\r\n| \r\n Preview Date<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n Mar. 29, 2023<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n Updated Date<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n Sep. 9, 2023<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n <\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n <\/span>Abstracts:<\/span><\/h2>\r\nThe United States and the Allied Powers have a number of options for responding to a Chinese military operation across the Taiwan Strait in 2026. The goal of these options is to minimize political damage and prevent China from further expanding its political gains. But there is always a gap between politicians\u201c perceptions and public opinion. The resistance of public opinion is the main reason that prevents the \u201dprior peace talks program\u201c. Domestic law resistance, international law resistance, and the lack of control over the end point also prevent the implementation of the \u201dex-ante deterrence program\". In the Ex Post Response Program, comprehensive political and economic sanctions formed the basis of the U.S. coalition's response program. But without a military response, no program can effectively stabilize the domestic situation, maintain the authority of the existing imperial order, or prevent the rapid expansion of China's geopolitical gains. But the risks of a military solution are also obvious. The challenge for politicians on both sides is how to control the level of military confrontation and how to avoid major military losses to either side. The Chinese side had the political advantage of choosing the timing and scope of the war. The difficulty for the US alliance to land on Chinese soil also ensured that China would not suffer a total military defeat. The U.S. advantage lies in its overall military and political superiority on a global scale. China was incapable of dealing a major blow to the United States at the national level. Even if U.S. military forces were to retreat to the Americas, it would not result in a significant reduction in U.S. political and economic power. A number of factors give the U.S. the psychological advantage to proactively escalate the level of military response, even to the point of applying nuclear devices in an actual conflict. In order to deter the occurrence of nuclear war, it may be more important to mobilize the anti-nuclear awareness of the citizens of both sides, in addition to the rational political understanding of the politicians of both sides.<\/p>\r\n <\/span>Keywords:<\/span><\/h2>\r\nWar, Trans-Taiwan Strait, Reunification, US-China Conflict, Response, Levels, Scenarios, Assumptions<\/p>\r\n <\/p>\r\n The U.S. coalition has initiated a series of responses based on China's trans-Taiwan Strait military operations in 2026. These responses could trigger an all-out war between China and the United States. There are three different versions of an all-out war between the Chinese (coalition) and the US coalition. There are differences in the details of these three versions. However, the basic structure and the basic evolutionary path are very similar. In the following discussion, we will try to omit the differences among the three versions. The main focus is on the main path.<\/p>\r\n <\/span>I: Three different versions.<\/span><\/h2>\r\n\r\n- \r\n
As the US coalition's soi program got out of hand, it escalated into a full-scale general war between the two sides;<\/div>\r\n<\/li>\r\n - \r\n
The U.S. bloc's comprehensive overall war plan was proactively planned in advance;<\/div>\r\n<\/li>\r\n - \r\n
\u00a0Suffocating economic war against China provokes China's initiative for a full-scale total war;<\/div>\r\n<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n <\/span>Two: A new character and tone of the war.<\/span><\/h2>\r\n<\/span>New Historical Features<\/span><\/span><\/h3>\r\nIf a full-scale overall war breaks out between the United States and China this time, it will have one characteristic. This feature is the first of its kind in the 3,000-year history of war that has been fully documented. It is that the predominant focus on weakening or eliminating the opponent's ability to sustain war has replaced the primary focus on eliminating the enemy's military power in previous wars.<\/p>\r\n From the first appearance of war records in ancient Chinese history books until World War I and World War II, and even the major wars after World War II, the elimination or weakening of an opponent's ability to wage war has focused on eliminating, annihilating, and crushing the opponent's military capability. The total military defeat of one side represents the loss of that side's military and political capability.<\/p>\r\n This upcoming war will also be different in that it will lack a military process. It may be more complex and varied, more brutal, and may result in more severe human casualties. Strikes from space; military behavior that relies heavily on space capabilities; over-the-horizon warfare; the suppression of sea-power war capabilities by land-power war capabilities; the full involvement of political maneuvering in the military process; the actual use of nuclear devices or mutual deterrence for combat readiness; a whole range of new military formations and features that will leave a strong imprint on the course of history.<\/p>\r\n But all of these military markers will not be the fundamental character of this war. The fundamental character of this battlefield lies in the<\/p>\r\n <\/span>First New Feature War<\/span><\/span><\/h3>\r\nThis was the first full-scale war in human history to focus on reducing the opponent's ability to sustain war. The elimination of military capabilities on the battlefield and the killing of armed men took second place to the importance of this war.<\/p>\r\n <\/p>\r\n <\/span>III: War Response Levels and Escalation Processes<\/span><\/h2>\r\n<\/span>3.1 Level 1 Response: War of Harassment<\/span><\/span><\/h3>\r\nHarassment warfare can appear as a common part of both the soi scheme and the overall warfare scheme.
