use of force to unify Taiwan is not supported by mainstream public opinion in mainland China.

(1. On September 30, 1981, Yeh Chien-ying issued the “Nine Points of Yeh”. He promised that Taiwan would retain its military; retain its system; maintain a high degree of autonomy; the central government would not interfere in Taiwan’s affairs; retain “external economic and cultural relations”; Taiwanese people would have exclusive seats in the central government; and the central government could subsidize Taiwan;
(2. On June 25, 1983, Deng Xiaoping elaborated on the “Deng Six Points”. Taiwan may have an army; the mainland will not send people to Taiwan (neither military nor administrative personnel); Taiwanese people will manage the party, government and military systems themselves; the central government will reserve special quotas for Taiwanese people; the executive branch will be independent, the judiciary will be independent, and the power of final appeal will not need to go to Beijing.)
(3. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao did not put forward any new proposals on Taiwan affairs. It can be assumed that they abided by the promises of “Ye’s Nine Points” and “Deng’s Six Points”.)
(4. Mainland public opinion is friendly towards Taiwan. The long-term influence and education of the concept of “Treasure Island”; the popular saying that “the most beautiful scenery in Taiwan is its people”; the long-term existence of the concept of “one country, two systems”; these concepts and ideas have long supported the mainland people’s strong public opinion base for “peaceful reunification” of Taiwan and “opposition to the use of force to reunify” Taiwan.

3.2 The public support for the peaceful reunification of Taiwan by mainland China is rapidly disappearing.

(1. No matter how many layers of veil there are, the anti-extradition bill turmoil that occurred in 2019 can be traced back to the roots of the United States and Taiwan through political science.)
(2. Although the official media in mainland China used very subtle language, they clearly pointed out that Taiwan was a major participant in the anti-extradition bill turmoil.)
(3. On Chinese social media, the attitude of mainland Chinese people is very clear. They acknowledge that not only did the Taiwanese authorities participate in the crimes of “selling out national interests” and “selling out ethnic interests,” but they also acknowledge that the overall public opinion in Taiwan is “selling out the country for personal gain.” This is a completely opposite conclusion to the public opinion before the anti-extradition bill turmoil.)
(4. Although the Chinese mainland authorities have tried their best to suppress public opinion, the public on the mainland has expressed their opposition to peaceful reunification and their strong demand for the armed reunification of Taiwan through various means. There are even arguments that “peaceful reunification is equivalent to selling out the country” circulating on various social media platforms. Occasionally, blog posts with an anti-war background will appear and be quickly reported by the public and shut down by various social media platforms.
(5. On September 3, 2019, Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the Central Party School of China with the theme of “struggle” [2]. This event conveyed to senior Chinese leaders the political tone that Xi Jinping would take a tough stance against the United States and Taiwan.
(6. On October 8, 2019, Yeh Chi-chuan predicted that “one country, two systems is moving away from Taiwan “ [3]. He also published this blog post on Duowei News, which is frequently visited by Taiwanese people.

 

IV. On August 10, 2022, Taiwan officially lost the “one country, two systems” principle.

 

4.1 On July 1, 2021, for the first time, the mainland omitted the phrase “one country, two systems” in an important speech.

In the political process of mainland China, there is a very important and regular program: on important holidays and anniversaries, the national leader must deliver a comprehensive speech. In every such routine event, the mainland’s policies towards Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan must be discussed. Regarding Taiwan, “one country, two systems” is a phrase that must be mentioned in every speech.
On July 1, 2021, Xi Jinping omitted the term “one country, two systems” for the first time in a speech at this level of speech.[4]

4.2. On August 10, 2022, the mainland formally deprived Taiwan of its right to “substantive one country, two systems”.

On August 10, 2022, the Chinese central government officially released a white paper on its policy toward Taiwan [5], clearly declaring that “Taiwan has lost the substantive ‘one country, two systems’ principle.”
The relevant arguments are copied below with a plain language translation. Although this plain language translation is redundant, it may help those unfamiliar with mainland Chinese political language to understand China’s statements.

4.2.1 Overview: No diplomatic power; no military command authority; high-ranking officials must be subject to central government oversight.

Taiwan has no diplomatic power; no command of the military; and its senior administrative officials must support the central government and accept its supervision. Regarding the economic structure, the mainland central government maintains a negotiating window. It has clearly stated that the following privileges can be obtained through peaceful negotiations: no taxes will be levied on Taiwan; no major reforms to the administrative structure will be made; and no major reforms to the economic structure will be made.
The following content is from Part Four of “The Taiwan Issue and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era”: “Promoting the Reunification of the Motherland on the New Journey in the New Era”.

4.2.2 The central government has maintained a window for peaceful negotiations. The opportunity is chosen by Taiwan.

Part A of the original text states: ” Achieving national reunification peacefully is in the best interests of the Chinese nation as a whole, including our compatriots in Taiwan, and is most conducive to China’s long-term stable development. It is the first choice for the Communist Party of China and the Chinese government to resolve the Taiwan issue. Despite the difficulties and obstacles we have encountered over the decades, we have persevered in striving for peaceful reunification, which reflects our cherishing and safeguarding of national interests, the well-being of our compatriots, and peace across the Taiwan Strait.”
Translation: For the sake of national interests and the well-being of our compatriots, we still maintain a window for peaceful negotiations. Whether you wish to negotiate or not is entirely up to you.

4.2.3. The “two systems” principle must be subject to the “one country” ceiling. It must directly accept the central government’s jurisdiction.

