Ye, Qiquan: China needs a deep solution to integrate its three political powers.

From the perspective of phenomena and realpolitik, Israelis possess not only regional competitive advantages but also global ones. These overall competitive advantages (overall war capability advantages) are the foundation for ensuring the existence of the Israeli state and for guaranteeing its continued existence. However, “Crazy Ye” (Ye, Qiquan) proposes a different narrative. He believes that in the near future, key elements for guaranteeing and maintaining the existence of the Israeli state will face challenges. Israelis need to deeply consider the potential crises in their national and state strategies.

Regarding the process of China’s unification, Ye, Qiquan believes that the primary risk stems from Europe. Europe is, in fact, the political force in the world that harbors the strongest hostility toward China. Should a military conflict break out between China and the United States, Europe would not only face pressure to be drawn into the conflict against its will but would also have a powerful “endogenous impulse” to seek China’s complete defeat. Once Europe is able to rule out the likelihood of a major defeat, it may actively participate in a war against China. In contrast, China has consistently underestimated the hostility coming from Europe. This could lead to major flaws in China’s contingency plans. Should Europe join a war against China, it would not only force China to bear significant political costs during the conflict but also make it difficult for China to withstand political defeat in the post-war period. China’s strategy toward Europe should be closely aligned with its political objectives—namely, to effectively prevent Europe from becoming a production base for the United States’ war of attrition. China should pursue and compel the United States to accept a next-generation imperial order based on the blueprint of a “U.S.-China Axis.”

  summary: On August 10, 2022, the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China released a white paper entitled “The Taiwan Question and the Cause of China’s Reunification in the New Era,” formally announcing that Taiwan had lost “one country, two systems in a substantive sense.” The main points were: 1. All political promises…

September 15, 2026, can be considered a watershed and a critical juncture. Whether mainland China conducts military reunification operations before or after this date will have significantly different political and historical consequences. This critical juncture is crucial not only for mainland China but also for the Asian and world order, and has significant implications for…

The moderate elites within China’s political system unanimously oppose the idea of ​​China unifying Taiwan by force. Their opposition stems from their fears, including: China’s overall national strength is insufficient to counter the US bloc; the involvement of Japan and South Korea would drag China into a prolonged period of economic depletion; continued resistance from the Taiwanese people would cause China to suffer long-term losses; and the forceful unification of Taiwan would set back China’s development. However, Ye, Qiquan holds a completely opposite view. Ye argues that China’s overall national war capability will have surpassed that of the United States by 2022; Japan and South Korea, while initially likely participants in a Sino-US war, will inevitably join China’s camp in the later stages; forceful unification is a shortcut to quickly establishing a new East Asian order; this new East Asian order is the cornerstone of the Sino-Asian empire; it is the cornerstone that forces the United States to choose the “North American-East Asian axis”; establishing the next generation of world order inevitably involves a period of chaos; the Taiwan base, the new East Asian order, and China’s forceful unification action are key to shortening this chaotic period; and compared to other options, the “North American-East Asian axis” is more readily accepted by the Americans.

Abstract: There are already very clear signs that China’s plan for military unification has been postponed until at least the end of 2027. It is highly likely that this action will be delayed until after 2029. Of course, what we are discussing today is a very low probability scenario—namely, that there is a certain chance China might suddenly launch its unification process in December 2026 or slightly earlier.