To complement the comprehensive political and economic sanctions, the U.S. and its allies have launched an all-encompassing, multi-faceted campaign of harassment against China in parallel with the propaganda war. This is characterized by armed confrontation at the sub-military level.
At this stage of action, Western European countries, Japan, Korea, and Australia are all powerful assets of the US. Burma, Thailand, India, Kazakhstan, and the Philippines, as well as the maritime demarcation line between China and South Korea, the Diaoyu Islands, and the Hwangam Islands, are all potential hotspots of chaos to increase political and military pressure on China.
China will induce or support political initiatives in Turkey, Iran, Syria and Palestine. As a reciprocal response to the political harassment of the U.S. group.
This phase will not last long because the United States has an overwhelming advantage over China in this phase of the struggle. China will do its best to avoid a prolonged disadvantage.\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<\/span>3.2 Secondary Response: Semi-Contact or Low-Level Proxy Wars<\/span><\/span><\/h3>\r\nWhether China is the first to escalate its response or the U.S.'s Asian proxies are the first to escalate theirs, a small-scale, real-world assault will take place at this stage.
At this stage, India, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Myanmar could become important assets for the United States.
China will certainly cause conflict hotspots and chaos in Europe. Expand the chaos of the Russian-Ukrainian war and activate or escalate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Utilizing existing and potential hotspots in North Africa and the Far East will also become China's political choice and military option.
Strictly speaking, this level of military conflict is still a collateral effect of political war, and does not have the characteristics of an independent and complete military conflict, but it is a necessary and preparatory stage for the occurrence of an actual military conflict.<\/p>\r\n <\/span>3.3 Response Level 3: Low Intensity Thermal Warfare<\/span><\/span><\/h3>\r\nAfter the transition and testing procedures of semi-contact war or low-intensity proxy war, low-intensity hot war will be the inevitable follow-up process.<\/p>\r\n 3.3.1 Equivalent Characterization of Low Intensity Thermal Warfare:<\/span><\/h4>\r\nThe low-intensity hot war was characterized by typical fighting, with heavy casualties and damage to military property. No major war losses were suffered by either side. There were no large-scale strikes against the national economic base.<\/p>\r\n 3.3.2 Guiding Members<\/span><\/h4>\r\nIn a small, low-intensity hot war, Japan, Korea, Australia, India, the Philippines, and Burma could be positive assets for the US.<\/p>\r\n 3.3.3 Korean Exit War Procedure<\/span><\/h4>\r\nWhether active or passive, Korea will be withdrawn from active combat after one or more low-intensity hot wars. Regardless of the state of war in which the Chinese bloc or the U.S. bloc finds itself, Korea will be the first country in the U.S. alliance to withdraw from the battlefield. Korea's withdrawal from the war signaled a serious retreat of American political power in Korea. This American political and military retreat will be difficult to reverse after the war.<\/p>\r\n 3.3.4 India and Myanmar<\/span><\/h4>\r\nIndia's border with China will remain hostile but calm. India will only be mildly involved in this phase of low-intensity hot war or will never enter it.
Burma and India have similar general dynamics but are somewhat more volatile than India. Either it never joined the US alliance; or it was more active in the US alliance than India.<\/p>\r\n 3.3.5 China<\/span><\/h4>\r\nThe frequency of surveillance and inspection of cargo ships entering and leaving Chinese ports by U.S. allied nations on the high seas has increased dramatically. China's economic activities have been severely curtailed. China is openly and extensively involved in various political hotspots in Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and the Far East.<\/p>\r\n 3.3.6 Europe<\/span><\/h4>\r\nThere is bound to be chaos in a number of hotspots in the European region. Chaos in North Africa and the Middle East is aggravated and intensified. The history of border movement in Europe faces reactivation, either accelerated or intensified.<\/p>\r\n <\/span>3.4 Response Level 4: Medium Intensity Warfare<\/span><\/span><\/h3>\r\n3.4.1 Relocation of the U.S. Garrison in Japan and Korea<\/span><\/h4>\r\nThe movement of the U.S. garrisons in Japan and Korea is a characteristic indicator of U.S. preparations for a medium-intensity war. The movement of the U.S. military forces and even the Japanese fleet to the Philippines, Guam, or the Indian Ocean islands can be regarded as a characteristic indicator that the U.S. is preparing for a full-scale general war. It is also a typical indicator that the Chinese group and the American group are preparing for a medium-intensity war and a high-intensity war.<\/p>\r\n 3.4.2 China has no active military program to defeat the United States.<\/span><\/h4>\r\nWhen China initiated its plan to unify Taiwan, it did not have a plan to initiate a war with the United States. Nor does China have a plan to actively defeat the United States as a re-reaction to the military response of the U.S. alliance. Nor will China stop the course of action of the US and Japanese military forces moving to the Philippines or elsewhere.<\/p>\r\n 3.4.3 The root cause of Korea's withdrawal from the war was not China.<\/span><\/h4>\r\nKorea is not capable of engaging in a medium intensity war, nor can it move naval forces to the Philippines. The root cause of withdrawing from a medium war is that Korea does not have the political capacity to withstand a medium war. South Korea could declare neutrality without significant loss of naval power and de-function U.S. military installations in South Korea.<\/p>\r\n 3.4.4 The de-Americanization process in Japan is initiated.<\/span><\/h4>\r\nWhether it is the result of active movement or the passive result of being hit by China, Japan's de-Americanization is an inevitable outcome once the Chinese bloc and the American bloc start a war of medium intensity. This result also initiates the political process of Japan's de-Americanization.<\/p>\r\n 3.4.5 China's proactive involvement in complex operations in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.<\/span><\/h4>\r\nMore complicated and deeper cooperation processes between China and Russia, China and Iran, China and Turkey, China and Afghanistan, China and Syria, and China and Egypt may be initiated at this stage.