(Research Outline)

summary:

The United States theoretically has five response plans to China’s actions toward reunification across the Taiwan Strait: two pre-emptive plans and three post-emptive plans. Theoretically, the pre-emptive plans, whether through negotiation or deterrence, can achieve relatively ideal results. However, in practice, given the political system of the US-West Asia alliance, the two pre-emptive plans have essentially no opportunity to be implemented. After China launched its military action, it is only natural for the US-West Asia alliance countries to respond politically, economically, and militarily. In addition to comprehensive political sanctions, the US-West Asia alliance has three different supplementary response plans: a comprehensive economic war plan; a pacification military plan; and a total war plan. Regardless of the response chosen by the US-led coalition, its starting point and/or potential outcome both point to “stopping the bleeding.” The opportunity for the US-led coalition to profit from China’s actions is virtually nonexistent. If China and the US-led coalition were to launch a full-scale total war, a highly complex historical upheaval involving Europe, Asia, Africa, and even broader regions would very likely commence.

Keywords:

China, unification, Taiwan Strait, military operations, US-China conflict, options

Various signs clearly indicate that China’s unification efforts are impossible to stop or prevent [1, 2, 3]. China’s military operations across the Taiwan Strait have a completely different significance for the United States than any other war since World War II. This war will shake (damage, destabilize, weaken, and dismantle) the US-led imperial order and may lead to the partial or even complete dismantling of the core of US-European imperial rule. The best response for the United States and Europe is to minimize losses. The chances of zero losses or even profiting from China’s military actions are extremely slim.
The US-led coalition’s damage mitigation strategy can proceed in two directions: pre-emptive response and post-event response. Different response plans exist for each direction, including: pre-emptive negotiation and deterrence plans; and post-event comprehensive economic sanctions, pacification military plans, and total war plans, all within the framework of political sanctions.

I. Pre-negotiation plan

The premise of the prior negotiation plan was that the US bloc had clearly recognized the unstoppable pace of China’s resolution of the Taiwan issue. It did not expect China’s unification efforts to further escalate the damage to the existing imperial order. Therefore, it initiated comprehensive political negotiations with China, hoping that China would not become a powerful force opposing the existing order, or even the leader of a group of opposing forces.

1.1 Basic Contents of the Pre-Negotiation Plan

1.1.1 The previously announced framework for Taiwan will not be included in the negotiations.

Since the Chinese central government released its white paper on the Taiwan issue on August 10, 2022, it has clearly rejected granting Taiwan “substantive one country, two systems” treatment. This is the published framework. The Chinese central government cannot back down from this publicly stated position.
Since the Chinese central government’s timeline is essentially set, there is no longer enough time to negotiate and change the path to unification. Moreover, the Chinese central government will likely view negotiations on the path to unification as a political trap.

1.1.2 The legal status and troop presence of the United States in Northeast Asia

Once China reunifies Taiwan, and if it utilizes Taiwan as a “land bridge” or “land sword,” it will severely restrict the United States’ “freedom of operation” capabilities in the Sea of Japan and surrounding areas. If China engages in deep cooperation with Russia, it can strengthen this capability from both the north and south. This presents a strategic challenge to the United States.
The legal status of the United States in Northeast Asia and the issue of its military presence should be the biggest demands of the United States in the negotiations.

1.1.3 Issues of Political Cooperation in Northeast Asia

Political cooperation in Northeast Asia will be a major concern for China. This is also the substantive issue that worries the United States the most. If China gains a geopolitical advantage over Taiwan (and possibly even the northern tip of the Sea of Japan), and subsequently strengthens its political cooperation with Japan, South Korea, and Russia, the gradual withdrawal of American power from Northeast Asia is a entirely predictable process.
This is a major developmental issue that China cannot avoid in its historical process. It is difficult to completely stagnate or make significant substantive concessions in this regard. Chinese diplomatic professionals will use a multi-pronged approach and sophisticated techniques to alleviate American concerns and gradually advance this process.

1.1.4 China will not further erode US political power.

Whether the United States can ensure or confirm that it will not interfere with or oppose U.S. political decisions outside of its surrounding geopolitical issues is another key concern. This is an important aspect of how the United States concentrates wealth through power and maintains its expensive imperial machine.

1.1.5 China’s Economic Decision-Making Power

Whether China can promise not to further erode Europe’s economic power is a key concern for Europe.
A key concern for China is how it can make progress in areas of economic decision-making power.
Europe, China, and the United States must make progress on this substantive issue, which is a crucial part of integrating China into the American imperial order. A confrontation among the three parties on this issue will become an obstacle to comprehensive political coordination.

1.1.6 U.S. Freedom of navigation within Chinese maritime baselines

This issue is not the key issue, but it can become a side benefit for both China and the United States when negotiating political and economic power. This non-essential issue may serve as a lubricant for key negotiations.
With China expanding its geopolitical advantages, the issue of the United States’ right to independent navigation in the waters surrounding China will not pose a substantial disadvantage or real threat to China. In addition to the apparent political gains the United States gains, China can even gain apparent benefits from Sino-US cooperation.

1.2 Advantages of prior negotiation

Prior negotiations can cover all key points of concern to both parties, reaching an agreement through compromise. For those who uphold the existing order, this is the safest and most reliable way to mitigate losses.
For the challenger, reducing the risk of military conflict while gaining substantial benefits is the best way to ensure political success.

1.3 Disadvantages, difficulties, and significance of prior negotiations

There exists a complex political reality. The political solutions most beneficial to a country or bloc are often the most difficult to implement within the US Western bloc. There are two major obstacles to reaching a pre-negotiation agreement with China. First, there is the disagreement within the US Western bloc leadership regarding the proposed solution. Second, there is public opinion resistance within the US Western bloc countries.

1.3.1 Decision-making resistance

European countries and the United States will not have completely aligned political and economic positions. A unified understanding of political concessions to China is unlikely. Even if such a political compromise is adopted, it could become a source of future infighting within power groups.

1.3.2 Public Opinion Resistance

Political decision-making processes in the United States and European countries are strongly influenced by public opinion. Before public opinion in the Western world is gradually shifted, any prior political compromises or agreements with China will generally be rejected by public opinion. Any politician who forcibly pushes through pre-negotiation plans with China faces pressure to end their political career.

1.3.3 The significance of prior negotiation plans

From an operational perspective, negotiating a solution in advance is practically impossible.
Although it was not feasible to implement, the behind-the-scenes discussions and contacts regarding the pre-planning scheme facilitated the implementation of the “post-event pacification plan.” This is the greatest significance of the pre-planning scheme.

II. Preventive Measures

2.1 Definition and Content of Preventive Measures

The preemptive deterrence strategy refers to a series of strong and comprehensive military plans, or even preemptive military actions, prepared by the US-led coalition before China launches a military operation to unify Taiwan. Its approach is to prevent a Chinese landing on Taiwan by deploying a large military force in advance, thus preventing such an event from occurring at the source. This leads to a series of different possible outcomes.

There are only three ways to successfully prevent mainland China from landing on Taiwan.

2.1.1 Preemptive deterrence: Directly stationing US-led coalition military forces on the island of Taiwan in advance; directly and effectively countering any landing operations by the Chinese central government.
2.1.2 Preemptive measures: Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines station overwhelmingly superior military forces in advance to prevent China from landing on the islands.
2.1.3 Nuclear deterrence: Immediately upon China’s launch of air operations, test-fire small nuclear devices directly from small reefs in the South China Sea with unclear ownership, thus escalating the war to its highest level. This demonstrates a willingness to use nuclear weapons in a decisive battle to deter a Chinese amphibious landing operation.

2.2 The End of the Preventive Measures

While preventative measures have a clear starting point, they lack a clear endpoint. The uncertainty and uncontrollability of the endpoint are the main reasons why preventative measures are difficult to implement.