Part B of the original text states: “We advocate that after peaceful reunification, Taiwan can implement a social system different from that of the mainland, exercise a high degree of autonomy in accordance with the law, and allow the two social systems to coexist and develop together for a long time. ‘One country’ is the premise and foundation for implementing ‘two systems,’ and ‘two systems’ are subordinate to and derived from ‘one country’ and unified within ‘one country.'”
Translation: Now, we talk about “one country, two systems.” But it must be understood that these two systems must be subject to the “one country” ceiling. They must be directly governed by the central government.

4.2.4. The “one country, two systems” solution must conform to the will of the people on the mainland.

Part C of the original text states: “We will continue to unite our compatriots in Taiwan, actively explore a ‘one country, two systems’ solution for Taiwan, and enrich the practice of peaceful reunification. The specific form of ‘one country, two systems’ implementation in Taiwan will fully consider the realities of Taiwan, fully absorb opinions and suggestions from all sectors on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and fully take into account the interests and feelings of our compatriots in Taiwan.”
Translation: (Direct meaning: The promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping are no longer valid.) Everything needs to be renegotiated. Taiwanese feelings can be considered appropriately, but the will of the mainland public must be respected. (Key point: Mainland public opinion should be the guiding principle.)

4.2.5. Taiwan’s “one country, two systems” principle cannot exceed the scope of preferential treatment given to Hong Kong and Macau.

Paragraph D of the original text: “For a period of time, affected by various complex internal and external factors, ‘anti-China and destabilizing Hong Kong’ activities were rampant, and the situation in Hong Kong was once in a severe state. The Communist Party of China and the Chinese government, after careful consideration of the situation, adopted a series of measures that addressed both the symptoms and root causes, upheld and improved the ‘one country, two systems’ framework, and promoted a major turning point in the situation in Hong Kong from chaos to order, entering a new stage of prosperity, laying a solid foundation for advancing the rule of law in Hong Kong and Macao and ensuring the steady and long-term implementation of the ‘one country, two systems’ principle.”
Translation: Don’t forget what you did in Hong Kong. The current “one country, two systems” is based on the mainland. Taiwan’s “one country, two systems” cannot exceed the preferential treatment given to Hong Kong and Macau.

4.2.6. On the issue of unification, we must listen to the mainland.

Paragraph E of the original text states: “To achieve peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Strait, we must confront the fundamental issue of the differences in social systems and ideologies between the mainland and Taiwan. ‘One country, two systems’ is precisely the most inclusive solution proposed to address this issue. It is a peaceful, democratic, benevolent, and win-win solution. The differences in systems across the Strait are not an obstacle to reunification, much less an excuse for division. We believe that as time goes by, ‘one country, two systems’ will be re-recognized by the vast majority of Taiwanese compatriots; and in the process of compatriots on both sides of the Strait working together to achieve peaceful reunification, the space and connotation of the ‘two systems’ Taiwan solution will be fully demonstrated.”
Translation: Now it is compatriots on both sides of the strait who are working together to promote reunification (in plain language: the initiative is now in the mainland. I’m going to get serious now, I’m not going to waste any more words).

4.2.7. The issue of reunification will definitely be resolved during Xi Jinping’s term.

Paragraph F of the original text: “Peaceful reunification means equal consultation and joint discussion on reunification. The long-standing political differences between the two sides are the root cause affecting the steady and long-term development of cross-strait relations, and they cannot be passed down from generation to generation. Cross-strait consultations and negotiations can be conducted in stages and with flexible and diverse methods. We are willing to conduct dialogue and communication with all political parties, groups, and individuals in Taiwan on resolving cross-strait political differences and exchange views extensively, based on the one-China principle and the ‘1992 Consensus.’ We are also willing to continue to promote democratic consultations among representative figures nominated by political parties and sectors on both sides of the strait to jointly discuss the grand plan for promoting the peaceful development and integrated development of cross-strait relations and the peaceful reunification of the motherland.”
Translation: Hurry up and find someone to talk to; this unification issue must be resolved within Lao Tzu’s term.

4.2.8. No American involvement allowed.

Paragraph G of the original text: “Currently, some forces in the United States are attempting to ‘use Taiwan to contain China,’ deliberately playing the ‘Taiwan card’ and provoking ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces to take risks and provoke. This not only seriously endangers peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and hinders the Chinese government’s efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, but also seriously affects the healthy and stable development of China-US relations. If this trend continues, it will inevitably lead to a sustained escalation of tensions across the Taiwan Strait, posing a huge and subversive risk to China-US relations and seriously damaging the United States’ own interests. The United States should adhere to the one-China principle, handle Taiwan-related issues prudently and properly, stop saying one thing and doing another, and fulfill its commitment not to support ‘Taiwan independence’ with concrete actions.”
Translation: The Americans are done playing the game. If they keep playing the Taiwan card, I’ll crush them.

4.2.9. No taxes will be levied on Taiwan.

Paragraph H of the original text: “Taiwan’s fiscal revenue should be used to improve people’s livelihoods, and to do practical things, good things, and solve difficulties for the people.”
Translation: Now it is said that the central government will not levy taxes on Taiwan.

4.2.10. Taiwan’s status as a special administrative region was not something it was born with; it had to be discussed.

Paragraph I of the original text: “Taiwan can exercise a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region.”
Translation: Yes! It’s not a given. If we don’t discuss it, it might not happen.

4.2.11. Taiwan’s governing officials must support the rule of the mainland and accept the rule and supervision of the central government.

Paragraph J of the original text: “All Taiwanese compatriots who support the reunification of the motherland and the rejuvenation of the nation will truly be masters of their own affairs in Taiwan, participate in the construction of the motherland, and fully enjoy the dividends of development.”
Translation: Taiwanese officials must support mainland China’s governance and accept the central government’s governance and supervision.

