| Chinese Current Affairs | Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 3, August 2026 |
USA Beats China again and Wait the Next Win
Ye Qiquan
| First release date: | Saturday, May 16, 2026 (Published in advance) |
| Reference data element: (APA) | |
| Ye Qiquan. (2026). The United States wins another game and awaits the next victory. Political Prediction and In-depth Analysis. August 2026. Volume 1 (3), 20-27. | |
| summary:
Driven by fear of American competitiveness and their own future, China’s ruling politicians used this summit with the US to deliver a complete surrender to the United States. This surrender agreement was prepared even before negotiations began. The US president not only didn’t have to expend any political resources, but didn’t even have to bend down to pick up the agreement. And America’s victory won’t stop there. China has already requested the next summit in the fall of 2026. It’s entirely reasonable to expect the US to achieve an even greater political victory at the next meeting. Meanwhile, China’s highest leadership needs to be vigilant about the enormous political risks.
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| Keywords: | |
| US-China summit; China’s unified procedures; national interests; political leverage; the “July 1 mechanism”; uncertainty. | |
(Note: “July 1 Mechanism”: refers to the announcement published by the People’s Daily, China’s top party newspaper, on July 1, 2025, regarding the establishment of the “CPC Central Committee Decision-Making and Deliberative Body.” This announcement signifies the transfer of China’s highest political decision-making power from Xi Jinping to a body named the “CPC Central Committee Decision-Making and Deliberative Body.” However, Xi Jinping still leads the executive branch of the body and fully retains his legitimacy and authority.)
I. Background and Summary
Although the first two articles in this issue were published in the same issue, the initial versions of these two closely related articles were actually published a month apart.
A month ago, Ye Qiquan predicted that by arranging this summit between the Chinese and American leaders, the United States had won a crucial victory—securing approximately four years of strategic stability and security. Regardless of whether the summit results in an agreement, a compromise, or a complete breakdown in relations, it will not affect the United States’ acquisition of this four-year strategic security period.
Ye Qiquan’s prediction has been partially validated by the outcome of the Sino-US summit. Specifically, the Xi Jinping administration has publicly pledged to the United States that it “will not initiate the process of China’s reunification during Xi Jinping’s term in office.” This means that China will not initiate the process of reunifying Taiwan until at least December 2027.
Xi Jinping’s promise was, in fact, made before the meeting between the Chinese and American leaders. The Americans only needed to say a few perfunctory words to achieve this significant outcome—without even investing basic political resources, they only needed to respond to a few ambiguous body language responses from the Chinese political leaders, thus hinting at possible future protection.
II. The US victory was already determined before the meeting.
By reviewing the People’s Daily reports from May 12th to 16th, 2026, one can clearly see the entire process by which the United States won the meeting. This process can be expressed in two Chinese words: “giving away for free.”
The following is a series of reports from the People’s Daily on the meeting between the Chinese and American leaders. It’s worth taking the time to review them.
| A series of reports from the People’s Daily on the China-US summit. | ||||
| Headline of the report | date | Page layout | Content and Background | significance |
| The Third Cross-Strait Summit on Chinese Culture Opens in Beijing | May 12 | Second Edition | People from both sides of the Taiwan Strait sat down and sincerely discussed unimportant matters.
The implication is that reunification by force is not on the political agenda. |
Openly flirting with Americans. I’m not challenging you anymore. |
| We can absolutely achieve mutual success and common prosperity. | May 12 | 3rd Edition | Hint: I’m not challenging your leadership. | Warlords
Before formally surrendering, a messenger was sent. |
| Grasp the direction of the development of China-US relations from a grand historical perspective | May 12 | 3rd Edition | Political lesson: We must surrender; surrendering is the right thing to do.
