Modeling the Intensity of State War, and Predicting the Course of the War in Ukraine

Abstracts:

A new National War Intensity Assessment System (NWIS) and Coalition War Intensity Assessment System (CWIS) did a good job of reviewing and validating a series of predictions that were posted online in April and May of 2022. These predictions about the course of the Russo-Ukrainian war were completely implausible and unacceptable at the time. Yet they were confirmed by the course of the war a year later. They are also supported by this new system of assessing war capabilities. Those predictions of a year ago indicated that the Russo-Ukrainian war would be confined for a long time between the L1 and L2 lines; that Russia would establish up to seven or so autonomous governments on Ukrainian soil; and that, at least until the end of 2026, Russia would not incur a military defeat. In this war capability assessment system, geographic factors, demographic factors, organizational capabilities, military capabilities, and economic capabilities are listed as the top war capability assets. Geography, in particular, is elevated to a level never before recognized. It is seen as the nation's strongest deterrent component. According to this war capability assessment system, the most powerful countries in terms of overall war capability are: China, the United States, Russia, India, Brazil, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Indonesia. According to the extended algorithm of this assessment system, the current Ukrainian coalition is weaker than the Russian coalition in terms of overall war capacity. This is the fundamental reason why the Ukrainian side is limited in the war in the Central and South Ukraine regions. This model also speculates that if Russia attempts to move its war effort westward across the L1 line, it will almost certainly inspire an upgraded and updated Ukrainian coalition. An updated Ukrainian alliance would be significantly more warlike than Russia's current alliance. It could lead to Russian defeats in Central and South Ukraine. But the new Ukrainian coalition's boundary of advance eastward could almost certainly not extend beyond east of the L2 line either. This is because once the battle line crosses east of the L2 line, it will inspire a renewed and upgraded Russian alliance. The war capacity of the renewed Russian coalition would once again exceed that of the Ukrainian coalition, resulting in another power flip.

Keywords:

Intensity of State War, Russo-Ukrainian War, Intensity of Coalition War

 

Only two months into the Russian-Ukrainian war, predictions have emerged that are disgusting to Westerners and border on the fantastical. Among them were that “the Russo-Ukrainian war will be confined to the Dnieper River and the Donbass”; that “Russia is invincible”; that “Russia will not experience military defeat until at least 2026”; and that “Russia will establish seven or so local self-governments on Ukrainian soil”. "; and "Russia will create about seven local self-governments on Ukrainian soil" [1,2,3,4]. These predictions are still extremely annoying for the West. But unfortunately they are becoming reality and facts step by step.

Do these predictions have a supportable rationale or factual basis on which they can be relied upon? After eliminating the emotional factor, can political science professionals think about the Russo-Ukrainian war from a different perspective.

Perhaps now there is an assessment tool that can test the predictions that emerged last year and that many rejected as unbelievable and repugnant, but that are becoming more and more realistic. That tool is the “National Intensity of War” scale. It can also be extended to assess the war intensity of warring groups or coalitions.

Here is the structure of what could be named the “National War Intensity” scale.

 

I. National War Intensity Assessment Framework:

1.1 Components of the National War Intensity Evaluation System.

1. Territorial Domain and Geographic Patterns: In this rating system, the territorial domain and geographic patterns are the most important assets of the country to withstand the impact of a total war. It accounts for 300 points in a single category. This factor is particularly important now or in the future, when the application of weapons of great power and coverage becomes the norm in warfare.
2. Emphasizes that demographic factors possess a significant influence on the final outcome of the war. It is worth 100 points. (130 points in the evaluation of groups of countries or war coalitions). This factor is very important in influencing the course and outcome of wars at a time when bloc and total wars are increasingly the norm, now or in the future.
3. The organizational capacity of the state is an important factor influencing the course of the war. Score 90. When other military and political factors are fairly close, the organizational capacity of the state can significantly affect the chances of victory in a campaign or even a series of campaigns.
4. A nation's “war-ready assets” and capabilities are also an important component of its war-fighting capacity. Its importance is particularly pronounced in short- and medium-range wars, as well as in the initial and early stages of a long war.
5. The most important factor in determining the outcome of a war is a nation's economic and productive capacity. This accounts for 350 points. Of these, industrial production capacity is particularly important, with 110 points; agriculture, 80 points; services, 40 points; and the ability to sustain military spending, 120 points.
6. National history and the science and technology of war, in moderation, exerts an influence on the course of the war.
7. Defense effects in war. Countries that go on the defensive are generally able to move quickly into a universal war mode; consistently increase the effectiveness of their wars; make better use of the war effects of geography; have a political environment that spearheads the escalation of the war hierarchy; and are easily tolerated by the real world, and by the historical record, when they use extreme means of warfare.

 

Table 1: National War Intensity Evaluation Project
Geographical factors: 300 points	land area ratio	Key assessment factors	The most powerful force for the country to withstand the impact of war in the scenario of the practical application of high-power, high-coverage weapons.
	geographic pattern	Reference factors in the assessment	The complexity of geographic patterns increases the country's ability to withstand the shock of war.
Political factors: 320 points	Demographic factors 100 points	headcount ratio	The actual operational unit of the nation's involvement in the war; the main counting unit that bears the brunt of the war; and the counting basis for the nation's recovery after the war.
		Labor force population ratio:	The actual ability to support the political, economic, and military activities of a country in a state of war.
		Percentage of dominant ethnic structure:	A key factor in sustaining war-fighting capability, organizational capacity, and political stability under the blows of brutal war.
	organizational capacity 90 points	Centralized capacity:	Models of state organization in peacetime, reflecting the responsiveness of state structures to war.
		Stabilization capacity:	The degree to which nationals recognize the structure of the State in peacetime, reflecting their ability to follow the State's course of action.
	National History 10 points.	World Super Leader Countries in History plus 10 points	National historical honor would appropriately raise the national tolerance for war.
		Add 5 points for historical or real-life regional powers	The realistic pursuit of national honor and leadership will appropriately raise the national tolerance for war.
	Military structure 120 points	Mathematical modeling to calculate the ranking of existing military forces of each country	Generally recognizes the legitimacy of national military power rankings and the ability of existing military assets to influence the conduct and outcome of wars to a significant degree.
380 national points for economic factors   The War League counts for 350 points.	80 points for agricultural productivity	Agricultural GDP and the Global Food Security Index are the main calculated indicators	Primitive and traditional agricultural production capacity was the most important context in which the country stood alone in isolation and under the pressure of war.
	Industrial Productivity 110 points	National industrial GDP and national innovation indexes are the main calculation indicators	The industrial production capacity is the decisive factor in the sustained investment and consumption of the State in war; it is the main means and the main capacity of the State to win wars.
	40 points for service industry capacity	Services GDP is the main calculation indicator	The ability to serve the forces of production must, in the course of war, be translated by some means into support for war operations.
	120 points for military spending capacity	The capacity of military spending in normal times can essentially determine the capacity of a country to sustain its military spending.	The ability to invest in military spending reflects a country's long-term ability to develop its war assets in a comprehensive manner.
	Military science and technology 30 points		War tech can pay considerable war dividends in short-term wars or in the early stages of a war.
state of war	Coefficient of defense effect	2.2	Intensity of war coefficients for United Nations P5 countries fighting defensive wars
		1.8	“Intensity of war coefficients for defensive wars by ”uncertain nuclear powers". India, Pakistan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, North Korea.
		1.4	Intensity of war coefficients when other countries are engaged in defensive wars.