4.2.12. Taiwan does not have the right to command troops.

Section K of the original text: “Compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait shall jointly explore and implement a ‘two systems’ solution for Taiwan, jointly develop and improve the ‘one country, two systems’ system, and ensure Taiwan’s long-term stability and security.”
Translation: The “one country, two systems” approach must conform to the tone of the mainland central government to ensure that Taiwan does not experience another rebellion.
In plain language: He had no command of troops.

4.2.13. Taiwan has no diplomatic power.

Paragraph L of the original text: “After reunification, relevant countries may continue to develop economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. With the approval of the Chinese central government, foreign countries may establish consulates or other official or semi-official institutions in Taiwan, international organizations and institutions may establish offices in Taiwan, relevant international conventions may apply in Taiwan, and relevant international conferences may be held in Taiwan.”
Translation: Taiwan shall no longer possess diplomatic privileges equal to those of Hong Kong. All diplomatic licenses and powers must be placed entirely under the control of the central government.

Fifth, Taiwan has no opportunity to initiate negotiations.

5.1. Taiwan has established a powerful barrier against unification.

 

5.1.1 The barriers against “one country, two systems” have been gradually raised and thickened.

In the process of cultivating an atmosphere of independence in Taiwan, the barriers against “one country, two systems” have been gradually raised and thickened. From 1992 to 2021, the proportion of people who identified as both Taiwanese and Chinese steadily declined, from 46.4% to 30.5%. During the same period, the proportion who identified as Taiwanese steadily increased from 17.6% to 62.8%, while the proportion who identified as Chinese steadily decreased from 25.5% to 2.5%.

5.1.2. The political atmosphere against the mainland was deliberately manipulated and amplified.

For example, in extensive English-language databases and even various overseas Chinese databases, historical materials are often presented with a political stance and background supporting Taiwan independence. When loudly criticizing China’s 1996 missile test, the tensions in US-China-Taiwan relations caused by Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the US as president are deliberately erased. When loudly criticizing China’s enactment of the “Anti-Secession Law,” provocative events such as Lee Teng-hui’s “freezing of Taiwan,” his “two-state theory,” Chen Shui-bian’s “one country on each side,” and his proposal for a “referendum on unification or independence” are deliberately ignored. To increase hatred towards those with a mainland background, historical facts are even distorted. For instance, the “February 28 Incident,” which resulted in fewer than 10 deaths, is repeatedly and loudly criticized. This incident is defined as a persecution of Taiwanese people by mainland Chinese. At the same time, the historical tragedy of the Japanese massacre of more than 400,000 Taiwanese people is deliberately ignored, and Japan is instead considered to be the most friendly country to Taiwan.
All true and false examples, both within Taiwan, in English databases, and in overseas Chinese databases, are shifted toward linguistic contexts that support Taiwan independence.

5.1.3 The overall political situation is unfavorable to mainland China.

Some international political events have been interpreted in a partial and one-sided manner, thereby encouraging an independent atmosphere in Taiwan. Examples include East Timor’s successful independence; Kosovo’s semi-independence; the United States’ successful intervention in Syria; and Israel’s continuous expansion of settlements. These examples have been interpreted as the United States being able to control the major trends in world politics.
The trend of the United States suppressing China did not originate with Trump. From Clinton to Bush to Trump, it has been a continuous process. The US has orchestrated the Wassenaar Arrangement; detained the Galaxy cargo ship on the high seas; bombed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia; promoted the sweatshop concept in Europe; deified and elevated the political status of the Dalai Lama; pursued the nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands in Japan; deployed the THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea; initiated international arbitration in the South China Sea; fabricated the Xinjiang concentration camp incident; fabricated the Xinjiang cotton incident; instigated the 2019 anti-extradition bill protests; promoted the “China is guilty” narrative surrounding COVID-19; and blocked Chinese companies such as Huawei and DJI. In this series of political conflicts, China has always been the passive party.
All these appearances will be automatically categorized by Taiwanese people as political factors supporting Taiwanese independence. Moreover, it is foreseeable that the US bloc’s containment and suppression of China will continue to intensify automatically—unless a powerful event occurs to stop this trend.

5.2. Taiwan’s inability and attitude to rationally assess the international situation.

5.2.1 Failure to understand China’s current strength and capabilities within the international system

Even in 2019, Taiwan’s primary assessment remained that the United States was a political force Taiwan could rely on. Taiwan demonstrated a deficiency in its understanding of international power in the following aspects.

(1. Failure to understand that the foundation and reliance of political power stems from economic capability. A superficial understanding of the determinism of military power, believing that military power is the essence of political power. However, according to World Bank data, China’s GDP in purchasing power parity terms officially surpassed that of the United States in 2016. The power that truly maximizes GDP in terms of war-making capability mainly lies in industrial and agricultural output. China’s industrial GDP, measured solely in US dollars, has exceeded the combined industrial GDP of the three North American countries and the European Union since 2012.)
(2. Failure to understand the actual ratio of China’s military input-output value to that of the United States. If we roughly calculate that the cost of China producing an aircraft carrier of the same class is 1/6 of that of the United States, the cost of China producing a cruiser of the same class is 1/6 of that of the United States, and the cost of China using military personnel is 1/5 of that of the United States, then China’s military expenditure-output value is actually basically on par with that of the United States. However, the United States needs to defend its military globally, while China’s military power only needs to defend a small area.)
(3. According to Yeh Chi-chuan’s calculation model of national (group) war intensity, in a hypothetical conflict in 2026, the US group will not be able to form a superior war force around Taiwan. Moreover, it may completely open a new historical window for land power to suppress sea power.

