\r\n| \r\n Preview Date<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n Mar. 29, 2023<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n Updated Date<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n Sep. 8, 2023<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n <\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n <\/span>Abstracts:<\/span><\/h2>\r\nKorea is an inescapable party in the drama of the Sino-American conflict. It is a major member of the American alliance. It was also a major participant in the early and low-level conflicts. However, Korea does not have the political basis for an all-out war with China, Russia, or even North Korea. This political shortcoming has resulted in Korea's ability to actively engage in low-level conflicts, but not in medium-level or more serious war operations. As the level of war response increases, it is to be expected that South Korea will quickly withdraw from the war process.<\/p>\r\n <\/span>Keywords:<\/span><\/h2>\r\n2026, Asian war, Sino-American conflict, Korea.<\/p>\r\n The inner characteristics of Koreans can be described as strong, even recklessly strong. They are not willing to be quiet in the political arena. In the days of the Chinese imperial order, they were proud to call themselves \u201cLittle China\u201d. In the American imperial order, they called themselves the \u201cJerusalem of the East\u201d. Korea has often followed the political decisions of the United States with the most conspicuous gestures.
Regrettably, however, Korea is the weakest participant in the Asian conflict between China and the United States. Although Korea has a stronger independent decision-making ability than Japan, Korea's political decisions are heavily influenced by those of its neighboring countries. Whether it is the United States, China, Russia, Japan, or even North Korea, any political decision of these countries will seriously affect Korea's decision-making ability, decision-making status, and decision-making direction.<\/p>\r\n <\/span>1. U.S. Influence on Korea<\/span><\/h2>\r\nThe United States has broad and deep political, economic, and military influence in Korea.
Korea is the second largest U.S. military presence in Asia. The wartime command of the South Korean military is vested in the United States. The U.S. has placed several missile tracking and surveillance systems in Korea. The U.S. has skillfully used surveillance, blackmail, protests, coups and even assassinations to control the fate of South Korean politicians.
In the event of a military conflict between the United States and China, South Korea is unquestionably a member of the American coalition. It is on the front lines of a Sino-American conflict.
If the US-China conflict is kept at the level of the \u201cYasuzi Scheme\u201d and below, it indicates that the US and China have a tacit understanding not to change the geopolitical situation in a serious way. At this level of conflict, Korea will remain at the front line of the US-China conflict, and this will not cause any major impact on Korea's national interests.<\/p>\r\n <\/span>2. China's influence on Korea<\/span><\/h2>\r\nChina's existing influence on Korea is mainly on the economic level. But at this level, the U.S. and European markets have more influence on Korea. Therefore, Korea actually embraces the economic policies of the U.S. and Europe more.
China has a real geopolitical advantage over Korea. But for more than 60 years China has been so reluctant to use this weapon that Korean politicians have forgotten this important fact.
China understands the reality of Korea. If Korea had behaved moderately in the US-China conflict, China would not have shown excessive resentment towards Korea.
China has the ability to start a war in the Korean Peninsula at any time. China has the ability to provoke conflict on the maritime border between China and South Korea at any time. China also has the ability to destroy the economic foundation of the Korean nation at any time.
If South Korea seriously provokes China, China may launch a direct strike against South Korea. The strikes would likely focus on ground military facilities and economic infrastructure. China may not seek to seriously damage South Korea's naval capabilities.
China will not allow Korea to enter a \u201cmedium response level\u201d and higher level war. Korea cannot resist China's political decision.<\/p>\r\n <\/span>3. Russian influence on Korea<\/span><\/h2>\r\nRussia has a geopolitical advantage over Korea. Although this advantage is hidden by its weak economic power, Russia has the ability to activate it at any time.
Russia's influence over South Korea is likely to be realized more through proxies.
Once Russia decides to strike Korea, it will probably be an indiscriminate strike. There will be no intentional retention of a particular aspect of South Korea's military power.<\/p>\r\n <\/span>4. Impact of North Korea on Korea<\/span><\/h2>\r\nAlthough both North and South Korea are pursuing reconciliation, it can be expected that there will not be any significant progress within a certain period of time.
The confrontation between North and South Korea is likely to intensify during the US-China conflict.
North Korea has a psychological advantage over South Korea, and while this advantage cannot actually be superimposed on political advantage, it can be superimposed on military capability.
North Korea actually has a geopolitical advantage over South Korea, although South Korea does not actually recognize this.
The cooperation between China or Russia and the DPRK is a major concern for South Korea. The slightest movement will alert South Korea's attention. This is the fundamental reason why South Korea is not able to fully engage in the US-China conflict.<\/p>\r\n <\/span>5. History of Military Operations in Korea<\/span><\/h2>\r\nAt the early stage of the Sino-American conflict, it was in Korea's national interest, and in the interest of Korean politicians, to take an active part in the U.S.-led military operations. As a colony of the United States, it was in Korea's national interest to follow the course of action of its sovereign.
Korea may participate in various military operations in the early stages of the U.S.-China conflict. It could also be involved in all low-level military operations.
Once the U.S. decides to withdraw its military forces beyond the range of China's medium-range ballistic missiles, that is the timetable for South Korea to withdraw its military operations.
China will not allow South Korea to enter a mid-level war and more significant military operations to minimize the risk to China. Korea is not in a position to resist China's political will. This is because China has a greater capacity to destroy Korea's national interests than the United States.
Korea is also incapable of resisting Russia's political decisions. In the event that Russia launches a war campaign against Korea through proxies, Korea will have to compromise with Russia. Even when Russia threatens to do so, Korea will back down.
South Korea certainly has the practical ability to resist a military strike by North Korea, but only if there is no context of Chinese or Russian involvement.<\/p>\r\n <\/span>Tiny knots:<\/span><\/h2>\r\nKorea is an inescapable party in the U.S.-China conflict drama. It is a major member of the American alliance. It was also a major participant in the early and low-level conflicts. However, Korea does not have the political basis for an all-out war with China, Russia, or even North Korea. This political shortcoming has led to Korea's active involvement in low-level conflicts, but not in medium-level or higher war operations. As the level of war response increases, the assumption that South Korea will quickly withdraw from the war process is to be expected. <\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \uff08\u672c\u6587\u4e3a\u672a\u5b8c\u6bd5\u4e4b\u7814\u7a76\u63d0\u7eb2\uff09 Preview Date Mar. 29, 2023 Updated Date S…<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_kad_post_transparent":"","_kad_post_title":"","_kad_post_layout":"","_kad_post_sidebar_id":"","_kad_post_content_style":"","_kad_post_vertical_padding":"","_kad_post_feature":"","_kad_post_feature_position":"","_kad_post_header":false,"_kad_post_footer":false,"_kad_post_classname":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[96],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4307","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uni-war"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4307","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4307"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4307\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4810,"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4307\/revisions\/4810"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4307"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4307"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4307"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}} |