China’s military unification plan (3): China’s variable design basis

By：叶 其泉

(Research Outline)

China’s move to reunify Taiwan is, in essence, a major action against the existing US imperial order. Any assessment that downplays this substance/essence will lead to serious bias in expectations.

summary:

China’s move to reunify Taiwan is essentially a major action against the existing US imperial order. Any assessment that underestimates this substance/essence will lead to serious misjudgments. The consequences of this action will substantially weaken the US-led, Europe-centric imperial order. It is reasonable to expect a “major response” from the US and Europe to this “small-scale military action.” China must therefore design its action plan based on a comprehensive and holistic response from the US and Europe. This will certainly include: variables targeting Taiwan; variables targeting Japan; variables targeting South Korea; variables targeting the US; variables targeting Europe; and other dynamic considerations.

I. China’s move towards unification is a political challenge to the US imperial order.

1.1 This has significantly reduced China’s room for maneuver in political ambiguity.

Since its full and deep involvement in the Hong Kong unrest in 2019, the United States has effectively launched a political campaign to categorize China as part of the opposing camp. China, as the victim, has consistently refused to acknowledge this political process. China has consistently attempted to ease or deny tensions with the US alliance through a policy of ambiguity. Seeking a middle ground to maintain ties with the US alliance has been considered by most Chinese politicians to be in China’s national interest.

China’s ideological forces are keenly aware of the hostility of the US-led alliance. They consciously deny or obscure this process of political hostility in order to postpone full-scale hostility with the US-led alliance as much as possible, while pursuing China’s maximum interests in the process.

China’s action-oriented forces may not yet fundamentally grasp this ongoing political narrative. They may view the “political conflicts” between China and the US as fluctuations and deviations occurring along a timeline. They believe that through their efforts, they can correct or mitigate these fluctuations and deviations. This understanding motivates them to work even harder to repair relations between China and the countries in the US-led alliance.

In any case, before China’s reunification of Taiwan begins, various forces in China have some room to maneuver in order to delay or downplay the political conflict with the United States in order to maximize China’s interests within the existing imperial order.

However, once China’s cross-strait military operations are launched, the space for political ambiguity on China’s part is significantly reduced. The two blocs of China and the United States have effectively entered into a direct political conflict.

1.2 Directly challenging the ruling authority of the United States

The United States has used military force to maintain the separation of the Taiwan Strait for 70 years. This is both a political and a military fact.

While China can find many pretexts to obscure or obscure the facts of the Sino-US conflict when challenging US authority in the South China Sea, maintaining the median line of the Taiwan Strait to preserve the actual separation between the two sides has always been actively managed and maintained by the United States. Once China initiates its reunification efforts, there will be no pretext or excuse to conceal this political reality.

1.3 Directly challenging the military authority of the United States

Ye, Qiquan has maintained since April 2024 that the United States is the dominant force in the Ukraine war [1, 2, 3, 4]. Perhaps this is true. Even if it is true, Russia, the other dominant force in the Ukraine war, has never declared that its military actions are directed against the United States.

The United States’ military authority has not faced any real challenges in its operations in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and the former Yugoslavia. Even Iran has strived to maintain a non-conflict relationship with the United States. When faced with challenges from the United States and Israel, it has effectively adopted a defensive posture.

However, China’s cross-strait military operation in 2026, even without the presence of US troops on the battlefield, will inevitably be perceived by the world as a direct military conflict between China and the United States. Moreover, it will undoubtedly be considered a US military failure. This is because its direct consequence is the complete destruction of the US-maintained separation of Taiwan by Chinese military force, thus directly revealing a gap in US military capabilities.

II. China’s reunification efforts fundamentally weaken the American imperial order.

If China’s transatlantic military operation succeeds, it will weaken U.S. dominance in at least the following ways.