5.2.2 Lack of mature political judgment

(1. Not understanding the United States’ current inability to maintain the existing world order.)
According to Yeh Chi-chuan’s prediction in April 2022, the US-led coalition (the Ukrainian coalition) would not be able to maintain sufficient dominance in Central Ukraine. The Russo-Ukrainian war would be protracted in Central Ukraine for a considerable period. This prediction has been largely confirmed by current battlefield developments. However, to this day, mainstream public opinion in Taiwan still overwhelmingly believes that the United States is the absolute dominant power in world politics.
(2. Failure to understand that total war and bloc war have in fact returned to the world political stage.)
In fact, whether facing a conflict initiated by Russia, the rise of the Arab world, or the challenge posed by China in 2026, the United States is incapable of confronting any challenge independently. However, even using bloc warfare tactics, according to Yeh Chi-chuan’s model of national (bloc) war intensity calculations, the US bloc will still be unable to gain a power advantage over China in the turmoil in the Taiwan Strait in 2026.
(3. Failure to understand the importance of public opinion in mainland China to Taiwan’s security. Taiwanese people have consistently rejected the mainland’s political proposal of “one country, two systems.” They stubbornly believe that the mainland is eager to force “one country, two systems” onto them. Therefore, Taiwanese people believe they have the ability and opportunity to reject this proposal without risking losing their political advantage. But the reality is that once mainland citizens…) The very foundation upon which Taiwan gained political advantage crumbled when it was asserted that Taiwanese people had betrayed national or ethnic interests. Although Yeh Chi-chuan had urged Taiwan in 2019 to take the risk of losing “one country, two systems” seriously, Taiwan remained unresponsive, thus missing a three-year historical opportunity. Finally, on August 10, 2022, Taiwan officially lost its de facto “one country, two systems.”
(4. Lack of understanding of mainland political language. Yeh Chi-chuan was able to deduce from public media reports in mainland China in 2019 that Taiwan would lose the “one country, two systems” principle, which would be realized three years later. However, Taiwan has never understood this political declaration from the mainland. A year has passed since August 10, 2022, and no one in Taiwan, whether scholar or official, has come forward to interpret the political announcements in the mainland’s white paper on its Taiwan policy. From this, it can be inferred that Taiwan and the mainland have completely severed their ability to communicate politically. However, this severance is an absolutely fatal flaw for the weaker Taiwan.)

5.2.3 Taiwan cannot make significant concessions on its existing political stance.

(1. Mainstream public opinion in Taiwan has always pursued independence. Their minimum goal is at least a structure like the Czech-Slovak Empire or the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.)
(2. Taiwan missed out on the political promises made by Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping. These promises included: Taiwan having high-level diplomatic power; Taiwan having full military command; Taiwan having full administrative power; Taiwan having full economic autonomy; Taiwan having final adjudication power; the mainland not sending military or administrative personnel to Taiwan; and Taiwan having a fixed political position in the national power structure. These political conditions far exceeded the political rights held by individual states in the United States, but Taiwan ultimately rejected this historical opportunity.)
(3. Due to Taiwan’s deep involvement in the 2019 Hong Kong unrest, mainland Chinese citizens perceived Taiwan as betraying the country and national interests, thus placing severe pressure on the Chinese central government to unify Taiwan by force. This led to the Chinese central government formally stripping Taiwan of its substantive political privileges under the “one country, two systems” framework on August 10, 2022. Under these circumstances, any attempt by Taiwanese politicians to engage in political contact with mainland China under pressure will likely be unsuccessful. The Taiwanese people cannot accept the current political restrictions imposed by mainland China.)
(4. Taiwan has no opportunity to produce figures like Thaksin, Modi, Erdogan, and Trump who can partially or completely reverse the political situation. The emergence of these political strongmen is based on the existence of severe group antagonism, class antagonism, political antagonism, and religious antagonism within the country. These factors are the foundation for the emergence of political strongmen under the electoral political model. However, Taiwan has now formed…) The de facto flat structure. A political foundation objectively friendly to the mainland has almost no statistical significance in Taiwan. There are no serious economic disparities, no serious religious conflicts, and no serious ethnic group differences. Therefore, the space and foundation for the emergence of a political strongman are lost. Thus, it is impossible for an opportunity to suddenly arise for a strongman to reverse the politically correct direction and engage in peaceful negotiations with the mainland.

VI. The mainland has no incentive to conduct peace negotiations.

After at least 14 years of systematic preparation, China is convinced that a war would bring enormous national benefits. At the same time, choosing a peaceful path would result in a serious setback for China’s national interests.

(1. Based on Yeh Chi-chuan’s calculation model of national (group) war intensity, the US group will not have a war capability advantage during the Taiwan Strait turmoil in 2026:)
(2. China will demonstrate through a conflict that land-based superiority in military power is returning to the historical stage. China attempts to force sea power to gradually and automatically retreat from the political system through a relatively minor conflict, thereby enabling China to acquire political power at minimal cost;)
(3. Peaceful actions would severely limit China’s geopolitical gains;)
(4. Peaceful actions will severely deplete China’s governance costs (political, economic, and historical costs).
(5. Peaceful actions will seriously hinder China’s historical progress.)

6.1 In the script of the US-China conflict in 2026, the United States faces a significant weakness.

In a hypothetical scenario of turmoil in the Taiwan Strait and a conflict between the US and China in 2026, the US faces at least the following significant flaws.