 

 

Table 2: Weapons Science and Technology Scale
Military high technology	Remote Projection Technology 9 points (Points are awarded on the basis of the highest score)	Weapons range >10K km	9
		Weapons range >5K km	7
		Weapons range >3K km	5
		Weapons range >1K km	3
	aviation technology 7 points. (Points are awarded on the basis of the highest score)	Hypersonic vehicle manufacturing	7
		Stealth fighter manufacturing	5
		Generation 4 aircraft manufacturing	4
		Generation 3 Light Combat Aircraft Manufacturing	3
		Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Manufacturing	2.5
	High Altitude Operations Technology 7 points. (Points are awarded on the basis of the highest score)	Space or near-space presence	7
		Satellite navigation capability	5
		Meteorological/imaging satellite capabilities	4
		Other 24-hour hold capacity	3
	Conventional weapons science and technology 7 points. (Points are awarded on the basis of the highest score)	(coll.) (fig.) sth huge	7
		Manufacture of conventional bombs above 1K tons yield	7
		7K-ton warship manufacturing	6
		Cruise bomb manufacturing over 800 kilometers	6
		Manufacture of air-launched bombs over 500 kilometers	6
		3K-ton warship manufacturing	5
		Main battle tank manufacturing	4
		Manufacture of light and medium tanks	3
		1K-ton capable battleship manufacturing	3
		Manufacture of projectile weapons over 30 kilometers	2

 

1.2 Importance of land area and geomorphology.

1.2.1 High-power, wide-coverage weapons applications are increasingly becoming a military reality

(1) Countries around the world are investing heavily in research on high-power bombs. Among conventional weapons, those with a yield greater than 1,000 tons of TNT equivalent are approaching success; the application of large-yield conventional weapons is increasingly becoming a military reality;

(2) Thirty-five years after the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Soviet Union, the world's fear of nuclear leaks is diminishing. This reality has lowered the moral constraints on the use of military nuclear devices;

(3) Following the Fukushima nuclear leak in Japan, the international community has been extremely tolerant of the release of nuclear contaminants. The morally restrictive threshold for the use of small and even medium-yield nuclear weapons has been further lowered;

(4) The process of miniaturization and operationalization of low-radiation nuclear weapons has increased the likelihood of the use of nuclear devices in warfare as a whole;

1.2.2 High-power, high-reach weapons have become a realpolitik tool for Russia and other countries

(1) Russians define themselves as Europeans in terms of their national origins, their cultural identity and their philosophical thinking. In the culture wars of recent years, under the mask of the so-called “civil”, “popular”, “non-governmental”, “spontaneous”, "popular", "non-governmental", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous", "spontaneous" and "spontaneous". Under the mask of so-called "civil", "popular", "non-governmental", "spontaneous", a large number of online media repeatedly emphasize that Ukraine is the largest country in Europe. This cultural process is a typical process of cultural war to expel Russia from Europe culturally (and even philosophically thinking). In this war, Russia is virtually defenseless.

(2) The inevitable outcome of the war in Ukraine will be the establishment of a solid “Ukrainian trench” [3]. This trench will physically expel Russia from Europe, both politically and economically. Without a war that completely deconstructs Europe, Russia will not be able to fully reverse its disadvantage for the next 50 to 100 years.

(3) The prolonged war in Ukraine is an attempt to economically and militarily weaken the Russian presence in Europe. This is a real and ongoing process. It is a process in which Russia is at a similar disadvantage.

(4) Russia is clearly at a general disadvantage in the face of the comprehensive, multilayered attack by the United States bloc.

(5) The defense of the European identity of the Russian people is an imperative for all Russians. This involves the cultural roots and philosophical attributes of the Russian nation. The mighty and powerful weapons of mass coverage became the political instrument they had to use. This choice could not be avoided. It is impossible to try to solve political dilemmas and philosophical dilemmas by moral means.

(6) Other countries are increasingly looking at the nuclear option as an operational option to protect their own polity structures and national interests. The Israel issue, India and Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, all revolve around this thread. Nuclear arms control will only get harder, not easier.

1.2.3 The overall war paradigm of the State or group of States returns to political reality.

At present the United States cannot deal with or face the challenge of Russia, or the challenge of China, or the challenge from the Arab world, alone. The paradigm of dealing with political strife as a group of nations has de facto become a political reality. When groups of states engage in total war, the vastness and geographic diversity of the country becomes an important factor in a state's ability to withstand war and influence the final outcome of the war.

It cannot be ruled out that there is a chance that a center of power leadership will peacefully cede leadership. But it is more common for the alternation of power to take place under strong pressure. Confrontations between powerful old leadership centers and powerful growing forces often take place in the form of armed groups.

1.2.4 Historical references.

Russia stopped the Germans in World War II by virtue of its land and climate, even though Germany had the most advanced weapons technology and mode of war operations.

The Channel terrain protected Britain. The vast country protected the Soviet Union and ultimately saved Europe. Meanwhile the ‘advanced and powerful' military powers of Northern and Western Europe were unable to stop the rapid onslaught of Nazi Germany.

The hilly and mountainous terrain of southwestern China prevented the Japanese from attacking in World War II. And consumed the vast majority of Japan's armed forces. This was despite the fact that while Japan had entered an industrialized country, China at that time was in an agrarian stage. Although there was a generational difference in the level of technology and productivity between these two countries at that time.

1.2.5 Vast national territory is the most powerful strategic deterrent.

In the case of large-yield, large-coverage weapons, or in the case of rapid military movement patterns, small countries can quickly lose their ability to wage war. They may even lose their national production capacity.

Vast national territory is the most powerful asset that can ultimately withstand the impact of large-yield, large-coverage weapons. Strategically, it is the most fundamental support for a nation's ability to rapidly escalate to the highest levels of war. It is also the basis for countering an enemy's “war leveling“ deterrent. Therefore, vast territory is, in fact, a country's most powerful strategic deterrent.