2.2.1 A Full-Scale Total War Showdown Between China and the United States
Pre-emptively stationing troops on the island of Taiwan would not only require overcoming restrictions under US domestic law but also under international law. If the US chooses this option, barring any unforeseen circumstances, a full-scale military confrontation between the US and China will inevitably erupt immediately. China might even choose a full-scale confrontation with the US-led imperial order.
2.2.2 Taiwan Independence
Utilizing superior forces pre-positioned in the adjacent region, the plan aims to completely destroy the Chinese mainland’s naval and air forces in the early stages of the war. With the Chinese mainland effectively deprived of its amphibious power projection capabilities, the plan seeks to completely sever Taiwan from mainland China, ultimately leading to Taiwan’s independence.
2.2.3 The swift and complete failure of the American alliance
Concentrating a large force in a small area carries the risk of a single battle leading to total defeat.
2.2.4 May accelerate or exacerbate the process of border movement in Europe.
A full-scale war would inevitably involve the leading states of the existing world order. It would inevitably trigger a full-scale confrontation between China and the power-level states of the existing order. The process of border relocation in Europe has already begun. China will certainly seize this opportunity to accelerate and intensify this process, triggering a restructuring of Europe’s power structure. This could potentially dismantle the entire US-led imperial order.
2.2.5 Uncontrollable use of nuclear devices
The use of nuclear devices is highly likely to trigger a retaliatory reaction, leading to completely unpredictable consequences.

2.3 Possibility of pre-emptive deterrence measures

Two major difficulties effectively prevented the implementation of the pre-emptive military plan. Its chances of implementation were almost zero.

2.3.1 Dual Restrictions of Domestic and International Law
The domestic and international laws of the United States’ allied nations are rules of conduct built to maintain the existing imperial order. To effectively implement preventative measures, these existing rules must be broken. This is tantamount to dismantling the pillars of the existing order, risking the accelerated collapse of the system.
2.3.2 The uncontrollability of the endpoint
Uncertainty about the outcome or the future is an obstacle to political decision-making. For any leadership group, power group, or management center, any uncertainty is the basis for political failure.
Moreover, among the foreseeable outcomes, there are several possibilities with extremely high costs. The fear of these outcomes reduces the probability of adopting this approach to near zero.

III. Reactive Comprehensive Political Sanctions

Activating a response plan after China’s military action has begun is a relatively easy political process for any Western country. China’s military action will first provoke public opinion in US-led coalition countries. Political, military, and economic actions taken in accordance with public opinion are a low-risk, high-reward approach for politicians in all countries. Regardless of the specific response plan, comprehensive political sanctions are an essential option in every scenario. The effectiveness of comprehensive political sanctions is mainly reflected in the following three aspects.

3.1 Stabilizing the political situation in the western United States

Immediately imposing political sanctions on China’s military actions is the easiest and most profitable political action to implement. It ensures the government maintains the initiative amidst surging public opinion. Given the current political climate of widespread hostility towards China in the US and Western European countries, public opinion in these nations will generally demand that governments adopt a tough stance against China. The US and its Western allies can hardly avoid this political choice.

3.2 Stabilizing the Imperial Order

If China’s military actions are not legitimized beforehand, then sanctioning China is the inevitable choice for stabilizing the imperial order. This political response must be strong enough to prevent further political collapse or the weakening of the imperial order. The degree of political sanctions must be strong enough to deter opposition forces in the Arab world, African countries, and South America.

3.3 Prevent China’s political gains from expanding further.

Regardless of the layers of secrecy surrounding its actions, China’s landing on Taiwan has essentially yielded enormous geopolitical benefits. It has effectively weakened US maritime jurisdiction. This fact could further compress the maritime attributes of Japan and South Korea, forcing them to move closer to China. The primary purpose of comprehensive sanctions is to halt or slow this process.

3.4 Implementation Probability

As a key component of every post-event response plan, the probability of implementing comprehensive political sanctions is infinitely close to 1.

IV. Comprehensive Economic Sanctions

In response to China’s military actions, the US-led coalition’s comprehensive political sanctions, coupled with stringent economic sanctions, represent the safest and most prudent way to mitigate damage to the existing leadership.
A swift and comprehensive political sanctions approach can quickly stabilize public opinion within the power elite. Subsequent economic sanctions must, as far as possible, consider or coordinate the following three requirements: satisfying domestic public opinion; maximizing the economic interests of the power elite; and severely limiting China’s political and economic gains. Therefore, comprehensive economic sanctions must possess the following characteristics.

4.1 Possessing political significance

High-tech fields; fields familiar to the public; fields that have a negative impact on public opinion in Western countries; will be the main targets of economic sanctions.

4.2 Dynamic characteristics

The sanctions will be rolled out and adjusted gradually. The starting point for economic sanctions is to maximize the sanctions against China without excessively damaging the domestic economy of the countries that initiate the sanctions.

4.3 Term-limited

Given China’s economic position in the global economic structure, sanctions or restrictions on Chinese products inevitably cause significant disruptions to the entire supply chain. After a period of adjustment, a list of sectors or products that cannot be replaced by other countries will become increasingly clear. These products will inevitably be lifted under the impetus of factors of production. This is an indicator of the emergence of gaps in economic sanctions. Once these economic demands are intervened by political forces, the gradual rebuilding of economic ties with China becomes a historical inevitability. In other words, the duration of effective sanctions depends on China’s strength within the international economic system.

4.4 Transform the current economic structure

Because sanctions will undoubtedly have a negative impact on China, they are forcing the country to seek new paths within its economic system to promote national economic stability. This effort will inevitably bring about changes, large or small, to the existing economic structure.

4.5 Expected Timeframe

The severe sanctions are expected to last for 3 to 5 years. Starting in the 4th to 5th year, both sides will begin to seek cooperation.

V. Military Plan for Pacification

If comprehensive political and economic sanctions fail to quell public opinion within the US West Coast bloc, a moderate, or even concurrent, military intervention is a reasonable expectation. The political objective remains to minimize losses: to prevent further political damage; to stop China from expanding its political gains; and at least to slow the pace at which China expands its political gains.
However, all politicians are extremely cautious about military conflict, especially when it comes to China. Controlling the level of conflict should be their primary choice. Therefore, the pacification military approach has its place in history. This military approach will inevitably have the following characteristics.

5.1 Frontline commanders must possess political qualities;
5.2 Ensure that every conflict and battle has significant and widespread propaganda effects and political gains;
5.3 Operations should be limited to small or medium-sized operations with political boundaries as much as possible;
5.4 The overall effect of the war is to ensure that neither side suffers a major defeat;
5.5 Political disputes continue to escalate, and political sanctions are constantly being introduced in new forms.
5.6 Political contacts under the veil of war continued in order to avoid a major defeat for either side;
5.7 Political Objectives: To maintain U.S. military presence and freedom of navigation in Northeast Asia; to prevent serious weakening of U.S. political standing in the Philippines; and to ensure that no Northeast Asian cooperation zone will be formed for at least 10 to 20 years.
5.8 Through military action, guide public opinion and ultimately facilitate comprehensive political and economic negotiations. Military action is not the goal of the appeasement military plan. Its purpose is to guide public opinion through military action, to explain the inability to defeat the enemy as a reality that is gradually accepted by the general public, and to facilitate comprehensive political and military negotiations through a shift in public opinion.

VI. Total War

In the preceding discussions of pre-emptive peace talks and post-emptive military pacification plans, we have already touched upon the key point of this article: China’s reunification with Taiwan effectively weakens the United States’ governing capacity. It effectively weakens the United States’ freedom of action in the Taiwan Strait and the Philippine Sea. It also effectively weakens the United States’ leadership in maintaining the imperial order.

The United States and its allies’ response to China’s actions is primarily focused on the following points.
(1) To meet the needs of domestic public opinion and maintain domestic political stability;
(2) Prevent China from gaining further geopolitical benefits in Northeast Asia;
(3) To prevent or slow down the pace at which China expands its geopolitical advantages into the South China Sea.
These objectives cannot be achieved solely through peace talks and appeasement. Total war is also an option. The following pathways can be used to initiate total war.
(1. A pre-set comprehensive war plan, which is to be quickly launched as a response to China’s military actions.)
(2. The military plan for pacification was out of control, and the military conflict escalated uncontrollably.)

6.1 The trajectory and predictions of a total war

6.1.1. The outcome at the national level is difficult to predict.
If the final outcome between China and the United States at the national level is one of neither side gaining a decisive advantage, it is highly likely to be a political result pursued by politicians from both sides.
6.1.2 The United States and its allies cannot occupy Chinese territory.
Once mainland China completes its landing on Taiwan, the US-led coalition will have virtually no chance of occupying Chinese territory. This is the foundation for China’s eventual defeat and also the biggest military and political challenge facing the US-led coalition, unless nuclear weapons are deployed.
6.1.3 The United States has global advantages.
In areas more than 2,000 kilometers offshore, the US-led coalition has an absolute advantage. This is the physical basis for the US-led coalition to launch a total war. China’s maritime routes to Australia, South America, Africa, and Europe will be severely restricted. China’s economic activities will suffer a severe blow.
6.1.4 China has regional advantages.
Once a full-scale total war begins, the political and military forces of the United States-led coalition will inevitably withdraw rapidly and completely from Northeast Asia. This process may be proactive or reactive, but the outcome will be the same.
6.1.5 The outcome of a major decisive battle is influenced by chance factors.
If a major military decisive battle were to occur, the battlefield would most likely be located in waters near Australia, close to Indonesia and the Solomon Islands, or somewhere where the military strength of the US and Chinese blocs is roughly balanced. Therefore, the outcome of such a large-scale decisive battle would be more influenced by chance.
6.1.6 A protracted war severely wounded China
If the United States launches a “protracted war” to block China’s maritime routes, it will inflict a heavy and unbearable blow on China.
6.1.7 A protracted war would weaken or severely damage the United States.
Given China’s formidable secondary and primary industrial capabilities, a protracted war is the only viable path for China to defeat the United States militarily. The United States and its allies cannot defeat China in a war of attrition.
6.1.8 Protracted War Severely Wounds Europe
China’s response to the US’s “protracted war” strategy involves deep involvement in Europe’s border maneuvering process. China will accelerate and intensify this process, simultaneously accelerating the dismantling of Europe’s power structure. This dismantling of European power may well be the opening act of the US retreating to the Americas.
6.1.9 The United States will not suffer a “national defeat” from a war with China.
Whether the US defeats China in a major war or suffers a crushing defeat, once the war enters a protracted phase, the US-led imperial order will inevitably be reorganized, restructured, or renewed. The US-led, Europe-centric imperial order is difficult to maintain.
However, the United States will not suffer a “national defeat” from a war with China. The United States’ active or passive relinquishment of its leadership in the world order will not immediately cause serious harm.
6.1.10 Global chaos is highly probable.

The disarray of the European order. Weakening Europe is a crucial part of China’s efforts to weaken the sustained war capability of the US-led alliance. This is unless the core European countries voluntarily break away from the existing imperial order. Both paths will lead to the same result: the disarray of the European order.
Russia is encroaching on the entire east bank of the Dnepr River. Russia is targeting the entire east bank of the Dnepr River as a new national security boundary in order to counter Europe’s cultural war of “de-Europeanizing Russians.”
The risk of power disintegration in Europe. Russia, Turkey, Iran, and pan-German forces will become the new power bloc in Europe.
The rise of the Arab world. The Arab world has psychologically, economically, and politically prepared to intervene in the process of global turmoil.
The African Resistance. Although Africa’s power is currently uncentralized, once a “visionary” finds an “economic path,” “political path,” or “philosophical path” to enhance Africa’s value, then integrating the power of the entire continent will be a natural progression.