It permanently seized control of the Taiwan Strait from the United States, which had held it for 70 years.
It has permanently restricted the “freedom of action” of the United States, Japan, and South Korea in the Sea of Japan and surrounding waters;
This laid the foundation for the encroachment of maritime rights by the “Land Sword” or “Land Bridge”;
This laid the foundation for, or directly facilitated, the withdrawal of American power from East Asia;
The retreat of American power in East Asia will lay the political and economic foundation for the formation of a “pan-East Asian cooperation zone”;
Japan and South Korea may deviate from the existing economic order to form, participate in, or join a new economic order in order to maximize their national interests;
If Japan and South Korea join the new economic order, it will effectively signal the dismantling of the existing economic order dominated by the United States and centered on Europe; or it will formally create two parallel world economic systems.
If the US-led coalition makes a major misstep in its response, it could quickly and directly lead to chaos in the heart of Europe, a full-blown border shift, or a redefinition of borders.

III. China’s move toward unification could fundamentally disrupt the US-led world order.

(1. A large number of countries are ready to challenge the world order governed by the United States;)

(2. Many countries have completed the ideological preparation for rebellion against the existing system;)

(3. If there is a significant gap in American power, the process of seeking new philosophical and political systems will be stimulated;)

(4. The existing philosophical and political systems have shown obvious drawbacks in maintaining the ruling order; the search for new philosophical and political ideas has become an inherent need worldwide.)

(5. Opposition forces will automatically seek out windows of opportunity, new paths of action, or new leadership. China’s military reunification efforts may be able to initiate this process ahead of schedule.)

IV. China’s variable design is based on the political reality of total hostility with the United States.

(1. The above analysis basically confirms that China’s military reunification action will pose a huge challenge to the US-led imperial order. As the leading group of the current imperial order, the United States and Europe will inevitably make a “huge response” to this “small-scale military action.” Their starting point is to minimize damage and ensure the stability of the order.)

(2. Chinese politicians are forced to accept (actively or passively) the possibility that China’s unification efforts may uncontrollably usher in a new historical era or an era of chaos;)

(3. China’s action plan for unifying Taiwan must be designed within the context of a comprehensive and systematic response from the US-led coalition. This includes:)

Variable design specifically for Taiwan;

Variable design specific to South Korea;

Variable design specifically for Japan;

Variable design specifically for the United States;

Variable design for the EU;

Variable design specifically for India;

A container design to accommodate opposing forces;

Design to address comprehensive economic exodus;

The mindset to define partners and adversaries in the course of history.

Summary of the research outline

China’s move to reunify Taiwan is essentially a major action against the existing US imperial order. Any assessment that underestimates this substance/essence will lead to serious misjudgments. The consequences of this action will substantially weaken the US-led, Europe-centric imperial order. It is reasonable to expect a “major response” from the US and Europe to this “small-scale military action.” China must therefore design its action plan based on a comprehensive and holistic response from the US and Europe. This will certainly include: variables targeting Taiwan; variables targeting Japan; variables targeting South Korea; variables targeting the US; variables targeting Europe; and other dynamic considerations.

References

1. Ye, Qiquan. Predicting the border wall in the Russia-Ukraine war as early as April 26, 2022. PPPNet. 2023. http://pppnet.net/early-prophecy-on-confined-walls-in-russia-ukraine-war/
2. Ye, Qiquan. The border wall in the Russia-Ukraine war will remain functional until at least the end of 2026. PPPNet. 2023. http://pppnet.net/confined-walls-still-work-in-russia-ukraine-war-by-2026-2/
3. Ye, Qiquan. Whose War? Winners and Losers in the Russo-Ukrainian War. PPPNet. 2023. http://pppnet.net/players-winning-or-losing-from-russia-ukraine-war-2/
4. Ye, Qiquan. Theoretical Three Ceasefire Lines in the Russo-Ukrainian War. PPPNet. 2023. http://pppnet.net/three-possible-ceasefire-lines-in-russia-ukraine-war/

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