1.3 The importance of demographic factors in the re-establishment of order.

1.3.1 Period of world disorder.

It is clear that there are difficulties in the functioning of the existing world power system. The United States is clearly finding it difficult to maintain world order through the operation of an expensive system of naval power. The countries that challenge the US, including Russia and China, are mainly trying to win national interests by challenging US authority. At the same time they are not willing to take over the management of a costly world order. The United States, on the other hand, is directly confronted with the reality of shrinking power differentials. When the U.S. voluntarily abdicates its management responsibilities, or is forced to do so, the world loses its power differential altogether and enters a state of chaos.

1.3.2. a period of exploration of philosophical models.

It is very clear that the Chinese are not willing to take over world power with the old expensive system. And they will not be able to run the system until they have fully seized the power of economic adjudication and financial decision-making. Finding a new philosophical paradigm to establish a new world order that is widely recognized and accepted will not be an inexpensive process. Often this process is dependent on a war that borders on devastation. It is not uncommon in history for times of chaos to be characterized by population declines in excess of 70%. During long periods of chaos, the demographic factor becomes one of the extremely important factors that ultimately determines victory. In the long history of warfare in ancient China, the side that was most successful in competing for population often became the side that ultimately won the war.

Indeed barbarian population pressure is considered by many historical scholars to be a major reason for the collapse of the Roman Empire.

1.3.3 Historical review and realistic outlook:

As early as April through June of last year, there were prophecies stating that Ukraine would have to rely on the human resources or armed forces of allied countries to sustain the war [2, 3]. More and more revealed facts have confirmed this reality. With the further reduction of its population, Ukraine is at risk of losing all of its land east of the entire Dnieper River. The US bloc can expect to win the Russo-Ukrainian war by means of a war of economic attrition, while Russia can expect to win the war by means of a war of demographic attrition.

 

1.4 The importance of economic forces.

1.4.1 The war machine is ultimately characterized by productive capacity.

Economic power is the basis on which war is sustained. And the war machine is manifested primarily through industrial production capacity. Especially under the harsh conditions of economic fragmentation and economic blockade, the industrial production capacity of a country is of paramount importance.

In the history of war in ancient China, every large-scale war was a process of mutual economic and human consumption, and even the victor of a large-scale war would suffer huge war losses. Even the victor of a large-scale war would suffer huge war losses. Only countries with strong economic productivity and production recovery ability could afford to engage in repeated large-scale wars. There are many examples of countries that have won wars and lost them as a whole.

The First World War and the Second World War were, at their root, still economic wars. It was still a war in which the most economically powerful side took over the less economically powerful side.

A strong economy can withstand numerous military failures. Whereas a side dominated only by military capability can lead to total defeat with just one large failure.

1.4.2 Historical examples

In the second great unification dynasty in Chinese history, the Han Dynasty, the process of its establishment is a typical example. The eventual victory of the earlier militarily weaker side over the earlier militarily stronger side depended on strong economic resilience.

The establishment of the Ming dynasty in ancient China is another example of the triumph of economic power over military power. A group that was initially weak in overall power was committed to economic development. This early relatively weak group used the development path of “building high walls, accumulating grain, and claiming the title of king slowly” to eventually become the most powerful party in terms of overall strength. It became the winner of a long war.

A number of warring groups in the history of British and French wars have incurred defeat for economic reasons, or even admitted defeat voluntarily for economic reasons.

 

1.5 The modest role of military science and technology.

1.5.1 Upgrading of military science and technology leads to upgrading of military models and doctrines

The essence of war is the pursuit (grabbing, seizing) of economic gain (long-term or medium-term goals). Any methods and programs that contribute to victory in combat, victory on the battlefield, and victory in war are maximally pursued and applied. The revolutionary role of military high technology is well documented. Revolutionary advances in weaponry often bring about simultaneous revolutions in military doctrine and military operating systems.

Ever since the use of the bow and arrow began in the history of Chinese warfare, the shape of war has entered an era in which terrain and geographical advantage were utilized to win. One side could set up ambushes in high mountains, corridors, and canyons, trap the enemy, and then kill them with bows and arrows at long range and non-contact. When artillery technology matured, Napoleon relied on a military doctrine based on artillery coverage to dominate Europe. The invention of the railroad revolutionized the way armed forces were concentrated and transferred. Airplanes allowed humans to strike the enemy from the air. Giant guns equipped on ships opened an era when sea power overwhelmed land power.The widespread use of medium- and short-range missiles plus airborne information combinations will also surely restore the era of land power over sea power.

1.5.2 High-tech weapons are not a necessary element of victory

But Korea, which was the best at making high-tech (bow and arrow) weapons, was the first of the six kingdoms to be destroyed. Napoleon would also fail quickly after losing his supply of artillery shells and military rations. The most advanced and least destructible Tiger tanks lost to the T34 and Sherman tanks, which were far behind in technical specifications.

The bow and arrow, a high-tech weapon, replaced the lance as the main decisive weapon about 1,500 years after its emergence. It was when it had become a good and economical weapon with the highest input-output ratio.

Artillery, the cannon-like firearms, also waited nearly 200 years before comprehensively replacing the bow and arrow's historic place as the decisive weapon of war. The epoch-making and revolutionary VI and VII rockets did not change Nazi Germany's air inferiority.

1.5.3 Economy as a fundamental attribute of the “decisive weapon”

The true essence of a weapon is maximum range and cheapest input. Not sophistication and power. Range comes from technology and cheapness comes from economic power. But the root is still economics. Weapons without cheap economy cannot sustain a long term state of war and national competition.

When cost prevented the mass application of bows and arrows, the decisive weapon of war remained the cheap lance.

When costs prevented the mass equipping of cannons and guns, the decisive weapons of war remained the cheap lance and bow and arrow.

When the cost of long-range artillery prevented it from being used universally, the decisive weapon of war remained the cheap light infantry.

When cost prevents the widespread use of modern medium and short-range missiles, the decisive weapons of war remain cheap light infantry plus tanks plus airplanes.

“Once the economics (input-output ratio) of the ”medium- and short-range missiles plus airborne information“ combination exceeds the economics of the ”carrier plus aircraft plus air-launched missiles" combination, the decline of aircraft carriers, the decline of fighters and bombers.A decline in the power of the sea was bound to follow.

Even if a 1K-ton TNT-equivalent conventional bomb is developed, it will not quickly become a decisive weapon until the cost is good enough for widespread use.

The benefits of nuclear weapons that are less than the costs of their use (combined political, economic, and military costs) dictate that they will not quickly become decisive weapons either.

This is the fundamental reason why this National War Intensity Rating System, attached to this article, assigns only 30 points to weapons science and technology.

1.6 Importance of organizational capacity

1.6.1 War as a genetic memory and group need

Memories of war, the need for war, group success, all of these factors that are discussed today as theories, when traced back to the lowest level of justification, it becomes clear that they are in fact a number of parasitic memory factors within the genes of organisms. These traits are inherited from generation to generation. They are stimulated or repressed by certain factors.