The Chinese public is being publicly guided to understand that avoiding conflict with the United States is the right direction. |
Publicly downgraded
Our lord is about to surrender, you must not resist. |
| Sino-US relations cannot go back to the past, but they can have a better future. | May 13 | 3rd Edition | We used to argue and nothing came of it, but from now on, brother, I’ll follow you. | Buying peace with money is a good solution; everyone should stick to this path. |
| To lay a more solid foundation for the development of China-US relations | May 13 | 3rd Edition | My surrender begins now, and I must be prepared for a long-term surrender. I will be America’s lackey forever. | Why bother fighting? It’s easier to live on your knees. |
| Striving to explore the correct way for China and the United States to get along in the new era | May 14 | 3rd Edition | The consequences of conflict and confrontation are unbearable for anyone. “Cooperation benefits both sides, while confrontation harms both.” “Mutual achievement and common prosperity” is the only correct choice. | Today’s edition of “Wang Jingwei’s Path to Save China” |
| A more stable US-China relationship is crucial for the world. | May 14 | 3rd Edition | Speaking on behalf of the Chinese capitulationists through the words of an American. | Today’s version of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Declaration |
| Building a “constructive and strategically stable relationship between China and the United States” is the most important political consensus. | May 16 | 1st Edition | Surrender document | China has agreed to remain America’s junior partner forever. |
| Let 2026 be a historic and landmark year for China-US relations, marking a new chapter and a brighter future. | May 16 | First Edition | Commemorating the first year of being a younger brother | A milestone in being America’s little brother |
| Forging a new path for proper coexistence among major powers in the new era. | May 16 | Second Edition | Being a subordinate is the right path | Being a lackey and drinking leftover soup is the right path in China. |
| Moving in the same direction and jointly opening a new chapter in China-US relations | May 16 | Second Edition | The path of being a subordinate is bright. | Brother, if you give me a sip of soup, I’ll always be your little brother. |
| Compiled by: Ye Qiquan/PPPNET | ||||
Political analysis doesn’t actually require secret intelligence. Public declarations are the definitive political conclusions. By reading China’s public political declarations, we can clearly see the process and context of a Sino-US meeting (negotiation). That is, before the political negotiations even began, the Chinese had already unabashedly presented their surrender. The US president even skipped the step of bending down to pick it up.
The United States’ victory in this major battle came so easily and so completely. The process and the outcome have utterly shocked capitalists and politicians like Trump, who have long relied on complex power struggles to achieve victory.
III. Background and Reasons for the US Victory
The main reason the US won so easily in this round of Sino-US negotiations stemmed from the fear of Chinese politicians regarding their own future. They hoped to gain US government protection for themselves or their family members by sacrificing China’s national interests.
Furthermore, the fear of America’s overall national competitiveness is the deeper political context behind all of this.
3.1 Fear of U.S. national competitiveness
It cannot be denied that China’s reform and opening-up process was basically a copy of the American economic model.
China officially embarked on a path of rapid development starting with its choice to become America’s junior partner (important milestones: 1972, 1979).
China’s rapid accumulation of national wealth and rapid growth in national competitiveness are also the result of obediently serving as America’s junior partner.
The training templates for China’s humanities theory system and national management system are copied directly from American tutorials and lecture notes.
Against this backdrop, China’s national governance system is rife with technocrats, politicians, and power assessment systems cultivated using the American model. While China’s national governance system boasts numerous patriots, idealists, and politicians with a strong sense of ownership, more importantly, they rely on an American-produced assessment system and narrative standards when evaluating national strength, overall competitiveness, and overall warfighting capabilities.
Within the framework of American-based national power assessment systems and narrative models, there exists a well-established overall assessment of the national power of China and the United States. The key point of this conclusion is that “China will, around 2050, essentially approach or slightly surpass the overall national competitiveness of the United States.” This conclusion forms the ideological basis for China’s fear of challenging American authority.
3.2 Fear of America’s intelligence-destroying capabilities
A significant event in US-China relations occurred in 2023 when the US disclosed extremely detailed intelligence on China’s Rocket Force. This event is considered to have weakened China’s overall strategic military power. This is yet another driving force behind the Chinese military and political circles’ fear of overall US power.
3.3 The Xi Jinping Group’s Fear of the Future and Fate
Since the announcement on July 1, 2025, of the transfer of China’s highest power, the Xi Jinping faction has been seeking a way out of its predicament.
The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee, held from October 20 to 23, 2025, temporarily slowed the decline of the Xi Jinping faction. It also suppressed the pace of the “Spring Blossoms and Autumn Fruits” propaganda campaign.
On January 24, 2026, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were quarantined, marking a stunning achievement in the self-rescue efforts of the Xi Jinping Group.
The announcement on July 1, 2025, did not significantly weaken the “traditional authority” of the Xi Jinping group, which became the biggest source of strength for its self-salvation. The visit of the US president further consolidated this “traditional authority.” This “traditional authority,” together with the power structure established before July 1, 2025, constitutes the foundation for the Xi Jinping group’s self-salvation, revival, or complete rebirth.
The above measures are insufficient to guarantee the long-term security of the Xi Jinping faction. Due to the Xi Jinping faction’s harsh governing style in the early stages, if it does not acquire a sufficiently strong protective shield, the entire group will face severe political purges once they lose power. This is not even the worst-case scenario; they may also be held accountable for historical responsibilities. Not only will they bear responsibility for the political turmoil of 2025, but they may also be accused of “selling out national interests and hindering the process of national reunification,” thus permanently severing their families from historical records and denying them any chance of a resurgence.