6.1.1 The U.S. military is not allowed to land on Chinese territory (including Taiwan).

In instigating unrest in the Taiwan Strait, China possesses an inherent advantage in launching an operation, provided that mainland China completely occupies the entire island of Taiwan within 4-7 days. The entire Western bloc will lose the opportunity to confront the Chinese army. They will have no chance of landing on Chinese soil. This military fact fundamentally deprives the US bloc of any possibility of victory in the war.

6.1.2 The United States has higher costs for operational warfare.

The input-output efficiency of land-based airports plus short-range missiles is far higher than that of mobile airports plus short-range missiles. Let’s assume China doesn’t destroy US mobile airports; assume the US F-35 and China J-20 have the same range and payload; assume the US air-launched missiles have the same range as China’s; China can still defeat the US through economic attrition in a prolonged conflict by using cheaper land-based airports and cheaper missiles. Moreover, in fact, in all three of these assumptions, the US is the relatively weaker party.

6.1.3 US strategic weapons are more expensive

If we assume that both US aircraft carriers and Chinese intermediate-range missiles are strategic weapons that will enter the battlefield, we can compare their operating costs.
Based on current online cost estimates, approximately 250-350 Chinese intermediate-range missiles would cost the same as a single US Ford-class aircraft carrier. Even if this estimate is halved, and 125 Chinese intermediate-range missiles cost the same as a US aircraft carrier, it’s plausible that 125 Chinese intermediate-range missiles could offset the combat power of a US aircraft carrier. This demonstrates that the US also faces cost disadvantages in the use of strategic weapons.

6.1.4 The range of land-based weapons has exceeded that of sea-based weapons.

Due to the cost and scale advantages of China’s manufacturing industry, Chinese-made medium-range missiles have become economically viable weapons that can be deployed on a large scale in the battlefield.
The currently accepted view is that the range of Chinese-made medium-range missiles exceeds the combined range of a US aircraft carrier, an F-35 fighter jet, and an air-launched cruise missile. This marks the first time in nearly 400 years that the range of land-based weapons has surpassed that of naval weapons. This will inevitably usher in a new era of land-based weapons suppressing naval weapons.
Meanwhile, online speculation suggests that China has approximately 3,000 medium-range missiles in stock. It is certain that if a conflict between the US and China were to materialize, China’s production rate of medium-range missiles would surpass that of the US in producing aircraft carriers.

6.1.5 An extremely difficult political process

Whether we start from the premise that the United States is unlikely to land on Chinese soil, or refer to Ye Qiquan’s group warfare intensity calculation model, we all implicitly agree on one point: that China will not suffer military defeat.
However, from the perspective of maintaining the current basic world order, the United States cannot afford military defeat. This is another essential point of contention in this Sino-US conflict.
Politicians in both China and the United States face a difficult political decision-making process in successfully moving between these two points.

6.2. Land power advantage in war is returning to the historical stage, or has already returned.

6.2.1 The history of war is essentially a history of the advancement of effective firing range.

(1. Effective range of a weapon: The effective range of a weapon is mainly composed of three factors: effective distance (range); lethality; and scale of use (economy).
(2. Wooden stick and gun:)
A review of ancient Chinese historical records shows that before the development of bronze technology, the dominant weapon in warfare was the wooden club. After bronze technology was applied to warfare, the dominant weapon became the spear, because the spear had a longer effective range than the wooden club. Then, the use of the bow and arrow appeared in ancient Chinese war records.
(3. Bows and arrows and crossbows:)
The bow and arrow, a long-range weapon, represented the first revolutionary advancement in weaponry. Its emergence changed the nature of warfare. For the first time, it allowed for the use of terrain to block enemy advances and achieve victory by killing them without contact with the ground.
However, for over a thousand years of recorded history, the bow and arrow never replaced the spear as the primary weapon of war. The main reason was that cost limited its scale. High costs in the manufacturing process, storage and maintenance, and personnel training were all economic factors that prevented the spear from becoming the dominant weapon of the ancient Chinese army for over a thousand years, alongside the bow and arrow. It was only after the economic cost of the bow and arrow finally decreased that it became the primary weapon in ancient Chinese warfare.
(4. Firegun:
Even before its effective range was comparable to that of a bow and arrow, the musket quickly replaced the bow and arrow. This was because the manufacturing cost of the musket was not more expensive than that of a precision bow and arrow, but the training and usage costs were significantly lower. Clearly, the effect of effective range far outweighs the effect of effective distance.
(5. Percussion gun:)
Later-developed firearms had better range, faster firing rate, and higher efficiency. The pursuit of greater effective range was reflected in the simultaneous pursuit of firing distance and firing rate, while also considering economic costs. Heavy machine guns possessed even greater range and higher firing rate, but their economic costs meant that they could only become key weapons during World War I, rather than decisive or dominant weapons.
(6. Artillery:)
Longer range and more effective destructive power dictated that artillery would inevitably appear on the battlefield. The Napoleonic era was a brief period where artillery determined victory. However, the economic characteristics of artillery limited its historical importance. It wasn’t until World War II that mobile artillery finally became the dominant force in European warfare.
(7. The Age of Sea Power:)
Due to the high load-bearing capacity of warships, heavy and massive cannons could be mounted on them. This led to the development of naval guns with extremely powerful calibers and ranges. The mobility of ships, in terms of both time and space, provided these guns with reusability. This gave shipboard guns a comprehensive advantage over land-based giant guns in terms of effective range, lethality, and operating costs. Relying on their superior effective range, naval guns could destroy land-based guns, while land-based guns could not destroy warships. This ushered in the era of naval superiority in military history. Naval superiority protected the military and political dominance of the Spanish Empire, the British Empire, and the American Empire.
(8. Composite range weapon:)
The Asian theater of World War II served as a prime example of the forefront of weapons technology advancements. It vividly demonstrated how the effective range of weapons determined the final outcome of wars. With mobile airfields and fighter jets having ranges far exceeding those of battleship guns, battleships and cruisers completely lost their intended combat effectiveness. There were even cases where one of the most advanced battleships of the time was sunk on its maiden voyage by aircraft launched from an aircraft carrier.
(9. Long-range weapons:)
With the V1 and V2 rockets as examples, a new generation of long-range weapons officially entered the battlefield. However, the revolutionary and advanced V1 and V2 could not reverse Nazi Germany’s air disadvantage. The reason was that the V1 and V2 lacked the economic efficiency that a dominant weapon in war must possess.
The longest range of missiles now exceeds 10,000 kilometers. However, long-range missiles are not currently the dominant weapons in warfare. For economic reasons, long-range missiles lack the capability to dominate the course of conventional warfare. For example, Ukraine abandoned its existing long-range weapons due to its inability to maintain and protect them. Even if North Korea possessed long-range missile capabilities, it would be unable to apply these weapons in actual combat.

