China’s military unification plan (9.5): Taiwan’s destiny (a discussion of medium- and long-term governance plans after military unification)

Preview Date Mar. 29, 2023 Updated Date September 8, 2023   (This is an outline of an incomplete research project.) summary: If China launches a cross-Taiwan military operation in 2026, the United States will find it difficult to respond appropriately. Mainland China possesses a clear military advantage in areas covered by intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as…

The announcement on July 1, 2025, could be termed the “July 1 Power Mechanism” or the “July 1 Power Transfer.” From then on, Chinese politics will enter a complex tripartite structure. Currently, all three parties are in trouble. The ruling faction (Xi Jinping’s group) still holds all the important metaphysical power; the military holds the actual power to stabilize the situation; and the background political forces effectively control the ruling power. Currently, none of these three parties is completely dead, nor is any completely alive. They all need to find a way out of their predicament.

Since 2012, Ye, Qiquan has argued that Hong Kong faces the risk of “a shrinking space for the ‘two systems’ framework.” He believes the chances of Hong Kong maintaining “two systems” or “substantive autonomy” after 2047 are close to zero. The current Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be divided into three provincial-level administrative units and one sub-provincial-level administrative unit. This basic structure will provide the central government of China with sufficient space to govern Hong Kong. The interaction between the central government and Hong Kong locals will also influence the specific setup and configuration of the sub-provincial-level administrative region, the “New Territories Southern District.” The article provides different prediction details for personal and corporate versions.

The moderate elites within China’s political system unanimously oppose the idea of ​​China unifying Taiwan by force. Their opposition stems from their fears, including: China’s overall national strength is insufficient to counter the US bloc; the involvement of Japan and South Korea would drag China into a prolonged period of economic depletion; continued resistance from the Taiwanese people would cause China to suffer long-term losses; and the forceful unification of Taiwan would set back China’s development. However, Ye, Qiquan holds a completely opposite view. Ye argues that China’s overall national war capability will have surpassed that of the United States by 2022; Japan and South Korea, while initially likely participants in a Sino-US war, will inevitably join China’s camp in the later stages; forceful unification is a shortcut to quickly establishing a new East Asian order; this new East Asian order is the cornerstone of the Sino-Asian empire; it is the cornerstone that forces the United States to choose the “North American-East Asian axis”; establishing the next generation of world order inevitably involves a period of chaos; the Taiwan base, the new East Asian order, and China’s forceful unification action are key to shortening this chaotic period; and compared to other options, the “North American-East Asian axis” is more readily accepted by the Americans.

(Research Outline) China’s move to reunify Taiwan is, in essence, a major action against the existing US imperial order. Any assessment that downplays this substance/essence will lead to serious bias in expectations. summary: China’s move to reunify Taiwan is essentially a major action against the existing US imperial order. Any assessment that underestimates this substance/essence…

In the Russo-Ukrainian War, the United States held the greatest influence in determining the ceasefire lines, although Russia, Western Europe, and China were also significant background factors. Theoretically, there were three ceasefire lines. The first was the geographical boundary line along the Dnieper River and the Black Sea coastline, which could also be defined as the western border of the battlefield. The second was the complete administrative border of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, which also served as the eastern border of the war. The third set of ceasefire lines consisted of arbitrary arcs drawn across a vast area between the western border line L1 and the eastern border line L2. If the US seeks only limited results in this Russo-Ukrainian war and does not want to directly involve more countries, it will have sufficient initiative to draw a stable ceasefire line somewhere along the L1, L2, or even L3 lines. For Russia, a ceasefire along the L1 and L2 lines offers a more certain prospect compared to the uncertainty of the L3 line. Ukraine is unwilling to accept the L1 line. However, Ukraine has no say in the continuation of the war or the ceasefire. The possibility of the L1 line persists because it will not harm US strategic interests. The primary reason for the possibility of the L2 line persists is the overwhelming US advantage on Ukrainian soil. The second major reason is that a ceasefire along the L2 line would not lead to a major political defeat for Russia. The third major reason is that China would support this line.