Certain plants, distributed across multiple time zones in the world, can suddenly bloom and drop fruit at a uniform time. Certain plants produce chemical or biological products to inhibit the growth of other specialties. These traits are in fact part of the plant's behavior with war. Plants also acquire the right to perpetuate specialties through acts of war.

The vast majority of marine organisms rely on group strategies for survival. Organizational ability determines species continuation for small-bodied organisms. Group strategy is in fact a group characteristic of the behavior of war. Although individuals all instinctively reject death, genes ensure the continuation of specialization through group strategies that allow a few individuals to choose death.

1.6.2 Organizational capacity is an important part of war memory

(1) Organizational capacity is a group need. It is also a vital war-fighting capability. Organizational capacity is an essential capacity that determines the continuation of the species.

(2. Species with super individual survivability can also have organizational capacity that plays an important role in survival competition. Lions and tigers are among the species with top-level survival abilities that also develop super-organizational abilities under certain conditions. For super-beasts to give up their reproductive power and food dominance in favor of strong groups, only the power of inherited memories of war can achieve this goal.

Africa's famous bad boy lions have demonstrated a superb ability to wage war through superb organizational skills. After a confirmed loss of an existential threat, this pride split. At a later stage after the two split lions suffered an existential crisis, the split cliques were once again reunited to enhance their war-fighting and survival capabilities.

1.6.3 Organizational capacity can be stimulated, enhanced, or weakened by the environment

(1) For human beings, the ability to organize is even more crucial for the survival and continuity of groups. Ancient China had an advanced agricultural civilization. This advanced agricultural civilization depended on strict adherence to the seasons, to the seasons. The next year's harvest had to follow a strict planting schedule. The predictable course of operations, the predictable number of harvests, led the ancient Chinese to embrace centralization. The more centralized the group's ability, the more it was able to accomplish huge projects of land reclamation, water conservancy, and river trough transportation. The more powerful the group, the greater the ability to cope with bad years and natural disasters by providing relief to each other.

(2. Unlike the Chinese agricultural civilization, Europe has long relied on fishing and hunting, with herding as the mainstay. This type of survival involves too much randomness. Groups, or clusters, were unable to predict and control the source of food and the safety of their survival for the following year. Thus the ability to organize has an upper limit on European populations. It is a double-edged sword in Europe. On the one hand numerically powerful groups have a survival advantage in the plundering process. At the same time, large groups are more prone to existential crises in the distribution process. This has led European civilization into the philosophical paradox of pursuing both moderately strong groups and small groups and individualism.

(3) Organizational capacity is very much influenced by the environment. When the survival environment is adverse, groups move toward larger groups and larger organizations. When survival risks are eliminated or improved, small groupism or individualism grows.

Almost all of the developed countries today are rife with non-marriage and non-life. Many countries have 0 or even negative population growth rates. In the early days of European immigration to North America, they faced a serious existential crisis. In the face of an existential crisis, groups subconsciously choose the survival of the larger group. We were able to consult a document that recorded a woman from Ireland who pioneered North America. It had raised as many as 37 children. This historical fact has a complete record of the names of the family members (see the chart at the front of the article). This completely reverses the perception that white women were unwilling to have children.

(4) Organizational capacity is certainly also affected by survival patterns. The Great Irish Famine is the biggest source of the problems in England and Ireland today. Comparatively speaking, there were many times in ancient China when there was a famine similar to the Irish Famine. But each such famine became a major opportunity for the ancient Chinese to integrate and unite with each other. The English have ruled the British Isles for nearly 1,000 years, and to this day have been unable to resolve the distinction between English, Welsh, and Irish identities. The reason for the serious differences in the results of similar starting points is that the core group of powerful people chose different philosophies and paths of survival at the critical moment.

1.6.4 This assessment model clearly has deficiencies in the rating of organizational strength that cannot be addressed today.

There are obvious shortcomings in the assessment of organizational strength that cannot be solved today. The main reason for this is the inability to accurately introduce computational factors for country history, philosophy of existence, ethnic structure, linguistic composition, religious divergence, etc. It may be that further work is needed when dealing with multi-ethnic countries like India. We need more information from previous studies combined with more in-depth mathematical computational modeling to more accurately rate their national cohesion and national war capacity. Looking forward to future opportunities to improve it.

II. Framework for assessing war groups or war coalitions

2.1 Grading of war involvement of coalition countries

The scheme for calculating the war intensity of a group of countries or a war coalition basically follows the framework for evaluating the war intensity of countries. According to the breadth and depth of a country's commitment to war, countries within a war coalition enter the grading according to different depths of involvement. They are graded as: belligerent countries; frontline allies; supporting allies; and background allies. And accordingly, the intensity of different levels of involvement is calculated.

 

2.2 Assessment of the unpredictability of alliances

Introduction of unpredictability assessment (looking forward to further introduction of computational modeling).

In the early stages of a war, the risk of change in alliance or bloc strength can be roughly assessed based on the reality of the political context. If the degree of risk is over-represented, it can be assumed that the assessment of the strength of the bloc at war is less accurate and more variable. If the degree of risk is low, it can be assumed that the assessment of the war coalition (bloc) is more accurate.

From a political perspective, some of the unpredictability is in fact in the predictable zone. When these factors can be assessed less rigorously, the risk can be graded as follows: change in position of background allies; possible opposition countries; potential opposition countries; and potential allies of the enemy.

But there are other unpredictable aspects of the war process that are completely unpredictable at the beginning of the war. For example, political and war geniuses can only be sifted out and recognized in the course of a war. Political geniuses and war geniuses cannot be discovered before or at the beginning of a war. Sudden catastrophes of nature, geographical catastrophes, environmental catastrophes, are also unpredictable factors.

 

2.3 Assessment of the course of the war

War is a dynamic process, and an offensive or defensive situation can change a country's ability to wage war. The possession and loss of land and resources will trigger a change in the assessment base. As the war progresses, the countries that join or leave the war state will keep changing. The depth and breadth of a state's involvement in a war will also change as the war progresses. A dynamic assessment of war is important and necessary.

 

Table 3: Coalition and Bloc Warfare Intensity (Dynamic) Assessment Items
Defense Mode	Geography provides strong real-world support for the defense.	Increase the country's war capacity by automatically entering the national war mode.	Generally have a prioritized political environment to escalate the war in the first place	Only the country where the war is taking place is stimulated with a defense effect. The remaining allies do not count for defense effects.
belligerent countries (Intervention factor 1)	Full and direct involvement in the course of the fighting	Holding the same political pursuits or even the same or similar philosophical pursuits as allies	The country is in a state of war	The entire national economy and the way it is organized around war aims
Frontline allies (intervention factor 0.6)	No direct involvement in the war	Share the same political pursuits as allies	The country is not in a state of war	The country is comprehensively politically mobilized in support of ongoing wars and alliances.
Supporting Allies (intervention factor 0.3)	No involvement in the war.	Have fairly close political pursuits or similar political aspirations with allies	The country is largely uninvolved in the war	Practical military and economic support to allies at the governmental level
Background Allies (intervention factor 0.15)	We're not going to get involved in a war at this stage.	Because of the realities of having fairly strong political and economic ties with the fighting countries.	Wouldn't actively get involved in the war.	Provide economic and political background support to war allies. No losses will be incurred as a result of such support.
Predictable ‘unpredictability’	Change in position of background allies (National strength factor 0.15)	Possible opposition countries (Countries whose political and economic gains are closely linked to the outcome of the war) (0.2 for national strength)	Potential opposition countries (Existing non-adversarial countries with divergent political positions) (country strength counts as 0.25)	Potential enemy allies Countries with political and economic positions close to those of the enemy) (country strength count of 0.3).
Unpredictable ‘unpredictability’ (No valuation methodology available at this time)	The subsequent effects of political and military genius in the course of a war	A sudden change in the philosophical outlook and political leanings of the general public	Unpredictable and unexpected political events	Unpredictable geographical or environmental disasters
Defensive side of the war	The defending side's war intensity assessment remains unchanged for the subsequent year. Overall strength combined with defense factor calculation	Territory and finances lost by the defending country are not counted as lost for 2 years after the loss.	If the attacker loses and becomes the defender, the lost territory and finances of the country are not considered lost for one year.	When the defending side becomes the attacking side, the defense effects that previously entered the computational model disappear.
Offensive side of the war	Intensity of war score before the war remained unchanged for one year	Occupied territories and finances are factored into the side's calculations after four years of stable occupation.	Defensive effects are not counted within 6 months of the attacking side's defeat into its own territory.	Defense effects are calculated in the new environment 6 months after the attacker loses and becomes the defender.

2.4 Renewal and Turnover of War Coalitions

As the course of the war progresses and changes, a change in the roster of countries participating in the war alliance without a change in the operational core can be considered a renewal of the war alliance. If the Operational Core changes, it is considered a turnover of the war alliance. In the event of a major war alliance renewal or alliance turnover, the naming and calculation of alliances will change significantly accordingly.

III. Static ranking of countries in terms of intensity of war

According to the National War Intensity Assessment System (NWIS), the national war intensity rankings are listed below.