6.2.2 Reopening the Window to the Land Power Era:

Regarding China’s intermediate-range missiles, two important characteristics have been implicitly acknowledged by online forces: their effective range and cost-effectiveness. Online discourse now implicitly accepts that the range of China’s intermediate-range missiles far exceeds that of a combined US mobile airfield, carrier-based aircraft, and carrier-based cruise missiles. In terms of cost-effectiveness, it is implicitly accepted that the actual cost (production cost, maintenance cost, and operational cost) of 600-850 intermediate-range missiles is comparable to the cost of a US aircraft carrier fleet (one aircraft carrier, six combat ships, 50 carrier-based aircraft, and two submarines). If the third characteristic, lethality, is verified in a small-scale exploratory battle, then China’s medium-range missiles may comprehensively surpass US weapon systems in all three aspects constituting their effective range.
If this possibility is ultimately confirmed, it will not only lead to the decline of American power, but will also usher in an era in which land-based warfare forces suppress sea-based warfare forces.
If this possibility is ultimately confirmed, the United States will automatically shrink its sphere of influence. China will not necessarily have to force the United States to retreat through a full-scale war. This is a huge temptation for China. Therefore, initiating a small-scale exploratory or demonstrative war is an irresistible temptation for China.

6.3. Peaceful actions would severely limit China’s geopolitical gains;

6.3.1 Peaceful Actions Limit China’s Geopolitical Potential in the Northern Sea of Japan

There is an important geopolitical backdrop at present: the US-led coalition (the Ukrainian coalition) is engaged in political struggle with the Russian coalition. This struggle presents an opportunity, or rather a possibility, for political cooperation between China and Russia in the northern Sea of Japan region. It’s even possible that China might use the Southern Kuril Islands to experiment with trilateral cooperation among China, Japan, and Russia. However, such cooperation would face numerous political obstacles without Japanese involvement in a conflict. Therefore, dragging Japan into a military conflict would be beneficial to China’s long-term geopolitical gains.

6.3.2 Peaceful actions would limit China’s ability to utilize Taiwan’s geographical advantages.

(1. Peaceful actions cannot eliminate the political connotations of the label “Taiwanese”. They cannot eliminate the draining effect of this political connotations on China’s political power.)
(2. Peaceful actions have severely limited the Chinese central government’s ability to utilize Taiwan’s geopolitical advantages. If the Chinese central government fails to properly develop Taiwan’s “land bridge” or “land sword” functions, it will not only fail to suppress or weaken the maritime power of Japan and South Korea, but also leave the possibility, from a historical perspective, for Taiwan to drift towards another powerful maritime force.
(3. If the geopolitical advantages of Taiwan Island are not effectively utilized by the Chinese central government, the opportunity for geopolitical cooperation in the northern Sea of Japan will be like a rootless duckweed. It will be a waste of political power that will not produce obvious benefits.)

6.4. Peaceful actions will severely deplete China’s governance costs (political, economic, and historical costs).

This section fully agrees with the concepts previously proposed by Ye Qiquan. There is no new or additional content. Please refer to Ye Qiquan’s article [3].

6.5. Peaceful actions will seriously hinder China’s historical progress.

6.5.1 Peaceful actions will lose or delay the opportunity to establish a Northeast Asian cooperation zone.

(1. As can be seen from the course of the early 20th century, the possibility of establishing a Northeast Asian cooperation zone through peaceful and gradual means does not exist; such efforts may even lead to negative political and economic consequences.)
(2. The path to establishing a Northeast Asian cooperation zone in a non-peaceful manner depends on the following factors: the reduction of the maritime power of Japan and South Korea; and the retreat of US power in Northeast Asia;
(3. To reduce the maritime rights of Japan and South Korea, it is necessary to establish two “land-based fixed anchorages” on Taiwan Island and in the northern Sea of Japan;
(4. The most reliable way to establish a strong anchorage on the island of Taiwan is through military means, not peaceful means;)
(5. The establishment of a Sino-Japanese-Russian cooperation base in the northern Sea of Japan or even the Southern Kuril Islands cannot be achieved through peaceful means; peaceful means also do not help to take advantage of the historical opportunity of European power restructuring.)
(6. Without a single military upheaval, the historical process of the retreat of American power in Northeast Asia could not have been initiated.)