3.4 The helplessness, tacit approval, or even indifference of China’s deep-seated forces
According to the announcement on July 1, 2025, the final political decision-making power in China does not reside in the hands of Xi Jinping’s ruling group. However, due to serious flaws in the constraint mechanisms designed in that announcement, the leaders of China’s deep-seated political forces (the CCP Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies) cannot fully control the political process. This is the main reason why Xi Jinping’s group can openly launch a “surrender plan” this time.
Of course, it cannot be ruled out that this “surrender plan” was put forward under the leadership of the “decision-making body.” It cannot be ruled out that this current highest authority in China is filled with another faction of “idealists,” namely, those who “follow the United States and avoid conflict with it.” Wang Jingwei’s willingness to organize a traitorous government was not driven by personal gain, but also by his “ideal.”
3.5 The helplessness and marginalization of China’s military power
The decisive role of the Chinese military in maintaining political stability cannot be denied. Especially now, China’s political stability heavily relies on military power. However, it is undeniable that the role of the Chinese military is severely disconnected from the political privileges it enjoys. This is a structural flaw that arose when the “July 1st Announcement Mechanism” was established. After Zhang Youxia’s isolation, this flaw lost its mechanism for adjustment, rendering the military completely incapable of intervening in the political process.
The “July 1st Mechanism” was designed by China’s deep-seated political forces to both control the political process through the military and limit its “orthodox armor.” However, this very mechanism led to Zhang Youxia’s isolation and also puts the leaders of China’s deep-seated political forces at risk of losing their supreme decision-making power.
America’s next winning opportunity
The US winning streak appears to be continuing. Chinese officials have announced they “look forward to visiting the US this fall.” This suggests a complex storyline is likely to unfold.
This meeting between the Chinese and American leaders yielded unexpected results for the United States. A seasoned negotiator like Trump certainly picked up on the flirtatious gestures from Chinese politicians, including initial signals of surrender, preliminary political concessions, signals of anticipation for further negotiations, and expectations of future gains.
One definitive conclusion is that Chinese politicians have presented their written surrender to the United States. However, due to stringent monitoring procedures, these politicians have not had the opportunity to articulate their demands and requests. Once Chinese politicians enter U.S. territory, these monitoring procedures cease to function. This provides the stage for these capitulationist politicians to negotiate further deals with the United States.
The most pressing need of China’s ruling politicians is for the United States to provide a protection mechanism for their future. In this deal, it is reasonable to expect the United States to reap even greater political benefits.
Although the United States will not agree to the terms that allow Xi Jinping to remain in the United States, China must be vigilant against the emergence of this serious political crisis.
Xi Jinping could easily use the condition of remaining in the United States to force China’s domestic decision-making bodies to provide him with strict and specific political guarantees. The probability of this happening is extremely high. Xi Jinping’s political maneuvering abilities and moral boundaries far exceed the predictable range of “the current leader of the decision-making body.”
The US could loudly proclaim the certainty of the next meeting between the Chinese and American leaders. This would force China to follow through, thereby increasing the US’s chances of winning its next political victory.
discuss:
The US victory began even before the Sino-US meeting. A month ago, Ye Qiquan asserted that the US had already secured a four-year period of strategic stability by arranging this meeting (Ye Qiquan, 2026). This assertion has now been reaffirmed. The Xi Jinping administration has promised the US that it will not initiate China’s unification process during his term.
Although the scheduled meeting between China and the United States is from May 13 to 15, 2026, Chinese state media, in their pre-meeting propaganda on the 12th and 13th, proactively pledged to “achieve mutual success and common prosperity,” “lay a more solid foundation for China-US relations,” and “grasp the direction of the development of China-US relations from a grand historical perspective.” These are all blatant political signals of China formally surrendering to the United States.
For the first 13 years of Xi Jinping’s administration, the Chinese government appeared on the world political stage as a challenger to the United States. In 2026, the Chinese government made a complete 180-degree turn, surrendering to the US and offering a series of political commitments. This major political victory not only safeguards the short-term political interests of the United States but also confirms the political prediction made by Ye Qiquan a month earlier: that the United States has secured at least four years of strategic stability.
On May 16, 2026, the People’s Daily, China’s most authoritative state-run newspaper, officially set the political conclusions for the China-US summit. These conclusions are: “A constructive and strategically stable relationship between China and the US” is the most important political consensus, and “Let 2026 become a historic and landmark year for China-US relations, carrying forward the past and opening up the future.” The straightforward content of these political declarations can be translated as follows.
- China has proactively acknowledged to the United States that it will not challenge the US’s global taxation rights and will continue to pay tribute to the US, focusing on being a follower of the US imperial order.