<\/p>\r\n <\/span>3.5 Response Level 5: Major Warfare<\/span><\/span><\/h3>\r\n3.5.1 Risks of Japan's Exit from the Battlefield<\/span><\/h4>\r\nRegardless of the extent of damage to China from a moderately intense war, it would be a historical trigger. It initiated a process of retreat of U.S. military and political influence in Japan. Once it is confirmed that the U.S. will not be able to stop China's geopolitical expansion in a major war effort, Japan's withdrawal from the war process is a foregone conclusion.<\/p>\r\n 3.5.2 Opportunities for the U.S. to Maintain a Presence in Northeast Asia<\/span><\/h4>\r\nThe opportunity to halt U.S. retreat in Northeast Asia depends on the U.S. defeating China in a major war and effectively halting China's political and geopolitical expansion. Such opportunities are difficult to control in advance, difficult to predict in advance, and highly susceptible to chance.<\/p>\r\n 3.5.3 Europe cannot fully commit to the war in Asia<\/span><\/h4>\r\nThe Russian-Ukrainian war has in fact reactivated the history of border mobilization in European countries. Many countries have already completed their psychological and even political preparations for joining the history of turmoil. Once China and the U.S. start to prepare for a major war, the process of border movement in Europe will be accelerated and intensified. Initiating and accelerating the process of European deconstruction of power is a necessary measure for China to prevent Europe from joining the Asian war.<\/p>\r\n 3.5.4 It is difficult to see how the U.S. can win a major war.<\/span><\/h4>\r\nThere is no pressure on China to maintain a system of power, and therefore no pressure for an overall victory. This fact gives China the political initiative to choose the battlefield. The United States does not have the opportunity to land on Chinese soil within the confines of China's chosen theater of war. This deprived the U.S. of the opportunity to defeat China completely. Once China and the U.S. enter into a war of attrition, the process of dismantling the U.S. imperial order has in fact begun.<\/p>\r\n 3.5.5 The U.S. Will Not Suffer State-Level Failure<\/span><\/h4>\r\nEven if there is a major war, the U.S. will not suffer a national level war defeat. China does not have the strength to defeat the United States at the national level, nor does it have the determination to do so. But the major problem facing the U.S. is the pressure to maintain the imperial order.<\/p>\r\n 3.5.6 Opportunities for the US to defeat China in a major war.<\/span><\/h4>\r\nIt is not true that the United States does not have a chance to defeat China in an all-out war. That would be the use of nuclear devices in war.<\/p>\r\n <\/span>3.6 Nuclear Warfare Options<\/span><\/span><\/h3>\r\nThe possibility of a nuclear war between China and the United States cannot be ruled out.
The use of nuclear devices is an unavoidable option in the escalation of the war between the Chinese and American blocs.<\/p>\r\n 3.6.1 U.S. Options for Maintaining Imperial Order<\/span><\/h4>\r\n <\/p>\r\n \r\n\r\n\r\n| \r\n Table 1: U.S. Programs and Projected Outcomes<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n | \r\n| \u00a0<\/td>\r\n | \r\n Maintaining Influence over Taiwan<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n Upholding the European Order<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n China-US Northeast Asia Cooperation<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n Maintaining a presence in Korea<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n Maintaining a presence in Japan<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n | \r\n| \r\n Ex ante and negotiation programs<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n N<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n| \r\n \u2714<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n \u2714<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n \u2714<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n \u2714<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n | \r\n| \r\n The Jing Sui Military Program<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n N<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n| \r\n \u2714<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n \uff1f<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n \uff1f<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n \u2714<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n | \r\n| \r\n Low-intensity thermal warfare<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n N<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n| \r\n \uff1f<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n \uff1f<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n| \r\n \uff1f<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n| \r\n \u2714<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n | \r\n| \r\n Medium Heat<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n N<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n| \r\n \uff1f<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n N<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n| \r\n N<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n| \r\n \uff1f\/ N<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n\r\n| \r\n major war<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n N<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n| \r\n \uff1f<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n N<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n| \r\n N<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n| \r\n \uff1f\/ N<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n\r\n| \r\n nuclear war<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n \uff1f<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n \uff1f<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n N<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n| \r\n \uff1f<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n | \r\n \uff1f<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n 3.6.2 Significant Risks to the United States in a Conventional Military Rush<\/span><\/h4>\r\nTable 1 gives a visual comparison of the risks faced by the US. If the conflict and reaction between China and the United States go beyond the scope of the \u201cprior peace talks program\u201d and the \u201csoi military program\u201d, the United States will face the risk of Korea and Japan withdrawing from the military alliance. The possibility of reversing this set of risks exists only in the nuclear war option.