6.5.2 Peaceful actions will exacerbate China’s historical difficulties.

(1. Postponing the establishment of the Northeast Asia Cooperation Zone is tantamount to wasting a lot of political costs for China from a historical perspective.)
(2. From a historical perspective, China faces a greater historical challenge or mission than establishing a Northeast Asia Cooperation Zone.)
(3. The postponement of the Northeast Asia Economic Cooperation Zone is tantamount to China allowing its greatest historical problem to be stabilized, solidified, and strengthened.)

VII. 2026 is a pivotal year for both the global landscape and Chinese history.

2026 will undoubtedly be a year of greater turmoil in international politics. In that year, war will in fact become a common need for many countries and political groups.

7.1 The United States is unable to quell the chaos in Europe.

The United States is unable to quell the wars in Europe. War and chaos become the only viable option for the US. Maintaining world order through sea power is a costly method of governance. If the US loses its ability to peacefully “increase taxes,” it will inevitably have to resort to war and chaos to maintain the “extremely weak power” needed to maintain order.
Quickly quelling the chaos in Europe is currently not an option that aligns with the strategic interests of the United States. Weakening the overall strength of both the EU and Russia simultaneously is a preferred path for the US to achieve a “power imbalance.”

7.2 Many countries are ready to join the process of decentralization in Europe.

There may be many different reasons and starting points that could ignite a Russo-Ukrainian war. The actual effects of a 2022 European war are already evident: the historical drama of unstable European borders has been restarted. The process of power restructuring in Europe has begun, or at least is in the works. Meanwhile, numerous countries are politically and psychologically prepared. They are ready to seize this historical opportunity to join the process in order to expand their own national interests.

7.3 Russia has already set its sights on the L1 line.

Since 2014, non-governmental organizations and social media in Europe and the United States have widely and deeply promoted the concept that “Ukraine is the largest country in Europe.” This has effectively launched a cultural and philosophical war, defining the “non-European identity” of Russians. The act of expelling Russians from Europe has comprehensively triggered a philosophical and religious crisis among Russians. The L1 line [6, 7], formed by the Dnieper River and the Black Sea coast, has been seen by Russians (ordinary citizens) as a necessary barrier to protect the nation’s survival. From a historical perspective spanning 100 to 200 years, the possibility of Russians moving to this geopolitical boundary is very real. New unrest or military action in other parts of the world could help and accelerate this historical process for the Russians.

7.4 The new economic distribution order needs a window to demonstrate its power.

If the global economy stagnates for an extended period, demands for a new distribution scheme or pricing order will arise. Without rapid, revolutionary technological advancements to quickly restore global economic growth and expansion, calls for wealth redistribution will naturally emerge. Global leadership will then face comprehensive, multi-faceted, and multi-dimensional resistance. Comprehensive political chaos will be a reasonable expectation.
Without a major economic revolution to reverse the decline, the process of seeking a new world order through political or philosophical revolution will naturally occur. These needs will automatically seek out outlets for their manifestation. All of these needs will have a negative impact on the existing forces maintaining the order.

7.5 With the rise of land power, a display window is needed.

Of the three characteristics that constitute the effective range of a weapon [8], land-based medium-range missiles have demonstrated advantages in “range of action” and “economy”. Another important characteristic, namely “lethality”, has not yet been verified. Historically, a new type of weapon will inevitably seize an opportunity to verify its capabilities. That is, land-based long-range weapons need a window to verify their third important attribute.

7.6 China’s Current Needs

(1. The unfair treatment in the past has aroused dissatisfaction among the Chinese people.)
Looking back at the history of colonial wars since the First Opium War, China has consistently been the target of exploitation. Even though China gained victorious status in World War I and World War II, the world power order has not granted China a truly just and equal opportunity for development. This is the basis for the Chinese people’s dissatisfaction with the existing world power order.
(2. Public resistance was difficult to prevent the forced search of Chinese ships on the high seas, the missile attack on the Chinese embassy, Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands, South Korea’s introduction of the THAAD anti-missile system, the invention of the sweatshop concept, the promotion of the Dalai Lama’s political effect, the fabrication of the Xinjiang concentration camp incident, the fabrication of the Xinjiang cotton incident, allowing a certain country to break nuclear restrictions, initiating the South China Sea arbitration case, triggering the Hong Kong anti-extradition bill turmoil, and the systematic blockade of the Chinese economy. A series of humiliating events greatly aroused the resistance of the Chinese people. 2019 Taiwan Administration) The extensive, active, and deep involvement of the government and ordinary residents in the Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests has further fueled the anti-establishment sentiment among ordinary people on the mainland, leading them to channel their anger towards a swift armed reunification of Taiwan. This strong public opinion has increased the difficulty for the Chinese central government to make political compromises. Excessive delays in reunifying Taiwan will not only place significant political pressure on the Chinese leadership but could also seriously affect China’s future political arrangements and historical trajectory.