Table 4: Intensity of war table for static countries
arrange in order	nations	National intensity of war	National Defense Intensity	country code
1	sino	888.9	1955.6	CHN
2	United States of America	820.6	1805.3	USA
3	Russian Federation, RSFSR	722.2	1588.9	RUS
4	India	607.8	1094.1	IND
5	Brazilian	515.8	722.1	BRA
6	Canadian	482.8	675.9	CAN
7	Australia	474.1	663.7	AUS
8	Saudi Arabia	443.7	798.7	SAU
9	Japanese	433.0	606.2	JPN
10	Indonesia	424.2	593.9	IDN
11	Iranian	413.4	578.8	IRN
12	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	412.6	907.7	GBR
13	German	396.0	554.4	DEU
14	French	394.7	868.4	FRA
15	a Turk	384.2	537.9	TUR
16	Mexico	382.8	535.9	MEX
17	Argentina	380.3	532.4	ARG
18	Algeria	379.6	531.4	DZA
19	Egypt	371.5	520.0	EGY
20	Pakistan	365.5	657.8	PAK
21	Italy	362.8	507.9	ITA
22	South Korea (Republic of Korea)	354.2	495.9	KOR
23	Spanish	353.1	494.3	ESP
24	South Africa	342.4	479.4	ZAF
25	Kazakhstan	341.9	478.7	KAZ
26	Columbia (District of, or University etc)	341.7	478.3	COL
27	Thailand	339.7	475.5	THA
28	Vietnam	333.3	466.6	VNM
29	Nigeria, West Africa	332.3	465.2	NGA
30	Polish	313.3	438.6	POL
31	Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan)	305.3	427.4	BGD
32	Venezuela	304.7	426.5	VEN
33	Chile	303.0	424.1	CHL
34	Democratic Republic of the Congo	302.8	423.9	COD
35	Belarus	298.3	417.6	UKR
36	Norway	296.2	414.7	NOR
37	Angola	296.0	414.5	AGO
38	Peruvian	295.4	413.5	PER
39	Tanzania	293.1	410.4	TZA
40	Sweden	289.9	405.8	SWE
41	Ethiopia	285.4	399.6	ETH
42	Philippine	281.2	393.7	PHL
43	Morocco	277.1	388.0	MAR
44	Malaysia	276.2	386.6	MYS
45	Iraqi	276.2	386.6	IRQ
46	sultan (ruler of some Muslim states, esp. Ottoman Emperor)	275.9	386.3	SDN
47	Libya	274.8	384.8	LBY
48	Myanmar (or Burma)	271.4	380.0	MMR
49	Uzbekistan	270.2	378.3	UZB
50	the Netherlands	269.1	376.7	NLD
51	United Arab Emirates (UAE)	266.4	373.0	ARE
52	Bolivia	265.1	371.2	BOL
53	Romania	264.8	370.8	ROU
54	Chadian	261.3	365.8	TCD
55	Niger (African state)	258.1	361.3	NER
56	Mongolia	256.7	359.4	MNG
57	Suomi	256.7	359.4	FIN
58	Mali, West Africa	254.5	356.2	MLI
59	Kenya	252.3	353.3	KEN
60	Portugal	250.1	350.1	PRT
61	Omani	249.9	349.9	OMN
62	Greece	248.7	348.1	GRC
63	Mozambique	245.0	343.0	MOZ
64	Switzerland	244.2	341.9	CHE
65	Turkmenistan	243.4	340.7	TKM
66	Korean Joseon or Chosun dynasty 1392-1910	241.6	434.8	PRK
67	Palestine	240.4	432.8	ISR
68	Paraguay	239.6	335.4	PRY
69	New Zeeland	239.1	334.7	NZL
70	Cameroon	238.2	333.5	CMR
71	Byelorussia	236.5	331.1	BLR
72	Afghanistan	236.4	331.0	AFG
73	Namibia	235.1	329.2	NAM
74	Mauritania	233.0	326.3	MRT
75	Seychelles	231.3	323.8	ZMB
76	Ecuador	231.0	323.4	ECU
77	Uganda	229.8	321.8	UGA
78	Austrian	228.2	319.5	AUT
79	Zimbabwe	226.9	317.7	ZWE
80	Botswana	226.2	316.7	BWA
81	South Sudan	225.5	315.7	SSD
82	Czech Republic (from 1993)	224.4	314.2	CZE
83	Belgium	224.0	313.6	BEL
84	Yemeni	223.4	312.7	YEM
85	Azerbaijan, former Soviet Republic and region of northwest Iran in Caucasus	223.1	312.3	AZE
86	Hungary	222.7	311.7	HUN
87	Cambodian	221.2	309.6	KHM
88	Irish	221.0	309.4	IRL
89	Côte d'Ivoire or Ivory Coast in West Africa	220.3	308.4	CIV
90	embargo	219.4	307.1	CUB
91	Madagascar	218.2	305.5	MDG
92	Cameroon	217.3	304.2	GHA
93	Denmark	217.3	304.2	DNK
94	Syria	215.5	301.7	SYR
95	jordan	213.6	299.1	JOR
96	Tunis, capital of Tunisia	211.8	296.5	TUN
97	Doha	208.3	291.7	QAT
98	Republic of Congo	208.2	291.4	COG
99	Papua New Guinea	207.9	291.1	PNG
100	Bulgaria	207.5	290.5	BGR
101	Mogadishu	206.2	288.6	SOM
102	Senegal	205.4	287.5	SEN
103	Uruguay	204.2	285.9	URY
104	Republic of Croatia (1991-)	204.0	285.6	HRV
105	Burkina Faso, West Africa	204.0	285.5	BFA
106	Central African Republic	203.9	285.5	CAF
107	Singaporean	202.4	283.3	SGP
108	(formerly) Ceylon	201.7	282.3	LKA
109	Laos	201.0	281.4	LAO
110	Serbia	200.3	280.5	SRB
111	Iraq	198.5	277.9	KWT
112	Slovakia	198.2	277.5	SVK
113	Guinea	196.0	274.4	GIN
114	Tajikistan	194.6	272.5	TJK
115	Dominican Republic (Tw)	194.3	272.0	DOM
116	Honduras	193.9	271.5	HND
117	Guatemala	193.5	271.0	GTM
118	Nepali	193.2	270.4	NPL
119	the Lithuanian republic, former Baltic Soviet republic	192.4	269.3	LTU
120	Gabonese	191.9	268.7	GAB
121	Nicaragua	186.4	260.9	NIC
122	Kyrgyz	182.6	255.6	KGZ
123	Georgia	182.0	254.7	GEO
124	Benin	177.7	248.8	BEN
125	Latvia	176.3	246.8	LVA
126	Guyana	175.5	245.7	GUY
127	Malawi, SE Africa	173.8	243.3	MWI
128	Rwandan	172.2	241.0	RWA
129	Estonia	167.6	234.7	EST
130	Togo, West Africa	167.5	234.5	TGO
131	Slovenia	167.4	234.4	SVN
132	Panama	164.5	230.3	PAN
133	Armenia	164.4	230.2	ARM
134	Costa Rica	163.5	228.9	CRI
135	Albania	163.3	228.6	ALB
136	Suriname	162.9	228.1	SUR
137	El Salvador	162.1	227.0	SLV
138	Haiti, the western third of Caribbean island Hispaniola	160.4	224.6	HTI
139	Icelandic	159.9	223.9	ISL
140	Liberia	159.4	223.2	LBR
141	abbr. for Bosnia-Herzegovina	157.1	219.9	BIH
142	Cyprus	156.9	219.7	CYP
143	Bahrain	155.6	217.9	BHR
144	Sierra Leone	155.2	217.2	SLE
145	hostilities	154.6	216.5	LBN
146	Brunei Darussalam, independent sultanate in northwest Borneo	154.2	215.9	BRN
147	Hong Kong	152.8	213.9	HKG
148	Equatorial Guinea	152.0	212.8	GNQ
149	Swatini (name)	151.4	212.0	SWZ
150	Republic of Moldova, former Soviet republic on the border with Romania	151.1	211.6	MDA
151	North Macedonia	148.3	207.6	MKD
152	Luxemburg	145.2	203.2	LUX
153	Jamaican	144.9	202.9	JAM
154	Burundi	142.1	198.9	BDI
155	Lesotho	138.1	193.3	LSO
156	Fiji (tropical volcanic island in southwest Pacific)	136.0	190.4	FJI
157	Bhutan	135.9	190.2	BTN
158	Trinidad and Tobago	135.1	189.1	TTO
159	Guinea-Bissau	134.7	188.6	GNB
160	Djibouti	134.4	188.2	DJI
161	East Timor (officially Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste)	128.3	179.6	TLS
162	Montenegro	128.1	179.4	MNE
163	Bahamas	128.0	179.1	BHS
164	Belizean	125.6	175.8	BLZ
165	Gambia	124.3	174.0	GMB
166	Mauritius	117.4	164.4	MUS
167	Cape Verde	112.1	157.0	CPV
168	Maltese	111.6	156.2	MLT
169	Barbados	104.5	146.3	BRB
170	the Seychelles	99.7	139.6	SYC

 

IV: European War Coalition Scoring and Endgame Predictions

4.1 Progress and projections of the war in Europe between the L1 and L2 lines.

Figure 1: Comparative Table of Intensity of Union Warfare in the European Theater of Operations

Figure 2. map of trends in the Russo-Ukrainian war (image source: https://pppnet.at/confined-walls-still-work-in-russia-ukraine-war-by-2026-2/）

4.1.1 War coalitions when the battlefield is between the L1 and L2 lines

With reference to the setting of the L1 and L2 lines of the Russian-Ukrainian War Restriction Wall [1] delineated in Ye Qiquan's article, the composition of the Ukrainian War Coalition and the Russian War Coalition when the Russo-Ukrainian War was fought to the east of the Dnipro River (the L1 line) and to the west of the Donbass (the L2 line) was as follows.

 

Table 5 Ukrainian Union I structure
Ukrainian Coalition I: (battlefield east of L1: intensity of war 761.7)
belligerent countries	Belarus	Stimulating defense effects; coefficient 1.4
Frontline allies	Lithuania, Poland.	National Warfighting Capabilities Count 60%
Supporting Allies	Czech Republic, France, Germany, Israel, UK, USA.	National Warfighting Capabilities Count 30%
Background Allies	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.	National Warfighting Capability Values 15%
Possibility to oppose the State	Selected South American countries	Anti-Existing Imperial Institutional Forces
Potential objecting States	Selected countries in Africa	Anti-Existing Imperial Institutional Forces
Potential allies on the other side	Most countries in the Arab world	Anti-Existing Imperial Institutional Forces

 

Table 6: Russian Union I structure
Russian Federation I: (battlefield position west of the L2 line: intensity of war 858.5)
belligerent countries	Georgia
Frontline allies		National Warfighting Capabilities Count 60%
Supporting Allies	Byelorussia	National Warfighting Capabilities Count 30%
Background Allies	China, Cuba, India, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Syria, UAE.	National Warfighting Capability Values 15%
Possibility to oppose the State	Four Central Asian countries, Mongolia	aftermath of the breakup of the Empire
Potential objecting States	Kazakhstan, Turkey.	multifactorial effect
Potential allies on the other side	Philippines, Mexico	Political and economic rationale

 

 

4.1.2 Intensity of alliance warfare when the battlefield is located between the L1 and L2 lines

 

Table 7: Coalition war intensity when the battlefield is located between the L1 and L2 lines
	Ukrainian Union I	Russian Federation I	benchmark score
Geographic scoring	229.8	314.9	/300
Demographic scoring	72.6	91.7	/130
Points for political categories	72.1	84.2	/90
Extra points for history	0	10	/10
Military factor scoring	133.8	122.4	/120
Agro-industrial capacity	41.9	52.9	/80
Industrial industrial capacity	81.6	72.7	/110
Service industry capacity	32.8	22.2	/40
Capacity to invest in armaments	97.2	87.5	/120
Total coalition war intensity	761.7	858.5

 

Figure 3: Map of the intensity of alliance wars where the battle lines are located between the L1 and L2 lines

Referring to Table 7, the visualization of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, the following inferential conclusions can be seen.