If the United States has a strong will to maintain the existing imperial order, the nuclear war option is a realistic pressure option.<\/p>\r\n 3.6.3 U.S. Psychological Advantage in Taking the Initiative to Escalate the Level of Warfare<\/span><\/h4>\r\nThe U.S. is at the center of the current imperial order, with a global presence and global alliances that far outweigh those of China (the Group). The U.S. has a strong military and political advantage in areas of the globe beyond the range of China's medium-range missiles. China is unlikely to cause a U.S. military loss at the national level. Even if the U.S. were to suffer a major military defeat or even a dismantling of the imperial order, the retreat of U.S. military power back to the Americas would be sufficient to keep U.S. real national power from being significantly weakened. The dismantling of the existing imperial military order did not necessarily mean a serious loss of U.S. economic and political power. A number of factors determined that the United States did not actually fear military defeat in a conflict with China. These factors also allowed the U.S. to maintain the psychological advantage of taking the initiative to escalate the level of war.<\/p>\r\n 3.6.4 Factors Deterring Nuclear Options<\/span><\/h4>\r\n(1) Technical deterrence <\/strong>
The politicians of both China and the United States must maintain complete control over the course of the war, and must ensure that the political and military capabilities of the front-line commanders are harmonized. At the same time, both China and the U.S. must refrain from inflicting major military blows on the other side. For example, they should not sink the aircraft carriers of either side, and they should not inflict more than 5,000 casualties on the other side in a single battle.
(2) Substantive Deterrence<\/strong>
China must substantially divulge or disclose that it has over 3,500 nuclear warheads before initiating military action against Taiwan. So that the U.S.-allied countries will block the nuclear option from public opinion.<\/p>\r\n <\/p>\r\n <\/span>wrap-up<\/span><\/h2>\r\nThe United States and coalition nations have multiple response options for a Chinese military operation across the Taiwan Strait in 2026. The goal of these options is to minimize political damage and prevent China from further expanding its political gains. But there is always a gap between politicians\u201c perceptions and public opinion. Public resistance is the main reason for blocking the \u201dex ante peace talks program\u201c. Domestic law resistance, international law resistance, and the lack of control over the end point also prevent the \u201dex ante deterrence program\" from being implemented. In the after-the-fact response program, comprehensive political and economic sanctions formed the basis of the U.S. coalition's response program. But no program without a military response can effectively stabilize the domestic situation, maintain the authority of the existing imperial order, or prevent the rapid expansion of China's geopolitical gains. But the risks of the military option are also obvious. How to control the level of military conflict, as well as avoid significant military losses to either side, is a huge challenge for politicians on both sides. The Chinese side has the advantage of having the political advantage of choosing the timing of the war and the extent of the battlefield. The difficulty for the U.S. coalition to land on Chinese soil also ensured that China would not suffer a total military defeat. The U.S. advantage is total military and political superiority on a global scale. China does not have the ability to deliver a major blow to the United States at the national level. These give the U.S. the psychological advantage of proactively escalating the level of military response, even to the point of applying a nuclear device to an actual conflict. In order to deter nuclear war, it may be more important to substantively mobilize the anti-nuclear awareness of the nationals of both sides, in addition to the fully rational political understanding of politicians on both sides.<\/p>\r\n <\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \uff08\u7814\u7a76\u63d0\u7eb2\uff09 Preview Date Mar. 29, 2023 Updated Date Sep. 9, …<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_kad_post_transparent":"","_kad_post_title":"","_kad_post_layout":"","_kad_post_sidebar_id":"","_kad_post_content_style":"","_kad_post_vertical_padding":"","_kad_post_feature":"","_kad_post_feature_position":"","_kad_post_header":false,"_kad_post_footer":false,"_kad_post_classname":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[17],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4304","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-2026war"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4304","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4304"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4304\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4791,"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4304\/revisions\/4791"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4304"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4304"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pppnet.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4304"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}} | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |