Author: 葉 其泉

依据一全新的国家与国家集团的战争强度评估系统的计算，美国及其联盟无法在东亚周边的战场中击败中国。面对中国在东亚周边的防守型的进攻行动，美国及其盟友几乎是无解的。在各种方案与各种级别的常规军事冲突中，美国联盟都无法取得优势。美国联盟不会遭到重大军事失败的前提依赖于冲突双方的政客们对战争的管理与控制。在保证已方不遭受重大损失的情况下，尽力避免给敌对方造成重大军事损失，将成为可能的东亚周边战争的奇特的特征。但是一旦冲突失控滑入全面战争，将会有非常高的机率启动核战争。一旦支持核战争的西方国家民意被启动，西方政客无力阻挡。这迫使中国必须承担起遏制使用核武器的西方民意的主要责任。中国可能需要进一步思考他们的核武装理论，以切合世界安全与稳定的客观需要，以及世界对中国的期望。

The application of high-power, high-coverage weapons is now increasingly a realistic possibility. The rapid deployment and movement of armed forces is becoming more and more sophisticated. The modes of bloc warfare and total war have returned to political reality. Under these new circumstances, there is a need for a new type of tool for assessing the country's overall war capability and the group's total war capability. This is the original purpose of this paper, which proposes a system for assessing the “intensity of national war”.
In this assessment system, geographic factors, demographic factors, organizational capabilities, military capabilities, and economic capabilities are ranked as the most important war-fighting capability assets. Geography, in particular, is elevated to a level never before recognized. It is seen as the most powerful component of a nation's deterrent power.
According to this assessment system, the countries with the strongest overall national war-fighting capabilities are China, the United States, Russia, India, Brazil, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Indonesia.
Based on the extended arithmetic of this assessment system, it is possible to calculate the war intensity of each war coalition involved in the European war. According to the current structure of the Ukrainian coalition, the overall war intensity of the Ukrainian coalition is weaker than that of the Russian coalition. This should be the fundamental reason for the limitation of the Ukrainian side in the war in the region of Central and South Ukraine.
The current stalemate in the region is also due to the fact that the Russian coalition does not have an overwhelming advantage in terms of the intensity of the war. The Ukrainian coalition has an advantage in terms of military equipment, armament investment capacity, industrial capacity, and service industry capacity. The Ukrainian coalition can strive for war advantage through armament consumption and industrial consumption. The Russian coalition has advantages in terms of geography, organization, and population. Russia can gain further battlefield advantages through manpower depletion and the support of relative political stability.
If Russia tries to push the war effort west of the L1 line, it will inspire an upgraded and renewed Ukrainian coalition. An updated Ukrainian alliance would be significantly stronger in war intensity than Russia's current alliance. It could lead to Russian defeats in Central and South Ukraine.
But the boundary of the new Ukrainian coalition's eastward push can hardly be more than east of the L2 line. Because once the front crosses east of the L2 line, it will inspire an escalation and renewal of the Russian coalition. And thus another power flip will occur.
The application of this assessment system provides a better explanation for the predictions of the direction of the Russo-Ukrainian war made in April, May, and June 2022 by Kichizumi Ye. These predictions indicate that the Russo-Ukrainian war will be confined between the L1 and L2 lines for a relatively long period of time; that Russia will establish up to seven or so autonomous governments on Ukrainian soil; and that Russia will not incur a military defeat at least until the end of 2026 [1,2,3,4].