Three Theoretical Ceasefire Lines in the Russian-Ukrainian War
First Release Date | April 26, 2022 | Reissue Date | May 23, 2022;; | Sept. 18, 2022;; | February 23, 2023 |
summaries：
In the Russo-Ukrainian war, the biggest force in determining the ceasefire lines was the United States, although Russia, Western Europe, and China were also important background factors. Theoretically, there were three ceasefire lines. The first is the geographical demarcation line between the Dnieper River and the Black Sea coastline. It can also be defined as the western border of the battlefield. The second one is the complete administrative border between Luhansk and Donetsk regions. This line also serves as the eastern border of the war. The third set of ceasefire lines is an arbitrary arc drawn over a wide area between the L1 line of the western border wall and the L2 line of the eastern border wall. If the U.S. seeks only a limited outcome in the Russian-Ukrainian war and does not want to get directly involved with more countries, it will have enough initiative to draw a stable cease-fire line somewhere along the L1, L2, or even L3 lines. For Russia, a ceasefire line on the L1 and L2 lines would have a more certain future than the uncertainty associated with the L3 line. Ukraine is not willing to accept the L1 line. But Ukraine has no say in the continuation of the war or in a cease-fire, and the reason that the L1 line is always possible is that it would not harm U.S. strategic interests. The first reason that the L2 line is always possible is that the U.S. has an overwhelming advantage on Ukrainian soil. The second reason is that a cease-fire on the L2 line would not result in a major political defeat for Russia. The third reason is that China would support such a line.Key Words: Russo-Ukrainian War, Ceasefire Line, Battlefield Boundary Wall, Somalization of Ukraine, Yugoslavization of Ukraine.The concept of premieres covered in this article
L1 Ceasefire Line
This is the ceasefire line along the Dnieper River and the Black Sea coastline. The complete Western Ukraine will be clearly defined. The reason why Ukraine does not accept this ceasefire line is quite understandable. This cease-fire line will cost Ukraine too much land. Only an extremely weak Ukraine will accept this reality. It will also be a sign of the West's political and military failure.But this ceasefire line is theoretically possible forever. The main reason is that such a cease-fire line would not jeopardize U.S. strategic interests. Moreover, the U.S. would be able to better control the cost of the war from this line.L2 Ceasefire Line
This is the ceasefire line along the full administrative border between Donetsk and Luhansk. It will also be the bottom line that Russia must hold. The U.S. camp cannot and will not cross this line (at least until 2026). Taking the war to this line is an extremely difficult choice for both the United States and Ukraine. If Ukraine and its leaders insist on this line as the ultimate dream, Ukraine will face enormous risks. 1. Only after a series of brutal battles will it be possible for Ukraine to advance to the L2 line. The prospect of this is the total destruction of the country's economic and livelihood base. 2. Ukraine can only realize this dream with the support of other countries' armed forces. Once Ukraine's allies establish multiple regimes outside of Ukraine's central government, Ukraine will lose control of its own territory. The Somalization of Ukraine will occur when these local states need to cash in on their earlier investments. Worst of all, it will be a repeat of the Yugoslavia's disintegration. 3. In the event of a prolonged struggle in Central Ukraine, the Russians will do their best to establish about seven or so autonomous local governments in Central and Southern Ukraine in order to relieve the prolonged pressure from the US. This would certainly lead to the Yugoslavization of Ukraine. 4. Acceptance of a cease-fire on the L2 line would mean that it would be difficult for Russia to overcome both military and economic failures. But a cease-fire on this line would not lead to a complete political defeat of Russia, and thus no discussion of the nuclear option would occur. 5. 5. This line is definitely Russia's bottom line and the eastern border wall of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Military attempts beyond this wall must trigger discussions of nuclear options. 6. 6. The L2 line is also a good option for China to stop NATO on land. It is politically, militarily, economically and geopolitically feasible.L3 Ceasefire Line
It is a group of ceasefire lines located between the L1 and L2 lines. The ceasefire lines in this area are relatively unstable because no side has been completely defeated. The next conflict could easily occur. But a ceasefire in this area is an easy political maneuver. Powerful politicians can always cash in their political interests in this political investment bank. They can cease fire or rekindle the war in this vast region whenever they need to do so.Somalization in Ukraine
To maintain a long or even just medium-term war, Ukraine must rely on the help of the armed forces of its neighbors. Ukraine's allies can cause the Somalization of Ukraine after its neighbors send their troops into Ukraine to pursue their own national interests.Yugoslavization of Ukraine
In order to relieve long-term pressure from the United States, Russia would benefit from the establishment of a number of local regimes dependent on Russia, including the creation of some seven autonomous local governments. This would lead to the Yugoslavization of Ukraine. Ukraine's allies could also contribute to the Yugoslavization of Ukraine.Europe Divergence
A quick ceasefire would help Europe avoid a long period of chaos. However, some countries want to prolong the war for their own national interests, especially those neighboring countries surrounding Ukraine.China supports the L2 line
Preventing NATO from expanding to the East is not only a real problem for Russia, but also a problem for China in the medium and long term. Therefore, under which circumstances and in which region to establish China's Line of Refusal (LOR) is a very sensitive and complex political and military issue. Supporting Russia on the L2 line is in China's medium-term interest. At the same time, there is a good room for political, military and economic maneuvering.The United States is deciding the course of the war.
This European war is widely known as the Russo-Ukrainian War. In reality, the real players are the United States and Russia. They are the ones who decide where and when the ceasefire line should be set. Among them, the U.S. has an absolute power advantage in Central and Western Ukraine.Ukraine was the most incompetent side in the war.
Ukraine has no decision-making power at all in matters of fighting and ceasefire. He is even weaker than some of his neighbors.=== Main content ====
Definition of the three ceasefire lines
In the Russian-Ukrainian war, there were theoretically three ceasefire lines. The L1 line is the geographic demarcation line delineated by the Dnieper River and the Black Sea coastline.The ceasefire line is relatively stable and difficult to reach. A relatively stable and difficult to reach ceasefire line. It is a final line of denial or a wall of limitation in a combat zone. The L2 line is based on the full administrative border of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions.The ceasefire line is relatively stable, but it is also the most difficult to reach. A relatively stable, but also the most difficult to reach, ceasefire line. It marks a huge military and economic defeat for Russia. It is also the eastern border wall or denial line of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The L3 line is any ceasefire line delineated in the wide area between the L1 and L2 lines.It can be fixed for a limited period of time. It can be fixed for a limited period of time, or it can keep moving back and forth as the battle and ceasefire swings. It won't be stable, but it's easy to achieve.Line L1: Characteristics, Status and Prospects
1. Features of the L1 line
Line L1, a geographic ditch divided by the Dnieper River, may be added to the Black Sea coastline. If both sides agree to choose this line for a ceasefire, it will remain relatively stable for a considerable period of time. The reasons for this are as follows:1.1 Military Function LineThis line has important military attributes. The line has important military attributes, as it can effectively stop or delay any cross river movement. This means that the ceasefire line there has the practical function of reducing the frequency and intensity of collisions.
1.2 Cultural boundariesThere is a great deal of cultural, psychological and ethnic diversity on both sides of the river. The cultural, psychological and ethnic structures on both sides of the river are very different. This is a culturally and psychologically acceptable border between Russia and Ukraine. Although the Kiev region, as a special case, does not have this feature. Both sides can agree to divide people with different ethnic orientations on different sides of the river. It may also carry some historical memory of Eastern and Western Ukraine. Russia, if utilized properly, could use this line to slowly restore the historical memory of Eastern and Western Ukraine.
1.3 Geographical boundariesThis is an excellent geopolitical demarcation line. This is an excellent geopolitical demarcation line, which can prevent the movement of Russian power to Western Europe. It will reduce the historical memory of the fear of Russia in "Europe".
1.4 Political denial linesIt's a bottom line for the U.S. group to stop Russia. It is the bottom line for the US bloc to stop Russia. This line, along the banks of the Dnieper River (and possibly the coastal territories of the Black Sea), is probably Russia's biggest gain in the war. Russia cannot cross this line on its own without the consent of the U.S. bloc. Obviously, the U.S. bloc does not like the idea of Russia crossing the western bank of the Dnieper River and taking over parts of Western Ukraine.
2. Timetable for the emergence of the L1 line
The ceasefire on the L1 line came about when the U.S. group had a close political will with Russia. Here are some of the factors that led them to sit down and talk about the L1 line as a ceasefire line.2.1 After Russia succeeded in establishing its own front on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River.
Russia succeeded in establishing its own front on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River. Russia has successfully established its own front on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River, which it has maintained after numerous counterattacks by the Western bloc. The U.S. may be hesitant to pay the huge price and the harsher consequences.
2.2. When some local neighbors have a strong desire to intervene in the war.
When some local neighboring countries such as Poland, Romania, Hungary, Turkey, Lithuania, etc., have a strong desire to send troops into Ukraine, it will be an urgent time to establish ceasefire lines to prevent the war from prolonging and expanding. Once these local states become involved in the war, it will inevitably and rapidly increase the cost to the United States of managing the war. There is a great risk of losing the effective buffer zone between the U.S. and Russian blocs. The main reason for these local states to send troops to the war would not be for the benefit of Ukraine, but rather the lure of Western and Central Ukraine. Once these local neighbors finally take firm possession of some parts of Ukraine, Western and Central Ukraine will finally lose its function as a great buffer zone separating Russia from “Europe.“
2.3 In times of political pressure on the frontline in China
As soon as significant political pressure emerges from the Chinese front, the U.S. must immediately shift its primary focus to China. Even if traditionally the Chinese do not initiate conflict, the second half of 2026 is a real high-risk point. The West should begin tracking China's public media closely from late 2025.
3. Prospects and political foundations of the L1 line
Rationally, of the three ceasefire options, L1 is not the most difficult one, as both the U.S. and Russia are quite comfortable with it.3.1 For Russia, of course.The L1 line should be the best result Russia can achieve these days.Russia has fully realized its main objectives under this ceasefire line. Russia has fully achieved its main goals under this ceasefire line, including the demilitarization of the Ukrainian army, the removal of anti-Russian forces, and the acquisition of a strategic buffer zone to protect its national interests. Russia will be happy to maintain the stability of this ceasefire line. With this larger interest in mind, Russia will be more tolerant of low-level provocations by its hostile neighbors.
3.2 If the U.S. considers China as its enemy number one, thenA cease-fire line on L1 is reasonable and realistic for the US.The So far.The United States hasFrom this war.It won its main political goal.IncludesWeaken Europe, weaken Russia, and separate Russia from Europe through solid Ukrainian trenches. The U.S. can stop in its tracks as soon as it achieves its pre-determined strategic gains. It can avoid the huge economic costs of continuing to invest in the future. Of course, if the U.S. quickly stops at L1, it will certainly pay a certain political cost for abandoning its comrades.
3.3 Ukraine's unwillingness to accept a ceasefire on the L1 lineThe Ukrainian government will not be able to stop its military and economic power until it is exhausted. No Ukrainian politician would dare to accept the reality of a ceasefire on L1. Until Ukraine completely loses its ability to fight back against Russia, a ceasefire anywhere would be suicidal. (And this does not mean only on the L1 line). Ceasefire on L1 looks scary, but in reality, it is not the worst outcome for Ukraine. Because Ukraine can't drive Russia out of its territory by itself. If Ukraine has to rely on the armed forces of its neighboring countries to fight against Russia, it will certainly end up with a bad outcome of Somalization or Yugoslavization in the course of the war or in the aftermath of the war. From the historical point of view, a bad outcome with certainty is far better than a bad outcome without certainty. But from a political point of view, a bad outcome with certainty is far worse than a worse outcome without certainty. But Ukraine has no real say in the continuation of the war or the ceasefire. Its political capacity is even lower than that of its neighboring allies.
3.4 Europe's Divided Judgments on the Russia-Ukraine WarThe European Union has a strong interest in the establishment of ceasefire agreements. It is in the interest of Europe as a whole, and especially of its core powers, to establish ceasefires everywhere as soon as possible. A quick ceasefire would help Europe avoid a long period of chaos. However, some countries want to prolong the war for their own national interests, especially the local countries around Ukraine. In fact, a divided and weakened Europe would also be beneficial to the long-term interests of the United States. It would increase American influence over the whole of Europe and reduce the cost of running the world. This is one of the main reasons why the US is willing to delay the war.
3.5 In any event.在L1線上建立停火線，不會損害美國的戰略利益，這是L1線作為停火線的可能性永遠存在的最大理由。而且由於上述的L1線的4個特徵，美國在這條線上管理戰爭的成本更低於其它地區。
Line L2: Realistic Characteristics, Opportunities and Prospects
L2線是依盧甘斯克和頓涅茨克地區的完整行政邊界劃定。它是另一條相對穩定的停火線，原因有很多。1. L2停火線的現實基礎
1.1 這條線可能是俄羅斯最初設定的選項之一。如果烏克蘭全面倒向俄羅斯，這條線將會成為一個現實。因為俄羅斯第一階段的軍事行動並沒有成功，導致這個選項很快就消失了。
1.2 L2線已經有了明確的歷史足跡。烏克蘭在行政上對這一地區失去控制已經超過8年。俄羅斯在發起特別軍事行動時已經宣布，這兩個地區已經取得了一種像克羅地亞一樣的地位，至少像科索沃的地位。同時，俄羅斯有足夠的力量來保持對這兩個地區的治理。美國不能或不會越過這條線（因為成本難以控制）。
1.3 L2線將是美國集團在這場動亂中所能達到的最高成就。美國幾乎沒有機會能把俄羅斯壓縮到L2線以東。
1.4 從政治上講，這是俄羅斯精英和普通民眾在經歷了一系列的戰鬥損失後能夠接受的底線。
1.5 L2線也將是中國支持的底線。中國和俄羅斯之間的關係一直都很複雜和微妙。在過去的40年裡，他們是禮貌和客氣的鄰居。這兩個國家既警惕又合作。他們在互相防備的同時相互合作。但是，中國一定會在一定的底線上支持俄羅斯，以避免俄羅斯在政治和軍事上遭受徹底的失敗。L2線就是這樣一條線，保護中國和俄羅斯，防止北約東擴。同時在這裡又有很多的政治操作空間。
2. L2線，時機和促成因素
雖然這條線路相對穩定，但它將是非常難以達到的。它必須與以下時機因素配合。2.1 俄羅斯在戰場上遭受了一系列的失敗；同時在長期的戰爭中，經濟上也遭受了嚴重的困境。俄羅斯的公眾輿論可能不會繼續支持一場曠日持久的戰爭。
2.2 一些烏克蘭軍事力量擺脫美國控制。他們成功地掌握了戰爭的主動權，然後與俄羅斯達成全面的政治妥協，再把停火線放回這條線上。
2.3 中國將出面發表正式聲明，表示一旦俄羅斯在這條線上面臨巨大壓力，這條線是歐洲穩定的重要因素。
3. L2線的前景：實現概率極低
3.1 The U.S. will not pursue this line on its own initiative.
接受這條線路意味着俄羅斯的精英們在反覆鬥爭後真正接受了壓迫性的失敗。這也標誌着俄羅斯在軍事和經濟領域都已經失敗。在這條線上設置防禦牆可以防止可能出現的政治潰敗。 但是美國不會主動追求這一目標，因為美國將為達到該線付出太多。這違背了美國的政治傳統。
3.2 Ukraine is incapable of achieving this goal.
要達到這條線路，烏克蘭必須依靠兩個要素支柱。一個是來自美國和歐盟的經濟和設備支持。另一個是來自其當地盟友的武裝力量。
3.3 The pursuit of this goal will lead to the division of Ukraine.
即使在當地鄰國的支持下，烏克蘭有一丁點可能把戰線推進到L2線，烏克蘭也會實際上失去了對自己國土的控制權。因為這些鄰國軍隊肯定會在烏克蘭領土上兌現其早期的投入成本。兌現其成本的方式包括建立多個獨立於烏克蘭中央政府的小型地方政權。這將導致Somalization in Ukraine。最壞的結果是有可能重演南斯拉夫解體的劇本。
Line L3, Group 3 Ceasefire Lines
1. 特徵和相關背景
實際上，在L1線和L2線之間還有一組停火線。在一個大的區域內暫時停火。在這樣的地區，在低強度妥協的情況下，停火線很容易就達成了。它也可以被戰爭中任何一方的低強度的政治需要所打破。 這一區域內的停火線，甚至可以只由戰爭中的一方單方面建立。戰爭中的任何一方或雙方都可以很容易地在這個寬闊的區域建立停火線，然後輕易地將其打破。這種停火和開火的遊戲可以在這個地區反覆進行。 在這一地區建立停火線是三種停火線方案中最容易的一種。它並不要求戰爭中的某一方完全被打敗。換句話說，停火線上的任何一方都保留有足夠的能力來挑起下一次對抗。挑起下一場戰鬥不需要特別大的政治和經濟成本。2. 對相關各方的價值
2.1 Uncertainty about Russia
對俄羅斯，在這一地區的停火則是一個很深的陷阱。由於美國在這一地區的全面強勢，可以將俄羅斯拖入長期戰爭的不確定性中。
2.2 Benefits to the United States
（1. L3區的停火線對美國和俄羅斯具有完全不同的政治價值。對美國來說，L3線是管理戰爭的時長和規模的一個完美抓手。
(2. 美國實際上是用俄烏戰爭中的最強大力量。美國不僅有能力決定何時何地設立停火線，而且有魔力將不利的局面變成有利的局面。如果美國想在L3線地區建立停火線，就意味着美國有計劃在這個地區長期保持其超級影響力。其他每一個國家，包括俄羅斯，都必須跟着美國的步伐跳舞。
（3. 美國還有另一個很大的優勢，即美國有機會在白俄羅斯和哈薩克斯坦發揮其影響力，使俄羅斯緩慢而長期地流血。
2.3 Split Ukraine
（1 來自烏克蘭的鄰國的武裝力量，一旦在中烏克蘭占據優勢，他們就會追求自己的國家利益。即烏克蘭的盟友將會帶來烏克蘭的索馬里化。 （2 如果俄羅斯在長期纏鬥中占據優勢，一定會在烏克蘭土了上建立多達7個左右的自治政府，以對抗來自美國的長期戰爭壓力。並最終導致烏克蘭的南斯拉夫化。即俄羅斯將會帶來烏克蘭的南斯拉夫化。
2.4 Splitting of Europe
歐洲國家沒有能力對俄烏戰爭做出適當的反應。
（1少数欧洲国家从俄乌战争中获益
一些歐洲國家，可能是波蘭、羅馬尼亞、匈牙利、土耳其和波羅的海國家，會被他們的青春荷爾蒙所驅使，跳進一場曠日持久的戰爭。環烏克蘭國家是這場俄烏戰爭中可能獲利的極少數歐洲國家。
（2 歐洲普遍性地受損
對於歐洲的核心大國，該地區的長期混亂只會對他們帶來近期，中期，和長期的損失。但不幸的是，他們也沒有能力做出適當的反應。
（3 美國促使和推進歐洲分裂
換句話講，歐洲核心大國希望在任何地方儘快停火，以減少損失。烏克蘭的鄰國則希望延長戰爭來獲利。這是歐洲進一步分裂的基礎。而美國則樂意看到這個裂痕擴大。
過戰爭建立割裂俄羅斯和歐洲的壕溝，也是美國分裂歐洲的一個手段。
消滅掉歐洲的一個主要的原材料基地，能讓美國從經濟上更好地控制歐洲。
3. L3線的機會（在烏克蘭中部停戰）
如果俄烏戰爭中的主要大國，美國和俄羅斯，對控制戰爭成本有相同的期望，在L3線地區設置停火線可能是雙方的第一個選擇。如果俄羅斯在今年（2022年）冬天之前不能在L1線建立穩定的拒止邊界，那麼在L3線地區建立停火線的機會將迅速增加。當俄羅斯面臨強大的軍事壓力，以及美國面臨強大的經濟壓力時，在L3區的停火就會實現。4. L3線停火帶來的前景
L3線地區的任何停火線都是有風險的，不僅對俄羅斯，對其他正在或將要參戰的玩家也是如此。4.1 To Russia (at risk)
（1. 美國在第聶伯河和多巴斯之間的L3線地區擁有強大的綜合力量。如果在那裡建立停火，俄羅斯將面臨被捲入一場長期戰爭的巨大風險。 （2. 為了緩解美國集團的長期政治和軍事壓力，強大的拒止陣線對俄羅斯來說是必要的。但這將使俄羅斯付出很大的經濟和軍事代價。因此建立起依賴俄羅斯的多個地方政權將是一個重要的反應方案。 （3. 同時，俄羅斯必須加速進入中國主導的經濟體系以增強自己的經濟基礎。 （4. 另一對策是，俄羅斯希望引誘歐洲幫助穩定這一地區的停火線。 （5. 如果俄羅斯引誘歐洲參與穩定停火線的努力失敗，俄羅斯將會參與或製造更大的歐洲混亂來減輕壓力。
4.2 For Local Neighbors (Short-term Gains, Long-term Losses)
對於多個當地鄰國來說，在L3區劃上停火線可能是一個參與和干預這場延長的戰爭的好機會。（1. 這個機會可能會增加他們在歐洲的發言權和對地區局勢的影響。 （2. 可能增強其公民的自信心和榮譽感。 （3. 增加與美國綁定的機會，從而獲得軍事和經濟利益。 （4. 激活歐洲不停地移動邊界的傳統，以期望獲得利益。 （5. 中期面临压力。在美國、中國、俄羅斯、法國、德國、伊朗、土耳其等幾個大國的壓迫下，烏克蘭周邊國家並沒有太多表演的空間。 （6.長期面臨危機。長期看烏克蘭周邊國家將面臨被俄羅斯、伊朗、土耳其三個大國壓迫。尤其如果中國與美國發生高強度衝突的劇本下，這種情況會加速出現。一旦歐洲被俄羅斯、伊朗、土耳其三個大國壓迫，這些被青春荷爾蒙驅使的國家將面臨如何保護自己的課題。
4.3 To the European core countries (in danger)
（1. 對於歐洲的核心國家來說，無論停火線在哪裡，儘快穩定歐洲的局勢是他們的首要任務。長期的混亂將置歐洲進入經濟和政治的雙重衰退。 （2. 歐洲核心國家同時擔心一場持久的戰爭會將中國捲入。如果這樣，他們將不得不直接面對與中國的爭端。 （3. 在中國與美國發生激烈的高強度衝突時，引發歐洲的混亂和衰退，必定是中國的一個合理選擇。
4.4 For Ukraine (inevitably divided)
（1. 烏克蘭自身沒有足夠的力量在L3線上與俄羅斯對抗，這是一個基本事實。 （2. 烏克蘭必須依靠美國和歐洲的經濟和設備支持，以及當地國家的武裝部隊的支持。這些當地國家派兵上戰場肯定是為了自己的國家利益，而不是為了烏克蘭的利益。他們一定會以某種方式兌現自己的投資。一個簡單的方法是建立一些獨立於烏克蘭中央政府的地方政權。這就相當於烏克蘭的索馬里化。最壞的結果是閱讀南斯拉夫分裂的劇本。 （3. 如果俄羅斯在中烏克蘭占優，烏克蘭被分裂的命運更是難以避免。南斯拉夫分裂的劇本肯定會在烏克蘭上演。 （4. 以200年的周期來看，一個俄羅斯逐步地浸涉並擴張到第聶伯河的沿岸的劇本，是合符俄罗斯的國家利益和民族利益的。
4.5 For the United States (pros and cons)
（1. 對美國來說，在L3區建立停火線會有很大的好處。這個國家有足夠的力量來主導這個地區的局勢。包括停火或重啟战火，以控制戰爭的規模和長度。美國從而有隨時對俄羅斯施加壓力的主動權。 （2. 維持烏克蘭壕溝的政治，軍事，經濟功能，至少在今後的50年中阻斷歐洲與俄羅斯的合作。 （3. 增加對歐洲的管理與控制力量，減小管理歐洲的成本。 （4. 如果多個國家積極地介入俄烏戰爭，美國管理這場戰爭的成本一定會急劇地增加 （5. 美國可以利用戰爭的壓力，在亞洲建立一個新的軍事政治聯盟。美國或者有可能將北約擴大到亞洲以壓縮中國。 （6. 如果中國與美國發生高強度衝突，美國沒有把握能獲勝。當然中國也沒有把握戰勝美國。但是對於大國來講，不確定性就是政治失敗。 （7. 只要在一場中等規模與中等強度的戰爭中，美國不能戰勝中國，美國管理世界的成本就會急劇上升。
Conclusion
簡而言之，理論上有三條停火線。L1線是沿着第聶伯河和黑海海岸線建立的地理分界。L2線是沿頓涅茨克和盧甘斯克的完整行政邊界建立。L3線是設置在L1線和L2線之間廣大地區的任何停火線。L2線是一條相對穩定的停火線，但它極難到達，可以確定至少在2026年底之前沒有希望。L3線目前看來是最容易實現的。戰爭中的主要國家可能都在考慮這個問題。但它也使所有參與方承受各種風險。雖然L1線不容易獲得，但對各方來說似乎相對穩定。如果參戰的主要國家不想繼續投入巨大的成本，在L1線上停火對他們不失為一個理想的解決方案。烏克蘭當然會反對在L1線上停火，他是他們在這場戰爭中沒有發言的能力。L1線的可能性長期存在的一個重要原因是：在這裡停火不會損害美國的戰略利益。參考文獻：
- Ye, QiQuan. Where will be ceasefire line chosen in Ukrainian War. The submitted recept from Opinion Channel @guardian.co.uk on April 26, 2022.
- Ye, QiQuan. Three Possible Ceasefire Lines of Russia-Ukraine War: Reality Basis, Opportunity, and Prospects. The submitted recept from International Security on May 23, 2022.
- Ye, QiQuan. Three Possible Ceasefire Lines of Russia-Ukraine War: Reality Basis, Opportunity, and Prospects. [Blogger Version of this Article] https://destinedfating.blogspot.com/2022/09/three-possible-ceasefire-lines-of.html
- Ye, QiQuan. Whose War? Players winning or losing in the Russia-Ukraine War. https://destinedfating.blogspot.com/2022/09/whose-war-players-winning-or-losing-in.html
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