- China will not (at least not during Xi Jinping’s administration) initiate any action to reunify with Taiwan. It will not even involve the US mechanism to jointly maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
- China not only currently submits to the United States, but will also establish a long-term mechanism to ensure its continued submission to the United States.
Why do China’s current political leaders dare to openly and blatantly promise the United States “not to initiate unification” and to uphold the American imperial order?
Ye Qiquan analyzed that the following reasons may exist.
Underlying background reasons:
China’s governing system contains a fundamental national power assessment system built upon contemporary Western narrative templates and evaluation frameworks. This system concludes that China will only be able to approach or reach parity with the United States in terms of national competitiveness and overall warfighting capabilities around 2050. This conclusion establishes the theoretical basis for the Chinese governing system’s fear of American national power. Although Ye Qiquan proposed an alternative system for assessing national warfighting capabilities, it is clear that Ye’s system has not gained acceptance within China’s professional and theoretical frameworks (Ye Qiquan, 2023).
Real-world political reasons:
On July 1, 2025, China announced the transfer of its supreme decision-making power and ultimate political decision-making authority. This power has shifted from Xi Jinping to a body dubbed the “Central Decision-Making Deliberative Body.” This has led to significant anxieties surrounding the Xi Jinping faction regarding potential political purges.
Ye Qiquan had previously predicted through multiple channels that if the Xi Jinping faction failed to complete the unification process in China by February 2027, he, his family, his maternal family, his wife’s family, and members of his main group would suffer severe political retribution. They might even be branded with historical responsibility, preventing their families from ever rising again in Chinese history.
Driven by deep anxiety and fear of political retribution, China’s ruling politicians today have readily surrendered to the United States in exchange for the possibility of American protection for the political and personal safety of their family members.
Of course, we cannot rule out another, less likely, possibility: that this surrender agreement was a long-term policy introduced under the guidance of China’s “central decision-making body.”
Because China’s theoretical system, value cultivation system, and power assessment system are all based on the American model, the existence of another type of “political idealist” in China cannot be ruled out. They have full faith in the political, military, and moral power of the United States. They adhere to the theory that conflict with the United States is unacceptable. They contributed to the conclusion of this comprehensive surrender agreement between China and the United States.
The US has another chance to win.
Although this time, Chinese politicians delivered a complete surrender to the United States, they received nothing in return. Under China’s tight political surveillance, politicians cannot find an opportunity to discuss private deals. For these politicians who submitted the surrender document, it served only as a pledge of allegiance. They received no political reward. They must find an environment where they can evade surveillance to conduct private negotiations and express their demands to the United States. Going to the United States, of course, provides such an environment.
Chinese authorities have publicly sought an invitation for a return visit to the United States, hoping it will take place in the fall of 2026. This presents a golden opportunity for the US to gain another advantage. Having escaped China’s oversight environment, China’s capitulationist politicians could very well use this opportunity to trade China’s national interests for their own private gains. The most likely scenario is a request for promises or concrete measures of protection from the US government for themselves and their family members.
The United States will have a great opportunity to gain a lot of political benefits with very little political resources.
summary:
Driven by fear of American competitiveness and their own future, China’s ruling politicians used this summit with the US to deliver a complete surrender to the United States. This surrender agreement was prepared even before negotiations began. The US president not only didn’t have to expend any political resources, but didn’t even have to stoop down to pick up an agreement. And America’s victory won’t stop there. China has already requested the next summit in the fall of 2026. It’s entirely reasonable to expect the US to achieve an even greater political victory at the next meeting. Meanwhile, China’s highest levels of power need to be vigilant about the enormous political risks.
References:
Ye, Qiquan. (2023). Group War Strength System: Predicting the Outcome of a Full-Scale War Between China and the US Around East Asia. PPPNET. Dec. 9, 2023. https://pppnet.net/group-war-strength-system-predicting-china-usa-war-around-east-asia/
Ye, Qiquan. (2023). A model of national war strength, and a prediction of the course of the war in Ukraine. PPPNET. Dec. 7, 2023. https://pppnet.net/nation-war-strength-model-and-prediction/
Ye Qiquan. (2026). Delaying China’s Reunification: A Key Victory for the United States. Political Forecasts and In-Depth Analysis. August 2026. Vol. 1(3), 1-14.
Ye, Qiquan. (2026). Delaying China’s Reunification: A Key Victory for the United States. PPPNet. Apr. 12, 2026. https://pppnet.net/usa-wins-on-delaying-chinas-reunification/
Ye Qiquan. (2026). Ranking of National War Intensity in 2022. Political Prediction and In-depth Analysis. April 2026. Volume 1 (2), 60-68.
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