• The overall intensity of the war in Russian Union I was greater than in Ukrainian Union I;
• Between the L1 and L2 lines, it can be inferred that the Russian coalition has a greater chance of winning than the Ukrainian coalition;
• The Ukrainian coalition is stronger than the Russian coalition in terms of military capability, arms investment capability, agro-industrial capability, and industrial capability. In long-term projections, the Ukrainian coalition has the potential to seize the war advantage through military and industrial superiority;
• The Russian coalition is stronger than the other in terms of geography, demographics, and political factors. The long-term trend is that Russia can seize the war advantage by utilizing its demographic and political environment.

4.1.3 Prediction of the outcome of the war when the battlefield is located between the L1 and L2 lines

(1) According to the conclusions of the War Intensity Assessment System (WIAS), the Russian coalition has the advantage in this vast area between the L1 and L2 lines;

(2) Russia's ability to forcefully take possession of the deep blue zone (Crimea, Luhansk, and Dnetsk) on Figure 2 is not in doubt, as the crossing of the L2 line to the east will inspire the formation of “Russian Alliance II.”

(3) There is a very high probability that Russia will take strong possession of the dark and dark blue areas of Figure 2 (Crimea, Luhansk, Dnetsk, most of the Zaporozhye Oblast, and most of the Kherson Oblast);

(4) There is a better chance that Russia will occupy the dark blue, dark blue, and lake blue zones on map 2 (Crimea, Luhansk, Dnetsk, Zaporozhye, Kherson, most of Nikolaev Oblast, and a part of Odessa Oblast);

(5) The worst-case scenario for Ukraine would be the loss of the entire territory of the eastern bank of the Dnieper River;

(6) It is unlikely that Russia will cross the L1 line to the west. This is because crossing the L1 line to the west would inspire an escalation of the Ukrainian Union to “Ukrainian Union II”. This would result in a reversal of war power.

 

4.2 Progress and projections as the war in Europe crosses west of the L1 line

4.2.1 Changes in the structure of the war coalition (update)

Once the Russian-Ukrainian war crosses west of the L1 line, it will seriously damage the interests of the US bloc, thus inspiring the upgrading and renewal of the ‘Ukrainian Union I‘ into the ’Ukrainian Union II'. This change will significantly upgrade the composition of the Ukrainian coalition's war forces. The composition of the Russian coalition, on the other hand, will not change significantly. As a result, the ratio of combat forces on the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield will be reversed. The Ukrainian side will gain an advantage in battlefield strength, while the Russian coalition will become weaker.

 

Table 8: Ukrainian Union Structure II:
Ukrainian coalition structure II: (front crossing west of the L1 line) 906.5
belligerent countries	Ukraine.	Stimulating defense effects; coefficient 1.4
Frontline allies	Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Poland, United Kingdom, United States.	National Warfighting Capabilities Count 60%
Supporting Allies	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.	National Warfighting Capabilities Count 30%
Background Allies	Greece, Hungary	National Warfighting Capability Values 15%
Possibility to oppose the State	Selected South American countries	Anti-Existing Imperial Institutional Forces
Potential objecting States	Selected countries in Africa	Anti-Existing Imperial Institutional Forces
Potential allies on the other side	Most countries in the Arab world	Anti-Existing Imperial Institutional Forces

 

4.2.2 Coalition war intensity when the battlefield is west of the L1 line

 

Table 9: Coalition Intensity of War after the Battlefield Crosses West of the L1 Line
	Ukrainian Union II	Russian Federation I	benchmark score
Geographic scoring	281.7	314.9	/300
Demographic scoring	85.2	91.7	/130
Points for political categories	72.1	84.2	/90
Extra points for history	0	10	/10
Military factor scoring	158.2	122.4	/120
Agro-industrial capacity	50.6	52.9	/80
Industrial industrial capacity	99.6	72.7	/110
Service industry capacity	40.4	22.2	/40
Capacity to invest in armaments	118.7	87.5	/120
Total coalition war intensity	906.5	858.5

 

Figure 4: Intensity of alliance warfare west of the L1 line

As can be seen from the information in Figure 4 and Table 9, once the formation of the Ukrainian Union II was triggered, the war capacity represented by the intensity of the war immediately flipped. The Ukrainian Union is ahead of the Russian Union in terms of overall scores, as well as in terms of military capabilities, armament investment, industrial productivity, and service industries.

4.2.3 Predictions of the outcome of the war after the stimulation of “Ukrainian Union II”

(1) The war power of the Ukrainian coalition II is significantly stronger than that of the Russian coalition, which could lead to a counterattack on Russia's withdrawal from the territories it already occupies;

(2) There is a very high probability that Russia will be compressed back into the deep blue and true blue areas shown in Figure 2 (Crimea, Luhansk, Dnetsk, most of the Zaporizhia Oblast, and most of the Kherson Oblast). And here a prolonged confrontation with the American bloc will take place. Because this line is very much in the long-term interests of the American bloc.

(3) There is still a high probability that Russia will continue to occupy the dark blue, dark blue, and lake blue areas shown in figure 2 (Crimea, Luhansk, Dnetsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, most of Nikolaev Oblast, and part of Odessa Oblast). This line of confrontation remains in the long-term interests of the American bloc.

(4.) There is one outcome that the American bloc does not generally pursue. It is to compress Russia east of the L2 line. Once the battlefield crosses east of the L2 line, it will inspire the formation of “Russian Alliance II”. This will cause another reversal of power on the battlefield.

4.3 Progress and projections of the war in Europe while east of the L2 line

Once the war is pushed eastward and crosses the L2 line, the various political and war combinations on the battlefield will once again undergo great upheaval and change. Characterized by the stimulation of Russia's national defense mentality, and the reorganization of new war alliance structures.