7.7 China’s Historical Needs

(1. Philosophical requirements:)
A cornerstone of Chinese ancestor worship is the veneration of historical heroes. This veneration forms the foundation of Chinese philosophy and worldview. Qin Shi Huang, Emperor Wu of Han, and Emperor Taizong of Tang are lofty cultural monuments in Chinese history. Their common ground lies in safeguarding and strengthening the overall national interests of the Chinese people. This philosophical foundation of ancestor worship also constitutes the deep-rooted nationalist sentiment of the Chinese people.
In modern Chinese history, numerous historical heroes have emerged in politics, including some widely respected and admired worldwide. However, from a historical perspective, they are inevitably limited by the historical constraints of their time and cannot be compared to the three exemplary figures mentioned above. The movement to unify Taiwan provided a window for the emergence of great historical heroes in China. The Chinese people’s hero-worshiping mentality could not allow this historical window to be missed. Initiating the movement for China’s unification was both an emotional need of the Chinese people and a necessity of Chinese philosophical and historical perspectives.
(2. Character window:)
A review of the political journey from 2009 to 2012, and the handling of the 2019 Hong Kong unrest, reveals that the current Chinese leader possesses, in multiple dimensions, the qualities to become a historical hero. He has the ability to quickly identify the crux of a problem amidst complex situations. He possesses exceptional political skills, capable of uniting various forces in seemingly impossible circumstances. He can turn unfavorable situations around and achieve unexpected victories. Missing out on this historical figure could severely hinder China’s historical progress.
(3 Power Window:)
Whether measured by GDP based on purchasing power, by the war capability supported by the secondary industry, or by Ye Qiquan’s national war intensity calculation system [8], China has fully possessed the material, power, and military-political foundations for unifying the country.
(4 Historical Records Window:)
A common characteristic of Chinese and foreign history is that recorders morally evaluate historical facts from their own perspectives. Inevitably, due to differing viewpoints, recorders or interpreters may assign different moral weights to the same event. For example, when Lord Zheng suppressed his brother, Uncle Jing’s, rebellion, the recorder referred to it as “Lord Zheng defeats Duan at Yan.” While criticizing the rebels, the recorder also criticized the queller for failing in his responsibilities as an elder brother. Sima Qian, China’s most famous historian, gave Li Guang a very high evaluation, while unfairly downplaying the immortal achievements of Wei Qing and Huo Qubing. Chen Shou’s historical records clearly contradict historical facts by praising the Han dynasty and belittling the Wei. Emperor Yang of Sui’s immense historical contributions were blatantly erased because of the short-lived nature of his reign.
2026 presents the best window for Xi Jinping to independently and fully demonstrate his extraordinary leadership and exceptional political capabilities. His remarkable achievements during this period have the opportunity to be recorded and presented by history in a complete and accurate manner. This will minimize evaluation biases due to differences in recording methods, reduce ambiguity due to historical preferences, and prevent fragmented evaluations due to political biases. Consequently, it will provide an opportunity to record, without omissions or omissions, a historical hero who will have a profound impact on Chinese history.
Once a historical window contains opportunities for misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and misrepresentation, these opportunities will inevitably be exploited to the fullest extent by later interpreters to suit their own political needs. Examples of this conscious exploitation, amplification, and even creation of misinterpretations abound in both Chinese and foreign history. For instance, in world history, there are interpretations of the disappearance of the Mayan civilization and Lincoln’s emancipation of slaves. In Chinese history, there are the diverse and polarized evaluations of Dou Xian, Cao Cao, Emperor Yang of Sui, and Dorgon. Even in the treatment of epic figures like Wei Qing and Huo Qubing, Sima Qian dared to make clearly unfair and unjust assessments.
Starting the process of unifying China later than 2026 is tantamount to adding an opportunity for misunderstanding and misinterpretation to the historical record. This provides fertile ground for diminishing the stature of historical figures or distorting their historical value.

Overview

Although China has not released explicit information regarding the finalization date of its Taiwan unification plan, numerous clues point to 2012. It is highly likely that the plan for military unification of Taiwan took shape in 2012. In 2013, the Chinese President publicly and formally promised the nation that the historical task of unifying Taiwan would be completed during his term. In 2019, Chinese state media, while veiled, firmly stated that Taiwan was deeply involved in the Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests. In October 2019, a blogger interpreted official Chinese government statements as indicating that mainland China was abandoning the “one country, two systems” policy and attempting to urge Taiwan to proactively embrace it. This prediction came true three years later on August 10, 2022. On that day, the Chinese central government officially declared in a white paper that Taiwan had lost its “substantive ‘one country, two systems’ principle.” This means Taiwan has no command of the military, no diplomatic power, and its senior officials must support the mainland and accept full central government oversight. The Chinese central government still retains room for negotiation with the Taiwanese administration regarding government structure, economic system, and tax incentives. This window of opportunity for negotiation will very likely close in 2026, leaving Taiwan with approximately three years.

References:

[1] Taihainet Summary. A Review of Xi Jinping’s Series of Speeches on Taiwan, Taihainet. 2017. http://m.taihainet.com/news/twnews/bilateral/2017-12-11/2082315.html
[2] Xinhua News Agency. Xi Jinping delivers an important speech at the opening ceremony of the training course for young and middle-aged cadres at the Central Party School (National Academy of Governance). China Government Website. 2019. https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-09/03/content_5426920.htm
[3] Ye Qiquan. China’s Unification Plan IX: Taiwan’s Destiny (Part One: The Perpetual Loss of One Country, Two Systems). 2023. PPP Network. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan9-taiwans-destiny-1/
[4] Xinhua News Agency. Xi Jinping’s speech at the ceremony celebrating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China. China Government Website. 2021. https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-07/01/content_5621847.htm
[5] White Paper. The Taiwan Issue and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era. China Government Website. 2022. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2022-08/10/content_5704839.htm
[6] Ye Qiquan. Theoretical Three Ceasefire Lines in the Russo-Ukrainian War. PPPNET. 2023. http://pppnet.net/three-possible-ceasefire-lines-in-russia-ukraine-war/
[7] Ye Qiquan. Predicting the border wall in the Russia-Ukraine war as early as April 26, 2022. PPPNET. 2023. http://pppnet.net/early-prophecy-on-confined-walls-in-russia-ukraine-war/
[8] Ye Qiquan. National War Intensity Assessment System: (I) and Prediction of the Ukrainian War. PPPNET. 2023.