4.3.1 Changes in the structure of the war coalition

(1) The Donbass region east of the L2 line is of special political significance for Russia, and since 2014 Donbass east of the L2 line has had de facto autonomous powers beyond those of the Kosovo region;

(2) Regardless of the point of departure of the Minsk Agreements, this series of international agreements de facto confirmed the autonomy of Luhansk and Dnetsk beyond the Kosovo region;

(3) Despite the fact that four oblasts have declared referendums on joining the Russian Federation, it is clear that the turbulent history of Luhansk and Dunnetzk is markedly different from that of Kherson and Zaporozhye;

(4) If it is assumed that Russia could tolerate the loss of the Kherson and Zaporozhye oblasts again in the war. But the loss of Luhansk and Dunnetzk must have galvanized the Russians into a national defensive mood;

(5) Assuming that the small probability event comes true and the battlefield is pushed east of the L2 line, it will inevitably inspire the formation of Russian Alliance II.

4.3.2 Intensity of alliance warfare when the battlefield is east of the L2 line

Russian Federation II

Table 10: Russian Coalition II: (Fronts crossing east of L2) (1055.5)
belligerent countries	Georgia	Stimulation of defense effects, factor 2.2
Frontline allies	Byelorussia	National Warfighting Capabilities Count 60%
Supporting Allies	China, North Korea, Iran.	National Warfighting Capabilities Count 30%
Background Allies	Cuba, India, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Syria, UAE.	National Warfighting Capability Values 15%
Possibility to oppose the State	Four Central Asian countries, Mongolia	aftermath of the breakup of the Empire
Potential objecting States	Kazakhstan, Turkey.	multifactorial effect
Potential allies on the other side	Philippines, Mexico	Political and economic rationale

 

Table 11: Coalition Intensity of War after the Battlefield Crosses East of the L2 Line
	Ukrainian Union II	Russian Federation II	benchmark score
Geographic scoring	281.7	405.0	/300
Demographic scoring	85.2	110.0	/130
Points for political categories	72.1	84.2	/90
Extra points for history	0	10	/10
Military factor scoring	158.2	155.0	/120
Agro-industrial capacity	50.6	64.5	/80
Industrial industrial capacity	99.6	90.8	/110
Service industry capacity	40.4	27.7	/40
Capacity to invest in armaments	118.7	108.3	/120
Total coalition war intensity	906.5	1055.5

4.3.3 Predictions of the course of the war after the triggering of “Russian Federation II”

(1) The triggering of “Russian Federation II” has led to a renewed change in battlefield war-fighting capabilities. The Russian Federation's war-fighting capabilities are once again dominant;

(2) The formation of the “Russian Alliance II” will cause major political upheavals as China enters the ranks of Russia's supportive allies. This could have successive political effects in the European region.

(3) There is a high probability that the political effects of “Russian Federation II” will trigger a further change in the composition of the subsequent war coalition, thus triggering a real all-European war.

(4) The composition of alliances and the intensity of the war across Europe require further study.

 

5. Summary

The application of high-power, high-coverage weapons is now increasingly a realistic possibility. The rapid deployment and movement of armed forces is becoming more and more sophisticated. The modes of bloc warfare and total war have returned to political reality. Under these new circumstances, there is a need for a new type of tool for assessing the country's overall war capability and the group's total war capability. This is the original purpose of this paper, which proposes a system for assessing the “intensity of national war”.

In this assessment system, geographic factors, demographic factors, organizational capabilities, military capabilities, and economic capabilities are ranked as the most important war-fighting capability assets. Geography, in particular, is elevated to a level never before recognized. It is seen as the most powerful component of a nation's deterrent power.

According to this assessment system, the countries with the strongest overall national war-fighting capabilities are China, the United States, Russia, India, Brazil, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Indonesia.

Based on the extended arithmetic of this assessment system, it is possible to calculate the war intensity of each war coalition involved in the European war. According to the current structure of the Ukrainian coalition, the overall war intensity of the Ukrainian coalition is weaker than that of the Russian coalition. This should be the fundamental reason for the limitation of the Ukrainian side in the war in the region of Central and South Ukraine.

The current stalemate in the region is also due to the fact that the Russian coalition does not have an overwhelming advantage in terms of the intensity of the war. The Ukrainian coalition has an advantage in terms of military equipment, armament investment capacity, industrial capacity, and service industry capacity. The Ukrainian coalition can strive for war advantage through armament consumption and industrial consumption. The Russian coalition has advantages in terms of geography, organization, and population. Russia can gain further battlefield advantages through manpower depletion and the support of relative political stability.

If Russia tries to push the war effort west of the L1 line, it will inspire an upgraded and renewed Ukrainian coalition. An updated Ukrainian alliance would be significantly stronger in war intensity than Russia's current alliance. It could lead to Russian defeats in Central and South Ukraine.

But the boundary of the new Ukrainian coalition's eastward push can hardly be more than east of the L2 line. Because once the front crosses east of the L2 line, it will inspire an escalation and renewal of the Russian coalition. And thus another power flip will occur.

The application of this assessment system provides a better explanation for the predictions of the direction of the Russo-Ukrainian war made in April, May, and June 2022 by Kichizumi Ye. These predictions indicate that the Russo-Ukrainian war will be confined between the L1 and L2 lines for a relatively long period of time; that Russia will establish up to seven or so autonomous governments on Ukrainian soil; and that Russia will not incur a military defeat at least until the end of 2026 [1,2,3,4].

 

References:

1. Ye Qiquan . Predicting the Border Wall in the Russo-Ukrainian War as Early as April 26, 2022 . PPPNET, Webpage:https://pppnet.at/early-prophecy-on-confined-walls-in-russia-ukraine-war/
2. Ye Qiquan. Theoretical Three Ceasefire Lines in the Russo-Ukrainian War. PPPNET, webpage:https://pppnet.at/three-possible-ceasefire-lines-in-russia-ukraine-war/
3. Ye Qiquan. Whose War? Winners and Losers in the Russia-Ukraine War. PPPNET, 2023. webpage: https://pppnet.at/players-winning-or-losing-from-russia-ukraine-war-2/
4. Ye Qiquan. Border wall for Russia-Ukraine war works at least until the end of 2026. PPPNET, 2023. webpage:https://pppnet.at/confined-walls-still-work-in-russia-ukraine-war-by-2026-2/

Other data sources involved in model calculations

World Development Indicators. World Bank. 2022. https://www.databank.worldbank.org/

Countryreports 2022. countryreports.Org. 2022. https://www.countryreports.org/

The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. 2023. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/

2023 Military Strength Ranking. global firepower. 2023. https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php

Global Food Security Index (GFSI) 2022. the Economist. 2023. https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/

2022 Report. Global Innovation Index. 2023. https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/gii-2022-report

Global Hunger Index Scores by 2022 GHI Rank. 2023. https://www.globalhungerindex.org/ranking.html